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ROMAN IMPERIALISM

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ROMAN IMPERIALISM

BY

TENNEY FRANK

PROFESSOR OF LATIN, BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

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To
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PREFACE

My purpose in the following pages has been to analyze, so far as the fragmentary sources permit, the precise influences that urged the Roman republic toward territorial expansion. Imperialism, as we now use the word, is generally assumed to be the national expression of the individual's "will to live." If this were always true, a simple axiom would suffice to explain every story of conquest. I venture to believe, however, that such an axiom is too frequently assumed, particularly in historical works that issue from the continent, where the overcrowding of population threatens to deprive the individual of his means of subsistence unless the united nation makes for itself "a place in the sunlight." Old-world political traditions also have taught historians to accept territorial expansion as a matter of course. For hundreds of years the church, claiming universal dominion, proclaimed the doctrine of world-empire; the monarchs of the Holy Roman Empire and of France reached out for the inheritance of ancient Rome; the dynastic families, which could hold their own in a period of such doctrine only by the possession of strong armies, naturally employed those armies in wars of expansion. It is not surprising, therefore, that continental writers, at least, should assume that the desire to possess must somehow have been the mainspring of action whether in the Spanish-American war or the Punic wars of Rome.

However, the causes of territorial growth cannot in every given instance be reduced to so simple a formula. Let us imagine a people far removed from the economic pressure as well as the political traditions of modern Europe, an agricultural people, not too thickly settled and not egged on by commercial ambitions; a republic in which the citizens themselves must vote whether or not to proclaim a war and in voting affirma-

tively must not only impose upon themselves the requisite war tax — a direct tribute — but must also go from the voting booths to the recruiting station and enroll in the legions; a republic, moreover, in which the directing power is vested in a group of a few hundred nobles, suspicious of the prestige that popular heroes gain in war and fearful of a military power that might overthrow its control. In such a nation are there not enough negative cross currents to neutralize the positive charge that rises from the blind instinct to acquire? Such a nation was the Roman republic.

Obviously the student of Rome's growth must not rest content with generalizations that have come into vogue in a later day. He must treat each instance of expansion as an individual problem and attempt to estimate all the contributing factors. He must also give a just evaluation of the opposing factors, which have so often been overlooked. Livy naturally did not devote as much space to telling of the falterings and the retreats as to the glories of the onward charge, but, though less picturesque, they are equally important to history. An adequate analysis must reveal the halting places as well as the victorious advances, it must lay due emphasis upon the checks imposed by the fetial rules, the hesitation of the senate before taking the inviting step into southern Italy and Sicily, the refusal of the people to grow enthusiastic over the foreign policy of the Scipios, the "hauling down of the flag" in Illyricum, Macedonia, Africa, Syria, and Germany. It will bring to light the fact that Rome's growth is far from being comprehended in a single formula of modern invention, and it will explain the apparent paradox that Rome became mistress of the whole world while adhering with a fair degree of fidelity to a sacred rule which forbade wars of aggression.

Unfortunately a detailed study of Roman territorial expansion necessarily creates an impression that is misleading. We must in such a study deal so constantly with records of war that Rome inevitably emerges with the character of an irritable and pugnacious state. Only a full record of Rome's success in preserving amicable relations with scores of neighbors could offset this erroneous impression. One must needs bear in mind that ancient international conditions were far more intricate

than modern. In the days of the early republic the Mediterranean world consisted of hundreds of independent city-states, and in the second century Rome numbered more than a hundred allies in her federation and perhaps as many more states in her circle of "friends," while on the periphery were countless semi-barbaric tribes ever ready to serve as catalytic agents of war. When one remembers that modern nations must employ all the arts of diplomacy to keep peace with their few neighbors, one is surprised not at the number of wars Rome fought but at the great number of states with which she lived in peace.

Notes have been added at the end of each chapter, partly in order to aid the reader who wishes to pursue the subject further, partly in order to indicate the basis for such new statements as I have presumed to make, partly to give some little measure of credit for excellent work that has been of service. In this last respect the notes are by no means adequate. Who could record his full debt to authorities like Mommsen and Meyer? It is the fate of great historians that their dicta are generally taken for granted in space-saving silence and are mentioned only on those rare occasions when their followers dare to differ. Nor have I always been able to jot down a grateful note when I have accepted the suggestions of other historians. The names of Abbott, Beloch, Botsford, Cardinali, Chapot, Colin, De Sanctis, Ferguson, Greenidge, Heitland, Kornemann, Kromayer, Niese, Pais, Pelham, Rostowzew, and many others would fill pages of additional notes if I could have recorded all my obligations. My gratitude is especially due my colleagues, Professor A. L. Wheeler and Dr. J. L. Ferguson, for kindly reading and amending several chapters. Finally, the book is inscribed to one without whose incisive criticism I should not venture to invite perusal of the following pages.

T. F.

BRYN MAWR, PENNSYLVANIA,
January 20, 1914.

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ROMAN IMPERIALISM

CHAPTER I

THE PEOPLE OF ROME AND LATIUM

ROME is situated about fourteen miles from the ancient coast line of the Mediterranean upon the low hills bordering the navigable Tiber. The Latian plain, which the city commands, stretches from the Tiber to the Volscian hills, and from the Sabine ridges to the sea; it may be crossed in either direction in a brisk day's walk. The soil ¹ of the plain is productive. It is largely composed of disintegrating tufa and lava which flowed from surrounding volcanoes during the Tertiary period. Since, however, the land of central Latium is rolling, and consequently erodes quickly, whereas the basic tufa is comparatively hard and disintegrates very slowly, the arable soil is apt to wash away when stripped for long periods by the ax and plow. Nevertheless, the whole plain is so superior in productivity to the ragged limestone ridges which border it that its inhabitants were doubtless often compelled to defend their title by force of arms.

Before the Indo-European tribes reached central Italy, Latium was possessed by a race of unknown origin,² men of short stature and dark complexion, who had not yet learned the use of metallic implements. They are usually classed as members of the Mediterranean race. The Indo-European invaders began to enter Italy from the north and east during the third millennium B.C., and continued to come in wave after wave until they mastered the greater part of Italy. In the marshes of the Po valley the sites of the earlier of these immigrants can still be identified in the peculiarly formed "terremare" or "pile-dwellings." From a some-

what later period date the "Villanova" cemeteries of Umbria and Tuscany, which have yielded archæologists so rich a fund of treasure. It was doubtless a branch of this immigrating race which took possession of Latium some time before the millennium that ended with the birth of Christ.

The peoples of the *terremare* introduced the use of bronze implements and weapons into Italy. They employed most of the domestic animals and cultivated many of the cereals and fruits which were found in Italy in Cato's day. The men of the Villanova settlements were workers in iron also, and adorned their utensils and weapons with many pleasing, though simple, designs. Even though the excavations in Latium have as yet proved unsatisfactory, we can hardly doubt that the immigrant tribe which took possession of the lower Tiber valley was also far advanced in the arts of a stable agricultural people.

How these invading Aryans disposed of the previous possessors we do not know. In view of the facts that the Romans of historical times practiced inhumation by the side of cremation, that they employed several different marriage ceremonies, and that their language contains a large number of words not of Aryan extraction, it would be futile to insist that the invading Aryan tribe kept itself free from racial contamination. It is more likely that the victors, after having overcome all armed opposition, incorporated the remaining inhabitants, chiefly women and children of course, into their own tribe. If this be true, the Roman people were a mixed race whose chief elements were immigrant Aryans and conquered non-Aryans.³ However this may be, certainly the predominant element was Aryan, for the Latin language is a close relative of Greek and of Celtic. The names of the more primitive deities, *e.g.* Jupiter, Janus, Diana, Saturnus, Vesta, Volcanus, Neptunus, contain Indo-European bases, and the characteristic institutions of family, tribe, and city are unmistakably Aryan in type.

By occupation the early Latins must have been shepherds and farmers, as, in fact, their ancestors had been before them, if the conditions revealed by the "*terramara*" and "*Vil-*

lanova" cemeteries may be drawn upon for evidence. The language⁴ of the Romans fairly smells of the soil: *egregius*, *putare*, *planum facere*, *saeculum*, *felix*, are all metaphors borrowed from the fields. Many of their noble families bear names like *Fabius*, *Piso*, *Lentulus*, and almost all the gods of the oldest calendar, the *di indigetes*, the hierarchy of Saturnus and Robigus ("Seed-god" and "Rust-god"), were spirits worshiped by farmer and shepherd.⁵ The gods of arts and crafts and commerce, Apollo, Minerva, and Mercury, find no place there. Remarkably few traces of elaborate craftsmanship in Latium, native or borrowed, have been discovered, although the Etruscan towns near by are storehouses of Oriental and Egyptian ware.⁶ Apparently the roving instincts of a commercial people, as well as the nervous impulses of a manufacturing folk, were absent or dormant south of the Tiber. These people knew nothing of sea-craft, for in their native vocabulary most of the words needed by seafarers are lacking.⁷ Nor were they notably warlike. Their army organization was in almost all respects borrowed from their neighbors, and they did not learn the art of making strong fortifications until the Etruscans introduced it from the East. We may infer that they had not extended their conquests far afield during prehistoric times, otherwise they would have come into territorial contact with the Greeks of Cumæ⁸ in a way that must have introduced the arts of Greek civilization into Rome. It is apparent, therefore, that for centuries the Latins were a quiet, unwarlike, non-expanding, agricultural and pastoral people, and that, before the day when Etruscan conquests began to overcrowd central Italy, they had little call to resort to arms except to defend their flocks from the occasional raids of the Sabellic tribes which possessed less desirable land.

Regarding the early political institutions of the Latin tribe, we have only meager data, but there is little reason to believe that the city-state⁹ system which prevailed in historic times had long endured. Such a system is not usually found in conjunction with social conditions as primitive as those which must have prevailed in early Latium; for it tends to

disintegrate tribal unity by creating strong centers of population. Now we know that the Latin tribe must have long remained a political unit, for no part of it developed a special dialect, and the worship of Jupiter Latiaris, the deity who dwelt upon Latium's highest hill, was recognized throughout the tribe. Harmony was indeed an absolute necessity of existence, since the tribe was small, possessed land much coveted, and was surrounded by hungry hill tribes ready at any moment to take advantage of civil jealousies in Latium. If we keep this fact in mind, we shall understand the import of the so-called Latin league. This league,¹⁰ according to the Roman historians, was based upon a compact formed by the Latian city-states for mutual protection. Such may have been its character in historical times, but it must have existed as a mere tribal union based upon feeling of kinship and common religion long before it was ever expressed in writing. Its origin in fact lies simply in the aboriginal tribal government of the Latin gens. What we may suppose, then, is that the Aryan invaders who took possession of Latium settled the land in village communities, as indeed most Aryan tribes have done in other parts of Europe, that they built their small clusters of houses together on convenient hills, farming the adjacent lands in common, and that the tribal government embraced all the villages of Latium. Such was the system of settlement still in vogue among the kindred hill tribes of Italy at a much later date. And if we attribute this system to Latium for the earlier period, we may understand the source of the tradition repeated by Pliny, that Latium once had fifty cities. It may well be that when the Etruscan invasion rendered life in the unprotected villages precarious, many of them were abandoned, and only such survived as lent themselves to ready fortification. The inhabitants of the many *vici* thus drifted into a few strong cities, and nothing remained of the numerous villages but the vanishing names of their shrines. Out of these names grew the legend that Latium had once been a land of many cities. Common ownership of land also gave way to private possession, per-

haps during the same time of stress — at least at an early date — for the decemviral code of the fifth century already recognizes free testamentary right,¹¹ a right which presupposes a considerable development from the first recognition of private ownership.

In the social fabric of this early population a fairly rigid caste system came into existence, a record of which has survived in the well-known words "patrician" and "plebeian." The origin of this class system is still an unsolved problem. The Romans¹² themselves thought it political, that, in fact, Romulus had chosen certain elders as senators and that the descendants of these distinguished men were the nobility of Rome. But Romulus has now vanished from serious history, and, even if he had not, we should have to explain the nature of the success which designated these men as worthy of the distinction. The most widely accepted view¹³ discovers a basis for the distinction between plebeian and patrician in the racial differences of the conquered inhabitants and the victorious invaders, — a view which seems to receive the support of a good historical parallel in the Norman conquest of England. In searching the evidence for a conquest that might have created this difference, critics have referred to the original invasion of the Aryan tribe, to the temporary subjection of parts of Latium by the Etruscans, which apparently took place during the sixth century B.C., and to the partial conquest by the Sabine tribes recorded by a doubtful tradition. Suffice it to say, however, that every attempt to prove that there were racial differences between patricians and plebeians, whether in ritual and ceremony, or in national traits, has been wholly unconvincing. It would seem that the people who met in prehistoric Latium were still in the social condition in which race amalgamation is quickly accomplished.

It seems futile to search further for evidence of racial differences. A more satisfactory explanation is suggested by the fact that economic conditions were such in Latium as readily to create class distinctions. In the first place,

the land varied greatly in productivity.¹⁴ The Alban hills are high enough to attract a greater rainfall than the Latian plain secures, while the lands beneath the Sabine and Roman hills are aided by subsoil moisture from mountain springs. These things gave certain farmers a great advantage over others, since the dry season in Latium is normally very long. Secondly, since the central plains were quickly washed bare of soil if kept constantly exposed by cultivation, the farmers who persisted in agriculture in such places must have found themselves reduced to a precarious existence. The cure for the evil lay in using such fields for winter grazing and acquiring summer pasturage on higher and less parched ground. But this remedy required both large capital and native wit. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that some men became lords of extended fields and persons of influence in the state, while others were reduced to economic and political dependence upon them. Eventually, the influential men took the legal steps necessary to secure predominance for themselves and their descendants; they stereotyped the caste system by ordaining that they alone, the *patricii*, could hold offices of state, they alone could consult the auspices in behalf of the city, and that their ranks should not be contaminated by intermarriage with plebeians.

There is, however, a striking peculiarity in Rome's caste system which deserves attention. In other states under conditions resembling those of early Latium, economic laws usually worked without check until a feudal system grew up in which the lower class was reduced to serfdom. Such serfs were the helots of Sparta, Crete, Thessaly, and other states of early Greece, the subject tenants of ancient Egypt and of medieval Europe. In early Rome the plebeians seem never to have become serfs; they were not, so far as we know, bound to the soil.¹⁵ This circumstance may be due to a certain sense of equity which is so prominent a characteristic in the legislation of this people. But it is more likely that local conditions saved the Romans from the paralyzing effects of a feudal system. A period of

Etruscan rule checked the normal development of oligarchy at Rome, and, after the nobility succeeded in ridding itself of this,¹⁶ new methods of warfare had been introduced which made a real feudal system obsolete. The old — we may say the Homeric — military methods of single combat were being displaced. On the north the Etruscans¹⁷ had introduced the Greek armor and hoplite army. On the south, the Greek colonies were teaching the new methods to the neighboring Italic tribes. The Roman nobles were therefore compelled in self-defense to discard their ancient manner of warfare and to form solid legions for which the inclusion of the plebeian soldier was a necessity. But in bringing the plebeian host into the line they made it aware of its own worth and gave it an opportunity to demand political rights. Tradition¹⁸ is probably near the truth when it asserts that the populace of Rome saved its civil rights and won political privilege by means of military boycotts. But whatever it was that saved Rome from the feudal system, which established itself for a period at least in almost all other ancient states, the fact that she did escape is very important to an understanding of her later military successes.

Finally, the peculiar characteristics of the Roman people can be noticed in various legal institutions which it is well to bear in mind from the very beginning. A sense of fair play and a respect for legal orderliness permeates the whole early history of this people. The Romans were always unusually liberal in their practice of emancipating slaves and of giving the privileges of citizenship to freed slaves, whereas the Greeks consistently refused to incorporate freedmen into the citizen body. Again, the Romans early established a distinct court of equity — that of the *praetor peregrinus* — for cases in which foreigners were involved, so that strangers who did not know the Roman *mos maiorum* might find equitable treatment in their business dealings with citizens. Of the same general nature is the ancient custom of prohibiting the sale and employment of debtor slaves within the borders of Latium, and the practice of

exacting a treaty of federation from conquered enemies rather than a proof of subjection in the form of tribute.

Most striking of all is the fetial¹⁹ institution, an institution which has a special significance for the study of Roman imperialism, since it reveals the spirit of Rome's *ius belli* as nothing else can. From time immemorial a semipolitical, priestly board existed whose province it was to supervise the rites peculiar to the declaration of war and the swearing of treaties, and which formed, as it were, a court of first instance in such questions of international disputes as the proper treatment of envoys and the execution of extradition. When any complaint arose that a neighboring tribe had committed an act of war it was the duty of this board to investigate the matter for the senate, and, if it found the complaint just, to send its herald to the offending state with a demand for restitution. His formula reads: "If I unjustly or impiously demand that the aforesaid offenders be surrendered, then permit me not to return to my country."²⁰ If restitution was not made, a respite of thirty days was given, after which the herald notified the offending states that force would be used, employing the following formula: "Hear me, Jupiter and Quirinus, and all other gods, I call you to witness that this nation is unjust and does not duly practice righteousness; and our elders will consider by what measures we may secure our dues."²¹ The same fetial board supervised the rites of treaty making at the conclusion of wars, using the following form of oath: "If the Roman people break this treaty, then do thou, Jupiter, so strike down the Roman people as I now strike this offering, and so much harder as thou art stronger."²²

Now if the practices of the fetial board were observed in good faith, it is apparent that peace must have been the normal international status assumed between Rome and her neighbors,²³ and that war was considered justifiable only on the score of an unjust act, — for example, the breach of a treaty, a direct invasion, or the aiding of an enemy. None of the phrases or formulæ of the fetials presupposes for a moment the conception of international policies that

possessed Solon when he advocated conquest for the sake of national glory, or Aristotle when he justified the subjugation of barbarians on the score of national superiority, or that actuated oriental nations to fight for the extension of their religion, or modern statesmen to employ war as a means of furthering commercial interests. The early Roman practice rested rather upon the naïve assumption that tribes and states, being collections of individuals, must conduct themselves with justice and good faith, even as individuals.

Of course, no one would make the claim that the fetial rule invariably secured justice.²⁴ Grievances usually appear more serious to the offended than to the offender, and a *casus belli* can readily be discovered when intertribal enmity reaches the breaking point through an accumulation of petty offenses, or through natural antipathy. But the important point after all is the fact established by the existence of this institution that the Roman *mos maiorum* did not recognize the right of aggression or a desire for more territory as just causes for war. That the institution was observed in good faith for centuries there can be little doubt. The use of flint implements in the ceremonies proves that it dated from the earliest times. The fact that Jupiter, who was guardian of the solemn fetial oath, was also the supreme deity of all the tribes adjacent to Latium must have tended toward a careful observance of the terms covered by the oath. In these circumstances the Romans could hardly imagine themselves as the god's favorite people, possessing an exclusive monopoly of his protective power in the event that they chose to disregard the treaties which he had been called upon to witness. Finally, the respect that neighboring peoples showed for Rome's pledge of faith during the Punic war and the high praise which Polybius,²⁵ the first Greek observer of Roman institutions, accords the Roman rules of warfare, testify to the fact that the fetial law was by no means a dead letter in historical times.

Now we need not suppose that it was a peculiar predisposition for morality that induced the Romans to inaugurate this important custom. Law and order were particularly

profitable in Latium, which was a plain much coveted by the tribes who eked out a scanty livelihood upon the Sabine and Volscian ridges. It is a commonplace that tribes of the plains have always discovered the advantages of peace before the highlanders. For centuries conditions were such that the Latins had all to lose and little to gain by recognizing practices of brigandage and lawlessness. They accordingly reached the conviction naturally that neighboring tribes must dwell in peace, that brigandage must be suppressed, and that the rules of equitable dealing which are observed by well-balanced individuals must also hold between neighboring tribes. And if their less fortunately blessed neighbors did not understand this perfectly apparent truism, they were ready to issue their *quos ego!* through the mouth of the fetial priest. Whatever the origin of the institution, it had a profound influence upon Rome's international dealings, for it encouraged a calm deliberateness of action and spread the respect of Rome's word, two factors which combined to make Rome's organizing power irresistible.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. For the geology of Latium see Sir Archibald Geikie's entertaining chapter on the Campagna in *Landscape in History*; and G. vom Rath, *Zeitschr. d. d. geologischen Gesell.* vols. XVIII and XX; for climatic conditions, see Philippson, *Das Mittelmeergebiet*. The relative productivity of Italian lands was about the same in Cicero's day as now. While Tusculum and the Anio valley were considered fertile (Strabo, V, 238-9), the main part of Latium was not found to be very well adapted to staple products (Cic. *de leg. agr.* II, 96, Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* XVIII, 29). On the other hand, Campania, then as now, produced three crops per year by the aid of irrigation (Strabo, V, 250). Cato considered cattle raising as the most profitable occupation near Rome in his day (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* XVIII, 29); grain takes sixth place in his list of important products (Cato, *de ag. cult.* I, 7).

2. On ethnology, see Modestov, *Introduction à l'histoire romaine*, 1907; Montelius, *La civilisation primitive en Italie*; Peet, *The Stone and Bronze Ages in Italy*; Grenier, *Bologne Villanovienne et Étrusque*, 1913; and Munro, *Palæolithic Man and Terramara Settlements* (1912), ch. XII.

3. It is a striking fact that while the inhabitants of Umbria, the makers of the Villanova cemeteries, regularly incinerated their dead, the inhabitants of Latium employed both cremation and inhumation. Pinza in his excellent survey of early Latian culture (*Monumenti Antichi*, XV, p. 730) finds that the early cemeteries of Alba Longa reveal a larger number of incineration than of inhumation graves, while those of the Roman forum and of the Esquiline hill reversed the ratio. It is usually conceded that cremation was an Aryan custom. On Indo-Germanic origins in general, see Hirt, *Die Indogermanen*.

4. Weise, *Charakteristik der lat. Sprache*³, pp. 14 and 23.

5. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*², 1st chapter.

6. E.g. the Regolini-Galassi tomb of Cære, cf. Pinza in *Röm. Mitth.* 1907, p. 35. See also *Bolletino d'Arte*, 1909, p. 161, and Pollak in *Röm. Mitth.* 1906, p. 329.

7. See *Mercantilism and Rome's Foreign Policy*, in *Am. Hist. Review*, 1913, p. 233.

8. From Cumæ they acquired the alphabet but little else. Cumæan traders were doubtless the intermediaries, and they may also be the source of Hesiod's knowledge of the Latins, see Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, II, 315; and Leo, *Gesch. d. Röm. Lit.*, p. 9. Since Faliscan, a dialect very closely related to Latin, was spoken even under Etruscan dominion in Falerii, north of the Tiber, it may be that the Latin tribes originally extended somewhat north of the river. However, excavations reveal "Villanova" cemeteries at Veii and Corneto not far from Rome, and these seem to be of non-Latin origin; see *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1907, pp. 51 and 350.

9. Eduard Meyer, s.v. *Plebs* in *Handwörterb. der Staatswissenschaften*, holds that the city-state must be posited for early Latium, but the village community is more consonant with Aryan custom. See Vinogradoff, *English Society in the Eleventh Century*, and Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen*, p. 41. Strabo, V. 241, informs us that certain Sabellic tribes still lived *κωμηδόν* in historical times. The institution of *compascuus* — common pasture grounds — which still survived at a later day in Italy is doubtless a survival of the system. For probable survivals of the old village governmental system see L. R. Taylor, *Cults of Ostia*, p. 18 (Bryn Mawr, 1913), and more recently, Rosenberg, *Der Staat d. alten Italiker*.

10. Dionys. IV, 49; V, 61; Diod. VII, fr. 3; Plin. *Nat. Hist.* III, 68. Seeck, *Rhein. Mus.*, XXXVII, and Mommsen, *Ges. Schriften*, V, 69, have discussed the traditional lists of communities which once existed in Latium. Since these lists are not dated they are of little service to history.

11. See Bruns, *Fontes juris, Leges XII tabularum*, V, 3, *uti legassit super pecunia tutelave suae rei, ita jus esto*.

12. *patres ab honore, patriciique progenies eorum appellati*, Livy, I, 8.

13. Ridgeway, *Who were the Romans*, 1908, has ably, though not convincingly, developed the view that the patricians were Sabine conquerors. Cuno, *Vorgeschichte Roms*, I, 14, held that they were Etruscans. Boni, *Notizie degli Scavi*, 1903, p. 401, believes that the patricians were the descendants of the immigrant Aryans, while the plebeians were the offspring of the aboriginal non-Aryan stock. Fustel de Coulanges, in his well-known work, *La cité antique*, proposed the view that a religious caste-system alone could explain the division. Eduard Meyer (cf. article *Plebs* in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*) and Botsford (*The Roman Assemblies*, p. 16) have presented various arguments in favor of the economic theory. See Binder, *Die Plebs*, 1909, for a summary of many other discussions.

14. See *Am. Hist. Review*, XVIII, p. 239, for a fuller treatment.

15. Neumann's attempt to prove that the plebeians had been reduced to serfdom (*Die Grundherrschaft der römischen Republik*, 1900) attracted much attention and even gained the partial assent of Eduard Meyer. But it is based upon an imagined parallel to German conditions and has no foundation in known facts.

16. See next chapter.

17. Fröhlich, *Beiträge zur Geschichte d. Kriegsführung d. Römer*; Helbig, *Sur les attributs des Saliens*, 1905.

18. Livy, III, 52.

19. See *The Import of the Fetial Institution*, *Class. Philology*, 1912, p. 335, for a fuller discussion of this question; also Holtzendorff, *Handbuch des Völkerrechts*, I, 242.

20. Livy, I, 32, 7. The event here narrated is probably not historical, but since Augustus was reviving the old ceremonies with antiquarian care when Livy wrote, we may suppose that his version of the formulæ is an accurate copy of the ancient one. Augustus, himself a fetial priest, claims in his *Res Gestae* (V, 13) that he has observed the rules, *nulli genti bello per iniuriam inlato*.

21. Livy, I, 32, 7.

22. Livy, I, 24, 8.

23. There seems to be no foundation for the frequently repeated generalization that in ancient times the normal international status was that of hostility, whereas in modern times states are normally assumed to be at peace with each other.

24. The letter of the law was observed at times without regard to the spirit; notably in the Spanish affairs in 137 B.C. Fowler, in his brief account of Rome (*Home University Library*), has recently marked out "slimness" and treachery as characteristic of Roman diplomacy, illustrating the point by reference to Livy's account (IX, 10) of the Caudine treaty. Nissen, however, has proved Livy's account unhistorical: *Rhein. Museum*, XXV, 1.

25. XIII, 3, and frag., 157.

CHAPTER II

ROME DOMINATES LATIUM

IN the preceding chapter we have dealt with the institutions and practices of the whole Latin tribe rather than with those of Rome, for the imperial city was not yet a separate political power. In fact, it would seem that the Latins acted in unison under tribal laws and customs for centuries before disintegrating forces set to work to elevate one community above the rest. And even when certain cities sprang up and began to gain predominance over large parts of the tribe, feelings of kinship, respect for common worship, and fear of common enemies still continued for added centuries to preserve a certain unity of action within the tribe. In this chapter we shall observe how Rome becomes the strongest city within the league.

Roman tradition preserved in the first book of Livy presents a very circumstantial account of the several battles by which Rome supposedly razed the Latin cities one after another until she was supreme mistress of the Tiber valley. Needless to say, if the Latin tribe had lived in such civil discord as legend assumes, it would quickly have succumbed to the inroads of the mountain tribes, which were eagerly watching for opportunities to raid. Of course legend had to account somehow for the abandoned shrines and old place names scattered over Latium, and being unable to comprehend the slower processes of civilization, it took a more picturesque route, attached a rumor of war to a hero's name, and made the villages disappear in fire and blood. How the original village communities were actually absorbed by cities growing up in more favorable locations can be illustrated by the transformation of various parts of Italy and Sicily in more recent times, when, in order to escape the brigandage which they were unable to suppress, the peasants

abandoned their small villages and crowded together in a few well-fortified hill cities, even though by so doing they were compelled to live several miles away from their own fields. Something of the same nature must have occurred in central Italy when, during the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., the rapidly expanding Etruscan people began crowding the Sabellic tribes in upon Latium, and finally pushed their own way over the Tiber. The villages upon the plains had to be abandoned, since they could not be made defensible, and as a result, communities like Rome, Tibur, Præneste, and Aricia, which could readily be fortified, and which had an unfailing water supply within their walls, secured an accretion of population and grew into strong cities. It is to this redistribution and the aggregation of the population at certain favored points that we trace the beginnings of the Latin city-states. Before long, when these new cities made up their contingent in the tribal army, they became aware of their own power, and then they began to exert this power in the furtherance of such policies as favored their own interests. Henceforth they acted more and more as individual units, regardless of the wishes of kindred cities.

A further step toward the dissolution of the tribe was taken when the Etruscans eventually secured a foothold in various parts of Latium. The mystery surrounding this interesting people¹ is only now yielding in some small measure to patient research. It seems that about the eighth century an Oriental tribe, once closely connected with Babylonia,² came overseas, settled upon the Italian coast north of the Tiber, and subdued a part of the Umbrians, mingling with them in marriage. There are several ancient sites, *e.g.* at Tarquinii, Clusium, and Volci, where it is evident that the "Villanova" cemeteries ceased to be used in the eighth and seventh centuries. In the immediate vicinity of these cemeteries new ones sprang up containing rock-tombs made for the inhumation of the dead. This change clearly records the arrival of the Etruscan conquerors, who built their splendid cities upon the sites of the subjugated Umbrians, and the new race, half Oriental, half Italic, spread with such

remarkable rapidity that before the sixth century it had taken possession of all that region of western Italy which lies between the Tiber and the Alps. Presently various groups, pushing southward, succeeded in gaining a strong foothold in the richest part of Campania. Orthodox Roman historians never admitted that the Etruscans conquered Latium, but archæological evidence of a temporary occupation of parts at least of this territory is now fairly overwhelming. Many of the military practices and some of the political and religious ceremonies of historical Rome are demonstrably Etruscan. A large number of the old family names that appear in the early legends³ have Etruscan bases. The great Capitoline temple was built in the Etruscan style, and the conception of deity itself — of gods possessing human form⁴ and living in temples — seems to have come from Etruria, for the native Latin deities were spirits which manifested themselves in varying shapes and aspects. Tusculum surely must have been a city of Etruscan foundation, if the name has any real significance. Etruscan remains are found in abundance at Palestrina and Velletri, and the remains of an Etruscan temple have been discovered on the ancient site of Satricum, between Alba and the sea. Finally, the Emperor Claudius, an antiquarian of wide reading, records the fact that the ancient Etruscan authorities identified the Roman king, Servius Tullius, with an Etruscan prince, Mastarna;⁵ and this identification seems to be confirmed by an Etruscan tomb painting⁶ of about 400 B.C., which represents Mastarna slaying a Roman chieftain, a chieftain who, furthermore, is represented as surrounded by an Etruscan bodyguard. To be sure, each individual piece of evidence might be explained as indicating nothing more than a temporary commercial and military contact, but the cumulative effect of the whole mass is so great that the historian must at least admit the likelihood of a brief period of political domination.

Now in order to understand the effect of this conquest upon Rome and Latium, it becomes necessary to take into account the methods of procedure of the Etruscans. These

strange conquerors seem to have operated in a manner peculiar to themselves. They had apparently come overseas in ships and in relatively small numbers. Mere bands of adventurers, they subjugated city after city, pressing the native population into service as subject clients. They did not destroy the cities they found, but took possession, organized the populace into effective armies, grafted their own ceremonies upon the native religion without wholly displacing it, introduced new architectural and artistic methods, developed crafts and commerce for their own profit, levied tribute on their subjects and thus transformed the cities of the conquered into strongholds of their princely power. The effect of such a conquest upon various Latian cities, including Rome, must have been revolutionary. Consciousness of tribal unity in Latium could not but suffer severely after several of the more important cities had fallen into the power of separate non-Latin princes, each of whom was concerned solely with the development of his particular possession. There can be little doubt that the overlords of the cities attempted to extend the boundaries of their own power as far as possible, and it is not at all improbable that some of the Latin communities in the vicinity of Rome were taken by her and destroyed during this period of regal Etruscan domination. The persistent tradition of Rome's destruction of Alba, a place which seems to have been the center of the old tribal worship of Latium, can thus be explained, and can hardly be explained in any other way. At any rate, owing to the combined effects of the slow natural process of city growth which had early set in, and the aggressive policy of the Etruscan princes, Rome, by the beginning of the fifth century, when the foreigners were finally driven beyond the Tiber, had become the metropolis of almost a third of the Latian plain.

It is not probable that the Etruscan domination lasted more than a generation or two, or that it ever brought a large number of Etruscans into Rome, for the Latin language suffered very little contamination, and there is no evidence that new deities were introduced, even though new cere-

monies were taught. Moreover, excavations have laid bare relatively few objects of Etruscan workmanship or style within Rome, and we know that all important political institutions remained Latin in type after the departure of the strangers.⁷

The revolution which drove the foreign lords out of Latium was probably that which tradition places in the year 509 and credits to the efforts of Brutus to avenge the disgrace of Lucretia upon the tyrant Tarquin the Proud. What truth there is in this picturesque legend we shall never know, but we may well believe that the date is not far from right, for nations have always proved to be fairly tenacious of the dates which mark their most important revolutions. The contest itself had a twofold cause, if we may judge from subsequent events. It was partly a patriotic uprising of the Latin peoples against foreign rulers, since Etruscan influences seem to disappear from the whole of Latium about this time, and since we find the Latins again acting in harmony⁸ afterwards. Partly, in Rome at least, it must have been a movement led by the aristocracy against a monarchical rule which, relying upon the support of the populace,⁹ oppressed the nobles. This we may infer from the fact that the new government formed after the revolution was strictly oligarchic in character, recognizing the political rights of the patricians only.

At the beginning of Rome's republican period the situation of the Latin peoples was as follows. The Latin tribe, although Latium was now broken up into a few city-states, again worked in harmony in face of a common danger. Its strongest cities were Rome, on the Tiber; Præneste and Tibur on the Sabine slopes, guarding the eastern edge of the plain; Tusculum and Aricia, holding the central Alban ridge; Laurentum, Ardea, Antium, and Tarracina,¹⁰ commanding the coast-lands. On the north of the Tiber were several Etruscan towns, notably Cære, Clusium, and Veii, whose princes long entertained the ambition of regaining the possessions in Latium which they had lost. On the east, in the Apennine hills, were several Sabellic tribes, ever on the

watch for booty. The Æqui, on the southeast, were constantly using the Trerus valley as a convenient raiding route into Latium. On the south, in the Volscian mountains, that broken-off spur of the Apennines now called the Lepini, lived the hardy Volscian peoples. They held several strongly fortified cities, like Cora, Norba, Setia, and Privernum, upon the heights and sought to extend their possessions in the fertile plains which bordered upon the Latian fields. The Sabines, the Æqui, and the Volsci were tribes closely akin to the Latins in origin, and spoke Italic dialects that might, without great difficulty, be understood by the Latins.¹¹ But it is probable that all consciousness of kinship had been lost in the centuries of separation, and that the pressure of economic circumstances had made each tribe the natural enemy of every other. Latium was obviously the goal for all of them, and her people, under the constant pressure from without, slowly developed an endurance and an organizing faculty which eventually, when aggressively applied, proved irresistible.

When the Latins had rid themselves of the Etruscan princes, they next met their common enemy of the south, the Volsci, and, taking possession of several of their strongholds, planted Latin colonies upon the captured sites.¹² This event is significant because it inaugurates¹³ a scheme of colonization which was later adopted by Rome as the corner stone of her federal policy. A Latin colony, then as later, was composed of citizens of the various Latin cities, and it became at once a member in full standing of the league of Latin cities. It therefore served as an outpost of the league, protecting the frontier and, since its citizens were drawn from all the members of the league, as a unifying factor within that body itself. This colonization is furthermore significant because it proves that after the disturbing Etruscan element had been removed the Latins were again ready to act in harmony. The sites selected for settlement were excellently chosen: Signia commanded the Trerus valley, the gateway of the Æqui, and Velitræ and Norba, the fertile plain behind the Alban hills. This plain, to be sure,

is to-day marshy and malarial, and was so in Cicero's time, and many visitors who have seen Norba's extensive walls have wondered how the marshy valley below could have supported so large a city. The explanation¹⁴ apparently lies in the fact that the Lepini, which now stand so bare and ragged, were probably covered by forests in Volscian days. When later the inhabitants began exploiting these forests, the usual results of deforestation ensued. Rains washed down the soil, choking up the streams with torrents of alluvium, and, once the water had gathered in stagnant pools, the malaria-bearing anopheles invaded the region with the disastrous effect apparent to-day. But this destruction of the fertile plain seems not to have been an immediate result of the Roman colonization, for the land was still considered very valuable a century and a half later. Deforestation probably dates from a time when timber nearer Rome had been used up and lumber merchants, in order to supply the needs of the metropolis, were obliged to resort to the Volscian mountains.

After the successful colonization of Signia, Velitræ, and Norba, the league met with severe reversals.¹⁵ Just why the league should have failed to hold its own at this time we are not told. Perhaps it had been weakened past quick recovery by the wars of the Etruscan revolutions, or perhaps the aristocracy, which was now in power at Rome, proved unable or unwilling to carry on the successful military leadership which that city had acquired under the aggressive foreign princes. Certain it is that the Æqui, whose native home was in central Italy, succeeded in making their way down the valley between Præneste and the Hernican towns and in seizing Labici and Tusculum on the very Alban hills, while the Volsci swept past the new colony of Norba, which they completely isolated by taking Velitræ, Ardea, and all the seacoast from Antium to Tarracina. In other words, the league lost fully a third of its territory and population. The loss, however, was in some measure compensated for by the fact that the advances of the Æqui and Volsci so endangered the existence of the Hernican tribe southeast

of Latium that it made common cause with the Latins. From this time on these two tribes acted in harmony against the common enemy.

The recovery of the ground which they had lost proved a tedious task for the Latins. Diodorus,¹⁶ who generally follows an earlier — and therefore less interpolated — tradition than Livy, gives the following steps in the process. Tusculum¹⁷ was retaken from the Æqui in 480, Labici in 418, and Bola in 415. By the end of the century, therefore, the Æqui had been driven back over the Trerus valley into their mountain fastnesses. Ardea was retaken from the Volsci and settled as a Latin colony in 442, Tarracina was recovered by the league in 406, and Velitræ recolonized in 404. It is probable, however, that many of the Volscian inhabitants were left in possession of their lands, since pro-Volscian sympathies repeatedly came into evidence in the region south of the Alban hills later, and a Volscian inscription has been found at Velitræ.¹⁸

It is apparent that these gains, losses, and recoveries of territory concerned the Latin league as a whole. Rome had doubtless shared in all the contests, but had not, so far as we know, been subjected to any alterations in her own boundaries.¹⁹ It was, however, much to her advantage that by her position she had been saved from the harrowing raids visited upon the other Latins, and we may therefore assume that the fifth century ended with a balance of advantages in her favor.

At the opening of the fourth century we find the Romans engaged on their own account in a mortal struggle²⁰ with Veii, an Etruscan city twelve miles north of Rome and an old-time enemy. This city, if we may judge from the remains, was at one time fully as large as Rome. Its fortifications were certainly as good, its territory was equally extensive, and the personal wealth of its citizens was probably greater. The struggle is said to have lasted eleven years. When the Romans finally won they incorporated²¹ the enemy's territory into the Roman city-state, dividing it into four Roman wards, and reallotting it in small

citizen holdings, a procedure which seems to indicate that Rome did not here have the support of the league, and that the league's constitution at this time was so loose that individual members might carry on wars independently.

A very important result of this victory was that it doubled Rome's territory, making her without question the largest city-state in Latium. Another result, ultimately of far-reaching consequence, was that the allotment of the extensive Veian territory in small holdings immensely increased the force of the Roman army, since soldiers of the line had to be men of property. Finally, since the allotment of land placed a fair competence in the hands of hitherto uninfluential plebeians, it gave an irresistible impetus to the democratic movement. In fact, within twenty years after the distribution of this land the plebeians gained the right to hold the highest office of state. The importance of this circumstance for the question of Roman imperialism lies in the fact that in the future it was usually the democratic element at Rome which favored a policy of expansion.

The conquest of Veii was, however, followed by a disaster that nearly destroyed Rome. A Gallic horde from the Po region made a successful raid through Etruria, defeated the Roman army at Allia in 387, sacked and burned the greater part of Rome, and laid siege to the Capitoline fort, the only portion of the city that remained standing. Fortunately the invaders were recalled by the urgent necessity of defending their own homes before they had succeeded in capturing the Roman citadel. They accordingly bargained for as high a price of ransom as possible and departed well laden with booty.

The city therefore survived, but it was for the time being terribly weakened, not only in resources, but also in prestige, and Rome's old enemies, the Volsci and Æqui, naturally chose this occasion to renew their raids upon Latium, and some of the Latin cities, apparently through a growing dread of Rome's supremacy, seem to have made terms with the enemy. At least Præneste is placed in the list of Rome's foes by our best authority.²² The enemy, however, was re-

pulsed and new Latin colonies were placed at Satricum (385) and at Setia (382) in territory wrested from the Volsci. An invading troop of Æqui was also repulsed, after which these people disappear from Latium.

The next forty years was a period of ferment within the league, caused apparently by the mutual jealousies of the various city-states, and especially by their common jealousy of Rome, now rapidly repairing the losses of 387. Rome's rapid growth is not difficult to explain. Her citizens had been taught valuable lessons in arts and crafts, in trade and political organization, by the Etruscan princes, and had received from them an ambition and impetus which they had not before possessed. The recent doubling of Rome's territory enabled the city to absorb a far greater population than hitherto. Rome had a fairly safe harbor which attracted traders from Sicily, Carthage, and Etruria, and by commanding a bridge over the Tiber she became the natural emporium for the products of both sides of the river. Rome thus offered the amenities of a more heterogeneous urban life than other Latin cities could afford, and the races of Italy have always been sociable. When we add that Latin immigrants to the city immediately secured all the civil rights of citizens because of their common membership in the Latin tribe, we can readily understand how Rome might attract the surplusage of Latian population and grow doubly fast at the expense of less favorably situated or less progressive communities.

But this rapid growth could only have created a consciousness of superiority at Rome and a feeling of envy and insecurity among the other league members. The resulting discord was aggravated, moreover, by increasingly divergent social ideals which made it difficult for the Latins to understand one another. The accumulation of wealth, and the new advance in political and military ideas growing out of highly diversified activities developed new practices in the leading city that could hardly have arisen in the smaller villages. For instance, Rome, because of her rapid material progress, had early recognized free testamentary rights, a

proof of an advanced conception of civil law. She was already breaking up her caste system by a series of tribunician compromises and entering upon a career of liberal politics with which the rest of Latium could hardly sympathize. Furthermore, in her contact at the harbor with Greek, Carthaginian, and Etruscan traders, Rome had learned many new lessons in the school of diplomacy through the necessity of making trading treaties with men of higher civilization — lessons which the cities of the interior had no opportunity of learning. Naturally the force of the old feeling that kinship of blood, worship, and language constituted the sole bond of friendship and alliance — a feeling so persistent with primitive peoples — must have been diminished at Rome. The Romans soon discovered that political and trading alliances — alliances carved on stone and based only upon a mutual consent dictated by considerations of common advantage — rather than of reputed kinship — were the rule among civilized peoples. In fact they conceived the idea of reducing the ancient tribal understanding to writing, thus placing the Latin alliance on the same plane as any other treaty. After that had been done, the pact became a mere record of the duties and privileges between bargaining states; the old bond of sentiment disappeared; the letter of the agreement took the place of the spirit. Obviously the days of the old Latin league were numbered. The actual written treaty,²³ inscribed upon a metallic column which stood in the Roman forum in Cicero's day, was by no means a simple expression of the old tribal customs of co-operation. This treaty in fact recognized Rome, not as *unus inter pares*, but as the equal of all the other Latin cities combined. Rome signed as one of the two parties to the agreement, and therefore became practically the leader of the league. Nor were Rome's powers of expansion curtailed, for although the treaty stipulated that both parties must call out their forces in defense of any invaded city, it did not prevent either party from conducting a war on its own account. The alliance also perpetuated the old practice of dividing the booty among league-members, an important

point, since it thereby preserved the custom of creating Latin colonies upon territory taken in any war conducted by the league.

There are several fairly well-authenticated events of the half century before the final disruption of the league which indicate the trend of its fortunes. The fact that in 383-2 two Latin colonies, Sutrium and Nepes, were planted north of Rome's newly acquired Veian lands seems to prove that Rome at that time was willing to let herself be completely surrounded by Latin communities, that, in other words, she had no idea of ever extending her own territory farther, and that the oligarchy then in power was exercising the conservatism for which it was always noted. But shortly after 367, the year in which the plebeians succeeded in winning their long-fought battle for the privilege of holding the consulship,²⁴ a policy of expansion set in, a policy doubtless to be explained by the new democratic influences at work in Rome. In 357 Rome and the Etruscan city, Falerii,²⁵ went to war, with the result that a few years later an alliance was made between that city and Rome, in which apparently the league had no part. Other individual alliances of a similar character were signed (354) with the Samnites, at that time the most powerful people of Italy, and (348) with the Carthaginians. But the most striking proof that Rome was ready to extend her own influence apart from that of the league was her formation of two new city wards (*tribus*), the Publilia and the Pomptina, in the very center of the Latin possessions below Norba, thus creating a Roman island, as it were, severed from the old *ager Romanus* by a wide strip of Latian territory. How this came about we do not know, and we hear of no dissatisfaction at the act.²⁶ It may be that there was still unallotted Volscian land in that region which Rome secured by friendly agreements or in payment for good services. The important point, however, is that Rome was now ready to extend the confines of the city-state a considerable distance from home. Such readiness to expand may well have made the Latins apprehensive, and, what is more pertinent, the presence of Romans on the

southern confines of Latium could not but bring within the Roman sphere of interest the region that had hitherto concerned the Latins alone. Rome immediately became a neighbor of the Aurunci, and presently (345) found herself involved in disagreeable complications with them.²⁷ In order to support her claims she had to send her armies across Latin territory, and within a few years the whole of Latium was up in arms against Rome.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. The best single account of the Etruscans is that of Körte and Skutsch in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, art. *Etrusker*.

2. Thulin, *Die Etruskische Disciplin*, 1905; Bowerman, *Roman Sacrificial Altars*, p. 62.

3. This point has been apparently established by Schulze, *Zur Gesch. lat. Eigennamen*. However, his material must be used with great caution. Etymology based upon verbal similarities in an unknown language makes extremely uncertain ground for historical deduction.

4. A point much emphasized by Carter, *The Religious Life of Ancient Rome*.

5. See Dessau, *Inscriptiones Lat. Sel.* I, no. 212, ll. 18-23, and Tac. *Ann.* XI, 24.

6. Found at Volci. It represents Mastarna (Macstrna) liberating a Cælius Vibenna (Caile Vipinas) from the guards of Gnaeus Tarquinius Romanus (Cneve Tarchu Rumach). For its interpretation I follow Körte, *Jahrb. des k. d. arch. Instit.* 1897, 57, as corrected by Schulze, *Lat. Eigennamen*, p. 96.

7. The tendency which has prevailed since Schulze's book was published, of attributing the foundation of Rome and all its early successes to the Etruscans, is far from justified by the evidence. The linguistic evidence produced by Schulze cannot be estimated till we can read the Etruscan inscriptions. At present a large part of it seems inapplicable to the question. The value of the architectural evidence is frequently overestimated. Architectural styles spread quickly even over countries not politically connected, as the rapid advance of the Gothic style during the middle ages can teach. Too much has been made of similarities in mere masonry. A comparison of the masonry of Yucatan and of Latium will point out the danger of inferring imitation from mere similarities in such matters, and a comparison of the walls of Rome, Norba, and Ferentinum will show that styles of masonry may owe more to the nature of the building material available and the purposes of the

builder than to the model. The most significant fact is that the Romans profited but little in the essentials of civilization from their proximity to the Etruscans. The historian who will compare the materials excavated from the early *sepulcretum* of the Roman forum and the other sites of early Rome with finds from the tombs of Tarquinii, Caere, and Veii, a few miles north of the Tiber, can only be amazed that the products of the two regions are so immensely different when the peoples dwelt so near together.

8. See below on the foundation of the first Latin colonies.

9. It is a commonplace that strong monarchs appeal to popular favor in their contests with the nobles. In this way the Egyptian kings of the twelfth dynasty overthrew the feudal system of their day; so the Greek tyrants of the seventh and sixth centuries, and the European monarchs of the seventeenth century elevated the regal power over a strong nobility.

10. The first Roman-Carthaginian treaty, dated by Polybius (III, 22) at the beginning of the Republic, seems to imply that the Latins held the coast-lands as far as Tarracina. Polybius' version makes the coast towns "subject" to Rome, but he may have mistranslated. The forum "stele" which dates from about the same time shows that the Latin of the sixth century must have been well-nigh incomprehensible by Polybius' day. I believe that Rome in making this treaty was acting as spokesman of the Latin league. A word of caution is in place against using this document as proof of certain political conditions or of commercial activity at Rome. It was a document drawn up by the Carthaginians, then a great trading nation, for their own benefit and against all future contingencies. It therefore pictures Carthaginian conditions and ambitions rather than Roman. Rome had no maritime commerce at the time of this treaty; see *Amer. Hist. Review*, XVIII, 235. I accept Nissen's defense of Polybius' date (*Neue Jahrbücher*, 1867, 321), but not Kahrstedt's interpretation of its contents in *Klio*, XII, p. 471. Mommsen (*Röm. Chronol.* 320) dates the treaty at 348 because of a statement of Diodorus, XVI, 69.

11. See Buck, *A Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian*, and Conway, *The Italic Dialects*.

12. The traditional date for Signia is 495 B.C. (Livy, II, 21), for Velitræ, 494 (Livy, II, 30, 31), for Norba, 492 (Livy, II, 34). These dates have often been questioned, and are rejected by Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte d. Alter.* V, p. 134. It must be admitted that the first five books of Livy are far from being reliable history. Records of colonial foundations deserve some credence, however, because they were kept for patriotic reasons by the citizens of the colonies and were not destroyed in the Gallic catastrophe as were the early records of Rome. Furthermore, excavations on the sites of Norba and Signia lend proba-

bility to the traditional dates in these instances. Delbrück (*Das Capitolum von Signia*) points out that the style of the architectural fragments of Signia's temple accords well with Livy's date. He also reasons that since the masonry of the city walls is the same as that of the temple foundation, and since the walls — being retaining walls — must have been built at the settlement of the colony, we may safely assign the same date to the whole colony. Recent excavations at Norba seem to prove that it was the site of an ancient Italic city which was rebuilt on a larger scale at the beginning of the fifth century (*Notizie degli Scavi*, 1901, p. 514; 1904, p. 407; 1909, p. 241. See also Frothingham, *Roman Cities*, etc., 1910).

13. Tradition considered Ostia as the oldest colony of Rome; but Dr. Taylor, *Cults of Ostia*, 1913, has shown that Ostia was probably not a colony until the third century. The method of colonization carried out so successfully by Rome was probably an invention of the Latin league and not of the Etruscan princes. Nowhere do we find that the Etruscans employed this peculiar system. They exploited cities already built instead of creating new ones.

14. W. H. S. Jones (*Malaria*, 1907, p. 61) believes that the mosquito, *Anopheles claviger*, did not arrive in Latium till the second century B.C., since he finds no proof before this time of its destructive effects there, whereas malaria was known in Greece several centuries before. But the Romans offered sacrifices to a goddess *Febris* in the earliest days (Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus*², p. 246). It is probable, however, that the anopheles did not find many favorable breeding grounds in Latium until the deforestation of the Sabine, Alban, and Volscian hills resulted in the creation of extensive marshes. De la Blanchère, *s.v. Cuniculus in Daremberg et Saglio*, discusses an interesting system of underground drainage found below Velitræ, and proposes that this system kept the region wholesome in the early days. But the argument does not apply to the most infectious region of the Pomptine marshes. Any final discussion of the question must also consider the possibility that the whole coast may have sunk since prehistoric days.

15. Roman patriotic annals kept no record of these revolutions, except possibly in the famous story of Coriolanus. We know of them only from records of the recapture of lost cities.

16. Diodorus indolently copied large portions of Fabius, the earliest Roman annalist, or some writer who depended closely upon Fabius, and therefore kept a more trustworthy tradition than Livy and Dionysius. See Mommsen, *Röm. Forschungen*, *Fabius und Diodor*. But it must be admitted that even Fabius' account of fifth-century events could hardly have rested on reliable sources, since Rome's early records were probably burned in 387. Sigwart, *Klio*, VI, 269, has succeeded in proving several inaccuracies in Diodorus. Beloch, *Einleitung in die Alterumswiss.* III, 187, also disagrees with Mommsen. The early

dates of Diodorus are not to be accepted as absolutely accurate, but they doubtless report a relatively reliable tradition which was early incorporated in the priestly annals restored soon after 387.

17. The passages in Diodorus are: Tusculum, XI, 40, Labici, XIII, 6, Bola, XIII, 42, Ardea, XII, 34, Tarracina, XIV, 16, Velitræ, XIV, 34. Drachmann's *Diodors Römische Annalen*, 1913, is a convenient edition. Diodorus regularly speaks of the Romans (not the Latins) as victors, but the fact that the conquered cities became Latin and not Roman territory proves that the whole league was acting in harmony.

18. Zvetaieff, *Inscr. Ital. dialect.* 47; Conway, *Italic Dialects*, p. 267; Skutsch, in *Glotta*, III, 87.

19. The city was early divided into wards, *tribus*; the twenty-first was called Crustumina, and embraced the territory of the ancient village of Crustumerium, which had apparently ceased to exist by the fifth century. The twenty-first *tribus* was apparently formed before the year 500. Since no new *tribus* were formed for over a century after that, we may infer that Rome's own territory grew very little, if at all, during this period.

20. Diodorus, XIV, 16, 43, 93, 102. For the ruins of Veii, see Dennis, *Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria*.

21. Diodorus, XIV, 93, says that the Romans destroyed the city and sold the citizens into slavery. We know that the city was not destroyed, and we may doubt whether its citizens were enslaved. It is very difficult to understand how the meager priestly annals—even if they existed from this time—could have contained such details. The later historians may have supposed that since the land became Roman the inhabitants were enslaved, but, as we have seen, the Romans left many Volscians on captured territory in southern Latium. The fact is that the Romans of the fourth century were not in a position to employ many slaves, particularly rebellious war captives (see Meyer, *Die Sklaverei im Altertum, Kleine Schriften*, p. 169). Beloch's assertion (*Der Italische Bund*, p. 31) that new wards were made only of land given wholly to Roman citizens has proved incorrect: *Klio*, XI, 367.

22. Diodorus, XV, 47. For a later treaty see XVI, 45.

23. Since the text was in existence (Cic. *pro Balb.* 53) there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of Dionysius' report of its contents (VI, 95. See also Livy, II, 33). There is, however, good reason to doubt the tradition that it was made as early as 492: Schwegler, II, 307; Pais, *Storia critica di Roma* (1913), I, p. 366; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, II, 96. It should probably be placed between 387, the sack of Rome, and 338, the wreck of the league, possibly at 358, when according to Livy (VII, 12) the treaty was renewed. Perhaps the Cassius whose name it bore was not a consul but rather the fetial priest who conducted the diplomatic arrangements.

24. For the *lex Licinia-Sextia*, see Diod. XV, 61, 75; Livy, VI, 35, and E. Meyer, *Rhein. Museum*, XXXVII, 610.

25. War with Falerii, Diod. XVI, 31, 36; Livy, VII, 22, 38. Treaty with the Samnites, Livy, VII, 19; Diod. XVI, 45. Treaty with Carthage, Diod. XVI, 69. Diodorus calls it the first. If Polybius (III, 22) is correct in placing a treaty about 508, this may well be the one quoted *in extenso* by Polybius, III, 24.

26. Livy, VII, 15. Since these wards were created in the year in which, according to Livy, the Latin league was renewed, the land may have been given to Rome by the terms of the treaty.

27. Livy, VII, 28.

CHAPTER III

ROME CREATES A CONFEDERATION

DURING the centuries when the Latin group was struggling to hold its own and adjusting itself to new internal conditions, the rest of Italy was experiencing great changes. The Etruscans, arriving about the eighth century, had, by the sixth, mastered most of western Italy from the Alps to Naples. Then Celtic invaders had taken most of north Italy from them; Latium had driven them out of its cities; and, finally, in the fifth century, Samnite mountain tribes had taken Capua from them. The Etruscans were thenceforth confined to the land that later bore their name, Etruria. The mountainous central Italy was all the while held by the rapidly growing tribe of Safini, commonly known as Samnites. These peoples quickly spread southward through the Apennines. Each new horde of them, advancing into a separate valley, severed from the rest by some mountain ridge, adopted a distinct name and soon developed its own dialect, its own customs and traditions apart from the kindred tribes. In historical times we find in the separate valleys of the central Apennines the Marsi, Pæligni, Præ-tuttii, Vestini, Marrucini, and Sabini, — all hardy clans of this same stock. The group which kept the Samnite name spread through the south-central mountains; then a part of them went westward over the fertile Campania, where they drove out the Etruscans from Capua,¹ the Greeks from Cumæ, and with surprising readiness adopted the life of their new neighbors, the Greeks of Naples. Other branches of the same race pushed on into southern Italy, and under the name of Hirpini, Lucani, Bruttii, and Mamertini populated the land as far as the very Greek cities of the southern coast.

These tribes were all jealous of their liberty, courageous

in battle, and persistent in defense, and might well have become the possessors of the whole of Italy, if they could have been united. But the mountain barriers which divided them precluded the preservation of tribal unity. The separate groups soon lost consciousness of their kinship with one another, and in the fourth century, the Samnites of the mountains are constantly found plundering their more fortunate Campanian brethren.

It was a struggle between the Samnites and the Campanians that finally involved Rome in extra-Latian politics and induced her to make her first defensive alliance of far-reaching consequences. The Campanians — or Capuani, as the Greeks called them from their city — were, as we have seen, Samnites in origin, and at this time they had lived in the plain not more than a century. But they possessed the richest land of Italy, land which, because of favorable climate and the practicability of irrigation, yielded three crops of garden produce per year. Besides, the nearness of Naples and Pompeii with good harbors insured the people a profitable market. In a word, they had grown very wealthy and possessed a city which was probably as large as Rome.² In their success, however, they seem to have grown indolent, neglecting their army, and exposing themselves to the onslaught of the mountaineers. What they needed was a strong ally whose power would be more respected than their own. Rome was just such a state, but Rome was one hundred and forty miles away, separated from Capua by the Volsci and Aurunci. What could have induced the Romans to form entangling alliances so far afield it is now difficult to comprehend. Perhaps her statesmen argued that it would be desirable to have friends beyond their ancient foe, the Volsci, and their new enemy, the Aurunci. They may also have been looking for friends in case the Latins should some day break out into revolt against the terms of the Cassian treaty. At any rate, the alliance was made, and with serious consequences to both signatories, for it imposed upon Rome the duty of policing the frontier of the unruly Samnite tribes and aggravated the discord with

the Latins, while on the other hand it subjected the Capuans to the orders of a strong power soon destined to overshadow them.

The Roman historians say that Capua purchased this aid at the price of her own independence³ and that Rome sent her armies into Campania to help drive the Samnite mountaineers back. The former statement seems to be incorrect, for later events indicate that Capua remained an independent state. The latter statement, though probable, has been doubted⁴ because Diodorus makes no mention of it. This, however, is no adequate reason for doubt, since Diodorus omits several important battles from his narrative of the events of this period. However, it concerns us little whether there was or was not a "first Samnite war." The main facts remain undisputed that after the year 340 Rome had a very vital interest in her alliance with Capua and that in her efforts to secure her Campanian interests she was soon involved in wars which did not end until she was mistress of the greater part of Italy.

The first of these wars came in 340 with the revolt of the Latins, a civil outbreak the causes of which are not far to seek. Community of interest had long been waning, and it disappeared entirely when the Gauls ceased to threaten central Italy after 348.⁵ The danger to Latin independence that lay in Rome's possession of the Pomptine and Publilian wards near Norba became apparent when Roman troops marched through Latium against the Aurunci in 345. And now that Rome had become the arbiter of nations as far south as Capua the position of the Latin allies was growing intolerable. The allies, of course, were compelled by the terms of the league-treaty to aid Rome in war, and so although every new alliance that Rome made gained her individually an increase of prestige and new practical advantages, it merely involved the Latins in further obligations and potential wars. Rome's maneuvers, moreover, practically tied the hands of the Latins, for they dared not attempt to increase their domain at the expense of Rome's new allies. Rome had, to be sure, only exerted her full

rights throughout her new course of diplomatic expansion, but the Latins had all unwittingly been put into a vise by her course, and unless they were ready to become helpless subject villages without ambitions for the future, they must struggle to break the old treaty and demand terms dictated by the lessons of recent experience. Rome naturally declined to hear of a substitution of new terms,⁶ and war broke out. The Latins were aided, as was to be expected, by some of the Volsci and Aurunci, and also by some of the Campanians. The latter were probably not citizens of Capua,⁷ but a branch that lived on the Falernian fields near the Aurunci, and that may have been displeased with the Romano-Campanian alliance.

When it came to the actual contest the Latins found themselves in bitter discord and without efficient leadership, the penalty of having followed Rome's dictates for so long. Diodorus informs us that the Romans decisively defeated the disaffected allies at Sinuessa in 340. The several cities laid down their arms one by one, and the war was completely over when Antium yielded in 338.

But the details of this contest are of little importance compared with its results: the political reorganization of the defeated allies by some far-sighted statesmen,⁸ who, for the first time in history, showed how a republican city-state might build a world-empire, and who thus shaped a policy that endured for centuries. The central idea of this statesmanship was that a prudent liberality should bind the conquered and the conqueror for the sake of their mutual interests. Its method was to remove as quickly as possible all the disabilities usually entailed by subjection and by carefully graduated stages to elevate the subject to full citizenship and thereby arouse patriotic interest in a common national welfare. The idea dominating Greek states that conquerors had a perpetual right to a parasitical life at the expense of the conquered, an idea which precluded a healthy and permanent growth of the state, was rejected entirely at Rome.⁹ A more revolutionary policy history can hardly display. The specific methods evolved for the appropriate

incorporation of the defeated states were in each case adapted to the behavior, the position, the strength, the race, the capacity for Roman civilization, and the remoteness of the particular tribe or city concerned.

The nearest Latin towns like Nomentum, Tusculum, Aricia, and Lanuvium were incorporated in the Roman state outright, but were at the same time allowed to continue their former municipal government. These were municipalities ¹⁰ (*municipia*) with full Roman citizenship.

A temporary probationary stage of citizenship was devised for towns that contained a less friendly population, like Velitræ,¹¹ which was half Volscian, and for cities farther off, whose loyalty was not yet tried, like the Auruncan Fundi¹² and Formiæ. Such peoples were given citizenship at Rome which entailed regular citizen service in Rome's army; though, on the other hand, they were denied the right to vote or to hold office at Rome. To these cities Rome sent a prefect to administer Roman law. Cities of this class were called *civitates sine suffragio* — Roman municipalities without suffrage. All of them were sooner or later, according to their individual behavior, elevated to full citizenship.

For most of the Latin cities a modified form of the old Latin-league alliance was provided, and such *socii Latini nominis* remained nominally on the same footing as Rome. This type of federation which put upon the cities no outward evidence of their subjection was, of course, highly respectable and eagerly accepted. The reasons for bestowing it varied in specific cases. The old Latin colonies (Signia, Norba, Setia, Circeii, Ardea, Sutrium, and Nepes) secured the advantage because they had partly been settled by former Roman citizens and had doubtless given little encouragement to the Latin revolt. Rome was afterwards so pleased with the behavior of these colonies that for centuries to come she adopted the Latin colonization scheme as her own favorite device for holding doubtful frontiers. In this same class of "Latin cities" were placed Tibur and Præneste, two cities which were still so strong that they were able to

dictate favorable terms for themselves.¹³ The treaty given this class was called a *foedus aequum*, "an alliance on terms of equality," and it stipulated mutual aid in time of danger. But it must have been apparent to the cities that, since they individually were far inferior in strength to Rome and since Rome's interests in foreign affairs now extended much beyond theirs, the allied armies would in the future fight the battles of Rome, not those of the allies. This disadvantage was inherent in the nature of the case, not in any wording of the treaties. One disability, however, was actually imposed by Rome. In order that the Latin cities which retained their old position might at the same time not retain the old *esprit* of the Latin league and unite once more against Rome, they were bound for an indefinite term to sever certain commercial relations and rights of intermarriage with each other, while keeping them with Rome. When the purpose of this imposition had been attained, the clause was struck out.¹⁴

A fourth type of government was devised for Antium, a Latin seaport town of no mean pretensions. The inhabitants of this town had engaged in that primitive kind of commerce which is hardly distinguishable from pirating,¹⁵ and they had been able to build a navy which did good service to the Latin cause in the war. Accordingly, when the Romans captured the town, they destroyed the fleet and bolted the prows of the ships to the front of the public platform in the Roman forum as trophies of victory. Not satisfied with this commemoration of their act, which survives to this day in the word *rostrum*, they stamped the picture of a ship's prow upon their rude bronze coins — the first of which were issued about 335. How to dispose of Antium was a problem of particular importance, since the city might readily afford a harbor of entrance for foreign enemies, and the presence in it of unfriendly inhabitants would necessarily force Rome to construct an expensive fleet to guard against such a contingency. Why Rome did not take full possession and reallocate all Antium's lands to trustworthy citizens we do not know. The later behavior

of Rome in such matters suggests as a probable reason the presence of some clause in the Latin treaties whereby Rome bound¹⁶ herself henceforth to share, with a few definite exceptions, all captured territory with her allies. Be that as it may, the Antiates were left in their city, a small group of Romans was allotted a portion of their land in order to safeguard Roman interests, and after a few years a new¹⁷ kind of government was devised to serve the purposes of all similar Roman maritime colonies. The citizens of such colonies were given full citizenship at Rome and home rule in their own municipal affairs. In these respects they resembled the inhabitants of the Roman *municipia* like Lanuvium and Aricia. They differed from them, however, in one respect, for, in lieu of their service as guardians of seaports, they were excused from military duty. A few years later Tarracina¹⁸ and probably Ostia were placed in the same class as Antium. Before the First Punic war Rome had ten¹⁹ citizen colonies at important seacoast points.

We have seen that Rome attempted to preserve the former status of the colonies which had been founded by the Latin league. Later she adopted outright the Latin colonization scheme for use on the frontier of the rapidly expanding federation. Cales,²⁰ the most remote city of the Aurunci, over a hundred miles from Rome, was captured when it refused to lay down arms with the other belligerents in 338. Rome took complete possession and invited the allies to make up a colony of twenty-five hundred souls for this place. The city was situated in a strategic position between two of Rome's allies, Teanum and Capua on the north and south, and between the semihostile Samnites on the east and the Roman possessions on the west. Furthermore, it commanded the valley trail between Latium and Campania. This was obviously just the position for a fort. But the Romans considered the old device of a Latin colony better than military occupation, which would have entailed a serious waste of productive power, for Rome's soldiers were citizens who tilled their farms between battles, not a guardian class which had to be supported during the whole year by public

funds. A settlement of Roman citizens alone might have been possible, but it might also have aroused much enmity and a charge of conquest for the sake of booty, even supposing that Rome could have induced enough men to leave the safety and advantages of Rome for a distant city in a dangerous locality. In a "Latin" colony all allies,²¹ including the neighboring Capuans, were allowed to share. It therefore stimulated friendly relations and served to make Rome and her various allies better acquainted with each other. As a special honor this first "Latin" colony of Rome's foundation was given the right of coinage.²² The later history of Cales, prospering and always faithful throughout the vicissitudes of the long Samnite wars, proves the immense importance of this foundation.

After all this reorganizing had been done there were still two strips of land not disposed of. One was a section about twelve miles long and six wide lying a few miles north of Tarracina in the Pomptine valley immediately below the old Volscian city of Privernum. It was probably taken from Privernum when that city was made a *civitas sine suffragio*. The Romans apparently were at a loss how best to dispose of it, and left it alone for the time being. About ten miles northwest of Capua there was another piece of land of nearly the same size which had presumably belonged to the Campanians who left the Capuan league to aid the Latins and Auruncans in the revolt of 340. It apparently was the site of the battle where the allied troops were routed.²³ Rome took full possession of this, the *ager Falernus*, also. These patches of Roman public property seem to have remained fallow until 318, when they were finally assigned in small lots to Roman citizens²⁴ by what has been called the "American homestead system." These Roman citizens built no new city with a distinct government, for they were supposed to exercise the duties and privileges of citizenship at Rome. Since, however, the *ager Falernus* was a hundred miles from the city, its judicial concerns were placed in the care of a *quæstor*²⁵ who was annually sent to the neighboring Latin colony of Cales.

The striking success of Rome in saving Campania from Samnitè raids, her proof of efficiency in the conduct of the Latin war, and her demonstration of liberality in the reorganization of the subdued peoples called the attention of several distant cities to the desirability of an alliance with the rapidly rising state. Cumæ, the famous old Greek city which had been in the possession of the Oscans since 417, entered the Roman federation²⁶ as an ally in 338, and Suessula, a Campanian city ten miles beyond Capua, became an ally in the same year. Acerræ, fifteen miles beyond Capua, followed a few years later.²⁷ But the most important addition to the Roman alliance was Naples, a strong Greek city which had kept its liberty, even when its metropolis, Cumæ, fell to the Oscans in 417. Naples did not reach this decision without creating a fierce factional contest among its citizens, for there was a strong Oscan²⁸ settlement in the city. It appears that the Greeks, who were the wealthier element, were not averse to having their property and their trading routes insured against Samnite raids by a Roman alliance. The Oscan faction opposed the proposed alliance, however, certainly not for love of the Samnites, whose kinship they must long ago have forgotten, but possibly by way of opposition to the aristocratic party. Whether the struggle ended in an armed contest as Livy reports²⁹ (VIII, 22) we do not know, but in 326 the Greek party proved superior and Naples signed a treaty with Rome of the same intimate nature as had been given the other Campanian cities. One unusually liberal clause, however, was added, a clause borrowed from the constitution of Antium and later regularly incorporated in treaties with Greek seaport towns. In return for the service of guarding the harbor³⁰ in behalf of the Roman federation Naples was excused from military service.

Such were the political institutions devised and adopted during the reconstruction period that followed the Latin war. They were not all characterized by undeniable wisdom. For instance, the distribution of the distant Falerian land to citizens without providing some form of munici-

pal government or otherwise taking cognizance of the fact that these citizens must go a hundred miles to exercise the right of suffrage was of course an anomaly. Perhaps the arrangement was devised as a temporary makeshift at a time of stress when the vacant land needed most of all to be occupied quickly against Samnite invaders. However, the arrangement remained permanently and served as a baneful precedent for later legislators.³¹

But some mistakes were to be expected of these untutored bourgeois empire-builders who were setting out on the task of amalgamating tribes and cities of every race and stage of culture. The clear vision displayed in most of their enactments is revealed by a comparison with the institutions which Greek states possessing a far richer body of political precedent to draw upon devised in similar circumstances. The institutions of Sparta have often been compared with those of Rome because of a certain formal likeness. However, Sparta lacked just that sympathetic insight into the psychology of nations which made the Roman state builders successful. The Spartan warrior class kept its helots in serfdom till they became a drag upon the state and endangered its existence; the Roman patrician, on the other hand, yielded to the plebeians by a series of timely compromises until the state enjoyed the benefits of a strongly amalgamated citizen body. The Spartans kept their conquered cities, the *perioeci*, in a condition of half citizenship from which generous patriotic service could never be expected, whereas the Romans opened the doors of full citizenship at once if possible, or at least after a season of probation. The Spartan colony, if founded in a foreign land, simply drained off a part of the state's population without extending its political dominion; if the settlement were nearer home, it became merely an abode of half citizens who had little genuine interest in the state's welfare. The colonies founded by Rome, however, were placed at serviceable points on the state's frontier and became an integral part of the state. They were made up of men from all parts of the Roman federation, who thus served as a unifying element

at home and abroad. Moreover, by extending Roman citizenship to some of the old Latin cities Rome held out to the new colonies a visible promise of full incorporation into the state when that should prove desirable.

Rome's policy of making alliances can best be compared with that of Athens, the Greek state which went furthest in attempting to build up a federation. The government of Pericles had the same opportunity as Rome to establish a strong empire by means of close defensive alliances. But a certain political myopia which blinded it to its own welfare caused the government to substitute the payment of certain moneys into the Athenian treasury for naval service in behalf of the whole federation. This payment of money degenerated into an annual tribute which was used by Athens for her own embellishment and became a mark of subjection, breeding ill will and revolt among her allies, and ultimately causing the ruin of Athens herself. Roman statesmen yielded to no such temptation. The citizens of Rome themselves paid all the taxes necessary to support both citizen and allied troops. Even at times of greatest stress the allies were not called upon for anything but the requisite quota of troops which their treaties stipulated. It was, in short, to the liberal policy inaugurated by the statesmen of 338 that the Roman city-state owed its capacity to unify Italy and make it one people.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. The Samnites drove the Etruscans out of Capua in 445 (Diod. XII, 31). For convenient lists of references regarding the sources of this chapter see Dessau's introductions in *C. I. L.* XIV, Mommsen's in *C. I. L.* X; also, Beloch, *Ital. Bund*, and Lange, *Röm. Altert.* II, p. 64.

2. Capua seems to have been the head of a Campanian league which included Atella, Calatia, Casilinum, and Puteoli. The chief magistrate in Capua was called *meddix tuticus*, in the other cities, *meddix*; see Beloch, *Campanien*, 314. The language of these Campanians of Samnite descent was Oscan. There were other important Oscan towns like Nola and Acerræ which did not belong to the Capuan league.

3. Livy, VII, 29; VIII, 2; Dionys. XV, 3; Appian, *Samn.* 1, hold that Capua at once gave up her independence, becoming a *civitas sine*

suffragio of Rome. This, however, seems to be an erroneous conclusion drawn from Capua's later status. At any rate, there was in the Pyrrhic war still a Campanian legion under its own general, which implies independence. For a full statement of the evidence see Niese in *Göttingische Gel. Anz.* 1888, 962; Pais, *Storia di Roma*, I, 2. p. 230; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, II, 285. Haeberlin has recently furnished strong support for the tradition that Capua became a dependency by proving that the earliest Romano-Campanian silver coins bearing the legend ROMANO were made in Capua about 335 B.C., that they belonged to Rome, and that Capua from that time on struck no silver coins of her own (*Berliner Münzblätter*, 1905-07). The argument seems at first sight irrefutable, but it rests after all upon a misconception of Rome's early methods of mintage. It is true that at a later day Rome was jealous of the right of coinage and considered it a mark of autonomy, but there is clear proof that at the beginning it was not so considered. Critics forget that Rome long had a branch mint at Luceria also which issued silver marked ROMA; and Luceria was a "Latin colony," that is to say, an allied, autonomous city of very great privileges. If Rome could make a business arrangement with a Latin colony to issue Roman coin, why could she not have such a business arrangement with Capua and still consider Capua an allied city? All I would claim is that Capua had an alliance of as good standing as a "Latin" city. There is other evidence that in the early days mintage contracts were let on a purely business basis without reference to political status. It is more than probable that Capua herself had such an arrangement with Naples before the Roman alliance, for the Neapolitan mint long issued coins marked KATTANO, KAMTANOM, etc. (Imhoof-Blumer, *Numis. Zeitschr.* 1886, 222). Furthermore, the coins of the Latin city of Cora were probably struck in Naples, and here there was surely no idea of the subjection of either city to the other. It is highly probable that the individual Capuans enjoyed the rights of *civitas sine suffragio* when in Rome, and hence later Roman historians placed the Capuan state in the wrong class of allies.

4. Mommsen's early theory expressed in his *Röm. Gesch.* that "Rome and Samnium came to an agreement by which Capua was left at the disposal of the Romans" has been widely accepted as an established fact (cf. Niese, *Röm. Gesch.*⁴, 53), although Mommsen himself later rejected it; see *C. I. L.* X, p. 365. This theory assumes a total disregard of the letter and spirit of the fetial institution, and can therefore not be accepted unless some proof is offered.

5. The Gauls had repeatedly threatened central Italy after the raid of 387. The Romans and Latins united against the common foe for the last time in 348, Polyb. II, 18.

6. Livy narrates that the Latins demanded the right to share in the consulship at Rome (VIII, 3). This seems to be a legal impossi-

bility and Livy's speeches of this period are, of course, pure invention. Probably his alleged reason for the war is also without foundation.

7. To be sure, Diodorus says "Campanians and Latins" (XVI, 90), but the only Campanians who seem to have suffered punishment in consequence of the war were the inhabitants of the *ager Falernus*. Unfortunately, even Diodorus is following a late tradition here, cf. Pais *ad. loc. cit.* p. 229, note.

8. Livy gives the consul of 338, L. Furius Camillus, grandson of the great hero of 387, some of the credit. It is natural that the consul must have had some influence, and his reflection to the consulship in 325 shows that he was highly respected. However, Livy's sources could hardly have contained any information about senatorial discussions. The most highly respected senator of the time was the famous patrician, M. Valerius Corvus, who held the consulship four times (348, 346, 343, and 335). T. Manlius Torquatus was also a man of great influence (consul 347, 344, and 340); so was the popular plebeian leader, Q. Publilius Philo (consul 339, 327, 320), who, in his first consulship, secured the passage of a law destroying the vetoing power of the patricians in legislation and granting legal force to the ordinances of the plebeian assembly. The success of the democratic movement was bringing new and vigorous blood into the Roman senate in those days, and one is tempted to attribute the new policies of the time to this fact. However, the *fasti* show that the men most relied upon in time of danger were still bearers of patrician names. The noble families of Rome did not quickly lose their grip on the faith of the Roman populace.

9. Eduard Meyer, *Gesch. des Alter. V*, 146-7, has an excellent paragraph on this subject. See also Reid, *The Municipalities of the Roman Empire* (1913), pp. 25-7.

10. Festus (Lindsay, p. 155) *s.v. municipium* seems to imply that some of these cities were not given full citizenship at once, but, in any case, they soon received it, since the *tribus Maecia* into which Lanuvium was placed, was formed in 332. Some time was necessary to carry out details. Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, III, p. 573, follows Festus. The source of Festus was Ælius Gallus, a jurist of the Augustan time — not always reliable. Most authorities to-day hold that the invention of the *municipium* of Roman citizens was of earlier date, and was first bestowed upon Gabii before the Latin war. Cf. Beloch (*Ital. Bund*, p. 118), Mommsen (*Staatsrecht*, III, 615), and Ed. Meyer (*Gesch. des Alter. V*, p. 135). All that we know, however, is that Rome very early had a treaty with Gabii (Dionys. IV, 58) and that the augural law recognized the *ager Gabinus* as different both from *ager Romanus* and from *ager peregrinus* (Varro, *L. L. V*, 33). This seems to me to prove that the Gabini were, then, not Roman citizens, but closely allied. It is probable, therefore, that the famous institution of the Roman *municipium* was an invention of about 338.

11. Cære has regularly been called Rome's first *municipium civitatis sine suffragio* on the miserable authority of Gellius, XVI, 13, 7. See Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, III, 572, for the usual view. Gellius, whose statement is crammed with inaccuracies, says that Cære was the first, but does not give any date. Now Livy (VII, 20) says that a treaty was signed with Cære for a hundred years in 353. Cassius Dio (frag. 33, Bois.) tells how Cære warded off war by surrendering half of her territory in 273 — a circumstance that would probably not have arisen if Cære had been a Roman *municipium* before that. Finally, Livy at least believed that Cære was a *socius* in 205 B.C. (See Livy, XXVIII, 45, 15, where Cære is included in a list of Etruscan cities which gave special aid to Rome.) I think Roman historians drew an unfounded inference that Cære was the first city of this class because in later popular parlance it became the custom to call the lists of half citizens *tabulae Caeritum*. Was the list alphabetical and at one time headed by Cære? See *Klio*, XI, p. 377, for a fuller treatment of the subject. It would seem, then, that this institution was also an invention of the sagacious statesmen of 338.

12. Livy, VIII, 14, says that Fundi and Formiæ were brought into the Roman state on these terms at their own request. This is not improbable. In 329 (Livy, VIII, 19) the Volscian Privernum was taken, deprived of some of its land, and placed in this class, and later very many Italian cities and tribes were introduced to full citizenship through this probationary stage.

13. Cora seems to have secured this position for good behavior if we may judge from the fact that she alone, so far as we know, of the old Latin cities was allowed the right of coinage. Cf. Mommsen in *C. I. L.* X, p. 645. Laurentum, apparently, was another ally of this class probably because of her religious connections with Rome. Cf. Dessau, in *C. I. L.* XIV, p. 186.

14. See Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, III, p. 632.

15. Strabo, V, 232.

16. For the next one hundred and fifty years Rome almost invariably colonized captured land by means of "Latin" colonies in which the allies shared equally with the Romans. There are only apparent exceptions to this rule. The "Roman" citizen-colonies were few, and to such colonies only 300 men were sent, and even some of these might be allies. In a few cases viri-tane assignments were made to Roman citizens alone, but so far as we know, only upon land acquired from peoples bound to Rome before the Latin war. The cases in point are the lands which later made up the Oufentina, Falerina, Aniensis, and Teretina wards. The Mæcia, Scaptia, Velina, and Quirina were probably made up of native population. See *Klio*, XI, p. 370, for the argument.

17. Ostia has regularly been called the first Roman citizen colony, but I think erroneously. Had Ostia been founded in the fifth or sixth

century as tradition holds (Polyb. VI, 2, 9), it is likely that the city would have had dictators or prætors as magistrates rather than the late duumviral system. Note also that Rome experimented for some time with the government of Antium before a satisfactory form was devised (Livy, IX, 20). It is most likely that the duumviral system which was the regular form for maritime colonies was shaped for Antium and applied to Ostia when that place was colonized somewhat later. The excavations of Ostia have not revealed any remains earlier than the third century, and I do not believe that the site contained anything but a village of salt workers and fishermen before that date. See L. R. Taylor, *The Cults of Ostia*, p. 3. If this be true, the invention of the Roman maritime colony was also subsequent to the Latin war.

18. Tarracina was colonized in 329 (Livy, VIII, 21), but it probably did not receive its final form of government until Antium did in 317 (Livy, IX, 20).

19. See Kornemann, *s.v. coloniae*, Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*.

20. See Mommsen in *C. I. L. X*, p. 451.

21. Beloch, *Ital. Bund*, p. 217.

22. See Head², *Historia Numorum*, p. 31.

23. Diodorus says "near Sinuessa," XVI, 90.

24. This seems to be the only assignment which does not conform to the principle that allies should share booty with Romans, but it must be noticed that the Romans probably took both pieces of land before such an agreement to share was made. It is usual to assume that the *tribus* Mæcia and Scaptia also were formed from viritane assignments to Romans in 332 (Beloch, *Ital. Bund*, p. 31), but the assumption is not probable, since these two wards were situated in the middle of Latium, and since Lanuvium, a city not resettled, belonged to Mæcia. When several Latin cities were made Roman in 338, some were added to old Roman wards; for others the two new wards were created.

25. This institution seems to be an old one, but we do not really know the date of its origin. See Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, II, 571.

26. Livy says Cumæ and Suessula were incorporated on the same terms as Capua, which, to be sure, he thought a *civitas sine suffragio* (VIII, 14). But Cumæ at least seems to have had its own government during the Punic war (Livy, XXIII, 35, 3). The Delian inscription of about 180 B.C. (*Bull. Corr. Hell.* VI, p. 45) which refers to a certain Μινᾶτος Ῥωμαῖος ἐκ Κύμης has been supposed to furnish proof that Cumæans were Roman citizens in 180. But it must not be forgotten that the Greeks called all Italians in the East "Romans."

27. In 332, Livy, VIII, 17.

28. Strabo, V, 246.

29. Livy reports severe battles in which the alleged besieging Roman army shared. But Livy's assumption of two cities in one at Naples, of a fixed garrison of *Samnite* troops stationed there, of a Roman settle-

ment in the Falernian lands eight years too early, and of Tarentine aid, prove the account apocryphal. Mommsen's identification (*C. I. L.* X, p. 350) of Livy's mythical "Palæopolis" with Cumæ only makes confusion more confounded. The favored position granted Naples by Rome precludes the hypothesis of a siege, and I have ventured to reconstruct the Livian report accordingly.

30. This is not explicitly reported but follows from the usual clause of *foedera aequa* that neither *socius* should permit the enemies of the other to cross his territory. Later the Greek allies of seaport towns are called the *socii navales*, since they furnish ships instead of troops, but such a clause could hardly have been incorporated as early as 326, for in the First Punic war Rome still *borrowed* ships from the Greek towns, she did not exact them by right of a treaty stipulation (*Pol. I*, 20). See Evans, "*Horsemen*" of *Tarentum*, p. 192.

31. It seems to-day that the introduction of representative government was the logical solution required, but such a proposal would hardly have been greeted with favor at the time. Apart from the fact that Rome could not be expected to give up her old constitution resting upon the primary popular assembly in favor of a system that might be a trifle more just to far-distant citizens, there were practical considerations in the way. The populace had hitherto participated directly in all political questions and were naturally not ready to vote away that privilege even to elected delegates. What government has ever given up its power voluntarily? Secondly, the populace had for two hundred years struggled to gain control over the oligarchical tendencies of the senate, and had almost won the battle. They would, no doubt, have feared that a small representative congress might develop the conservative tendencies of the senate. Thirdly, if Rome was to be liberal in the extension of the franchise, the day would not be far distant when a system of proportional representation would bring the government into the hands of non-Latin peoples. In fact, under such a system Rome would probably have lost control of the government within a few years, and an inharmonious and futile federation would have displaced the strong state which showed such organizing power and so consistent a policy. The representative principle might have been introduced to advantage in the Gracchan days when the allies had been thoroughly Romanized, but it would have paralyzed the state if tried before. A better proposal was one offered later by Augustus, but rejected, that distant municipalities might express their vote by written ballots which should be counted at Rome. But even this plan is open to the objection that with the cumbersome means of communication of those days, distant citizens could hardly be well informed regarding men and issues without participation in the discussions of the Forum. Later, under more favorable circumstances, Rome apparently tried representative government in Macedonia; see *Ch. X*.

CHAPTER IV

ROME DOMINATES CENTRAL ITALY

IN 326 a border quarrel broke out between Roman settlers on the Liris and the neighboring Samnites which spread until the Roman state was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the united strength of Samnium. This is the so-called "second Samnite war," which occupies so many pages of Livy's most dramatic decade. The first part of Livy's account must not be taken too seriously. One cannot help suspecting misplaced vaticination in the picturesque warrior who, according to Livy,¹ ushered in the struggle with the histrionic announcement: "The question is whether the Samnites or the Romans shall be masters of Italy." What did those farmers and shepherds know of Italy? They were bent on supporting their respective claims to a few acres of disputed land on their common frontier, and nothing more.

A struggle was, of course, inevitable, for both peoples were expanding rapidly, and they had not yet developed an art of diplomacy that could mitigate the danger of an impending clash. And they were expanding in ways so diverse that there was little hope that either would learn to understand the other. The Samnites were a prolific and hardy race, unwittingly obeying the Mosaic precept to increase and multiply. The old custom of sending off each year the surplusage of population to find new homes is still known in the histories of institutions under the name of *ver sacrum*, which the Sabellic peoples applied to it. The Samnite tribes simply broke through their boundaries because of overpopulation. The migrant hordes cleared a homestead wherever they could, whether with mattock or with sword mattered little to them. They took possession by right of the circumstance that they were there and must live.²

Rome was also expanding, but in a different way. Here was no overcrowding of population. She actually lacked men to settle the frontier colonies and had to borrow homesteaders from her allies to hold her acquisitions. In fact, at Rome expansion was an accident rather than a necessity, — a by-product of Rome's insistence upon good order on the frontier and perfect regularity in all international transactions.³ She pacified the periphery in order to protect the center, and since the new frontier exposed her to strange, lawless tribes, that is, lawless from the point of view of Rome's *mos maiorum*, her thoroughgoing insistence upon her conception of government drew her into a progressive game of pacification and organization.

It becomes a question of minor importance, therefore, what the ultimate cause of the quarrel may have been, since the tension was bound, in any case, to give way sooner or later. Livy, whose sources could hardly have contained any authentic discussion of causes, believed that Rome's alliance with Naples awakened the ill will of the Samnites, and that this enmity was aggravated by the establishment of a Latin colony at Fregellæ on land claimed by the mountaineers. The Neapolitan alliance can safely be disregarded as an element in the quarrel.⁴ All that has been written in recent histories regarding Rome's encroachment upon the Samnite "sphere of influence," and upon Samnium's trade-route through Naples is quite beside the point. The scarcity of Neapolitan coins in the Samnite region is proof enough that the hill tribes had no commercial relations worth mentioning with this seaport.⁵ And as for "sphere of influence," they probably concerned themselves little about a thing so abstract. As a matter of fact the Samnites had been excluded from the plain for more than a century. However, we are not left wholly to conjecture in searching for the cause of the war. In the treaty which Rome was forced to sign after the famous disaster at Caudine Forks in 321 — a copy of which must have survived until historical times — Roman colonies (it is not specified which) were mentioned as the grievance, and they were ordered

withdrawn.⁶ The inference, therefore, is safe that the war began with a dispute about ownership of land on the Liris, where Rome had planted the Latin colony of Fregellæ in 328. The actual merits of the case are now difficult to determine. The Romans had driven the armed Volscians across the Liris during the Latin war. They may have thought their claim to that valley sound. On the other hand, the Samnites asserted that they had destroyed the Volscian Fregellæ and were, therefore, entitled to the site. History is full of such disputes, and in this case we are wholly disqualified by lack of knowledge to adjudge the claims.

For several years little was accomplished on either side.⁷ The Romans were still employing the old Doric phalanx, which was adapted for heavy warfare on the plains, and their army hardly dared enter the mountain passes. The Samnites, apparently not yet united, were satisfied to keep up a haphazard guerrilla warfare so long as that sufficed to ward off the enemy. They had no large cities to lose, and even if some of their isolated valleys were devastated, the loss was not serious. Finally, in 321, the consuls decided to strike a telling blow. The Roman army was reorganized on the more pliant Samnite system⁸ which worked with the maniple of 120 men as a unit. Accompanied by their reorganized army, the consuls marched to the southern end of Campania and entered the Samnite mountains at the Caudine pass, hoping to strike the enemy from the rear in a place where the country was comparatively open and where friendly Apulians might be counted on for aid. But the Samnites were now united. A strong force of them caught the Roman army in the pass and compelled it to surrender. With the army at their mercy they then forced Rome to cede the Liris valley and sign articles of peace. Thus ended the most inglorious war in the annals of the Roman army.

Rome kept⁹ the peace and surrendered Fregellæ, but her next maneuver shows that she had no intention of acknowledging that the principle underlying her policy had been wrong. In a word, she began to strip the Samnite tribes

of their power to harm by surrounding them with a chain of alliances. The task was naturally difficult for a nation which had just lost prestige by defeat, but it was made possible by the fact that the hill tribes for their part had incurred the hostility of all their neighbors by their lawlessness. In Apulia, southeast of Samnium, a district peopled by old Italic tribes that had been pushed back by the Sabellic expansion, Rome naturally found a friendly reception.¹⁰ By securing the allegiance of the Frentani, the Samnitic tribe on the Adriatic coast, and of the Lucanians on the south, Rome had her enemy hemmed in upon three sides. The hardy Sabellic peoples of central Italy should naturally have been friendly with their own kind, but they apparently were not, for some remained neutral during the next war, while others gave the Roman army a right of way through their territory.

These were maneuvers that the Samnites had never learned to employ, and yet they doubtless understood the import of Rome's diplomacy. It was probably because they saw the fruits of the Caudine victory fast disappearing that the Samnites seized a Roman stronghold in 315, thereby gaining possession of Sora. Diodorus¹¹ simply records the fact without explanation. This time both sides fought in full earnest, mustering all the strength they could command, and both were equally ready to try aggressive tactics. The Romans first broke through the Caudine pass, marching into Apulia to strike the enemy from the vulnerable side and draw them as far afield as possible. The Samnites, refusing to be drawn off, struck boldly into Latium, completely crushed Rome's army of defense near Tarracina,¹² and devastated Latium to within twenty miles of Rome. So near success did they seem to be that the Campanian cities began to consider means of conciliating the apparent conquerors. The Romans, however, quickly recalled their southern army and at the same time, with that characteristic doggedness which so often amazed their enemies, sent a Latin colony to Luceria, south of Samnium, to serve as the frontier post of the empire they felt sure of establishing.

The recalled army attacked the invaders successfully, drove them back to Samnium and pacified the hesitating allies of Campania. Then the Romans took up the war with more deliberation, and for the next three years struck from the home side with terrific energy. They recaptured Fregellæ, the original cause of the dispute, cleared the upper valley of the Liris, bringing Sora and Arpinum into their alliance; they next seized the strong Campanian cities of Nola, Atella, and Calatia, which had sympathized with Samnium, and, finally, invading Apulia again, they administered two telling defeats to the armies of Samnium. Thus by 311 the enemy were nearly subdued, and the Romans had every reason to expect an early cessation of hostilities. But the Samnites had learned from Rome what diplomacy could accomplish, and instead of yielding in despair they secured the aid of several strong Etruscan cities. Accordingly in 310, while the Samnites again struck at the foe in Apulia, an Etruscan force laid siege to the Latin colony of Sutrium. For the first time the consuls of Rome had to separate and lead divided forces. Fabius, making a daring march through unknown Etruscan forests and Umbrian mountains, attacked the northern enemy from the rear, compelled the important cities of Arretium, Cortona, and Perugia to join the Roman alliance, defeated the army besieging Sutrium, and relieved the colony. In a second year's campaign he compelled the Etruscans to revoke their alliance with the Samnites and sign a truce for a term of years. Meantime, the Samnites were driven out of Apulia, but in 306 they again tried an aggressive policy and repeated the same tactics in 305. This time they advanced as far as the Falernian fields, but were soon driven back. The Romans finally succeeded in storming their central stronghold, Bovianum, and in capturing their general, Gaius Gellius, whereupon they made peace, and signed an alliance apparently upon the basis of the Roman claims of 327.

It has seemed worth while to give these details of the campaign because they are the first fairly well-authenticated records of Rome's art of attack. The care with which she

sought out exposed passes, the boldness and rapidity with which she struck into distant regions in order to surprise and disintegrate the enemy, the dogged faith with which she planted far distant colonies, even in the face of apparent defeat, show those qualities already well developed which, a century later, play so conspicuous a rôle in the story of the Hannibalic war.

Samnium came out of the struggle with her territory practically unimpaired, if Livy,¹³ who seldom belittles Roman success, is to be trusted. And Livy seems here to be following a good source, for the Latin colonies settled during and after the war barely touch Samnite territory. What then did Rome gain by her desperate warfare? Little from Samnium, except that she turned the tables upon her enemy. At Caudine forks the Samnites had dictated the terms; in 304 they asked for peace.

But in other ways the war had far-reaching consequences, for it tested Rome's friends and allies, indicated the weak spots in the federation that called for reorganization, and — of foremost importance — it forced every tribe and city from the Arno to Magna Græcia to align itself, at least temporarily, for or against Rome.

After the war we again find Rome reconstructing and building up her political organization, skillfully adapting her methods to the material at hand. In Etruria, raided by Fabius for almost two hundred miles, no extension of the *ager Romanus* took place,¹⁴ no municipality was enfranchised or even placed in the class of half citizens; no land was taken for distribution to citizens; no Latin colony was settled. Even the treaties with Etruscan cities were of an un-Roman type: Rome usually made her treaties "for all time," but in Etruria they were signed for a term of years, after the Etruscan fashion. Nothing could be more apparent than that Rome was pursuing a peculiar policy of *laissez faire* with these peoples, and there were good reasons for doing so: she needed their friendship because they might do good buffer service against the booty-hungry Gauls of the Po valley. Furthermore, she did not desire too hasty

an incorporation of citizens of an entirely uncongenial civilization. We shall find this policy consistently pursued beyond the Tiber for many years to come.

Among the Sabellic tribes of central Italy Rome's methods were wholly different. The war had revealed the fact that Rome must control this region. The road to the Frentani, Rome's new friends on the rear of Samnium, had to be kept passable in case the Campanian route should be blocked as it had been twice during the war. Then again Samnium ought by all means to be severed from Rome's potential enemies in northern Italy. Now the trail to the Adriatic lay through territory occupied by the Æqui, the M̄arsi, the P̄aligni, the Vestini, and the Marrucini. These tribes must have been friends of Rome during the war, for we do not hear of their blocking the road when the consul took the eastern route to Apulia. After the war the senate signed treaties of permanent alliance with all of them except Rome's old-time foe, the Æqui. This little tribe, according to Livy, was attacked in 304 on a charge of treachery. It was treated with extreme severity, for most of the people were driven out of their confined mountain home. The land was then appropriated for the two Latin colonies of Alba Fucens¹⁵ (founded 303) and Carsioli (298). Livy's explanation of Rome's action on the ground that the Æqui had been treacherous is not unreasonable in view of the tribe's past history, but we may still be allowed to question whether the punishment would not have been lighter if the land in question had not been exceedingly desirable for military purposes. It is probable that here, as at Cales in 334, the fetial law was read through glasses colored with a tint of expediency. Be that as it may, Rome's two solid Latin colonies on the Adriatic road, together with her "everlasting" alliances with the Sabellic tribes farther east, effectively cut Italy into two parts, and after the third century Rome controlled the dividing segment.

South of Rome, the trials and vicissitudes of the war necessitated not a little reorganization. The Hernican league of cities which commanded the valley road to Cam-

pania had simply shifted its friendship from the Latin league to Rome in the settlement of 338. During the Samnite war the league had not acted in absolute unity, for some of its cities had allowed "filibustering" in the Samnite army. The senate found Anagnia and Frusino guilty of this misconduct and incorporated them as Roman cities without the franchise (*civitates sine suffragio*). The loyal cities, Aletrium, Verulæ, and Ferentinum, were allowed to remain independent with the status of such Latin allies as Præneste. In the old Latin towns nothing but faithful co-operation had been encountered. These peoples fought side by side with the Romans throughout the war, which had, in fact, served to amalgamate former enemies with the federation. Thus at an early date Rome's policy of incorporation was tried and found not wanting.

In a portion of the Auruncan tribe some calamity, of which we now know nothing,¹⁶ necessitated readjustment. Whether the Samnites in their daring raid of 315 devastated Suessa and the neighboring country, or whether the Suessans favored the enemy and were accordingly punished by Rome, the land was at any rate soon used by Rome for colonization. Suessa received a Latin colony in 313, and in 296 Roman maritime colonies, of the peculiar type inaugurated at Antium, were planted at Minturnæ and Sinuessa.

Finally, the federation of allies was extended beyond Capua by the inclusion of the strong Campanian city of Nola, not to speak of the Lucanian and Apulian tribes which had apparently been more loosely attached to the federation by temporary treaties. Samnium, as we have said, bound herself to the Roman federation without appreciable loss of territory and ostensibly with the preservation of her sovereignty, but the situation of the Latin colonies placed during and just after the war tells a significant story not recorded in any clause of the treaty. It proves Rome's unmistakable purpose to exclude her foe from an independent foreign policy. Besides Alba¹⁷ and Carsioli in the country of the Æqui, Sora, an old Volscian town on the Liris, was colonized

(303) to guard the northern Samnites. Interamna (312) was placed near Fregellæ to guard a critical pass on the Latian side. Suessa (313) lent support to Cales in commanding the road into the Auruncan country. Saticula (313) held open the Caudine pass, and, finally, Luceria¹⁸ (315), full eighty miles beyond Capua, was designed to keep together the anti-Samnite sentiment in the south.

Unfortunately for Rome a Gallic invasion stopped the work of peaceful reconstruction at this point (299) and tempted the Samnites into a desperate revolt. It seems that some Gauls¹⁹ from central Europe, who had entered the Po valley in search of land, were there diverted by their kinsmen and directed against Rome. Together with some Cisalpine Gauls and Etruscan free lances they succeeded in reaching Roman territory and carrying off rich booty. The Samnites seized the occasion to attack the most vulnerable point of the Roman federation, which was Lucania. Scipio,²⁰ the first great consul of that name, drove them back, whereupon they invited the whole of northern Italy to make a combined attack with them upon the power that had begun to outstrip them all. The allied forces of Gauls, Samnites, Etruscans, and presumably even some Umbrians and Sabines,²¹ met in Umbria in 296. Rome lost the first battle of the contest, but, attacking again a few days later under the veteran Decius Mus, won a decisive and long-remembered victory at Sentinum, the news of which even reached Greece, and which Rome's greatest dramatist, Accius, later glorified in a chronicle play. Rome chose to make light of the offense committed by the northern peoples and turned all her attention to the pacification of Samnium. There she found but scattered groups carrying on a petty warfare, and, in 290, peace was reestablished, apparently with a renewal of the terms of 304.²²

In 291 a new and very large Latin colony was sent to Venusia²³ in Apulia, on the border of Samnium and Lucania. That the area of Roman dominance in central Italy might be widened, the Sabines²⁴ were deprived of autonomy and incorporated into the Roman state as half citizens, an

act which can hardly be looked upon as punitive, since within a few years they were adopted into full citizenship. However, a few square miles of land bordering upon the Adriatic were taken from them for a Latin colony which might serve to guard the coast road.²⁵

The contests of Rome during this period, then, brought her very little new territory, but they made her the predominant power throughout the greater part of Italy — an area at least twenty times the size of the state's domain. It would be interesting if we could but know what this young upstart state intended to do with this power. There is little evidence that Rome had grown ambitious for empire and looked forward to grasping the whole peninsula. Her actions tell a different tale. Beyond doubt the senate had decided to remain master of the central Italian strip as far as the Adriatic; it had also decided to keep Samnium at all costs separated from any neighbor that might aid her in a revolt. So far as we can now read Rome's intentions from her actions, this seems to have been the limit of her ambitions, and indeed it is probable that the senate actually did not desire to go further. If it had, there was an irresistible army at its service and near at hand were several Etruscan towns which would have been easy of conquest because internal dissensions had left them inadequately protected. But it can be laid down as a general rule that Rome studiously kept "hands off" beyond the Tiber after the fall of Veii, even as the Etruscans and Umbrians were generally very little concerned about Rome. It was only when the Gauls broke over the Apennines and invited those peoples southward on a raiding tour as an alternative to being plundered themselves, or when the Samnites urged them to a division of spoils that the Etruscans and Umbrians fell into dispute with Rome.

In fact, it was perhaps this characteristic self-restraint, this ability to withhold covetous eyes from "the longing backward glance" that ultimately won Rome her greatest gains. It certainly was something else than fear that turned hardy mountaineers like the Marsi, Vestini, Pæligni, and

Sabini away from their own kindred, the Samnites, to become loyal soldiers under the Roman standards. There must have been respect bred of the knowledge that the Romans were able to keep a pledge, to restrain grasping hands, and to bestow favors, as well as to strike and punish.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. Livy, VIII, 23, 9. Livy, even in this period, is extremely untrustworthy. Diodorus is not wholly reliable history, and he willfully omits all records of the first nine years of the war; but I have followed his account of the campaign so far as he gives it, since the movements of the armies as he records them are tactically plausible. Those of Livy are not even possible. Burger, *Der Kampf zwischen Rom und Samnium* (1898); Nissen, *Rhein. Museum*, XXV, 1; Kærst, *Neue Jahrbücher*, Supp. XIII, 725; and De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, II, 305 ff., have helpful discussions of the sources.

2. Mommsen's classic praise of the Samnites for their struggle in behalf of Italian liberty is well known: "History cannot but do the noble people the justice of acknowledging that they understood and performed their duty" (Eng. Tr. I, p. 467). Why should history praise or blame in this instance? The Samnites were as yet simply following the primitive instinct to acquire meat and drink. They were surely not fighting for Italy. Samnite victory meant an Italy of the old type, a disintegrated mass of barbaric tribes; Roman victory meant, at least, an organized Italy led by a directing intelligence. Kærst (*Hist. Zeitschrift*, 1911, p. 530) has well pointed out how Mommsen frequently misinterpreted Italian history because of his enthusiasm for the nationalism which held sway in Germany in his own day.

3. In this day of economic history it may seem presumptuous to make such claims. The fact is that the economist has overstepped his bounds in Roman history. The critic who tries to understand the growth of Rome from the point of view of material needs will never solve the problem. Primarily, Rome did not expand because its citizens needed land; it would be nearer the truth to say that the Romans became landholders — an agricultural people — because they expanded and had to hold their frontiers. The Roman annalists fell into the same mistake as the moderns have done in giving so much room to the cry for land and to agrarian laws. The ancient Roman conquerors did not expropriate a tenth of the land that the annalists supposed they did. The theory that conquest bestowed ownership has now proved to be un-Roman, an Oriental theory which did not reach Rome until the time of the First Punic war.

4. On the Neapolitan alliance, see preceding chapter, note 29.
5. Of 63 Campanian silver coins found in a treasure in central Samnium, only three were Neapolitan, yet there were five Tarentine pieces: Mommsen, *Röm. Münzwesen*, p. 119.
6. Livy, IX, 4, *coloniae abducerentur*. Fregellæ must be referred to and possibly contemplated colonies on the Liris. If the Neapolitan alliance had been the cause of the war, the Samnites would have demanded its nullification at this time.
7. Livy records picturesque battles only to add that some of his sources failed to mention them. Cf. VIII, 30, 7 of a battle where "20,000 of the enemy were slain"; but *in quibusdam annalibus tota res praetermissa est!* Again, after an alleged raid into Apulia — *hostes nec hic nec illic inventi*, VIII, 37. In 322 the dictator seems to have compelled the enemy to sue for peace, but *irrita fuit deditio*, VIII, 38, 39. This is the kind of history the late annalists drew from family legends.
8. See the *Ineditum Vaticanum* in *Hermes*, XXVII, 121. The date of the army reorganization is, however, not given in any ancient source. See also Steinwender, *Ursprung des Manipularsystems*, 1908.
9. Nissen, *Rhein. Museum*, XXV, 1, has shown that Livy's account of the alleged breach of this treaty was a late invention and that Rome actually abided by the treaty. Niese (*Röm. Geschichte*,⁴ p. 66) and Burger (*loc. cit.*) have interpreted the data most clearly. Diodorus' account of the recapture of Fregellæ in 313 (XIX, 101) would seem to prove that Rome had surrendered it.
10. With a part of the tribe they apparently fell into a dispute and employed force to make the country sure, if we may accept the words of Diodorus, XIX, 10.
11. Diodorus, XIX, 72.
12. Diodorus, XIX, 72; at Lautulæ, the pass through the Volscian ridge which commands Latium. Strabo, V, 232, mentions a sack of Ardea which should probably be dated here.
13. *Foedus antiquum Samnitibus redditum*, Livy, IX, 45. A copy of this treaty was probably accessible to annalists later, but we must confess that they often neglected to look up the original tablets.
14. See *Klio*, XI, p. 377, for a discussion of Rome's behavior towards the Etruscans.
15. I am inclined to think that the two new wards of Roman citizens, the Aniensis and the Teretina (at least, the former), were first confined to land taken from the Æqui at this time. They were established in 299. Niese places them in Campania (*Röm. Geschichte*,⁴ p. 69) and Mommsen in the Hernican lands, but the name Aniensis seems to connect with the river Anio, and inscriptions seem to bear out the attribution (*C. I. L.* XIV, nos. 3442, 3460, 3466). Possibly the northern portion of the Hernican land was taken and included in the same distribution.

16. Livy's story (IX, 25) is negligible, since it disregards the fact that the Samnite army had won the victory at Lautulæ in 315 and devastated the coast region. Roman tradition had a short memory for Roman defeats.

17. I omit Narnia in southern Umbria, which Livy dates at 299 (X, 10). I cannot bring myself to believe that Rome invited trouble in Umbria until after the battle of Sentinum in 295. It is interesting to find that Pontia, the Volscian island off Tarracina, was seized and colonized by "Latins" in 313 (Diodorus, XIX, 101). The inhabitants had apparently engaged in piratic raids upon the Latin coast.

18. Judging from the presence of an Oscan sacred inscription in Luceria, we may perhaps infer that the majority of the colonists were drawn from Campania. See *C. I. L.* IX, 782, and *Ephem. Epigr.* II, p. 205. Cf. *C. I. L.* XI, 4766, for dialect words in a colonial inscription.

19. Polybius, II, 19. It is usual to attribute the Gallic uprising to the influence of the Samnite insurrection (e.g. Niese, *Röm. Gesch.*⁴ p. 70). This places the cart before the horse. The Gallic invasion originated in a vast migratory movement in central Europe and touched northern Greece also. Besides, the best evidence implies that the Gallic invasion preceded the Samnite uprising.

20. The Scipionic inscription, Dessau *I. L. S.* no. 1, proves that Livy has totally misplaced the campaign of this year (X, 12). On the other hand, the inscription — written about fifty years after the event — is somewhat too encomiastic in its claim that Scipio *subigit omne(m) Loucanam*. It is probable that Rome seized for permanent occupation the land of Taurasia in Samnium, which Scipio captured in 298, for in the year 180 this land was given away by Rome (Livy, XL, 38).

21. Diodorus, XXI, fr. 6, says "and other allies." This statement apparently refers to the Sabines, since Rome took away their independence after the war.

22. Beloch, *Ital. Bund.*, p. 53.

23. That it contained twenty thousand colonists as Dionys. XVII, 5, says, is hardly plausible. The Latin colonies of this period usually received four thousand settlers, or less. The Oscan that appears on the coins points to a large Campanian element among the colonists. Conway, *Italic Dialects*, p. 171.

24. See Chapter V.

25. Hadria was planted about 290 on land that had belonged to the Prætuttii, an offshoot of the Sabines, Livy, *Epitome*, XI. Jan. 14

CHAPTER V

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE YOUNG DEMOCRACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

IN 290 Rome had grown to be a power of great prestige throughout Italy; but if an Athenian had visited the city and, knowing nothing of Rome's recent successes in arms, reported what he could see in a casual survey, his tale would have been brief and prosaic. At that time the city contained perhaps two hundred thousand inhabitants,¹ most of whom lived in small and ugly "adobe" huts. There were a few temples of coarse, gray tufa with terra-cotta trimmings, which the merest Greek village with its tasteful marble structures would have scorned to own. A Greek visitor, with his memories of the Acropolis, would have been amazed to find at Rome no statues and no paintings, except for the few treasures brought as booty from Etruscan cities. Instead of the extensive docks of the Piræus, where ships from every eastern and western port were to be found, the Roman harbor of the time boasted merely a gravel bank where river craft could be drawn up, and where, near by on an unpaved area set off by stakes, primitive bartering of farm products and trade by means of copper coins could be carried on. The state mint at Rome had as yet felt no demand for silver coins.

If the Athenian had desired to learn something of the history of the city before him, he would have had to interview the town gossip, for in 290 no history of Rome had yet been written. There was, in fact, no writing of any sort, except the recording of laws and treaties — no poetry, no drama, nothing that might be called literature.

And the occupations of the Roman people were as simple and unconsciously monotonous as the external appearance of their city. There were no factories like those of Athens.

The Romans were still farmers, and little else. Their women spun all the cloth that was needed in their households, the men themselves made their own farming implements, and even the Roman senators did not disdain to drive the oxen between sessions! If the Greek visitor had remained to view the growth of the Roman federation throughout Italy during the next two decades, he must have marveled how such power could emanate from the simple folk of that homely and insignificant town.

That state of peasants, however, contained things which even a Greek could not help but admire. It had leveled, graded, and paved a road to Capua which was to stand the test of centuries of wear. It had brought wholesome water from the hills several miles away for the poor of Rome who could not afford to sink wells. When its legions were encamped, every man knew his appointed place, and the picket passed the watchword with machine-like precision. In a sitting of these farmer-senators the business at hand proceeded with deliberation: the members did not lose their heads with every oratorical outburst.

The form of their government would not have been altogether unfamiliar to the Athenian visitor, for in 290 Rome was fast becoming almost a pure democracy. Three years later the plebeian assembly (in which all men's votes were equal) finally secured full legislative power, and henceforth the populace could, if it chose, override or disregard the counsel of the senate.

In the decade that followed the Samnite treaty of 290 — years that were to be devoted to the work of conciliation and unification within central Italy — two important incidents occurred which resulted in a complete revision of Rome's foreign policy, for they proved to Rome that peace and order in international dealings were not attainable until the natural boundaries of the peninsula were reached. The first of these was a new Gallic invasion in 285.² The Senones, a Celtic tribe which had established itself south of the Rubicon on the Umbrian and Picentine coast, attacked the Etruscan Arretium, now a Roman ally, defeated the

Roman army sent to relieve the besieged city, and finally slew the Roman envoys sent under a flag of truce to confer with them. Curius Dentatus, one of Rome's most efficient generals, was then hurried north to administer appropriate punishment, and he did so with more than characteristic thoroughness. He drove the Senones entirely out of their country and took full possession of their land for the state.³ Thus vengeance was meted out in full measure to the very tribe that had sacked Rome a century before. A citizen colony of the maritime class was at once planted at Sena on the coast to act as a garrison of the region until the state should dispose of it in some suitable manner. However, this did not end the war. The Boii, a Gallic tribe friendly to the Senones, took up the quarrel, secured the aid of several Etruscan towns, notably Volci and Volsinii,⁴ and apparently of some Umbrians also, and marched southward. They were met at Lake Vadimon, only 50 miles from Rome, and defeated. The next year they made one more attempt which ended with a similar disaster, after which the Celts sued for peace and confined themselves to upper Italy for a half century. The Etruscan cities which had joined the enemy were forced to surrender in 280, and Rome was acknowledged arbiter of the whole region as far as the upper Apennines and the Rubicon. We shall presently consider the details of the reconstruction undertaken as a consequence of these three Gallic raids.

The second incident to which we have referred was of a more dangerous nature and incurred even more serious consequences. It brought Rome into war with Pyrrhus — her first trial of strength with the Greek phalanx. This war was the result of a very involved series of circumstances. The Greek cities of southern Italy had for a hundred years suffered from the encroachment of Lucanians and Bruttians, the southernmost Sabellic tribes. On the western coast only Elea had survived out of a long list of famous cities. The rest had been destroyed or had acknowledged defeat and received the conquerors as fellow-townsmen. The southernmost cities, richer in material wealth than in armies

and in courage, had adopted the weak policy of relying upon mercenary aid. Tarentum, the strongest and wealthiest of the southeastern group, had repeatedly employed Greek generals with their troops to repel the barbarians from her sphere of interest: the Spartan king, Archidamus, in 338, Alexander of Epirus, in 334, and the Spartan, Cleonymus, about 304. Later, about 299, Agathocles of Syracuse undertook a pretended defense of the western cities, but he devoted more energy to the subjugation of the Greeks to his own empire than to the repulsion of the barbarians.⁵ When, in 282, the attacks of the Lucanians did not cease, Thurii, unable to resist them longer, appealed to Rome for aid. This course seems to have surprised the other Italiote Greeks who had been accustomed to class the Romans with the barbarians. But Thurii apparently understood the situation better than the rest. The Thurians knew that Tarentum's pretended protectorate over the southern coast cities had never been of service to any one but Tarentum and her subject city, Heraclea.⁶ The present Syracusan tyrant, even granted that he could be trusted, was engaged elsewhere. Rome, now a name of weight throughout Italy, had shown by her generous terms with Naples that she respected and was willing to protect Greek institutions. Such were the considerations that induced the Thurians to apply to Rome. The request was granted after a thorough discussion of the dangers and proprieties of such a course, and a Roman contingent soon relieved the besieged city. Tarentum, however, with her pretensions as protector of Greek cities, was naturally angered; and when some Roman ships stationed at Thurii appeared off Tarentum, they were sunk with the explanation that according to an old treaty Roman ships were forbidden to sail in those waters.⁷ A Tarentine troop next attacked Thurii and drove out the Roman garrison. Finally, when the Roman embassy sent to demand reparation was refused a hearing,⁸ Rome declared war against Tarentum.

The Greek city quickly secured the aid of the neighboring Messapii, the Lucanians, and the Samnites, who were eager

for any excuse to attack Rome. The Italiote Greeks, however, did not respond to her call, even though she proclaimed the war a defense of their independence. The first onset resulted in a Roman victory. Tarentum therefore appealed to Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, who came at once (280) with a veteran army of over twenty thousand, hoping, it seems, to win an empire in the West as Alexander the Great had recently done in the East. The Romans met him at Heraclea and were thoroughly whipped, whereupon most of the Italiote Greeks went over to Pyrrhus. The victorious general dashed northward as far as Latium in the hope that the Roman federation would desert to him, but here he found, as Hannibal did later, that Rome had built a solid political structure upon which she could rely. He therefore withdrew to friendly country again in order to clear the ground as he advanced. The next year a second Roman army marched down to meet him and was again driven from the field. Pyrrhus, however, now eager to return home because of complications in Macedonia, made overtures of peace,⁹ and the senators, we are told, were ready to cut short their disastrous excursion into foreign affairs and accept a restriction of their power in southern Italy. However, the aged Appius Claudius, who may have been the author of the Thurian expedition,¹⁰ urged vehemently against accepting terms from a victorious enemy. He carried the senate with him, and the war was continued.

Pyrrhus, unable to return home because of the refusal of his terms, crossed into Sicily (278), whither he had been invited to lead the Greeks against the encroaching Carthaginians. The Romans improved the occasion by winning over the Italiote Greeks and forcing the Samnites and Lucanians into renewed submission. And this time the Samnites were destined to pay for their revolt. Pyrrhus returned to Italy after an absence of three years and attempted to regain the lost ground, but he was defeated by the veteran general, Manius Curius, and driven back to Tarentum. When, in the next year, Pyrrhus sailed home, Rome drove the Epirote garrisons out of Italy.

This war taught Rome a lesson with unmistakable emphasis. The Samnites and Lucanians could not be reckoned with unless the Greek cities beyond were considered, and the Greek cities could not be controlled so long as their harbors were open to receive mercenaries from Greece. The senate accordingly decided to assume control over the whole end of the peninsula — which it could now readily do, partly by right of conquest, partly on the basis of alliances made during the war — and it set to work immediately to reach a definite and satisfactory conclusion with every city and tribal organization as far as the coast. Here punishment was meted out, there rewards distributed, in every case a settlement was made, and recorded on bronze or stone to endure for “time everlasting.” However, before we examine this work of organization, let us revert to the question why Rome should have chosen to involve herself in the war, for it is apparent that her alliance with Thurii, which caused it, was by no means a necessity. In fact, we may assert, that since the Romans must have known that the Thurian alliance would lead to a battle with the Lucanians, they were infringing the spirit of the fetial law when they made it.

It is usually assumed that Rome desired to become involved in a war with Tarentum so as to extend her power to the very end of the peninsula. But this is after all a daring hypothesis, for Rome knew of the Tarentine habit of inviting Greek armies to help her, and it is questionable whether the senate could have contemplated with equanimity a struggle with the famous Greek phalanx which had attained such renown under Alexander the Great. In fact, there seems to be evidence to prove that when the question of the Thurian alliance was first broached at Rome, the senate, which was well enough informed to foresee possible consequences, rejected the offer, and that it was the plebeian assembly, which, having just attained full legislative rights in 287, took matters into its own hands and voted for the alliance. The evidence is found in a chance reference made by Pliny ¹¹ to a statue at Rome erected by Thurians in honor of the plebeian tribune, Ælius, who had secured the passage of

the plebiscite which relieved Thurii of siege. Since up to that time the senate had had control of foreign affairs, and the centuriate assembly, largely controlled by the aristocratic party, was the legislative body which regularly voted on such matters, the intervention of a tribune can only mean that the plebeian assembly took matters into its own hands after the senatorial leaders had rejected the offer of alliance. The consular lists show that a group of strong plebeians practically had control of Roman politics during this period; these were, in fact, the very heroes that later history honored above all others: Decius Mus and Coruncanius, Curius Dentatus and Fabricius. With them worked the aged Appius Claudius and Aemilius Papus, who, although patricians, favored the popular cause. Decius was consul for the fourth time when he "devoted" himself to death at Sentinum. Curius, *quem nemo ferro potuit superare nec auro*, served as consul three times, and while censor followed Claudius' example and built an aqueduct for Rome. Fabricius was consul three times during the war and was intrusted with the difficult task of carrying on peace negotiations with Pyrrhus. In fact, almost all the critical campaigns and the difficult diplomacy of this war were intrusted to the strong plebeian nobles who stand out so distinctly in the history of this period. When we keep in mind that the war was brought on by a plebiscite, that Fabricius, the leader of the democratic party, was elected consul to conduct the first campaign, and later, when the war seemed about to fail, was sent on the disagreeable errand of making terms with the enemy, and that finally it was Appius Claudius who held the senate from yielding when it became discouraged with a quarrel it had tried to avoid, we may safely attribute the Thurian embroglio to the democratic party and its leaders. It is significant that the first instance, so far as we know, of Rome's departure from the intents and purposes of the fetial institution occurred but five years after Rome had accepted the principle of popular sovereignty.

Was the democratic party, therefore, more eager for empire than the senatorial? Not a word of the discussion that

preceded the decision has come down to us, but there is reason to believe that it was. And we shall repeatedly find in following the events of succeeding epochs that the populace was ready to enter the dangers of imperialism when the senators held back.

The senators, of course, were brought up to read the scores of treaties that the state had signed in the past and they were bred in the legislative atmosphere that surrounds treaties. Upon the plebeians, past obligations which they had not assumed and of which they knew little weighed lightly; they lived in the present and in the future. The senators respected the orderly conduct of state affairs by their forefathers and the *mos maiorum* created by their own highly lauded ancestors, of whose honorable traditions they considered themselves the guardians; the plebeians, who had had little share in the making of these traditions, failed to appreciate their sacred character. The senators knew something of the strength of neighboring states, they had to count the cost in tribute which they must pay to defray the expenses of war, and the loss to their properties if the enemy succeeded in raiding their lands. The plebeians, who knew less of the circumstances, were free to indulge hopes of victory based upon past success, and to count upon the booty that was distributed after battle and on the new lands opened for colonization after conquest. The plebeians also remembered that such improvements for their benefit as the aqueduct, which brought them wholesome water, and the Appian way, which lowered the price of grain, were undertaken more readily after wars, for then both tribute and booty might be available, whereas in ordinary times of peace no one cared to propose a tax levy. And in this calculation they were not mistaken, for no sooner was the Pyrrhic war over than Curius as censor devoted the booty to the expenses of a new aqueduct, the *Anio vetus*, which brought an abundant flow of cold water from the Apennines, thirty-seven miles away. Finally, it is a commonplace that the popular imagination catches at the vision of expansion, victory over distant peoples, and mere bigness, and vaunts itself in the dribble

of glory which a dreaded nation shares with the meanest of its citizens. The senate, burdened with the actual responsibilities of government, had little time for such dreams.

The three Gallic invasions of 285-3 and the Pyrrhic invasion of 280 had involved almost all the peoples of Italy. When Rome came out victorious in every contest, she had the obvious task thrust upon her of arriving at a final understanding with all the cities and tribes which were not yet fitted into her federal structure. Fortunately for Italy, it was the senate rather than the now sovereign populace which undertook the task of organization. The people had been frightened by the disasters into which their daring political excursion had thrust the state, and they diffidently yielded the reins of government to the senate during the half century after the vote on the Thurian alliance. In reviewing the reconstructive work of the senate it will be convenient to survey at the same time the political condition in which the various peoples of Italy found themselves after their permanent incorporation into the Roman city-state.

The Etruscans, as we have noted, occupied a peculiar position in the history of Rome's expansion. The Romans did not seem to know just how to treat those neighbors who "neither spoke nor lived as other men." At times they showed the deepest respect for the Etruscan ceremonials and institutions, knowing well how much they had learned from these neighbors, but, at other times, an impatient disgust seemed to break out against a civilization that was essentially alien — an impatience which behaved suspiciously like race prejudice: *Vos Tusci ac barbari!* shouted Gracchus with scorn at the Etruscan priests. For over a century after the Veian conquest the Romans concerned themselves very little about the Etruscans. Elsewhere they made their alliances with a view to permanent relations: their treaties were "for all time," but in dealing with Etruria they pursued a policy of *laissez faire*, or, perhaps rather, they had no definite policy at all, for they adopted the Etruscan form of alliance in dealing with these people. Even the Gallic and Samnite raids which from time to time se-

duced various Etruscan cities led to but few serious consequences.

However, after the battle of Lake Vadimon (285), in which several Etruscan cities joined the Gauls, despite the fact that Rome had incurred the war by aiding Arretium, *laissez faire* was at an end. Rome punished the participating cities, Volci,¹² Volsinii, Cære, and Tarquinii, by seizing a part of their territory. The rest of the Etruscan towns were apparently brought into the federation without any loss of property, though they seem to have acknowledged Rome's sovereignty in foreign affairs for all time. So far as we know, the only ¹³ Etruscan city that received Roman citizenship before the first century was Cære, and she was granted citizenship of the inferior class. Some of the territory that the state had acquired by confiscation was used for maritime colonies,¹⁴ partly, we are told, in order to suppress Etruscan piracies, partly, we may infer from their date of settlement, in order to hinder the Carthaginians from gaining a convenient landing place near Rome. Since maritime colonies received only 300 settlers each, little territory could have been used up in this way. The larger amount of the new acquisition was shared with the allies when the Latin colony of Cosa was planted in 273. However, some land was also left open as public property, doubtless to be rented out for the benefit of the state treasury.¹⁵ After this settlement it would seem that about 12 per cent of Etruria was *ager Romanus*. The rest belonged to confederate cities and remained in their possession until the social war (90 B.C.) extended Roman citizenship throughout Italy.

Unfortunately, Etruria did not prosper ¹⁶ under Roman rule. The blame, however, rests upon a people who would not adapt themselves to their times. The Etruscan nobles, who had years before grown wealthy in commerce, mining, and military conquests, and who ruled like medieval barons over their clients and serfs, would not realize that ancient conditions had passed away. Commerce had taken other routes after Alexander the Great opened up the Orient; the mines of Etruria had been worked out and were no

longer profitable; Rome had put a barrier to further conquests. With the establishment of peace the feudal system had also become obsolete, for there was no longer any *raison d'être* for large troops of retainers. So the nobles lost their wealth, and the serfs, pressed into uncongenial work upon the soil,¹⁷ repeatedly tried to revolt. Only a few of the Etruscan nobles seem to have been capable of adapting themselves to the new order of things. The factories of Arretium turned successfully from metal work to pottery,¹⁸ and some men became successful plantation owners; but, on the whole, these people never again found themselves. Roman citizens, more abreast of the times, gradually bought up a large part of the bankrupt estates, much of Etruria was recolonized by Sulla and Augustus, and, finally, under the paternalism of the empire, it regained some appearance of prosperity. But then it could no longer be called Etruscan.

The Umbrians were too disunited and too diffident to cause Rome much concern. They were the people, who, if we are correct in identifying them with the bearers of the "Villanova" culture, had once possessed half of Italy. The Etruscans had taken from them first the territory west of the Tiber, and then the Po valley. The Sabellian tribes captured the southern half of their land upon the Adriatic; the Celtic Senones, the rest. Scarcely one fifth of their former empire remained to them at the end of the fourth century, and that was poor, mountainous country. It is probable that the ease with which they won their early successes caused their ultimate weakness, for in spreading over so vast a territory the tribe, not yet culturally capable of the requisite cohesiveness, fell apart into segregated groups which eventually pursued individual policies and preyed upon each other. The very earliest inscription of Umbria, a war curse of about the fourth century B.C., betrays the secret of their feebleness. It is a part of the ritual of Iguvium,¹⁹ one of their chief cities, and it calls upon Mars to destroy their enemies: the men of Etruria, of Tadinum, of the Nar, and the Iapudes. They curse kinsmen and strangers alike. It is not surprising that Umbria fills so insignificant

a place in Roman annals. The unreliable triumphal tables record some victories over the Umbri during the "second" and "third" Samnite wars, but it is improbable that these people ever acted in unity. There are no old coins of united Umbria as of the Vestini and Frentani. These people, unlike the Sabellic tribes, did not later receive Roman citizenship in one group or in one ward. In fact, after the Social war, their towns are found inscribed in at least a dozen different wards — which would indicate that the Romans had found no unity among them. It is probable that after the terrible battle of Sentinum, whatever communities were still outside of the Roman federation hastened to ask for admission. Two communities only, Nequinum and Spolegium, lost their territory to "Latin" colonies; the rest, to the number of about twenty-five, apparently secured liberal treaties of alliance with Rome. Some of the nearer ones gained full Roman citizenship during the following century,²⁰ the more distant ones had to wait until the Social war. The two Latin colonies planted upon confiscated territory were Narnia, about 290,²¹ and Spolegium, in 241. So far as we know,²² Rome acquired no territory in Umbria for her own public land.

The *ager Gallicus* — sometimes called *ager Picenus* because of its former owners — was a district of about 1000 square miles which had been taken from the Senones in 284 because of their raids during the preceding year. Rome at once sent a small citizen colony to Sena on the Adriatic, and in 268, a larger "Latin" colony to Ariminum on the Rubicon, the northern boundary of that region. The rest of the land seems to have remained fallow for a long time. But in 232, when Rome had begun to forget her old obligation to share all conquered lands with her allies, the democratic leader, Flaminius, secured the allotment of this district to Roman citizens, and at once built the Flaminian road from Rome to the newly settled country. It is probable that this very *ager Gallicus* was the first unassigned public land — of which we hear so much in Gracchan times — and that its distribution to Roman citizens in 232 was the first serious breach of

Rome's old-time agreement to share all booty equally with her allies.

South of the *ager Gallicus* dwelt the Picentes,²³ a tribe with which Rome apparently had not come into contact before the end of the Pyrrhic war. After the war, Rome, bent on securing a compact federation, undertook to obtain their allegiance. Their principal city, Asculum, and the half-Hellenized seacoast town, Ancona, became allies of ordinary standing; with some rural clans, however, there was difficulty. The consul used military suasion, took a strip of land on the seacoast for a "Latin" colony at Firmum (founded 264) and enrolled the rest of the tribesmen as Roman citizens without suffrage. A prefect was then sent to them from Rome to administer justice. So worthy of their position did they prove themselves, that within a few years they were accorded full citizenship and enrolled in a new ward, the Velina, created for them in 241. The Picene episode clearly shows the senate's determination after the Pyrrhic war to fit every tribe of Italy into a definite place in the federation; it reveals also a striking faith in the adaptability of distant Italic tribesmen for citizenship. It would have been well for Rome if the statesmen of a century later had been equally open-minded, and granted Asculum the same privileges when she desired them, for it was their refusal that led to the outburst of the Social war in that city.

Central Italy, the cradle of the Sabellic peoples, was inhabited by a number of democratic peasant tribes, the Vestini, Marsi, Pæligni, Marrucini, and Frentani. These were so far removed from the cultural states that they long retained their tribal organization and their primitive institutions. No cities emerged to claim preponderance over the surrounding peasantry as in Latium. The simple and sturdy people dwelt in small villages,²⁴ cultivated their narrow valleys, and used the hillsides for pasturage. Letters were but slowly introduced, and commerce was so insignificant as to call for but the most sparing use of coins. We have already commented upon the fact that these tribes favored Rome rather than their kinsmen, the Samnites,

in the great wars, and we have attributed this preference partly to the Samnitic lawlessness, partly to Rome's superior diplomacy. Be that as it may, they became members of the Roman federation before the "third" Samnite war, securing terms that accorded them their autonomy and democratic tribal government,²⁵ the full possession of their lands, and probably also whatever privileges of coinage were then in vogue; and in this condition they apparently remained till the Social war.

The Sabines,²⁶ a kindred tribe bordering upon Latium, and extending to the Adriatic, were somewhat differently treated. As we have already noticed, Curius found cause to invade the Sabine territory in 290 after the Gallic-Samnite war, and forced the people to accept Rome's sovereignty. The state appropriated a strip of the Adriatic coast upon which it at once settled the two "Latin" colonies of Castrum and Hadria. On all the rest of the Sabines, so far as we know, Rome at once bestowed citizenship²⁷ without franchise, and in 268, full citizenship. The people nearest Rome were enrolled in one of the old Roman wards; for the rest, a new ward, the Quirina, was created in 241. The Sabines from that time on constituted one of the sturdiest and most reliable elements of Rome's citizen-body.

If we pause at this point and compare the senate's methods of reorganization as revealed in Umbria, Picenum, Sabinum, and the Sabellic tribes, we shall notice an apparent inconsistency which may betray some facts that our sources have not preserved for us. It will be remembered that in Umbria Rome made her alliances with the individual cities and not with the tribes as a whole, while on the other hand her treaties with the Vestini, Marrucini, Pæligni, Marsi, and Frentani were signed with the governments of the whole tribal league. The Sabines and Picentes were treated in neither fashion. Their countries were subjected to a rapid raid, a strip of land was taken upon which a Latin colony was planted, and the whole tribe was incorporated into the citizen body of Rome. The reason for this diversity of procedure seems to lie in the varied social and political condi-

tions of these three classes of tribes at the time when Rome first had to deal with them.

The Umbrians, for instance, were not a united people. They had separated into several groups during their rapid expansion and most of the groups had developed city-states which were independent of the tribe. They were too weak to resist pressure from Rome singly, and it was too late to reunite. Accordingly, individual cities of Umbria fell quickly, one by one, into the Roman alliance, at very little cost and on excellent terms.

The tribes of the second class, the Marsi, Vestini, etc., were in a wholly different state of civilization. Even in Strabo's day they lived largely in villages. When Rome met them during the early days of the Samnite war, no cities had yet emerged to create separate polities for themselves. Their primitive tribal governments, however, were compact and thoroughly capable of making agreements with a foreign power and of holding their individual members strictly to the observance of such agreements. Now Rome may have preferred not to encourage such tribal unities; she may have preferred to sign her treaties with individual cities as she did in Umbria, but the history of these Sabellic tribes shows that if only there was a responsible government with which she could deal in good faith and which could hold its members to the observance of the obligations that a treaty involve, Rome was satisfied and made no effort to dissolve the tribal organization.

Now Picenum and Sabinum, and we may include the Æqui, lay halfway between the representatives of these two classes. Sabinum, near the Umbrian and Roman border, and Picenum along the coast seem to have begun evolving respectable cities, but the process had probably gone just far enough to weaken the former tribal coherence without creating adequate substitutes in the new urban forms. More or less political confusion resulted. It is easy to understand what must have occurred during the heavy strain of the Samnite war. The Sabines, Æqui, and Picentes were officially allied to Rome, but when their governments no longer were re-

spected by the members, individual adventurers must constantly have volunteered for the Samnite army, and whenever a war was over, Rome invariably found a number of citizens of these supposedly friendly tribes among her captives. This is why Rome took the shortest way toward dissolving the native governments of these three tribes. It was not land that was wanted, it was a stable and responsible government which could hold its individual citizens answerable to the promises of the state. Since these peoples would not act together as did the eastern Sabellic peoples, and had not yet developed responsible city-states within the tribe, Rome simply swept away their crumbling governments, incorporated them into her citizen body, and divided them into prefectures through which to act in her administration of Italian affairs. She found them, when thus organized, excellent individuals, and therefore gave them full citizenship early; and later, as their cities grew, she shifted the local government more and more upon their own municipal organizations.

The insight of Rome's statesmen into the social and political conditions of these Italic peoples and their versatility in finding methods of procedure appropriate to the varied circumstances account in large measure for the success of the organization of central Italy which alone saved Rome from destruction in the Hannibalic war.

The Samnites, who had risen against Rome for the fifth time when Tarentum called for aid in 282, had little to expect after the war was over. And they were punished, though not as severely as might have been expected. The victors confiscated a valley tract which commanded the northern approach to the Samnite capital and there planted the "Latin" watchdog colony of *Æsernia*, wisely choosing Oscan-speaking²⁸ colonists for the place. They also took possession of a segment straight through from the old colony of *Saticula* to *Luceria* so as to sever the main Samnite tribe from its kindred, the *Hirpini*. On the best portion of this territory the splendid "Latin" colony of *Beneventum* was immediately placed (268). The rest — undesirable mountain

country, unsuitable for colonization — was left unclaimed until a century later, when it was given to a Ligurian tribe. The Hirpini were allowed their own government, probably a democratic tribal form. The Samnite city of Telesia seems also to have gained autonomy at this time and must have had an advantageous alliance with Rome, for it henceforth struck coins of its own.²⁹ The main part of Samnium once more signed an alliance with Rome — this time presumably surrendering to the victor its rights to an independent international policy. But the people retained their own democratic tribal government³⁰ as before, and prospered as they deserved. In 225, at the time of the threatened Gallic invasion,³¹ they could furnish 70,000 foot and 7000 horse! Henceforth they were loyal allies, and the repeated invitations and countermarches of Hannibal had little effect upon them, even when Capua yielded to the enticement of the enemy after Cannæ. To be sure, the mountain villages of the tribe did not grow to be great cities. But the Oscan cities and the Latin colonies near by, placed more advantageously along the highways, thrived for centuries, and their prosperity was in large measure due to constant accretions of sturdy Samnite mountaineers.

The Lucanians, who throughout the Samnite wars had in general befriended Rome — chiefly because of their fear of the Samnites — were bitterly enraged by Rome's defense of Thurii in 282, and strongly supported Pyrrhus. After the war they yielded like the rest to the victor, and were taken into the federation with apparently no punishment but the forfeiture of Pæstum, an old Greek city which they had conquered. Here Rome immediately (273) founded a "Latin" colony. The Lucanians retained their democratic tribal government³² and even continued to issue communal coins. Apulia was of old the home of Messapians and Iapygians into whose territory Samnites had wedged from the north and Greeks from the east. The cities of Teate and Ausculum, for example, spoke Oscan, most of the other cities employed Greek, while in the interior villages various native languages still prevailed. Apparently no bond of

unity prevailed among these peoples except their common dislike of the Samnites. Luceria³³ and Venusia had been appropriated for "Latin" colonies during the Samnite wars, which might indicate some pro-Samnite sentiment among them at that time, but it would appear that these various peoples took no vigorous part in behalf of Pyrrhus and Tarentum, and some are known to have aided Rome. At any rate, we hear of no confiscations in this region after 272, and the coins issued from so many of the Apulian mints³⁴ after that date reveal a continuance of the alliance which had been formed during the "second" and "third" Samnite wars. They also demonstrate the continued prosperity of this fertile region up to the time of the Punic war. Then the territory suffered so severely from the Hannibalic raids that it never again regained its former prosperity.³⁵

The Bruttians bear the distinction of being the only strong Italian people that Rome neglected to bring into a definite position in her federation after the Pyrrhic war. They lived among the forest-clad, granite mountains of what is to-day called Calabria, and were apparently an offshoot of the Lucanians,³⁶ from whom they had gained their independence in 356. They destroyed several of the old Greek colonies of the coast, grew rapidly into a strong people, formed some kind of a stable government with a capital at Consentia, and struck tribal coins bearing the legend BPETTIQN. Rome first came in contact with them during the Pyrrhic war, when, according to the evidences of the triumphal *fasti*, they fought Rome bitterly. Our sources say nothing regarding Rome's settlement after the war, but there are two or three peculiar circumstances which shed light upon the problem. Firstly, Polybius (II, 24), in giving a list of Rome's allies in 225, does not mention the Bruttii; secondly, the Bruttii alone of Italian tribes continued to issue silver coins through the third century;³⁷ and, thirdly, two cities of Greek origin, Petelia and Terina, which were subject to the Bruttii before Pyrrhus' arrival, were autonomous allies of Rome after the war. These facts seem to indicate that Rome — whether because she scorned the Bruttii, or because she knew they

were too thoroughly hemmed in to do any harm — neglected to take them into her federation; that while she invited the ex-Greek cities of Bruttium into her alliance, securing autonomy for them, she dismissed the rest on good behavior.³⁸

On the south Italian coast were a number of Greek cities which before the days of Pyrrhus had dwindled to a mere shadow of the Magna Græcia of the sixth century. Internal factional fights and bitter interstate jealousies had destroyed several of the most famous of them, and weakened the rest. The typically Greek temper, over-individualized and utterly lacking in cohesive clannishness, began its work of disintegration just as soon as the various cities came into close relation with each other. The poison of self-assertiveness was eliminated only by the destruction of the stronger element in factional strife, and then there remained only a weak and passive population, too feeble to withstand foreign enemies. Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, helped on the work of devastation in his attempt to gain an empire for himself. He destroyed Caulonia (388), subdued Croton, and weakened Rhegium and Hipponion beyond recovery. He was succeeded by the Lucanian and Bruttian conquerors. Poseidonia, Laos, Tempsa, Terina, and Hipponion, in fact, the whole western coast as far as Rhegium, with the exception of Elea, were now permanently lost to the Greeks. Of the few surviving cities, Tarentum alone retained some of her former splendor, but even she had not enough vigor left to fight her own battles; and she was disliked by her neighbors. This was the situation when Thurii finally changed the course of events by appealing to Rome against the barbarians.

During the war Heraclea, Elea, and Rhegium sympathized with Rome, while Croton, recently pillaged by Agathocles, and Locri, long used to servitude, veered with every gust of wind that blew. After the war Rome treated these Greek cities, whether they had been friendly throughout or not, as irresponsible dotards that deserved kindness for what they had once been. Most of them were given treaties which dignified them as Rome's "equals." Rome under-

took to protect them, without asking for military service in return. It was enough if they closed their ports to the enemies of Rome. Several of the Greek cities that had fallen under the sway of the Bruttians and Lucanians were restored to autonomy and admitted as members of the federation. But most markedly did Rome prove her friendliness towards the Greeks in her treatment of Tarentum, the city which had brought on the whole wretched war. Some captives were apparently taken in Rome's attacks upon the city, since we are told that Livius Andronicus — Rome's first dramatist — came to Rome in captivity from Tarentum. It is probable too that the honorary title of *foedus aequum* was withheld in the treaty with Tarentum. In other respects, however, it is difficult to see how Tarentum suffered. She was accorded the right of coinage,³⁹ a concession usually made only to the most privileged, her citizens were not disarmed or deprived of their ships, nor were they put under military or naval obligations to Rome. No clearer instance of the prudent employment of conciliatory tactics could be found. It all proved a paying investment a generation later, when Rome needed the aid of a trained marine against Carthage. Even for the present it was a good bargain for both sides. Rome could feel confident that the southern ports were closed against invaders, and the Greeks were protected against the raids of the barbarians. The Greek towns also profited materially a little later when Rome's power began to spread, for the sovereign city stipulated in her treaties that her allies should enjoy the same commercial rights as her own citizens. And since the people of southern Italy were engaged in commerce to a greater extent than the Romans, they were the first to profit. Thus it came about that the privileged class which called themselves "Italici" while trading in the East under the provisions of Rome's treaties were largely Campanians and Italiote Greeks.⁴⁰

This survey of Rome's reconstructive work demonstrates that the senate of 270 followed in the main the policies originated by the first empire-builders of 340. The "Latin

colony" they found especially efficient in garrisoning conquered country at little cost, in satisfying and reconciling allies, and in taking care of Roman citizens who needed land. Twenty of these colonies were settled between 338 and 264. Citizen maritime colonies were more sparingly used, probably because of a general understanding that allies should share equitably in land distribution. Three of these were founded at Adriatic coast points. Outright virginal assignments to Roman citizens apparently ceased because of the provision just mentioned. The custom of incorporating foreigners of good stock into the city-state was continued in the case of some of the Hernicans and Æquians, and most of the Sabines, Prætuttii, and Picentes. Whether any of the former half citizens were promoted to full citizenship during this period we are not told, but it is not improbable, since the custom of promotion was still in vogue a century later. The federal alliance was, of course, the device used over by far the largest area, and necessarily so, since it would have been impossible to assimilate distant peoples and tribes of alien customs on the instant. In fact, clear-sighted statesmen must have begun to doubt whether Rome could ever amalgamate all the states that were embraced by some threescore different treaties.

One change the senate now made in its traditional policy. It had been found that Roman citizens assigned to Latin colonies often returned to Rome in case of disappointment, and that other colonists too were attracted to the metropolis by the ease with which "Latin" colonists could become Roman citizens. In fact, residence at Rome and enrollment on Rome's census list seem to have been the only requisites. If this state of affairs continued there was danger that some of the Latin colonies might soon dwindle away. When, therefore, the senate founded a new colony at Ariminum on the Gallic frontier, it decided to impose certain disabilities⁴¹ upon the colonists in case of their returning to Rome. And this policy held for the next twelve colonies. The precaution may have been well meant, but it stirred up some disagreeable complications in time to come, and, what was

worse, it gave later legislators a precedent for imposing further disabilities upon other classes of allies.

It was at this time, too (269), that the senate established its first mint at Rome for the coinage of silver, and, by some method of which we know nothing, attempted to circulate the new silver coin as the standard throughout Italy.⁴² At any rate, very many of the mints of Latins and allies ceased to issue silver after 268. And thus the silver *denarius* became a token, as it were, of Rome's sovereignty over the whole peninsula.

In connection with the details of conquest presented above it will be convenient to attempt an estimate of the territory appropriated from conquered states. This is the more necessary since no subject was more misunderstood by the ancients. Scholars have long known that the post-Gracchan annalists — yielding to a besetting sin of historians — overworked the psychological method in their efforts to be persuasive, and attributed to statesmen of bygone days the ideas and methods of their own. As a consequence of this, agrarian laws like those of the Gracchi were projected into the history of the fourth and third century land distributions. Such laws presupposed the existence of vast domains of public land, and these, in turn, presupposed extensive expropriations at time of conquests. It accordingly has come to be a generally accepted view that Rome regularly took by right of conquest about a third of the conquered territory.⁴³ This is very far from being the case. A careful weighing of all the evidence presented in the preceding summary will establish the fact that the conquerors took ⁴⁴ about 3 per cent, not 33 per cent, of the land in their conquest of Italy between 338 and 264. We know now that there was very little public land when Hannibal entered Italy in 220 and that the territory which became the bone of contention in the Gracchan days was almost all acquired during and after the Second Punic war: acquired partly through the appropriation of tracts devastated by Hannibal, partly through confiscation applied according to a new legal theory ⁴⁵ to revolting states. It was then that the whole of

Campania, large tracts in Lucania, Apulia, and Bruttium, and extensive areas in Cisalpine Gaul fell to the state. Before that time Rome had in general followed the policy inaugurated about 340 of taking possession only of small tracts on the frontier for the sake of military colonies.

We must add, however, that though the land taken and colonized was a very small portion of Italy, it was a considerable amount in proportion to the population of Rome. And even though Rome shared the colonies with the allies, she had to provide so many colonists during the period that her surplus population was effectively drained off. The labor and capital that might otherwise have turned to commerce and industry found ready employment in the new allotments, and thus the Romans still remained a purely agricultural people. This circumstance accounts not a little for the solid strength that the nation displayed in later wars, but it also accounts for a certain lack of resourcefulness in dealing with the urban population, and lack of sympathy for various activities that a nation should encourage.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1. The total number of (male) citizens in 290 is given by Livy, *Epit.* XI, as 272,000. This includes, of course, a great many inhabitants of important cities outside of Rome.

2. The only reliable statement is found in Polybius, II, 19.

3. See Mommsen, *Röm. Forsch.* II, 372, on this matter, which the annalists confused with the work of 290. Also, Münzer, *s.v. Curius* 9), in Pauly-Wissowa.

4. I infer that these are the Etruscans meant by Polybius, since they were attacked after the Gauls were disposed of. With Niese, *Griech. und maked. Staaten*, II, 28, note 1, I reject the story of Cassius Dio, who involves Tarentum in this war. The conditions later imposed upon some of the Umbrians imply that they had joined the expedition.

5. See Diodorus, XXI, 4 and 14.

6. See Niese, *Griech. und maked. Staaten*, I, 476 ff. The chapter in this work of Niese is perhaps our best account of the Pyrrhic war. Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* III, 1, p. 562, is also excellent in many respects.

7. This tale comes from a very unreliable source, but may be true. It is hard to understand how or when Rome could have signed a treaty not to pass the Lacinian headland. After colonies were founded on the

Adriatic, it was absolutely necessary to conduct some shipping past Tarentum, and it would seem that some transporation of goods must already have been carried on. The colony of Hadria was then seventeen years old.

8. Polybius mentions this fact: I, 6, 5.

9. It may be that the disgruntled senate made the first overtures. The annalists would be likely to suppress such a fact.

10. At least, the democratic party, of which Appius Claudius was still one of the most respected leaders. Historians to-day usually reject the dramatic tale of Claudius and his speech in the senate; but the story must antedate the interpolating annalists, since Ennius refers to it (Ed. Vah. 202). There is no reason to think, therefore, that the speech — which circulated in Cicero's day (*Brut.* 61 and *Cato maior*, 16) — was apocryphal. But if the speech existed, it must have kept the annalists fairly close to the facts. A timely proffer of aid from Carthage doubtless encouraged the senate to accept the advice of Appius, see Niese, *Hermes*, XXXI, 495. The proposals of Pyrrhus are given in the *Ineditum Vaticanum* (*Hermes*, XXVII, p. 120). According to this authority, Pyrrhus demanded that Rome acknowledge the independence of all who had joined him.

11. *Nat. Hist.*, XXXIV, 32. Pliny often employs worthless sources, but in this case his source drew its information from the inscription of a statue which remained in full view in the Roman forum. Rome apparently had friendly relations with Thurii before; Tacitus, *Ann.* XIV, 21.

12. See the *Fasti Triumphales* for the year 280, and note that the colony of Cosa lay mainly upon Volcian territory, Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* III, 51. The citizen colony of Saturnia (planted in 183) and the near-by *præfectura Statoniensis* (Vitruvius, II, 9) seem to occupy Volsinian territory. For Cære, see Cassius Dio, frag. 33, dated 273. The land was used for maritime colonies. For Tarquinii, see Diodorus, XX, 44 (a treaty for forty years dated in 268). Since Gravisca was later settled near Tarquinii (Livy, XL, 29), it is probable that there was a loss of land here also. Rome had a dispute with Falerii later, in 241; see Polybius, I, 65.

13. I have shown elsewhere that Tarquinii and Falerii both remained allies, and were not made *civitates sine suffragio* as is regularly assumed; *Klio*, XI, 377. We do not know when Cære became *ager Romanus*; see the same study.

14. The maritime colonies of 300 citizens planted upon the Etruscan coast are as follows: Castrum (about 264), Alsium (247), Fregene (245), Pyrgi (about the same time), Gravisca (181). All of these, except the last, date from the Punic war. For references to these colonies see Kornemann's excellent list in Pauly-Wissowa, but emend as follows: *Castrum* in Etruria was a citizen colony founded about

264; *Castrum* on the border of Picenum was a Latin colony founded about 290–86, probably on Prætuttian land. (Note that the former is governed by *duumviri* and the latter by *praetores*.)

15. A part of this was parceled out to Roman citizens a century later in the *praefectura* of Saturnia (183). There were also Roman citizens at the *praefectura Statoniensis* and at several *fora* on the southern parts of the Cassian, Clodian, and Aurelian roads. Some of these citizens might have been tenants on public lands, some of them may have held allotments. For these places, see *C. I. L.* XI.

16. Plutarch says that Gracchus conceived of his agrarian reforms because of the Etruscan conditions which he noticed on a journey from his province; Plut., *Tib. Gracch.* 8. The population had always been sparse because of the uneconomic landlord system. In 225 there were less than two able-bodied men per square kilometer in Etruria, while Campania could furnish ten; see Polybius, II, 24.

17. The Roman annalists frequently refer to what they call slave riots in Etruria. These were in fact social upheavals due to the survival of the old feudal system. In Volsinii the serfs seized the reins of government in 265 and the masters appealed to Rome, whose consul found the rocky citadel (now Orvieto) almost impregnable. As a result, when the city was finally taken and the former masters reinstated, Rome demanded that the city be rebuilt on level ground. So the late annalists tell an interesting story of Rome's shrewdness; Val. Max. IX, 1, 9; Zonaras, VIII, 7.

18. See Nissen, *Ital. Landeskunde*, II, 316.

19. See Buck, *A Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian*, p. 279 (*Iguvinian Tables*, VI, b, 54). The Iapudes were Illyrian pirates who spread havoc on the Adriatic coast of Italy; see Pauli, *Altital. Forschungen*, III, 413.

20. This, I confess, is based upon inference. Asisium and Fulginia apparently received citizenship before 90 B.C., since their magistrates continued to be called by their old title, *marones*. Oriculum, Mevania, and Trebia were not in the same ward as the cities that were allied until 90 B.C. They were on the Flaminian road and therefore probably attained citizenship early. Tuder and Iguvium, two cities assigned to the tribus Crustumina, were still allied to Rome a few years before 90 (Sisenna, frag. 119, and Cic. *Balb.* 46). Perhaps all the cities along the Tiber — which were ascribed to the same ward — were allies until 90. Of the rest we know only that Camertum possessed a *foedus aequum* till the Social war. The subjugation of the northernmost tribe, the Sarsinates, required a special invasion about 268 — not many years before the birth of Plautus, their most famous citizen. These mountaineers may have been disturbing the newly founded colony of Ariminum.

21. Livy dates Narnia at 299, but it can hardly have been founded until after the battle of Sentinum.

22. Beloch (*Ital. Bund.* p. 57) scarcely supports his conjecture that Rome took large stretches of public land in Umbria. In the days when Rome settled Umbria it was not the custom to appropriate lands except by way of severe punishment, and we have no reason to think that many Umbrian cities incurred this.

23. Picentian history is full of uncertainties because the Roman annalists confused the territory with the *ager Gallicus*, sometimes called *ager Picenus* in legal documents. They therefore attributed wholesale confiscation and allotment to land which had experienced nothing of the sort; see *Klio*, XI, p. 373. The correct inferences can be drawn from Polyb. II, 21, 7, and Cato, in Varro, *R. R.* I, 2, 7. Strabo (V, 251), who finds a people called Picenti below Naples, immediately drew the hasty conclusion that the Picentes of the Adriatic had been transported. This is, of course, erroneous. I would revise Beloch, *Ital. Bund.* p. 55; Nissen, *Ital. Landesk.* II, 410, and Mommsen, *C. I. L.* IX, p. 480, accordingly.

Asculum was an ally till 90, when in fact it was among the first to revolt. Since the rest of Picenum had received citizenship, Asculum felt that it too deserved as much.

24. Strabo, V, 241, *κωμηδὸν ζῶσιν*.

25. For the Roman treaties with these tribes, see Diod. XX, 101; Livy, IX, 45; X, 3. For the tribal organization, *Vestini*: Polyb. II, 24; Livy, XLIV, 40; tribal coins, Conway, *The Italic Dialects*, p. 260. *Marrucini*: Polyb. IX, 24; Conway, p. 254, *totai maroucai*. *Paeligni*: Diod. XX, 101. Possibly Rome later dealt with the individual cities here; the evidence is late and unreliable. *Marsi*: Polyb. II, 24; Conway, p. 294, *pro legio[n]ibus Martses*. *Frentani*: Polyb. II, 24; Conway, p. 208, *Kenzsur*; tribal coins, Conway, p. 212 (Larinum had a separate treaty).

26. With the Sabines I include the subdivision of the Prætuttii (modern Abruzzi).

27. Mommsen, *C. I. L.* IX, p. 396, following a late legend, states that the Sabines were driven out and most of the land confiscated. My reasons for rejecting this, which is the orthodox view, are, in brief, as follows. (1) The earlier tradition holds that the Sabines remained and became Roman citizens, see Cic. *de Off.* 1, 35; *pro Balb.* 31; Livy, XL, 46, 12; XLII, 34, 2; Velleius, I, 14. Strabo, V, 228: *ἔστι δὲ καὶ παλαιότατον γένος οἱ Σαβίνοι καὶ αὐτόχθονες . . . ἀντρέσχον μέχρι πρὸς τὸν παρόντα χρόνον*. (2) Livy would hardly have praised the volunteers from this district as he does in XXVIII, 45, had they not been of non-Roman stock. (3) Schulten, in *Klio*, II and III, has shown that names ending in (*i*)*edius* and *idius* are Sabellic, and that they occur as frequently in the country under discussion as in regions undoubtedly Sabellic. (4) There is a peculiar magistracy, called the octovirate, in Sabine towns which seems to be a survival of a non-Roman office. (5) It was not Rome's

habit to confiscate land for purely Roman allotment or for the use of the Roman treasury until long after the period in question. (6) We find no references to public lands in Sabinum in Republican times when agrarian bills were discussed. The scant references in late sources probably point to unallotted rough land (so-called *subseciva*) left over from imperial expropriations.

The legend which Mommsen follows arose from the confusion of Curius' settlement of Sabinum in 290 and his furious onslaught on the Senones in his second consulship in 284. It occurs in such unreliable authors as Orosius (III, 22), and Val. Max. (IV, 3, 5).

28. The coins are partly Oscan, though the colony was founded by Rome. See Conway, *It. Dialects*, p. 199.

29. Head², *Historia Numorum*, p. 28.

30. See Conway, *It. Dial.* p. 189, an inscription of a *meddiss toutiks*.

31. Polyb. II, 24.

32. Their coins dating before and after the Pyrrhic war are stamped ΛΟΥΚΑΝΟΜ. This league was wrecked in the Second Punic war when Hannibal conquered southern Italy and held it for several years. The *ager publicus* which Rome later possessed in Apulia was acquired after Hannibal's departure, partly by right of reconquest, partly by appropriating devastated country.

33. It is possible that both of these places were in the possession of Samnites when captured, and should not be considered in connection with Apulian history.

34. See Head², *Historia Numorum*, p. 43.

35. The public land acquired for the colony of Sipontum (194) and the *pascua publica* mentioned by Livy under date of 185 (XXXIX, 29) and referred to by Varro, *R. R.* II, 1, 16, were doubtless appropriated during the war with Hannibal. Strabo, VI, 285, says: "Formerly this region flourished, but Hannibal and the later wars laid it waste." The plantation system, which unfortunately was invoked by Rome in order to develop waste country as quickly as possible, only served ultimately to make efficient development impossible.

36. The facts are not clear, see Diod. XVI, 15, and Strabo, VI, 255-6. The dominant element seems to have been Sabellic, but there was doubtless a large admixture of more primitive peoples in this last retreat of the vanquished. Conway records some Oscan inscriptions from the region, *It. Dial.* p. 3.

37. See Head², *Hist. Num.* p. 91.

38. Dionysius, XX, 15, holds that Rome appropriated half the forest of Sila on this occasion; and state contractors were surely at work with the timber and pitch industry there as early as 213 (Livy, XXV, 1). Dionysius may be correct, for confiscation of the central forests would have given protection to Rome's friends along the coast, Rhegium and Locri. I cannot think, however, that Rome was at this time interested

in the timber of Sila, since she had little shipping, and there was still an abundance of forests near Rome. In the Hannibalic war the Brutians aided Hannibal and were then deprived of a great part of their territory, which was then used for colonies. The Bruttian captives on that occasion were apparently made public slaves if we dare believe Gellius, X, 3, 19.

39. See Evans, "*Horsemen*" of *Tarentum*, p. 192, and Niese, in *Hermes*, XXXI, 502. They could not have been *socii navales* as yet, for Rome borrowed her first ships from Tarentum in the Punic war, as Evans points out on the evidence of Polyb. I, 20. The lack of coinage in various Greek cities after 268 does not necessarily point to a Roman restriction. Several of these cities gave up coinage before the Pyrrhic war because of poverty, and they naturally became still poorer during the war. The wealthier cities, Tarentum, Locri, and Rhegium, continued to issue silver coins. One must guard against attributing the distressing conditions that were brought on by Hannibal's conquests to the period following the Pyrrhic war.

40. See *Am. Hist. Review*, XVIII, 242.

41. They were denied *connubium* with Roman citizens, and difficulties were put in the way of their acquiring Roman citizenship. See Kornemann, *s.v. Coloniae*, in Pauly-Wissowa, col. 518.

42. The Roman mint at Capua had struck silver since about 335; the mint at Rome issued only bronze till 268, a striking commentary on Rome's lack of interest in commerce and industry. After 268, a score of mints in Latin and allied cities still issued bronze, but within the federation only Tarentum, Naples, Rhegium, Locri, Cales, and possibly Heraclea, continued to issue silver. The Bruttii also coined silver. The Capuan *victoriati* and the Lucernian *denarii* were issued by Roman branch mints.

43. Schwegler, *Röm. Gesch.* II, 404, is usually cited as having proved this, but his evidence is far from sufficient. Rostowzew, *Zur Gesch. des Römischen Kolonates*, has proved that the legal theory whereby ownership of the soil was supposed to follow conquest came into Rome's policy from the Orient at a later day.

44. The territory of the Italian peoples — I exclude the Gauls — incorporated in the federation by 264 amounted to about 38 million acres. On land appropriated between 338 and 264 Rome settled some twenty Latin colonies. Each colony received about 3000 settlers, and each settler about eight jugera (about $5\frac{1}{3}$ acres), as an average, making a total of about 320,000 acres. Since each colony was furthermore given a public domain from which to defray municipal expenses, this figure may be raised to 500,000 acres. Add to this — for liberal measure — half a million acres to cover other confiscations, such as we have mentioned in the preceding summary of Rome's reorganization. The sum total will not exceed a million acres, that is, less than 3 per

cent of the Italian territory then conquered. Several considerations support this estimate. (1) Niese, *Hermes*, XXIII, p. 410, has proved that the so-called Licinian-Sextian agrarian law of 366 was actually passed after the Hannibalic war. (2) Had virgane assignments of large tracts been made to citizens before the Second Punic war, the census figures should have risen more rapidly than they did. (3) If the Roman treasury had possessed extensive public lands for leaseholds before the Punic war, the Roman tax upon citizens might have been alleviated, as it was not. (4) Later references to *ager publicus* in the inscriptions of the Gracchan land commissioners (see *Jahresbericht für Altertumsw.* 144, p. 277) and in literary sources all point to land acquired in the Punic war and after (with exception of the *ager Gallicus*). Cardinali, *Studi Graccani*, and Soltau, *Hist. Vierteljahrsch.* 1913, 465, recently attempted to support the annalistic view.

45. Rome learned after the conquest of Sicily that conquered territory was often considered the public domain of the victorious state. To be sure, Rome did not at once adopt this theory for permanent application, but the discovery of it had a certain effect in making the senate more ready than before to expropriate land. The effect is seen in Rome's treatment of revolting south Italians at the end of the Hannibalic war.

CHAPTER VI

ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY

The First Punic War

THE Sicilian city of Messina, the parent city of the ill-fated Messina which was recently destroyed by earthquake, gave Rome her first occasion to extend her empire beyond Italy.¹ A band of Campanians who boastingly called themselves Mamertini — the sons of Mars — took possession of Messina while serving as mercenaries in the army of Syracuse. During the years of anarchy which followed the death of the Syracusan tyrant, Agathocles, these Mamertines extended their rule over several cities of northern Sicily. When, however, Hiero II established himself in Syracuse about 274, he set out to check this new power and win back what his city had lost. In 268 he gained a decisive victory over the Mamertines and was on the point of investing Messina, when the Carthaginians, who now possessed a full half of Sicily and did not wish Hiero to grow too strong, ordered him to desist. The Carthaginians then placed a garrison in the city on the pretext that they wished to protect its independence from the encroachments of Hiero; but the Mamertines very evidently did not desire that kind of independence, and they secretly voted to induce the garrison to leave and to ask the Romans for a protecting guard. The garrison was accordingly disposed of, and an appeal was sent to Rome for an alliance and a detachment of troops.

What were the Romans to do with such a request? The debate on the question was long and intense. From the point of view of international practices and of previously existing treaties no serious objection could be raised. Since Rome was sovereign at Rhegium on the coast of Italy, less than two miles from Messina, her interests were as much involved in

the place as those of either Carthage or Syracuse. There were no treaties which forbade Rome to hold alliances in Sicily.² On the score of respectability there could be no serious objection to an alliance with the Mamertines,³ for although they had seized Messana by force, that event was now a whole generation past, and in the meantime they had established their position among nations and had been recognized by both Carthage and Syracuse as a treaty-making power of good standing. And what could have been shocking about the capture of a city when Sicilian history was filled with accounts of usurpations? Hiero had himself seized the throne by a *coup d'état* just a few years before. Furthermore, when the Mamertines asked for aid, they were, so far as we know, autonomous,⁴ and Rome therefore would not have to break the old fetial rules in granting the request. Nothing except the question of expedience need influence the senate in its decision, and yet the senate found itself unable to decide. The conservatism of old, experienced men came to the fore, men who realized the dangers, who must discover ways and means in case Carthage resented the alliance and tried to drive the Romans back, and who must bear the brunt of criticism in case of failure. These men knew also how vast the federal structure already was and how easily it might crash to the ground if the foundations of faith and respect were shaken by defeat abroad.

Rome was now a democracy, and so when the senate refused to give a favorable answer to the Mamertines the jingoes took the matter to the plebeian assembly. The populace voted to accept, "for," says Polybius, repeating the words of the aristocratic Fabius, "the military commanders suggested that the people would individually get important material benefits⁵ from it."

There is every reason to think that few men at Rome saw the seriousness of the step that was being taken. They could hardly have realized that they were bringing on a terrific war which would last for nearly a quarter of a century. The senate's management of the opening maneuvers demonstrates the fact that it hoped to invest Messana without a

contest and that it had no intention at first of trying to secure Sicily. The first consul sent to garrison Messina went with only two legions (Polyb. I, 16). When an armed contest ensued, the senate dispatched a full force of four legions, but reduced this by half the next year (I, 17), apparently not intending to conduct an aggressive war. On hearing, however, that Carthage was making serious preparations, it again sent a full force to storm Agrigentum, and then finally during the fourth year conceived the idea of pushing the war vigorously until the enemy should be swept from Sicily (I, 20). And it is not till then that Rome made any effort to build a navy, without which little could be accomplished.

In view of this behavior, it is probable that the senate accepted the investment of Messina provided every effort were made to avoid war.⁶ But what was the need of gaining control over Messina? The argument as briefly presented by Polybius (I, 10) is just the kind that would convince any modern government. Carthage had expanded till she now controlled all of northern Africa, the south of Spain, Corsica, Sardinia, and the western half of Sicily. Now, though there is no indication that either Rome or Carthage resented bigness and success in each other, the methods of Carthage were objectionable to her neighbors. Her imperialism was of the oppressive and exploiting kind that often betrays itself in commercial nations. Her whole policy was mercantilistic. Navigation and embargo acts followed her army and navy. Her ambition was to gain possession in order to exclude other nations' vessels and control a monopoly of trade,⁷ and vessels that sailed in her closed seas were sunk. Now Rome was little concerned about maritime trade—in fact, the farmer-senators had always signed the trading treaties presented by Carthage, treaties which secured all the commercial advantages to Carthage and gave Rome few in return. What did they care for such things? But they were anxious for the political safety of southern Italy, which the Punic encroachment was endangering. If Carthage obtained Messina, her strong fleet could

block the narrow roadstead of less than two miles that led to Rome's southern allies and the Adriatic colonies. She also could readily invest Rhegium, which lay across the straits, a thing she had in fact showed some intention of doing⁸ in 282. The past history of Carthage proved that such fears were not figments of the imagination, and it was clearly the prudent course to grant Messana's request for an alliance and keep the Sicilian straits from falling into the power of a state which practiced the doctrine of *mare clausum* whenever possible.

But underneath the whole discussion in the senate doubtless lay the consciousness that this body would soon lose control of the matter. Ambitious leaders would secure the consulship, stirring up the popular imagination with jingo speeches, force the hands of the senate, and entangle the state in a war. And that is what occurred. It is significant that the populace selected a Claudius to conduct the expedition. He made short shrift of peaceful parleys and brought on a contest of arms. *Appius indixit Karthaginiensibus bellum* says Ennius,⁹ in a blunt hexameter that befits the occasion. The senate later took its revenge by denying Claudius a triumph, although he had won two decisive victories,¹⁰ but this was poor consolation. The consuls continued to lead the armies farther and farther afield and the senate had to shoulder the full burdens of responsibility.

This is hardly the place to rehearse the tedious history of the war, which can readily be found in the comparatively trustworthy sketch of Polybius. The events that reveal the evolution of Rome's purposes can be briefly told. When Claudius, the Roman consul, arrived at Rhegium, opposite Messina, he found the Carthaginian fleet policing the straits, but he borrowed transports from the Greek seaport towns,¹¹ eluded the enemy's navy at night, and effected a crossing. Beyond Messina he found the Carthaginian as well as the Syracusan armies laying siege to the city. With them he entered into negotiations, but coming to no results, he attacked the two armies separately and succeeded in relieving Messina. His success induced a great number of

Sicilian cities — both Syracusan and Carthaginian subjects — to declare for Rome, and even Hiero offered to pay an indemnity and become Rome's "friend." He was received with open arms and became Rome's loyal supporter for the rest of his long life. Rome now reduced her army for a year, but the next year, hearing that Carthage was gathering a large mercenary force of Gauls and Spaniards, she sent a force of about 30,000 to lay siege to the stronghold of Agragas (Agrigentum), which was taken after a six months' siege. At this point, Polybius says, the senate decided to drive the enemy from Sicily. There was little use, however, in attacking the seacoast towns without the aid of a fleet, and up to this time Rome had apparently possessed no vessels of war. She therefore undertook to construct a large fleet,¹² using a Punic ship which had run aground as a model. The consul of 260, Duilius, who had probably never set foot on shipboard before, took charge of this mushroom fleet and annihilated the Punic navy,¹³ which had long been mistress of the seas. The next year the senate demonstrated the earnestness of its purpose by attacking both Sardinia and Corsica, and capturing the latter.¹⁴ When the Carthaginians attempted less aggressive tactics, hoping thus to weary the enemy, the Roman fleet fought its way to Africa (256) and landed an army before Carthage in the hope of forcing terms. This army, however, was badly defeated, and to add to the disaster, the Roman transports which were carrying the remnants back to Italy were shattered by a storm. For fourteen more years the contest went on with varying results, a contest in which upon the sea alone the Romans lost some two hundred thousand men.¹⁵ Finally, with a fleet built by private subscription, Lutatius Catulus severed communications between Carthage and her Sicilian army (242) and at last forced the tireless general, Hamilcar Barca, to acknowledge defeat. By the terms¹⁶ of the treaty Carthage surrendered her possessions in Sicily, and bound herself to pay a war indemnity of 3200 talents (nearly four million dollars) in ten annual payments, to give back her prisoners of war, and to cease employing Italic soldiers as mercenaries.

Rome henceforth had control in Sicily. The Syracusan state with its subject cities became an "*amicus*" of Rome, and Messina and some of the other cities which had been independent before Rome's arrival became *socii*. The whole western portion, heretofore tributary to Carthage, now by right of conquest became tributary to Rome.

And it was because Rome now acquired a tribute-paying dependency that the Punic war was epoch-making. Hitherto Rome had built up a federation of autonomous states which had agreed to aid Rome in return for aid, but they were never called upon for tribute. In Sicily, however, Rome fell heir to a dependency, in which the inhabitants were not only political subjects, but tenants of the state which owned the soil. Would Rome adopt the foreign idea or would she extend her own policy of federation? If she adopted the alien principle, she would secure a large annual revenue for the treasury and might look forward to the time when she, like Eastern states, could shift the burden of tax from the citizens to the subjects. But in that case the Roman state would no longer be a respected leader of a federation; it would be an imperial democracy, exploiting the subject for the profit of the sovereign citizen. The temptation of the tribute was alluring, and Rome yielded so far that she introduced the federal idea only sporadically.

In the year 242, then, Rome secured her first subject province and set out on the devious road of imperialism. And since the form of government which she now adopted for Sicily was ultimately to be used in a vast number of provinces, it will be worth our while to consider it in some detail. The eastern end, of course, was not included in the province until after the fall of Syracuse in 212. The principles of sovereignty which Hiero and the Carthaginians were exercising in Sicily with such great profit before 242 were not an invention of theirs. The inscriptions of Asia and the papyri of Egypt have revealed the source of these principles in the monarchies of the East,¹⁷ which borrowed them from Alexander, who in turn had acquired them from Persian practices. They appear most clearly in the docu-

ments of the Pergamene, the Seleucid, and the Ptolemaic kingdoms. In the Seleucid kingdom, for instance, we find that the king claimed as a sovereign right personal ownership of the soil. The territory in the kingdom was divided into two great divisions. One part, inhabited chiefly by Greeks, was given over to the cities to govern. Of such land the king might disclaim ownership in lieu of support and relief from governmental burdens. To particularly loyal cities he might grant remission of taxes, but from the rest he could exact a fixed lump-sum tax apportioned according to population and wealth. The other part of the kingdom — chiefly farming country cultivated by native tribes which were not organized into cities — the king claimed as a royal possession. Choice portions of this he might prefer to treat as his personal estate, and sublet, sell, exploit by slave labor, or use as hunting ground. On the rest he might permit the natives to live as lifelong hereditary tenants upon the payment of a tenth or fifth of the yearly produce. The territory of the Seleucids therefore was divided roughly as follows :

- | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|--|
| I. Dependent but autonomous cities | { | (a) immune from tax.
(b) taxed a stipulated sum
which the city officials
gathered. |
| II. Villages and country districts | { | (c) Royal estates either leased
to tenants or worked by
paid labor and slaves for
the king.
(d) Tithe-paying hereditary
tenantry. |

This system Hiero and the Carthaginians seem to have adopted, modifying it, however, by extending the idea of royal ownership even over the cities of class I, as had been done in Egypt. As a result, class (b) practically merged into class (d), that is to say, although the autonomous city governments of class (b) remained, the inhabitants paid their tithes directly to the king's contractors and they were

considered the king's hereditary tenants. Class (a) remained in Sicily in a few cases at the good will of the king.

Now, Rome adopted this system — which she called Hiero's — with some modifications. The changes were due partly to the insertion of some ideas from her own federal system, and partly to the desire to elevate some cities which had served her in the wars and lower others which had proved hostile. The greatest of these changes were instituted during the Second Punic war, when the new tyrant of Syracuse after Hiero's death was deposed for giving aid to Hannibal. Our information regarding Rome's system comes mainly from a passage in Cicero's Verrine oration of the year 70 B.C. (III. 12-14): "We accepted the sovereignty of the Sicilian cities with the understanding that they should continue in the same legal position in which they were . . . (1) A very few of them were taken by force of arms, and though accordingly their land became Roman public property (*ager publicus*) it was given back to the former possessors (on leaseholds). The renting of this land is in the hands of the Roman censors. (2) There are two allied states where no tithes are collected, Messana and Tauro-menium (in V. 56, he adds a third, Netum). (3) Then there are also five cities free from taxes though not allied: Centuripæ, Halæsa, Segesta, Halicyæ and Panormus. (4) All the rest of the Sicilian land is subject to tithe and indeed was so before our conquest even in accordance with their own institutions."

Let us compare this classification with the Oriental grouping given above. Cicero's class (1) is Roman *ager publicus* acquired by right of conquest. This had therefore in the main been the personal estate of Hiero and the public land that the Carthaginian state had owned. When Rome displaced these powers as sovereign she inherited the direct ownership of such tracts. She probably added to them some territory confiscated from hostile cities. This therefore corresponds to class (c) of the Seleucid scheme. It is to be noticed that Rome allowed the existing renters to remain on this land whenever they desired to do so. Cicero's

class (2) does not correspond to anything in the Seleucid system, for it is an extension into Sicily of Rome's own federal system: Messina received an alliance like that of Naples as early as 264. Tauromenium¹⁸ secured special terms by a bargain in the Second Punic war. Of Netum we know nothing. It would seem that Rome's original idea was to extend her federal system into Sicily, but that later, when she learned how much more lucrative Hiero's policy was, she adopted that instead. Cicero's class (3) corresponds to the Seleucid class (a). Cities immune from tax at the good will of the sovereign therefore had probably existed under Hiero's system. Rome, however, in adopting the idea of the "immune" city, did not necessarily reward the very same cities that the former sovereigns had. She had her own reasons for punishing and rewarding. Halæsa, Halicyæ and Segesta received their favored positions because they were among the first to declare allegiance to Rome. The last named profited in addition because a legend had grown up to the effect that it was founded by a remnant of the Trojans of Æneas' crew — a story not forgotten by the laureate of Rome.¹⁹ It was enriched by an increase of territory. Why Centuripæ and Panormus were favored we cannot say, for they were both taken by storm. Perhaps they were rewarded for good services in some later war. Cicero's class (4) corresponds to the Seleucid group (d) but also includes the group (b) in accordance with the policy of Hiero and the Carthaginians. The sovereigns in Sicily had, as we have already noted, borrowed from Egypt the idea that ultimately all the soil belonged to the sovereign and should be taxed directly by him. This class included fully three-fourths²⁰ of the cities of Sicily, a state of affairs which had doubtless existed before the Roman invasion. Rome simply kept these cities in the same condition as before because most of them had neither aided nor withstood her in the Punic war. It will be seen, therefore, that the Oriental system as modified successively by the Seleucids and Ptolemies, by Hiero and the Carthaginians, was finally applied by Rome to Sicily in the following manner: —

I. *Ager Publicus* (about 6 communities) owned by the sovereign people.

II. Allied cities (3) members of the Roman federation.

III. Free cities (5) independent and free from obligations on good behavior.

IV. Tithe-paying communities (about three-fourths of Sicily).

It would be interesting to know whether the senators comprehended the theory of state ownership, the practical results of which they adopted.²¹ Did they claim full ownership of the soil in Sicily — later lawyers called it *dominium in solo provinciali* — as the Ptolemies did in all the soil of Egypt? In other words, did they at first consider the tithe as *rent* paid by tenant to owner, or as *tax* paid by the governed to the state? These questions we cannot answer, but it is probable that in the beginning the Romans simply adopted the Sicilian tithe system as they found it without formulating the legal principle underlying it. By Augustus' day, of course, the theory of state ownership must have been accepted, since colonies were then planted in Sicily. But it is significant that this was not done earlier, and that, for a century after the acquisition of Sicily, the principle itself was only sporadically employed in conquered territory except when the Romans found it in use before their arrival. In other words, the Romans, though ready to benefit by continuing the practices of the Oriental idea, long hesitated before applying it independently. How further contact with this foreign system gradually developed a legal interpretation of its significance we shall presently see.

We come now to the practical question which Rome had to face in the financial administration of her new possessions. The allied cities presented no difficulties, for they were treated as the Italian allies had been. The five new "immune" cities took care of themselves, and they gradually came to be treated like the allies. The Sicilian *ager publicus* fell into the same general category as the land of this nature in Italy which the Roman censors rented on leaseholds of various kinds. The only difference was that in Sicily prudence

required the retention of the native tenants so far as possible. The tithe-paying communities, however, were an entirely new problem to the Roman finance department; and here Rome followed the path of least resistance, simply continuing Hiero's system²² of tithe gathering and introducing no changes not absolutely necessary. Fortunately for the Sicilians, Hiero, fearing that his subjects might, if oppressed, revolt to Carthage or Rome, had devised a fiscal machinery which precluded extortion and abuse. He had not imposed a fixed money rent. The reason for this was that, owing to the uncertainty of the rains in Sicily and the impracticability of irrigation, crops varied much from year to year. It was obviously less burdensome to the farmer, therefore, if he might deliver in kind a certain percentage of whatever his produce might be. The tax upon cultivated fields was a tenth of the yield, and for grassland it was a stipulated tax upon the cattle that pastured there. The tax collecting was not done by state officials — the ancient state was averse to burdening itself with a permanent staff of salaried agents — but was farmed out to the highest bidders. In Sicily these individual contractors usually served in comparatively small districts, whether because no business corporation existed large enough to undertake the whole task, or because Hiero for reasons of policy prevented the formation of a financially powerful association. Finally, in order to prevent extortion — which usually develops in a contractor system of tax collection — and in order to retain the loyalty of his subjects, Hiero curtailed the powers of the collectors by providing that local officials in each city should make up the requisite census of landholders which served as a basis for estimates. In this way representatives of the taxpayers were provided to guard against the greed of the collectors, and, on the other hand, officials of the state to examine possible misrepresentations of the taxpayers. If a dispute arose between collector and peasant regarding an estimate, the burden of proof lay upon the collector, and the trial must be conducted in the district in which the taxpayer lived.²³ This system Rome adopted outright, and,

in order that it might remain advantageous to the Sicilians, provided that the bids should continue to be made in Sicily — not at Rome — and in small lots, so that native collectors might continue to contract for the business. Thus Sicily was long protected from the publicans of Rome who later became so sinister a power in the state; and even in Cicero's day we hear that Sicilian cities availed themselves of the privilege of farming the neighborhood taxes to save their citizens from collectors' profits.

Regarding the amount of revenue which Rome received from Sicily, we are not as well informed as would be desirable. The eight most highly favored cities yielded nothing; the *ager publicus* yielded of course whatever rental the owner could get from it, but this area was a very small part of the whole. We are told by Cicero that the yield of the wheat tithe in the year 73 — which seems to have been a fairly normal year²⁴ — was worth nine million sesterces, *i.e.* about half a million dollars (with money having about the same purchasing power in terms of wheat as to-day: three sesterces per modius at the granary). The tithe upon all the other products of Sicily would hardly be as much, since the island produced mainly wheat. There were also harbor dues in the form of a five per cent export tariff and, assuming that Sicily could spare for export an additional tenth of her crop, this duty would amount to about \$50,000. All in all, therefore, Rome collected from Sicily approximately one million dollars besides her rentals on public land. If we accept Holm's estimate²⁵ of 2,500,000 inhabitants for Sicily and deduct about one-fifth of this number for the untithed portion, we may fairly estimate that Rome's revenues from the main population of Sicily amounted to about fifty cents per capita.

Thus far we have dealt only with Rome's method of securing and managing the Sicilian revenues; there still remains the question of the political administration of the new possession. At first Sicily may have remained under consular supervision, though of this we know nothing. By 227, however, a characteristically Roman method of administration was invented, which was employed during the Re-

public for all the possessions later acquired outside of Italy. Rome had no desire to disturb the city government of Sicilian communities, or to assume the burden of supervising them, but three things she must do. She had to provide a military power strong enough to guard the island from recapture, she had to authorize an official to see that the dues were legally collected, and she had to have a judicial authority at hand to try cases involving her own citizens. For the performance of such duties the people were ordered to elect an additional prætor annually. The Roman prætors, in theory colleagues of the consuls, had long commanded Roman armies, and as commanders had exercised high executive functions. They had supervised the financial dealings of their own military quæstors and for many years they had also been given charge of the administration of justice. Thus the prætorship combined exactly the functions which were called for in Sicily. On the Roman constitutional theory a magistrate must have full right to act according to his own judgment during his term of office, and the only check upon his great power lay in the facts that this term of office was brief and that he might be impeached at the end of it for any abuse of his authority. During his term, however, he exercised almost royal authority, and he assumed not unfittingly the place that former rulers had held in the island. His military services were not often called into exercise, since the prestige of the Roman name was now such that legions could usually be dispensed with. In the collection of dues he had a certain supervisory function, but was not burdened with the details except in disputed cases, when he was required to appoint a board of arbitration.²⁶ The quæstor sent by the home government managed the financial details. His judicial duties were also limited, for the Sicilian municipal courts had jurisdiction over all cases that involved natives alone. The prætor presided only when Roman citizens were concerned and in such cases the Rupilian law — passed in 131 — provided that the jury must consist of fellow-citizens of the defendant, whether he be Sicilian or Roman.

It seemed, then, that the new province was thus provided

with an efficient government. Time proved, however, that there was one serious flaw in applying the old Roman theory of magisterial power to the office of provincial ruler. The administrator who abused his powers in dealing with Roman citizens was certain to be called to account, but who would protect the interests of provincials several hundred miles from Rome if the prætor chose to override legal restrictions? ²⁷ A special court wherein provincials might air their grievances against unjust governors was presently provided at Rome, and the Roman tribunes usually showed a commendable zeal — born of party animosity against senatorials — in bringing delinquent governors to the bar of justice. Still it was an expensive undertaking to carry cases to Rome. It seems now that the interests of the provincials would have been better safeguarded by restricting the powers of the prætor to some extent, but the Roman constitution was based upon the theory of strong and unhampered magistracies, and it was difficult to override the conviction that *mos maiorum* was infallible. Suffice it to say that few cases of maladministration were reported for a century, *i.e.* during the time when traditions were still sound at Rome. Later, when the state's sense of honor was breaking down under the stress of revolution, legal checks, whether at Rome or in the provinces, would have availed little.

The cities of Sicily, even those which were subjected to the Roman tithe, were left autonomous and continued to issue their own coins. In fact, the right of coinage was extended to a dozen cities ²⁸ which had not enjoyed it under Hiero and the Carthaginians. The forms of government varied in different cities, but they were in general more democratic than those which Rome had established in Italy. Although a senate (*boulê*) usually existed, it was frequently a closed corporation, membership in which conferred dignity rather than important power. These city governments with their local administration were left quite intact by Rome, except that her assumption of sovereignty removed once and for all any ambitions which such governments may have had with regard to dabbling in the larger problems of

foreign affairs. This fact naturally circumscribed their activities and tended to elevate the *boulê* over the popular assembly, since the business with the sovereign—usually matters of little importance—was more gracefully and expeditiously transacted by the smaller and more dignified body. This does not mean that the senate deliberately pursued a policy of oligarchizing the local governments, though historians often claim to find proof of such a policy. To be sure, several cities which fell into factional feuds asked the senate for aid in the writing of sounder constitutions, and in such cases the envoy sent by the senate was likely to bring aristocratic ideas from his own political circle at Rome. But even in such instances—for example Halæsa,²⁹ Agrigentum, and Heraclea—the Roman lawgiver made as few changes as possible, and the Verrine orations are full of indications that the Sicilian municipal governments still differed radically from the Roman form devised for her own foundations in Italy. In such matters Rome usually pursued a policy of *laissez faire*.

Whether Rome made any effort to prevent the growth of a communal feeling throughout Sicily by means of commercial or marital restrictions, as she had among the conquered Latins, we do not know. For some reason, Segesta,³⁰ one of the most favored and friendly cities, was closed to general *commercium*, while Centuripæ, a city of the same class, was not. That is as far as our knowledge goes. There may have been a particular reason for the restriction in the case of the former city. The closing of a community's lands to *commercium* was far from being an unmixed evil, since Sicily was in danger of falling under the bane of the plantation system. It will be remembered that Segesta had received a grant of territory from Rome and it was well that this should not be exposed to the general market of Sicilian plantation owners. At least the restriction had a beneficent effect, for this city is later not in the list of those distressed³¹ by the evils of the *latifundia*. Is it too much to suppose that there were men before the Gracchi who understood agrarian tendencies?

If we should attempt to estimate the benefits to the subjects of the newly created provincial government, we should perhaps be assuming a work of supererogation. For, while the Romans desired their provinces to be ruled efficiently, they measured results from the point of view of the state, not from that of the provincials. The Roman prætor was hardly expected to be a director of a charitable organization. Yet as prudence must have a seasoning of sympathy to be effective, Rome's administration, at least in the early days, endeavored to secure the good will of the governed. Of the later days of civil war and Verrine brigandage we need not speak here, for the Republic was then a wreck, and the province suffered less from Verres than did Rome from Verres' political master, Sulla.

On the whole, Sicily, at least western Sicily, benefited by the change of sovereigns. In fact the Sicilians showed by their readiness to revolt from Carthage in 263 and their loyalty to Rome during the Second Punic war that in their estimation Rome was the better ruler. Carthage was notoriously a hard taskmaster and it is probable that had she gained complete control in Sicily she would have increased her tributes and monopolized the Sicilian trade. Rome, to be sure, was a firm overlord, but she had the name also of desiring to deal justly. Carthage had billeted armies and kept up a constant petty warfare on the island. Rome's policy was to strike hard till a war was over and then maintain peace by her very prestige. Sicily had never before known an era of peace such as followed the Roman occupation. With security, freedom from armies, and exemption from levies,³² the islanders were more than repaid in material gains for the moderate sum that was sent to Rome in tribute.

Various chance references to Sicily indicate that the government did something by way of safeguarding the provincials from the greed of Rome's own citizens. We are told that the prætor was carefully restricted in the matter of accepting gifts and in making purchases.³³ He had not even the right to buy himself a slave in the province except

to fill a vacancy in his service. The provisions for native jurors in the prætor's courts,³⁴ for native censors and tax collectors, and for special courts to hear the cases of provincials against their governors, all these things prove that the sovereign state entertained enlightened views upon its responsibility as a master.

The governors of the province for the first century of its history represented the best type of Roman. The first prætor was the famous democratic leader Flaminius, and his services to the Sicilians were long remembered with gratitude. Valerius Lævinus, who governed the province for three years during the Hannibalic war, gave much of his time to the encouragement of agriculture. The elder Scipio Africanus was wise enough to see that social intercourse with the Greeks and sympathetic regard for their customs gained the allegiance of the provincials without belittling the governor. His heir, Scipio Æmilianus, who finally razed Carthage, invited the Sicilians after his victory to reclaim from the spoils of Carthage whatever had once belonged to them. In fact, the list of Sicily's governors included most of the great names of the period.³⁵ It would be hard to imagine that under such men the province would have been exploited for the profit of Roman citizens.

[The few scattered references in Roman authors that bear upon the matter seem to indicate that the senate did not further the special interests of Roman land seekers in the province. Just as the tax farming was largely left in Sicilian hands, so too the land remained in their possession. No Roman or Latin colony was sent to the island during the Republic. Some of the vacant lands of the west were given to Segesta.³⁶ After Morgantia revolted during the Second Punic war, the city was colonized by a Spanish troop, and the vacant Agrigentine lands were given by the senate to Sicilians of other cities. About the same time Rome sent a proclamation to Greece to be read at the Olympic games promising their former estates to all Greeks who had emigrated for fear of the Hannibalic war. Finally, Rupilius in

131 resettled with Sicilians the city of Heraclea which had suffered in the Servile uprising.

But if the new régime had wrought changes in Sicily, how much more profound were the effects of the acquisition of this, her first province, upon Rome. When the Sicilian quæstor sent the home market nearly a million bushels of wheat per year, he supplied about a third of the demand which had hitherto been satisfied by farmers near the city. The land released from grain production usually fell into the hands of capitalists engaged in cattle raising and fruit culture, and the steadier population of small-farm owners diminished in the rustic wards about the city.

No less significant were the social changes after the war. The nobles of Rome who had campaigned in Sicily for so many years had often established their headquarters in the splendid Greek cities of the island, and there they had been initiated into the refinements of an old culture and an atmosphere of art and letters which shamed them into new ambitions. In Hiero they found a willing cicerone who must have experienced a cynical satisfaction in displaying the triumphs of Greek culture to his conquerors. In the theater of Syracuse he doubtless showed them performances of Euripides and Menander; in the temples, the masterpieces of Praxiteles and Apelles; in the libraries, histories which contained even the legends of early Rome — some of which probably the Romans themselves did not know. All this made no small impression. A year after the war a Roman schoolmaster was asked to translate some of the Greek plays so that the Roman games might have something better than races and fights to offer, and presently Hiero was invited to Rome to see how well his lessons had been learned. It is not surprising that Livius began with tragedies from the Trojan cycle, when Segesta had already profited by flattering Rome with a myth of common descent from Troy. Presently too a soldier who had campaigned in Sicily wrote the story of Rome — her first native work — in a pedestrian imitation of Homer's epos; and senators

who had doubtless learned the language in Sicily embellished the dry, priestly records of Rome with their best Greek so that the cultured world might know that Rome had a history of which to boast. It was in the Pyrrhic war that Rome had first become conscious of her existence, and in the Sicilian war she found the need for self-expression and the ambition to take her place among the cultured nations of the Mediterranean.

Most of all was Rome's political policy affected by the conquest, not so much by what the Romans learned of Greek political science as by the inevitable consequences of owning and ruling a tribute-paying dependency. The profits accruing to the treasury were sure to tempt the populace to new conquest; and in expanding further the Romans must soon embrace peoples that could manifestly never be included with credit in the citizen body. They must then abandon the principle which had in a larger sense justified the continuance of a progressive extension of Roman law and order through Italy, and adopt a rule based upon the claims of superior force. The wisest of the Romans saw very early that consuetude in ruling a politically inferior people for profit must endanger Roman character, coming as it did before the nation had time to shape for itself a humanizing culture capable of counteracting the poison of insolence. The self-complacency with which the conquerors viewed their subjects overseas soon expressed itself in a new attitude toward their Italian allies. In their eyes the Italians now began to sink to the plane of subjects, and the promises of the great statesmen of 340 were in danger of being forgotten. Living in such an atmosphere, the conquering Romans could hardly discover that their city-state was not, like the imperial monarchies, adapted for empire; that a populace which gained dominion over subject races by means of armed force was merely creating a military power that would ultimately turn upon the state itself and subject it also to the position of servitude it imposed upon others. At present they only reveled in the discovery of "how glorious a thing it was to rule."

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1. Polybius, the most accurate of Roman historians, opens his work with a brief account of this war. Unfortunately, we must confess that his sketch — as is to be expected of an introductory epitome — is far from complete and bears the marks of dealing with chronological sequence in a summary manner. Meltzer's *Geschichte der Karthager* is the fullest modern account of the war. Beloch's *Griech. Gesch.* III, 1, 664 ff., contains an excellent sketch. See also Heitland, *Roman Republic*, I, p. 193, with a tinge of British imperialism in its philosophy; Holm, *Geschichte Siciliens*, III; Niese, *Griech. und makedon. Staaten*, II, 174 ff.; Schermann, *Der erste Punische Krieg*; Reuss, in *Philologus*, XIV; Varese, in *Studi di Storia Antica*, III; and Meyer, *Der Ausbruch des erst. Pun. Krieges*, 1908.

2. Philinus, the pro-Carthaginian historian of Sicily, said there was, but Polybius looked into the matter and found that Philinus was misinformed, Polyb. III, 26. Philinus as secretary of a Carthaginian general was by no means an impartial reporter, see *Unger in Rhein. Museum*, XXXVII, 153.

3. Polybius apparently thinks it was unseemly for Rome to ally herself with a state founded by freebooters, III, 26. In this he is only repeating one of the arguments of the aristocratic opposition to the war as he found it in Fabius (Polyb. I, 10). I doubt not that some senators opposed the war on this ground, and the senatorial writers like Fabius could well afford to make much of an argument so specious when later explaining their opposition. But it could never have been anything but a plausible pretext to cover the real conviction that the alliance was imprudent for other reasons. States do not consider circumstances of twenty-five years past, they must deal with existing nations as they find them; and Messina was in 264 a recognized treaty-making power.

4. Both Polybius (I, 11), and Diodorus (XXIII, 4) are obscure on this point. The only established fact is that there was no Punic garrison in Messina when the Romans arrived.

5. It is easy to see that the urban plebeians would imagine that various benefits might come from further conquest. More land would be opened, grain would be cheaper because connections with Sicily would be established, and plunder would be available. But I doubt whether real economic pressure was evident. Rome had recently been sending all her surplusage of population to colonies, and there was still unsettled land available in the *ager Gallicus* and near Beneventum. We may also doubt whether the majority of the voters — who must have been farmers — cared to see grain prices drop at Rome, their best market.

6. Since Claudius was not granted a triumph by the senate despite his victories, I infer that the senate did not approve of his course of action in settling the dispute by force.

7. Strabo (802) notes that Carthage sank foreign vessels which sailed in her *mare clausum*. See also the Carthaginian treaties with Rome, Polyb. III, 21-4. It must be remembered that these were drawn up by Carthage to further her commerce, and that Rome, still an insignificant agricultural state, was satisfied to accept pretentious but useless privileges in return for what she gave.

8. Polyb. (I, 7) says that this is one reason why Rhegium asked Rome for a guard in 282.

9. Ed. Vah. 223, cf. Livy, XXXI, 1, *App. Claudium consulem qui primum bellum Carthaginiensibus intulit*. This reiteration seems to indicate that Claudius was the leader of the jingoes.

10. The name of Claudius does not appear on the triumphal *fasti* for the year 264.

11. Polyb. I, 20.

12. The building of this fleet is described with great admiration by Polybius, I, 20-23. Reid, *The Municipalities of the Roman Empire*, p. 26, notes, however, that the *corvi* which Polybius admired so much had been used by the Athenians in the Sicilian expedition.

13. The copy of the honorary inscription raised to Duilius is well known, Dessau, *I. L. S.* 65.

14. See discussion in Nissen, *Ital. Landeskunde*, I, 365; Leuze in *Klio*, X, 420; Eliaeson, *Beiträge zur Gesch. Sardin*; and the oldest Scipionic inscription, Dessau, *I. L. S.* 3. Rome probably held Corsica from this time, even though we do not find it mentioned in extant versions of the treaty of 241.

15. Polyb. I, 63, records the loss of 700 quinqueremes, and each had an average of 120 marines and 300 in crew (Pol. I, 26). See Tarn, *Journal Hell. Stud.* 1907, who estimates the loss at 500 ships.

16. Polyb. I, 62: Appian, *Sic.* 2.

Hiero was still king of Syracuse and Rome's "friend" in 241, but his heir lost the kingdom to Rome in the Second Punic war by giving aid to Hannibal. The eastern end of Sicily was then reorganized by Rome, and I shall speak of Sicily as it was after the whole of it had become a province.

17. Rostowzew's study of Rome's provincial land theories (*Studien zur Geschichte des Röm. Kolonates*) is a brilliant work which displaces all previous discussions upon the subject. An inscription of Sardis of great importance to the discussion has recently appeared, published by Robinson in *A. J. Arch.* 1912. For Sicily see Rostowzew, pp. 229-40. Since Rome's system for Spain and Sardinia — which had been wholly Carthaginian — required a fixed money payment from each city, it is probable that Carthage did not exactly follow Hiero's method. Rome, however, adopted Hiero's system for the whole of Sicily.

18. Appian, *Sic.* 5.

19. See Vergil, *Æneid*, V. 718. The story was known to Thucydides

VI, 2, 3) and the Segestans probably made the most of it. Cicero, *Verr.* IV, 72, also refers to it.

20. All of the sixty-five *civitates* of Sicily except five *liberae et immunes*, three *foederatae* and the very few (*perpaucae*) *ensoriae* of Verres III, 12. I cannot agree with Holm, *Gesch. Sicil.* III, 375, that there were twenty-five *ensoriae*. *Perpaucae* could hardly refer to more than a half dozen. Besides not many cities had been taken by storm and some of these (Agrigentum, Leontini, Henna and Hybla) are clearly not *ensoriae*.

21. The old view that Rome always based possession of the soil on conquest has been thoroughly refuted by Rostowzew (*op. cit.*). Klingmüller's attempt to revive it in *Philologus*, LXIX, 71, is unsuccessful.

22. *Verr.* III, 14.

23. *Ibid.* 38. A convenient brief discussion of the *lex Hieronica* is found in Holm, *Gesch. Sicil.* III, 373.

24. Perhaps somewhat above the average; *Verr.* III, 40, 7.

25. The estimates vary from four million to Beloch's very low figures of $1\frac{1}{2}$ million. See Holm, III, 243. Of course there were also many slaves in the third century, but there is no possibility of estimating the number of these.

26. *Verr.* III, 28.

27. Later praetors — about the time of Sulla — discovered the following method of extortion. The senate gave the praetor a certain sum with which to buy grain in Sicily for his troops. It also set the price at which he was to buy. Some thieving praetor found, however, that by ordering the whole amount needed for the year at once upon his arrival — that is, in the spring when grain was twice the usual price — the farmers would rather pay the difference in silver than deliver the grain at a price below the market value. The senate at home was so occupied with factional struggles that it failed to correct such abuses and the extortion passed into a recognized privilege, *Verr.* III, 181 ff. Verres went a step farther and demanded the money outright as his due.

28. See Head², *Historia Numorum*, 115.

29. Agrigentum was given a new constitution by a Scipio (Africanus in 205, or Asiagenus in 193), Heraclea, by Rupilius in 131, and Halæsa, by a Claudius in 95, see *Verr.* III, 122–25.

30. See *Verr.* III, 93 and 108.

31. *Verr.* III, 120.

32. Sicily was exempt from the regular levies to which Italian allies regularly contributed, but in times of stress was occasionally asked for volunteers: Livy, XXXV, 2; XXXV, 23, for the defense of Sicily; XLIII, 12, 500 *socii navales*; Messana was bound by her treaty to furnish one ship, *Verr.* V, 51.

33. *Verr.* IV, 9.

34. *Verr.* III, 28.

35. Flaminius, Livy, XXXIII, 42; Lævinus, Livy, XXVI, 40; XXVII, 8, 18; Scipio Africanus, Tac. *Ann.* II, 59; Æmilianus, Diod. XXXII, 25. Holm, p. 513, gives the list of Sicilian prætors. After the Gracchan times we hear of maladministration: Carbo (114), Servilius (102), Aquilius (101), Lepidus (80), and Antonius (76) were brought to court for abuses in Sicily. Some of them, however, were charged with military misconduct, and Cicero's statement may be true that the Sicilians had not publicly accused a governor before Verres.

36. Segesta, *Verr.* V, 125; Morgantia, Livy, XXVI, 21; Agrigentum, *Verr.* II, 123; Heraclea, *Verr.* II, 124.

CHAPTER VII

THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST

The Hannibalic War

THE liberal democratic movement that had gradually raised the plebeians to the political plane of the patricians by the year 287 and had manifested such propensities for new experiments, for political adventures, and for territorial increase until 260, was apparently checked during the sobering and oppressive war. When the times called for closely reasoned plans and varied experience, it became the senate's duty to assume the burden of direction. And so in the treaty of 241 and in the subsequent administrative schemes devised for Sicily one finds a shrewd and farsighted senate providing for the treasury and the national resources, instead of a popular assembly distributing profits and advantages to individual citizens.

The colonization of the period tells the same tale. During the last ten years of the war two or three small citizen-colonies had been placed on the Etruscan coast, apparently to prevent the Punic fleet from effecting a landing there, and it was doubtless for the same reason that a "Latin" colony was planted at Brundisium in 241. In addition to these, a small citizen-colony was placed at Æsis on the Adriatic: a "no-trespass" warning to the Illyrian pirates, who had been raiding the region and of whom the Romans presently had to take further cognizance. Immediately after the war the full franchise was given to the Sabini and Picentes, thus extending the city of Rome *de jure* across the peninsula to the Adriatic. Thereby the last two of the thirty-five tribes, the Quirina and Velina, were formed. The act was a graceful and liberal recognition of the worth of these

sturdy mountaineers who had fought side by side with the Romans in the last war. In the same year a Latin colony was sent to Spoletium in southern Umbria. Its purpose was apparently to serve as a point of security in the immediate rear of Falerii, which had proved refractory this very year. Therewith ended colonization for over twenty years. The heavy losses in Sicily and the consequent drain upon the population naturally put an end to demands for land, and the few Roman colonies of the time were founded, as we have seen, only in response to pressing military needs. The spirit of adventure and expansion was manifestly in abeyance. And yet that that spirit could readily be stirred into flame by a slight spark is proved by the Sardinian episode which we must now examine. One of the surprising things about the Punic treaty was that Rome had not demanded Sardinia. To Rome, now that Carthage was a bitter enemy, this island, within a few miles of Roman Corsica and within easy striking distance of Rome, seemed to be a menace. Its omission from Rome's demands is only explained upon the hypothesis that in 241 Roman international politics were relatively simple and that questions which would instantly occur to modern diplomats versed in foreign and domestic intrigue did not as yet fall within the range of Rome's knowledge.

When the mercenaries of Carthage who had been denied a part of their promised stipend mutinied and her Libyan subjects revolted because of the oppressive tribute imposed upon them, the Punic garrisons stationed in Sardinia also mutinied and declared the island free from Punic rule. They even sent to Rome offering to place the island in her possession, but Rome refused to consider¹ the offer. In fact, Rome was at the time inclined to conciliate Carthage and to help her in her present difficulties. At a protest from Carthage Rome undertook to prohibit Italians from aiding the revolting mercenaries.² Upon the release of the offending Italians she bought up and sent back all Carthaginians who were in servitude in Italy, and, as Polybius goes on to say, "responded generously to all requests that were made."

It is hardly a brilliant, even if widely accepted, conjecture, that this behavior of Rome's was due merely to a desire to keep alive a nation that still happened to owe her a paltry 1500 talents. If measured by shekels, how could such a sum compare with the advantages that would accrue from the destruction of Carthage? The policy was rather directed by a conservative group of men who happened to be in control of affairs at the time and who genuinely desired to regain the friendship of Carthage. With the annual change of magistrates, however, a change of administrative front towards Carthage was wholly possible.

Carthage, indeed, was prepared not to surrender Sardinia to her rebels without a protest. She sent an army to regain the island, but her troops joined the mutineers and the general was put to death. "Thus Carthage lost Sardinia," says Polybius,³ as though the Punic claims were thus disposed of. Some two years passed without any further effort on Carthage's part to reestablish her rule on the island. In fact, she was using every available man in the struggle at home, and the Romans began to hope that the mutineers in Sardinia would be able to consolidate their power to such an extent that Carthage would abandon every effort at reclaiming the island. And it is not improbable that if they had succeeded in establishing a firm government Carthage would not again have risked an attack. But the troops proved to be poor masters: they fell into quarrels, and were presently driven out by the natives. The fugitives then placed themselves at the service of Rome, asking the senate to take over their claim to the island. Their title was, of course, a trifle dubious, suggesting somewhat the treaties between intoxicated African chiefs and European traders upon which modern European nations have parceled out large parts of a continent. Rome realized that Sardinia, under discordant native rule, would not long maintain its independence if Carthage chose to reconquer it, and she accordingly accepted the offer and took possession. Carthage, however, now rid of her civil war, protested that she had prior claims. It is possible that a modern

court of arbitration would decide that a two-year cessation of efforts under stress of such difficulties would not entail a forfeiture of rights. But of course the question was not submitted to arbitration. The quarrel which ensued ended in Rome's declaring war, and a struggle was averted only by Carthage's surrendering her claims, and, in addition, paying an indemnity of a further 1200 talents. Rome thereupon took possession of Sardinia, without, however, making any serious effort for several years to impose her rule upon the natives. It was enough for the present that the Punic fleet should no longer have occasion to cruise in Italian waters.⁴

The incident is highly important in showing that Rome was acquiring (doubtless under the tutelage of Hiero who knew more about the world's diplomatic ways) a wider view of her possible interest in neighboring lands. It shows also to what extent the senate was ready to disregard the plain dictates of justice for the sake of attaining its own ends. Measured by modern standards, the seizure of Sardinia was the act of an unprincipled bully. It would, indeed, be unjust to rank it with — shall we say, the recent occupation of Tripolis — for Rome could, after all, with not a little show of reason, have advanced the plea that Carthage had abandoned the island. It would perhaps be fairer to compare it with the order of the United States which compelled Colombia to renounce her claims to Panama, a few days after the revolt of the straits-republic. But more important than an odorous comparison is the judgment of Polybius (III, 28), who lived soon after the act and who, in a political life full of varied experiences, had met with many deeds that were worse; who, too, was ready to forgive Rome much, and yet condemned this as having no reasonable pretext or justification. For Rome the chief results of the affair were that it killed the better feeling which for some time had promised to arise between the two states and that it furnished a successful rallying cry to the party of aggression at Carthage, the party which finally rushed the state into a war of vengeance against Rome.

How the political parties in Rome aligned themselves on the Sardinian question we do not know. In fact, there is no reason to suppose that the division on the question followed party lines. However, before long, a discussion arose which divided the populace from the senate in the old manner. In the year 233 a tribune of the plebs, Gaius Flaminius, urged that the so-called *ager Gallicus*, from which the Senones had been driven some 50 years before, be divided into small farms and assigned to citizens who desired such allotments. The senate, led by Fabius, opposed the measure vigorously, but Flaminius nevertheless carried it by a vote of the tribes.⁵ Of course post-Gracchan writers attributed the senatorial opposition to a desire on the part of the senators to keep the land open for profitable leaseholds, but it is very doubtful whether many senators were as yet involved in distant investments. The senate could bring forth serious objections to the law on several counts. It might hold that the state should not surrender a good source of revenue for the benefit of individuals. It might dislike a reversion to the old scheme of virginal allotment which sacrificed the more compact colonial system, particularly since the allotment had to be made so far from home. What could Roman citizenship mean to individuals some 200 miles from the city? Furthermore, the proposed assignment would disregard the principle followed so strictly since the Latin war of sharing new acquisitions with the allies in the form of "Latin" colonies.⁶ There even seems to have been a charge that this legislation would disturb the social order, perhaps for the alleged reason that it would give public property to the listless who had lost their possessions and did not deserve state aid, and, doubtless, for the less openly expressed reason that laborers would be scarce at Rome if they were given lands of their own. At any rate, Polybius, who must have obtained his account from the history of Fabius and interpreted it in the spirit of his senatorial friends at Rome, calls this act "the first step in the corruption of the people."⁵ We are not here concerned directly with the social import of this measure, but it touches the

problem of imperialism at two points. In the first place, the resumption of virginal assignments of conquered land to Roman citizens shows that the old habit of sharing all conquests with allies had now been suspended. Secondly, the distribution of lands to the poor of Rome by the democratic government introduced a very expensive paternalistic principle — carried to its extreme by the Gracchi — which tended to make imperialism a necessity. For, once the conviction had gained a foothold that every Roman citizen *ipso facto* had a right to a plot of ground, the state was forced to surrender its revenue-producing domain within Italy to the crying populace, and, in order to reimburse itself, to extend its tributary domain outside of Italy. To be sure, the evolution of this principle was slow, but the year 233 sees the birth of it in the assignment of the Gallic lands.

About this time Rome became involved in the first act of a farce which later ended in a dramatic episode of serious import. During the third century the Illyrian⁷ tribes of what is now Albania had been gathered into a sort of monarchy, and from neighboring Greek colonists they had learned enough of seamanship to make fairly successful pirates. The Macedonian kings alone were shrewd enough to understand that by employing their services one could escape their depredations. Italic merchants had often appealed to Rome to suppress these marauders, but the senate was little concerned in maritime matters and let things drift. When finally about 230, Teuta, the Illyrian queen, fitted out a whole fleet of pirates, which seized the chief city of Epirus and from this station plundered the eastern shipping of Italy, the senate sent two envoys with the demand that the brigandage be stopped. To this the queen rejoined that she was not inclined to restrain her subjects from their customary occupation. When, thereupon, one of the envoys delivered his ultimatum, he was seized and put to death. Now of course the senate had to act and a Roman fleet quickly broke up the pirate-queen's power. The three Greek communities which she had taken — Corcyra (Corfu), Apollonia, and Epidamnus — were set free and joined the Ro-

man alliance; a part of the kingdom was given to a petty prince, Demetrius of Pharos, whom we shall meet again; Teuta was required to pay Rome tribute for the portion she retained in order to remind her of her past, and Rome herself kept two strongholds that she might command the situation in the future. After this settlement Rome sent embassies to the Greek states most nearly concerned to announce the terms of the treaty and explain her course. The Achæan and Ætolian leagues thanked her heartily, and Corinth voted to invite Rome to take part in the Isthmian games.

However, after a few years' association with royalty,⁸ Demetrius grew as ambitious as he was simple-minded, and when, in 219, he saw that Rome was engaged in a Gallic war, assuming that she cared little for the Illyrian rocks, he began to take possession of the whole region — even the part formally subject to Rome. Vengeance followed speedily. Æmilius Paullus in a short campaign drove the kinglet into banishment, added the island of Pharos and the stronghold of Dimale to Rome's possessions, and apportioned the rest appropriately among petty princes of the region. Thus Rome first crossed the Adriatic. The incident is worthy of notice both because it shows a new policy of protecting Italian waters, and because it proves that the senate avoided the acquisition of territory east of the Adriatic except for policing purposes.

This period is noteworthy also because of a new contest with the Gauls.⁹ For half a century after the expulsion of the Senones in 284 the Gauls left Italy undisturbed. But in 238 some Transalpine peoples entered the Po valley where they were joined by the Insubres (living near modern Milan) and the Boii (the founders of Bologna) for a raid upon Italy. Apparently the same thing occurred now as during the Samnite war when the Celts of the Po saved their own possessions by diverting immigrant tribes upon Italy. The threatened raid ended, however, in a quarrel among the Celts, and Italy was spared. A few years later the movement was again set on foot, provoked perhaps by the fact that the Romans were

then settling their public lands south of Ariminum.¹⁰ This time the invaders mustered an unusually large host, and great was the terror at Rome. A census of able-bodied men immediately available for service was taken all through Italy and an enormous army of over 150,000 men was sent out to meet the enemy in Etruria.¹¹ The consuls won a decisive victory at Telamon (225) and followed this up by invading the enemy's country, hoping, it seems, to crush the tribes of the Po once and for all so that peace would be definitely assured in the future. The Genomani (who lived near Verona) and the Veneti, a non-Celtic tribe inhabiting what is to-day the district of Venice, joined the Roman alliance. The Boii submitted to terms after a severe defeat in 224. But with the Insubres Rome kept up the struggle for two years, even after they had offered terms of peace. Then the two tribes surrendered some of their territory (upon which the Latin colonies of Placentia and Cremona were settled in 218) and submitted to tribute.

It is difficult to determine now what attitude the Romans assumed towards these barbarians during this period. Polybius (II, 35) speaks of them much as the American colonists spoke of the Indians in the seventeenth century: as of 'creatures that have no rights in law, and are the legitimate prey of any civilized nation. But Polybius was a Greek. It seems to be true that Rome desired more than the mere submission of the Insubres. She continued the attack apparently with the purpose of weakening the tribe till peace should be assured.¹² But she probably rested this purpose upon the plea that the history of Gallic raids necessitated such action and not upon a general theory of the inferiority of the barbarian, as the Greek might have done. Proof of this attitude is the fact that the peaceful Genomani and Veneti were never disturbed; their right to the possession of their land was recognized, and they were finally admitted to Roman citizenship. We shall recur to this subject later. At present it is only necessary to remember that this Gallic war had serious consequences, since the two hostile tribes revolted again as soon as Hannibal arrived in Italy, and

gave him invaluable support through the whole war, especially by lending him cavalry.

We now reach the Second Punic war, the importance of which could not readily be overstated. Who has not at his finger tips a list of the "remote and immediate causes" of this struggle? Because of the supreme importance of the event, it is desirable in this instance to examine the validity of the general belief that the two nations involved could not brook rivalry and that the subjection of one or the other of them was an *a priori* necessity. Such a view takes for granted that both nations were bent upon conquest at all costs. This misconception will best be refuted by a full statement of the causes, but it may be worth while to point out that it has its origin, not in a study of Roman history, but in a misapplication of Oriental, as well as of more modern ideals, to Roman methods. Before the history of the eastern states — Babylonia, Egypt, and Persia — was as thoroughly studied as it now is, the possibility existed of loosely grouping their political ideals with those of Greece and Rome and arriving at the popular generalization that the "ancient" state was imperialistic in a sense that, since the creation of the modern "concert of powers," no longer exists. Now it is true that the eastern monarchies were generally imperialistic. The empire of the East was seldom a nation of one tongue, one race, one worship; it was held together artificially by its ruler and his effective instrument, a mercenary army. Conquests which brought tribute — the sinews of the ruler's wars — were absolutely essential to the life of the dynasty.¹³ How different was the Greco-Roman city-state whose very origin lay in the homogeneous small group which constituted its own army, paid its own expenses, and chose its own magistrates from its own body! Even in such a state, of course, greed for conquest might arise, but it would manifestly go against the grain, for the citizen himself must shoulder the danger and the cost, and the conviction is ever present that expansion is suicidal, for the city-state constitution must go under with the acquisition of dependencies.

The monarchical form, on the other hand, was adapted to and lived by conquest and the monarch compelled his subjects to fight for it. Obviously a general comparison between ancient monarchies and republics¹⁴ in this respect is wholly misleading.

Certain modern parallels have also led to a misunderstanding of Greco-Roman ideals. Imperialism has acquired a momentum in medieval and modern times which it did not have in the third century B.C., and we must guard against projecting present-day convictions into that period. The factors in the development of modern imperialism are several — none of which ever influenced Rome. In the first place, the church, representing a religion that demanded worldwide recognition, must of necessity, so soon as it claimed temporal power at all, set up the demand for universal empire. Secondly, the awe-inspiring ideal of the Roman empire inherited through Charlemagne, not only by the central "Holy Roman Empire," but more locally by France, was for centuries an example, comparable to which nothing existed for the Roman republic. And thirdly, modern empires have been built up by monarchical dynasties directed by the same driving force which vitalized the old Oriental monarchies. But the Romans of the third century had no such imperialistic background. To them the history of the great Oriental monarchies was a closed book. The one great conquest of which they knew anything had proved unsuccessful, for Macedonia was then weaker than before Alexander's day. Even the Diadochian powers which professed to follow Alexander had reached a *modus vivendi* which much resembles our "concert of powers." It is safe to say that the idea of universal power never occurred to any Roman¹⁵ before the Punic war. He was accustomed to a world of petty city-states which owned a few square miles outside their walls and did not ask for more. If, therefore, we hope to understand the groping, stumbling, accidental expansion of Rome, we must rid ourselves of anachronistic generalizations and "remote causes" and look instead for the specific accidents that led the nation unwittingly from one contest to another

until, to her own surprise, Rome was mistress of the Mediterranean world.

In order to weigh these causes correctly it will be necessary to review the western policy of the two states interested in Spain at this time, Massilia and Carthage. In the early sixth century a Greek colony from Phocæa in Asia Minor, settled Massilia, a town not far from the mouth of the Rhone. This city quickly grew wealthy in bartering with neighboring tribes and established numerous trading stations along the coast from Nice to Spain. It showed no desire for empire, wishing only to have the privilege of trading in peace. Presently, its traders established posts in Spain for the interchange of goods with the Iberians, among them Emporiæ¹⁶ and Rhodæ in the north, — two flourishing towns in the third century. Other stations for the same purpose were established much farther south, in the region where New Carthage later¹⁷ stood. With the arrival of Carthaginian merchants, however, came the new principle of trade monopoly. Southern Spain became a part of the Punic empire, and Punic ships patrolled the waters, sinking any trader of a foreign nation that dared appear.¹⁸ Naturally, there was trouble between the shippers of the two peoples, and in the end the Massiliots lost their ports in the south. Now the significance of this struggle is due to the fact that Massilia was one of Rome's closest friends and most loyal allies. It is said that Massilia stored Roman gifts in her treasure house at Delphi as early as 396 B.C.,¹⁹ and that she helped Rome to pay the ransom exacted by the Gauls in 387. The old statue of Diana on the Aventine was a copy of the Massilian Artemis. Throughout the Punic war the Massilian fleet appears to have been the mainstay of Rome's navy and, in fact, it won the severest naval battle of the war, if we may believe a recently discovered²⁰ fragment of Sosylos. It was apparently Massilia²¹ that introduced Rome to the Ilian alliance in Asia Minor, which, as it turned out, served to open a way to participation in Asiatic politics. Finally, in payment for many favors, when Massilia was attacked by barbarians in 154, Rome sent an army which

liberated the city,²² and won for it an extension of territory, and special trading privileges among the Gauls.

Carthage was all the while pursuing her own purposes in Spain. An early trading treaty²³ with Rome (dating about 348) had forbidden Roman vessels to trade beyond Mastia in southern Spain, and, as we have seen, about the same time Carthage blocked the Massiliots from their posts somewhat north of this point. For a century, the Punic conquests in Spain progressed slowly. But immediately after the great war with Rome, Hamilcar Barcas, filled with bitterness at the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, set out to establish a Punic power in Spain. There can be little doubt that his intention was to secure control of a sturdy population for the Punic army rather than revenue for the treasury,²⁴ and that his prime motive was to bring a war of revenge against Rome in return for the defeats he had suffered. He met with striking success, for his generalship was superb and his rule was firm, though not oppressive. When in 229 he fell in battle, Hasdrubal, a member of the same family, succeeded to his command and carried on the work of winning over the Iberian tribes even more rapidly than before. The Massiliots realized, of course, that these Carthaginian victories would soon deprive them of all their Spanish trade — for no other nation could trade where the Punic standard was planted. There can be little doubt that it was Massilia²⁵ that drew Rome's attention to Spanish affairs. She had gradually lost a large part of her Iberian trade and in a year or two her flourishing colonies of Emporiæ and Rhodæ would doubtless go under. If Rome cared little for the question of open ports in Spain, the Massilians had other ways of arousing her interest. They could urge that a Punic attack upon Emporiæ would be a declaration of war against Massilia, which, in turn, must involve Rome because of their alliance; and she could din into the ears of Roman senators the reports that were current in Spain that the ultimate purpose of the Barcids was a war of revenge upon Rome. Her diplomacy was effective, at any rate. Rome became thoroughly concerned about Punic advances in Spain, and sent envoys

to Hasdrubal in 226 with requests for a treaty defining that "the Carthaginians should not cross the river Iber in arms." Rome obtained what she desired and presently, in pursuit of the same policy of anticipating Carthaginian success, she entered into a defensive alliance with Saguntum,²⁶ an independent Iberian city of considerable strength, a hundred miles south of the Iber.

Thus matters stood when, in 221, Hannibal, the young son of Hamilcar, succeeded to the command of Spain. He at once subdued the whole peninsula as far as the Iber, with the exception of Saguntum, and then, at the head of a splendidly trained army, in accordance with the plan and purpose that his father had taught him from youth,²⁷ he made ready to bring on a war with Rome. Saguntum, as it happened, offered a plausible excuse, for it had committed some hostile act against a Spanish tribe that was allied to Carthage. By picking up this quarrel, Hannibal hoped to force a declaration of war from Rome and throw the onus of the ensuing conflict upon his enemy. If the declaration came from Rome, Carthage would be forced to support him, which it certainly would not do if he invaded Italy on his own initiative, for the Punic aristocracy which lived by trade strongly favored peace. The capture of Saguntum would, furthermore, wipe out the last unfriendly people in his rear, would enable him to close the harbor to the Roman navy, and would secure him the booty with which — according to Polybius — he hoped to mollify the home government and equip his army for the long march. He accordingly attacked Saguntum in 219 when the Roman consuls were busy in Illyricum, and, after a siege of eight months, captured it. The Romans sent envoys to Carthage, demanding the punishment of Hannibal and, upon the refusal of their request, declared war.

What then were the causes of this war? Livy and Appian, who wish to exculpate Rome, recklessly state that Hannibal broke the treaty of 226 by crossing the Iber to attack Saguntum, not knowing that the city lay a hundred miles south of that river. Polybius belittles Hannibal's provocation to

attack Saguntum and holds that Carthage should have based her grievance upon the seizure of Sardinia twenty years before. This seems to be a very peculiar argument from a statesman of Polybius' experience, for ancient states did not assume the privilege of annulling old treaties on the ground of severity any more than modern states do. Most modern historians assert that Rome's alliance with Saguntum was an infraction of the spirit at least of the Iber treaty; for they assume that the treaty defined the Iber River as the boundary of the Punic and Roman "spheres of influence" in Spain.²⁸ This, I think, is a grave misconception of third-century international politics. Rome had made the Saguntine alliance several years before the war, and yet not a word of protest had been raised against it. Hannibal attacked Saguntum, not on the ground that the Saguntine alliance encroached upon the Punic sphere, but on the ground of the wrongs committed by Saguntum against Spanish allies. In no ancient source is there the slightest indication that Carthage considered her rights in Spain to have been infringed²⁹ by the Saguntine treaty. Polybius, in his very full discussion, does not hint at such a theory. In fact he definitely assumes that Rome had full power to make any alliances she chose with free states in Spain, and asserts that all such allies were entitled to security by the terms of former treaties. Nor did Rome know anything of the modern doctrine of "spheres of influence," although it may have had some meaning for the ancient monarchies of the eastern Mediterranean. Rome's alliances showed in general an abhorrence of loose ends, and always insisted upon clear definitions of boundaries. A penumbra of undefined influence over a hinterland of unexplored territory would have been entirely beyond her understanding at that time. She had hitherto dealt with a patchwork of innumerable city-states and tribes whose petty areas in every case were precisely defined. She had signed at least a hundred alliances with such states, and the jurisdiction of each of these hundred treaties was clearly and definitely known. Not one of them assumed any kind of influence or

interest beyond the precise boundaries of the signatories. Accordingly, although an affair like the Saguntine alliance would call for immediate protest in a day of Monroe Doctrines and African protectorates, there is no reason to suppose that in the third century, when it occurred, it involved any infraction of rights or that it could, in any way, have offended Hasdrubal and Hannibal, except in so far as it revealed Rome's success in gaining an ally coveted by them.

The cause of the war, therefore, was neither desire for world conquest on the part of either power, nor a dispute over predominant influence in Spain.³⁰ The nations came to blows because the Barcid family — whose war policy had met with defeat in 242 and 238 — were able to keep alive the bitter feelings aroused by former defeats and to discover a situation at the right moment whereby they could force their government to support a raid of vengeance upon Italy. If a brilliant son of Hamilcar Barcas had not survived to carry on the policy of his father till the favorable moment arrived, there is not the slightest reason for assuming that Rome and Carthage would not have found a *modus vivendi* in the same way that the neighboring powers of the eastern Mediterranean had.

The purposes of the two contestants are fairly well revealed by subsequent events. Rome, upon whom an unwelcome war had been thrust,³¹ made no move to acquire territory in Spain. She simply tried to end matters by a quick thrust. Knowing that the Carthaginian government had been inveigled into the contest against its wishes, she ordered her whole army and navy against Africa,³² wisely reasoning that Carthage would quickly recall Hannibal if hard pressed. Rome doubtless intended if successful to demand an indemnity and end the affair. Against Hannibal's veteran army of 50,000 she sent only a mere 10,000 new recruits,³³ whose object it was to worry the enemy and hold the mountain passes until the main army in Africa should accomplish its mission.

Hannibal's designs are also made clear by his early maneuvers. Not daring to rely on the home government

for transports, he chose the hazardous land route through Gaul and the Alps. When once in Italy, he hoped to double and treble his army with the Gallic tribes of the Po which had recently been at war with Rome. He did not intend to destroy Rome and make Italy a dependency of Carthage, for the terms of his alliance with Philip of Macedonia,³⁴ made in the heyday of his greatest successes, prove that he assumed Rome would continue a strong power. But he did hope to humiliate her and to cut off her northern and southern allies in such a way that her power would be definitely limited. He did not even hope to gain tributary empire in Italy, for he knew, of course, that Rome's allies would not leave the Italian federation except upon better terms than they were already enjoying. What he actually promised the south Italian allies³⁵ was absolute autonomy under Punic protection, a form of alliance that would have brought little benefit to the Carthaginians, who already enjoyed the ordinary rights of commerce in southern Italy and who would scarcely have dared to propose the establishment of a commercial monopoly there. It was, therefore, not a war of extermination nor of conquest.³⁶ Its purpose was simply to administer a thorough humiliation that would wipe out the disgrace of former defeats.

The war was the severest test of endurance that the Roman republic had yet had to face. Hannibal made his way to Italy with such speed that the senate was obliged to recall the African expedition and itself assume the defensive. The brilliant Carthaginian with his veteran army made quick work of Rome's raw recruits. At Trebia he drove the consul off the field with a loss of 20,000 men, and the next year trapped the unwary Flaminius at Lake Trasimene, where 40,000 Romans were lost. When, however, he called upon Rome's allies to accept his protection, he found to his surprise that there was no response. Then he threatened devastation of their lands and marched the length of Italy, spreading havoc, but still the allies remained loyal to Rome. In battle, however, he had not lost his cunning, for at Cannæ (216) he drew the consuls into an engagement where the

largest army Rome had ever mustered was completely destroyed. Rome lost 70,000 men that day; and eighty senators were among the dead. After Cannæ, when even Roman nobles were ready to give up in despair and consider taking refuge in Greece, it is not surprising that there were some defections among the allies. The Lucanians, Apulians, and Bruttians declared for Hannibal, and, worst of all, Capua, whose forty thousand men regularly fought in the Roman contingent, deserted to the conqueror. Then came word that the Gallic garrison of 10,000 had been wiped out, that Philip of Macedonia was fitting out a fleet to join Hannibal, and that Hiero, the generous ally in Syracuse, had died and that his heir was ready to yield to Carthaginian bribes. Half of Rome's citizens were lost, and a large number of her allies. New troops were raised wherever possible; eight thousand picked slaves were armed for service,³⁷ and promised freedom for good work. A double tribute was levied on all citizens, state loans from citizens and allies were raised by mortgaging public property; and, in order to build a fleet against Philip, an additional graduated property tax was laid upon the wealthier citizens. Finally, the state appropriated all trust funds of widows and orphans, taking upon itself the payment of the trustees' annuities. The drain was terrific and promised to continue a long time, for Rome had learned that Hannibal was not to be met on the field by any chance consul with raw recruits. The state, besides providing an army³⁸ that could watch Hannibal, was obliged to keep a second army in Spain to block the road against Spanish reënforcements; it had to guard northern Italy from Gallic raids, to protect Sardinia and Sicily from Punic attack, to lay siege to Capua and Syracuse, lest defection should seem to go unpunished, to patrol the Adriatic with a fleet in order to prevent Philip from sailing, and, finally, to watch Carthaginian waters lest Punic aid reach Hannibal. For ten years the state persisted doggedly in this Fabian policy of holding its own until the enemy's prestige should wane and resources be found for a direct attack upon Carthage. Finally in 205 the legions brought Hannibal to bay in southern

Italy. Then by a supreme effort the state raised a new volunteer army, equipped it from the gifts of all the Italians, and sent it under the younger Scipio to invade Africa. There after a year of hard drill Scipio faced the enemy, and victorious in two battles, he forced the Carthaginians to sue for peace. According to the terms of the treaty which the Roman senate and people ratified,³⁹ Hannibal was to evacuate Italy, Carthage was to cede Spain to Rome, pledge herself to pay a war indemnity of 5000 talents, and, further, to surrender her war vessels and give hostages until the treaty obligations should be fulfilled. However, before the terms had yet been put into operation, the Carthaginian navy, whether emboldened by the return of Hannibal, or whether through anger at the thought that the navy must be abandoned when peace was established, deliberately attacked some Roman transports. The Punic government supported its navy, and even Hannibal now refused to advocate peace on the terms originally offered. There was nothing to do but to face Hannibal once more in the open field, and at Zama, in 202, Scipio succeeded in winning a brilliant victory over this general who had never before suffered defeat.

The terms ⁴⁰ which Scipio now offered, and which Carthage accepted, were much severer than before. The indemnity was doubled, and Numidia was declared independent of Carthage and given to Prince Masinissa, who had aided Rome. Carthage bound herself to carry on no wars outside of Africa, and to submit her disputes within Africa to Rome's arbitration. These new additions were, therefore, qualitative as well as quantitative. The treaty of 203 had assumed that Carthage would continue as a sovereign state with an empire very nearly as large as she possessed after the First Punic war. The treaty of 202 not only lopped off half of this empire, but made Carthage in fact, if not in name, a Roman dependency — and all the more helpless since her nearest neighbor was to be an ally of Rome. The treaty did not stipulate that Carthage must furnish a contingent for Rome's army — in other words, she was not made an

ally — but within a few years Carthage came to realize that although the position of *socius* might impose certain duties and would formally mark her as a Roman dependent, it nevertheless brought with it the advantages of Roman protection. At any rate, a few years after the war, Carthage is found in the list of Rome's allies.⁴¹

Rome came out of the terrific struggle with great glory, but many of her losses were irreparable, and her gains proved a burden. The conquest of Spain had been a political necessity during the war, since it alone could furnish the enemy with new recruits, and its retention afterwards was, of course, the only conceivable course, but for two centuries this new province cost the state more than it yielded. The Barcids, in order to acquire Spain for military purposes, had imposed only a very light tribute and Rome could not expect to win it from Carthage if she increased these impositions. Consequently, the Spanish tribute was always extremely low — only half a tithe upon its poorly tilled fields.⁴² Furthermore, the Spanish tribes were far from ripe for political responsibilities and they had no love for an orderly régime. The negotiations of the sovereign encountered constant difficulties owing to the fact that the people were divided into innumerable tribal groups. No sooner had a Roman general sworn a treaty with a tribe than it reshaped itself Proteus-like into another form of state and disclaimed participation in the preceding agreement. The policing of Spain degenerated into an undignified and costly guerrilla warfare, disgraced by schemes and stratagems. The Roman generals learned to deal in the tricks dealt them. Nowhere did Roman warfare and diplomacy descend to such devious ways as in Spain. But we shall come to this again. Suffice it to say that at various times during the following century the Roman senate would have been relieved to hear that the whole peninsula had disappeared under water.

The havoc wrought in southern Italy was irreparable. For twelve years the Romans and Carthaginians had driven each other over this region, both sides storming cities and laying waste fields as the best methods of tiring and weaken-

ing their opponents. The inhabitants who did not enroll in one army or the other were captured or driven to other lands. When the war ended much of the territory south of Beneventum was a waste tract, and most of the famous Greek cities on the coast were reduced to a mere handful of poor creatures who huddled together in any corner of their city walls that happened to be left standing. The waste land — perhaps two million acres — Rome appropriated as being without claimants. But what could she do with it? Her citizen body had been reduced by half and if any remained who had no farms of their own, they could find enough near home, for land in Latium went begging on the market. Colonists were not easily found, and yet the state had to find settlers to hold its former conquests in the Po valley if this troublesome frontier was to be protected. Somehow a few citizens and allies were presently collected for a resettlement of the Latin colonies at Cremona and Placentia near the Po, and for the foundation of Latin colonies at the southern cities of Thurium and Hipponium (henceforth called Copia and Vibo); and when Antiochus of Syria in 194 threatened an expedition against Italy at the advice of Hannibal, maritime colonies were sent to hold the exposed seaports of Bruttium and Apulia. But these colonies used up all the state's available men and disposed of but a fraction of the waste territory. The state accordingly tried to devise a scheme that would provide for the speedy development of the rest. The impoverished resources at hand precluded the possibility of reëstablishing intensive farming, but it was argued that if the state would lease large tracts of its land upon easy terms, citizens might be induced to contract for such leaseholds for the raising of cattle and sheep. Ranches would require but few hands; they could be manned with slave labor, if free labor was not available; their products could be marketed more readily than grain, and the state would soon be receiving considerable returns from land now useless. The scheme was adopted, and the terms made attractive. Leaseholds of five hundred acres⁴³ — or even of a thousand acres, if the contractor had two children —

were offered, in order that all the land might soon be made productive.

There can be little doubt that this method of exploiting the land was the wisest possible at the time. But it later led to the irremediable evils of the plantation system with its concomitant evils of slave labor; and it prevented the healthy development of more productive farming when Rome's population was again increasing.⁴⁴ And yet how could the inexperienced government of 200 know that Rome's population would soon reach normal proportions, that it would be difficult to recover the leased lands for colonization, and that the landlord system, once firmly entrenched, would become well-nigh impregnable, to the permanent exclusion of the small farm? Nor did the senate foresee that Rome would one day govern a score of foreign provinces whose armies must draw their strength from Italian farms if the state was to survive. Rome did her best to meet the situation in the light of past experience, but the problem created by the war was too complicated, her experience too inadequate, and later the harm done was beyond repair.

In the Roman constitution the war wrought few changes. The newly acquired province of Spain ⁴⁵ readily fell into the form of government shaped for Sicily. The federation in Italy had stood the endurance test better than could have been anticipated, and the senate saw no reason for introducing any innovations there. In fact, because of the general satisfaction, the senate even grew negligent about making several well-deserved promotions towards citizenship. The old city-state government at Rome had proved itself versatile enough to meet the exigencies of the war. To be sure, the early losses on the field had been appalling, and it is usual to assert that these heavy losses were due to an oligarchical system which placed annual civil magistrates at the head of the army.⁴⁶ This criticism is not entirely justified. The senate, as a matter of fact, did not adhere to the constitutional principle very closely. Just as soon as a commander had proved himself efficient, he was kept at the head of the legions until his work was done.⁴⁷ The old oligarchical

jealousy of the popularity of individual generals was effectively suppressed. The two elder Scipios, Marcellus, Sempronius, and Otacilius were kept in service until their death. Fabius and Marcellus were elected to the consulship five times and repeatedly held promagistracies in the intervals. Valerius served in the field uninterruptedly for ten years. In the case of the younger Scipio the disqualifications of age were overlooked in order that he might carry the war into Africa, and after he arrived there he was kept in charge until the war was over. In fact, the constitution was so liberally interpreted that it did not in any way obstruct the selection of the best men. The difficulty lay rather in finding any man who could face so brilliant an opponent, for it is not every generation that begets a Hannibal. Even if Rome had possessed a large standing military staff, the chances are that ranking officers would have proved incapable of meeting the extraordinary test, and that this war, like most modern wars, would have had to find its own general. It cannot be said then that this crisis in Rome's history had proved the oligarchical constitution woefully at fault. On the whole, the senate and the people both came out of the struggle well satisfied with their government and its conduct of the war.⁴⁸ The senate had special cause for satisfaction, since it emerged with its prestige enormously increased, and was able for the next twenty years to rule Rome practically single-handed.

But perhaps the most portentous result of the war lay in Rome's new consciousness of her strength. The struggle had revealed an unknown power of endurance, of loyalty, and of persistence in the temper of the Roman people. It had demonstrated that the constitution held the state's resources at a point of quick response. It seemed to prove that the nation was unconquerable. If Rome soon grew impatient with the tedious methods of older powers that merited her respect, if she began to command where she should have followed, if she betrayed an itching desire to impose her form of polity upon neighbors who failed to conduct a businesslike government, and if, finally, supremely

contented with the workings of her constitution, she ceased to remold it to growing needs, how much of this overweening faith in herself was not due to that proud consciousness of her strength which was borne in upon her on the hard road from the Trebia to Zama !

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. Pol. I, 83 and 88. Even Utica near Carthage asked Rome to accept sovereignty over that city. Rome was bound by the treaty of 242 not to make alliances with the subjects of Carthage.

2. Such action would be taken as a matter of course to-day, but our modern rules of neutrality are not old. They are largely due to the efforts of Thomas Jefferson. See *United States Statutes at Large*, I, 381.

3. I, 79.

4. Velleius, II, 38, says that T. Manlius Torquatus subdued the natives in 235. The island, together with Corsica, was placed under a special prætor in 227, as was Sicily. It is probable that tithes were then imposed. However, during the Second Punic war, about 215, the Sardinians rebelled, probably because they were ordered to give extra supplies of grain to the then bankrupt state (Livy, XXIII, 32, 9). Upon being reconquered they were subjected to additional oppression (*Ibid.* XLI, 6). They seem, in fact, to have been reduced to the same class as the *civitates censoriae* of Sicily, if we rightly understand Cicero, *pro Balb.* 41, and *pro Scauro*, 44.

5. Pol. II, 21, and III, 80. A public landmark dating from the Gracchan period has been found in the *Ager Gallicus* (C. I. L. I, 583), proving that Flaminius did not distribute all the public land there. Probably there were not enough settlers for all of it.

6. As late as Gracchan times this point was raised as an objection to virginate assignments. See Appian, *Civ. Wars*, I, 10, and *Lex Agraria*, l. 31 (C. I. L. I, 200). To be sure, the *ager Gallicus* had not been shared with the allies at the time of its conquest, except that a portion had been used for the Latin colony at Ariminum, but the senators probably held that when the time for division came it must be shared in the old way.

7. For the Illyrian affair see Pol. II, 1 ff., and Niese, *Griech. und makedon. Staaten*, II, 281.

8. Pol. VII, 9.

9. The Gallic war is reported in Pol. II, 21-35. For a good summary of the Gallic wars, see Niese, *s.v. Galli*, in Pauly-Wissowa, and Lauterbach, *Untersuchungen zur Gesch. Oberital.*

10. This is the explanation of Polybius, II, 21, which, however, is not entirely satisfactory. The aristocrats, Fabius and Scipio, from whom Polybius obtained his facts, apparently were very severe on the

reputation of the democratic leader, Flaminius. As senatorials they opposed the distribution of the *ager Gallicus* and were all too ready to prove that the distribution of this land caused the calamities of the Gallic war. Polybius' censure (III, 81) of Flaminius is unduly bitter. We must remember that the Transalpine migrations of the Celts which for two centuries had exerted pressure southward from the Black Sea to Spain were not yet over.

11. Polybius, II, 24, has preserved a summary of this invaluable document. The number of able-bodied Italians is given as 770,000.

12. Reid, *The Municipalities of the Roman Empire*, p. 73, calls Flaminius a great expansionist. Doubtless several ideas of the Gracchi as well as of Cæsar had their origin in the schemes of this independent democratic leader; but in Gaul Flaminius seems to have followed the senate's orders. The attack upon the Insubres in 224-2 was a necessary answer to the Gallic invasion of Italy, and the most persistent campaign against the Insubres was led not by Flaminius but by the aristocratic consuls of 222, Marcellus and Scipio. It is also to be noted that the conquered territory was settled by "Latin" colonies at Placentia and Cremona, a fact which points to senatorial methods.

13. Even Polybius (XI, 13) saw that republics were naturally anti-imperialistic, while monarchs were driven to a policy of expansion.

14. On imperialism in Greece and the Hellenistic empires, see Ferguson, *Greek Imperialism*, 1913.

15. To be sure, Polybius represents Scipio Africanus as saying in his harangue to his soldiers before Zama that they were fighting for the "supremacy of the world" (XV, 10). Polybius, who wrote sixty years after the event, could hardly have had a report of the speech. Scipio's whole career proves him an anti-imperialist. The first treaty he signed with Carthage in 203 recognized that state as independent.

16. See their coins in Head², *Hist. Num.*, p. 2; on excavations see Schulten in *Neue Jahrbücher*, 1907, 334.

17. Strabo, III, 159.

18. Strabo, XVII, 802, quotes Eratosthenes (early third century) to this effect.

19. See Christ, *Sitz. bayr. Akad.* 1905, p. 80.

20. Edited by Wilcken in *Hermes*, 1906, p. 103. See also Polybius, III, 95-6.

21. This I think a reasonable inference from the close political connections existing between Marseilles, Lampsacus, and Rome in 196 B.C., as proved by a Lampsacene inscription: Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscr. Graec.*² 276.

22. Pol. XXXIII, 8, 12. For an attempt at a correct understanding of this affair see *Am. Hist. Review*, XVIII, 236. The war in question was undertaken by Rome wholly on Massilia's behalf and all the profits of the conquest fell to Massilia.

23. Considering Rome's close connections with Massilia; it is not unreasonable to assume that Carthage is here adding a clause in Rome's treaty which was devised chiefly for Massilia; Pol. III, 24, gives the treaty.

24. Since Rome later received only half a tithe as tribute in Spain, it is probable that the Punic tribute had also been low.

25. The Roman historians naturally forgot the important rôle of Massilia in the earlier proceedings, since Rome eventually assumed the whole burden of the quarrel. However, Appian, *Hann.* 2, knew that "Greeks settled in Spain" first appealed to Rome against Punic encroachment, and these were, of course, the clients of Massilia.

26. The Massiliot traders may well have suggested this course to the Saguntines, since a Roman alliance would insure an "open door."

Polybius (III, 30) places the alliance several years before 221, but apparently after the Iber treaty. The city was Spanish, as the excavations prove, not Greek, as the annalists thought. But it was strong and well governed, Pol. III, 17.

27. Pol. III, 11, 12.

28. E.g. Heitland, *The Roman Republic*, I, p. 223; Niese, *Röm. Gesch.*⁴, p. 110, footnote 2; Meltzer, *Gesch. der Karthager*, II, 421; Kromayer in *Hist. Zeitschr.* 1909, p. 237; Ed. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, p. 269.

29. Polybius (III, 29) goes so far as to claim that the Carthaginian government repudiated the Iber treaty on the ground that Hasdrubal was not authorized to make it.

30. When the war opened, Rome sent only a small detachment to Spain with the purpose, not of conquering the peninsula, but of holding back Spanish reinforcements until the war should be settled in Africa.

31. Polybius informs us that there were no discussions at Rome, for the reason that the war was thrust upon the state and could not be avoided (III, 20). It would be futile, therefore, to look for party alignment in regard to this war.

32. Pol. III, 41.

33. Pol. III, 40.

34. Pol. VII, 9. Kromayer, *Hist. Zeitschr.* 1909, p. 237, has pointed out the importance of this document in judging Hannibal's policy.

35. Pol. III, 77 and 85; VII, 4.

36. Hannibal hoped, however, to win back the western half of Sicily (Pol. VII, 4) and probably Sardinia.

37. For these various measures, see Livy, XXII, 57; XXIII, 21, 31, 49; XXIV, 11, 18. The *socii navales* furnished but few ships: Livy, XXVI, 39; Tarn, in *Journal Hell. Studies*, 1907, p. 48.

38. Livy, XXV, 3, seems to exaggerate when he estimates the citizen army for the year 212 at 23 legions. However, there must have been at least 15, stationed as follows: 4 with the consuls, 2 as city reserve, 2 with Fulvius in Apulia, 1 with Claudius, 1 in Etruria, 1 on

the Gallic frontier, 2 at Syracuse, 1 on board the fleet operating in Greek waters, and 1 in Sardinia. Besides these, Gracchus had the 8000 ex-slaves in Lucania, and Lentulus had in Sicily the fugitives from Cannæ who had lost their citizens' rights. The Scipios in Spain probably had only allies.

39. These terms are given indirectly by Pol. XV, 1, 7, 8. The portion of Polybius in which the matter was discussed has been lost.

40. Pol. XV, 18.

41. Livy, XXXVI, 4, 10, de classe Carthaginensibus remissum *praeterquam si quid navium ex foedere deberent*.

42. Livy, XLIII, 2, 12.

43. The first reference to this law occurs in a speech of Cato (Gellius, VI, 3, 37) delivered in the year 167. It was doubtless passed soon after the Hannibalic war. I believe this law was made for the purpose of quickly developing southern waste lands. To accomplish this object the senate freely allowed tenants to assume larger leaseholds than the law specified. It is well known that this practice brought intense dissatisfaction in the Gracchan days. This is, of course, the famous law which the annalists erroneously credited to Licinius and Sextius of 366 B.C. Cardinali, *Studi Graccani*, 1912, believes, however, that the annalistic account is accurate.

44. It required several decades, however, before Rome became overcrowded again. During the three decades after the war, Rome's citizen body increased only 25 per cent, whereas the acreage of *ager Romanus* increased 100 per cent. See *Am. Hist. Review*, XVIII, p. 245.

45. The only practical difference was that the *civitates* were allowed to pay Rome specified sums as tribute (in this case, based upon an estimate of half a tithe on produce) instead of an annual percentage in kind. This was the usual Seleucid system, probably established in Spain by Carthage. The cities were, therefore, *stipendiariae* rather than *decumanae*. Of course there were favored cities in Spain as well as in Sicily: several *foederatae*, some *liberae*, and many which, at an early day, secured the privileges of Latin cities. See Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*, I, 251.

46. E.g. Heitland, *The Roman Republic*, I, p. 227.

47. The record of Marcellus, the hero of Clastidium (222) is as follows. He entered the service as prætor, 216, and was stationed near Capua; retained there as proconsul, 215; consul, 214, but still serving at Capua; as proconsul transferred to take charge of the siege of Syracuse, 213; remained there, 212 and 211, when he captured Syracuse; reelected consul, 210, and sent against Hannibal. Kept in command till his death in 208.

48. Party animosity practically vanished during the war so that an "era of good feeling" ensued which it is difficult to parallel in Roman history. The senate constantly consulted the wishes of the assemblies,

for example, in the changing of the money standard and the appointment of a monetary commission in 217 and 216, in the election of a board of public works in 212, and in the proroguing of magistrates in 208. On the other hand, the assembly sometimes delegated its duties to the senate, as in the matter of punishing the Capuans in 210 (Livy, XXVI, 33). This harmony between the parties lasted until Cato secured the downfall of Scipio.

CHAPTER VIII

SENTIMENTAL POLITICS

THE Punic war was not yet at an end when envoys¹ came from Egypt² and Ætolia complaining of unwarranted incursions upon their territory by the unruly Philip V of Macedonia, Rome's recent foe. They desired Rome to aid them. Presently Rhodes and Attalus sent envoys with similar messages and appeals. Lastly came Athens. Her land had been attacked, she had no army, her other friends had already been rendered helpless. Here was a door opened to Rome leading to the whole world of eastern politics. The appeal was flattering for it proved a widespread respect for her power as well as a sure faith in her reliability.

The political confusion in the East that Rome was invited to help disentangle was not an ordinary one. For a number of years there had been a kind of "concert of powers" which had more or less successfully dominated the Ægean world. While the three kingdoms, Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt, composed of fragments of Alexander's empire, had fought one another to a point of equilibrium, the old Greek city-states had largely reestablished their freedom, and had been able to win over an increasing number of cities for the area of autonomy. These free states promulgated the particularistic³ principle of the ancient Greek city-state and during the third century secured its tacit adoption by the monarchies that found such difficulty in forgetting Alexander's example of conquest. In order to understand Rome's participation in the politics of this old world it becomes necessary to review the situation of the more important nations composing it.

The two most important republics of this group were

- Rhodes and Athens. Athens had not regained her autonomy until 229, when Achæa paid the required price to Macedonia for her liberation; and yet because of her great past and because of the number of publicists in her service, she could do something toward creating public opinion and toward holding discordant elements together in a common cause. Thus she was influential, even though wholly negligible in arms.

Rhodes' strength in the earlier days was a direct product of the "Royal" peace and its tendencies (387 B.C.). Later the state fell under Macedonia's sway, but in 305 it asserted its right to autonomy by splendidly resisting the attack of Demetrius. Meanwhile, Rhodes had grown strong, not only because of its situation upon the line of Mediterranean commerce, but also because of its readiness and ability to become the carrier of that commerce. It was of prime importance to this republic that the "concert of powers" should encourage peace and prosperity in the eastern end of the Mediterranean and that ambitious despots should be kept from gaining power enough to monopolize the trade or to close any of the harbors of the Ægean and the Pontus. But Rhodes deserves better than to be weighed in the economic scale and listed upon the ledger as purchasable in drachmas. This community of merchants must have had many statesmen of sterling worth among its leaders. That no Greek state was ever more trusted is shown by the number of appeals it received to arbitrate international disputes, and one has only to remember how the whole Greek world sent it rich gifts with which to restore the city that fell in the earthquake of 224 to realize in what esteem and respect it was held. Rhodes may seem at times to have been officious in her interference with belligerents, since she even undertook to pronounce judgments and demand reparation from the side she deemed in the wrong. Yet her neighbors had learned that Rhodes' decisions were usually fair, that what she desired was the prevention of useless and unjust wars, and that she had no schemes for territorial aggrandizement hiding in the folds of her diplomacy. Other republics of

some note, several of which were accustomed to act in unison with Rhodes, were Chios, Mitylene, Byzantium, Cyzicus, and Heraclea.

In the Peloponnese, the Achæan league, comprising about ten democratic city-states, was the strongest and most respectable power. At the beginning of the third century, when the Diadochi were quarreling over the fragments of Alexander's kingdom, a few of the cities of the Peloponnese had united for mutual defense and had invited their neighbors to rid themselves of Macedonian garrisons and co-operate with them. Thus the Achæan league had originated. It met with moderate success throughout the third century, and occasionally made some effort to include in its membership all the cities of the peninsula, for it realized the value of reaching a natural boundary on every side. At the same time, however, the league restrained undue ambitions, and deserved more friendship from its neighbors than it actually received. Its great misfortunes were that Sparta, its nearest neighbor, was for a long time in the hands of tyrants with whom peace was impossible upon any honorable terms, that a Macedonian garrison had to be admitted into the strategic city of Corinth, whereby the league became dependent upon the will of Philip V, and, finally, that under its federal constitution united action was so difficult to secure at critical moments that the decisions of the league were often ambiguous and tardily carried out.

The Ætolian league resembled the Achæan in form, but differed materially in substance. Its people were more homogeneous, for it was rather a primitive group of cantons than an artificial league of cities. Furthermore, its ideas of international relationships were quite undeveloped; piracy and brigandage were apparently recognized modes of gaining a livelihood. These occupations made the Ætolians good fighters, and an alliance with them secured the double advantage of immunity from their raids and the use of their excellent soldiery.

Finally, among the powers of the Hellenic world that withstood the aggressive policy of the despots, was Attalus,⁴

the ruler of Pergamum, himself a despot. This king — he was the first of the royal line — ruled over territory that his uncle had shaped into an independent state upon the death of Lysimachus in 281, but the title to the territory, as well as to the royal position, was so uncertain that Attalus dared not be unfriendly toward the policy of peace. To his credit be it said that he had from temperamental inclinations associated himself with the best traditions of Greek art and culture, a fact that naturally directed his political sympathies toward the policies advocated by Rhodes and Athens. And thus it is that, though a despot, he is not to be classed with Philip and Antiochus, and that, though territorially and economically the natural rival of Rhodes, he is found at the end of the third century working with the Greek states in favor of a concert of powers.

Around this Greek core were the three Hellenistic empires, — Macedonia, the Seleucid kingdom, and Egypt, — which, after the death of Alexander, inherited the greater part of his world power. The only real nation among them was Macedonia, a state that had been welded together out of simple peasant and herdsmen tribes by Philip II. With this homogeneous nation at his back, what could not Alexander have done toward shaping the whole of Greece into a united nation if he had but applied his genius to such a task instead of pursuing the title of King of Kings! But perhaps the suggestion involves an anachronism, for the full meaning of nationalism was not yet known in his day. After Alexander's death Macedonia lost much of its foreign power and scarcely held its own, even at home, until Antigonus Gonatas (277-39) came to the throne. He strengthened the central government, won the alliance of Achæa, and reestablished garrisons in many Greek cities. His grandson, Philip the Fifth, continued his policy of controlling the Peloponnese by means of an alliance with Achæa. Philip gained his spurs in directing the "social war" against Ætolia, where, if we may believe Polybius, he proved himself a skillful general and a popular ruler.⁵ His success, interpreted by court flatterers in terms that would better befit an Alex-

ander, apparently turned his ambitions toward empire, and we shall presently have ample occasion to note what price he paid for these ambitions.

Antiochus ⁶ III of Syria (222-187) earned his title of the Great by his success in regaining large parts of the interior of Asia that preceding Seleucids had lost. At the end of the third century, he was engaged in the project of winning back Cœle-Syria, which the Ptolemies had taken from the Seleucids in their weaker days and which Antiochus himself had failed to regain in an earlier effort. His plans for the future contemplated an invasion of Asia Minor, where his ancestors had held possessions in the past, and these plans ultimately resulted in the destruction of the ambitious king.

In Egypt ⁷ reigned the third despotic power of the East — the Ptolemies. The first three kings of this house had not been satisfied with their empire on the Nile, and so, availing themselves of favorable opportunities, they had stripped their rivals of Cœle-Syria and the various cities and islands along the shores of Asia Minor and Thrace. Later rulers, however, had been inclined to adopt the particularistic doctrine of Rhodes, knowing that an increase in the number of free states in the northern Ægean would result in the weakening of Macedonia and Syria, and would also aid the commerce in which Alexandria was heavily interested. Accordingly, the Ptolemies kept peace with a large part of the world, subsidized the smaller states of the Ægean, particularly the neighbors of Macedonia and Syria, and made trading alliances as extensively as possible. In fact, we have seen that Egypt was one of the first eastern states to offer Rome her friendship, a circumstance that profited Rome in a very practical way when her grain supply was destroyed by Hannibal.⁸

Such, in brief, was the situation in the Ægean when Rome was invited in the year 201 to join the coalition against Philip V of Macedonia. This Philip, it will be remembered, had without excuse given aid to Hannibal after the battle of Cannæ, and had for several years during the Punic war engaged a large part of Rome's fleet when she could ill

afford to divide her forces. The circumstances of this First Macedonian war were as follows. Demetrius of Pharos, when banished from his Illyrian possessions by Rome in 219, had taken refuge with the ambitious Philip, devoting all his powers to inducing him to attack Rome and build himself an empire in the west.⁹ When Philip heard of Rome's defeats at Trebia and at Trasimene Lake, he decided that the plan was feasible and that he might arrive in time to divide spoils with Hannibal and secure for himself at least a part of Italy. He was obliged, however, to subdue a rebelling Illyrian hireling first, and by the time this was done, Hannibal had won the battle of Cannæ. This battle, of course, changed Philip's plans, for he now knew that Hannibal had anticipated him in Italy. However, with the design of securing as much of Rome's wreckage as possible, he sent envoys to Hannibal to request an alliance on the best possible terms. The shrewd Carthaginian, who did not care to have a rival in Italy and yet was glad enough to permit Philip to draw off some of Rome's forces, made an alliance promising the Macedonian a free hand in Roman Illyricum. In return, Philip was to assist Hannibal "in whatever way the signatories should later determine."¹⁰ The king was doubtless disappointed, but took what was offered and invaded Rome's possessions in Illyricum. The senate heard of the treaty, and, not knowing that Hannibal's jealousy would suffice to keep Philip away from Italy, sent all the forces it could possibly spare against the new foe. Philip's former enemies, the Ætolian league, Attalus of Pergamum, Athens, and Sparta, joined Rome, and for several years a desultory warfare was kept up to prevent the ambitious monarch from leaving the defense of his own country. However, in 207, when Hasdrubal arrived in northern Italy with a strong army to aid Hannibal, Rome had to concentrate all her energies upon a supreme effort to save herself. She had to let Philip into Illyricum, a large part of which he accordingly conquered. The next year when the great danger to Rome was over, — Hasdrubal was slain, and Hannibal shut off in Bruttium, — the senate realized that Philip

was no longer in a position to combine with Hannibal, but, since Rome was now intent upon gathering a strong army to invade Africa, it agreed to make peace with Philip and ceded to him the larger part of Illyricum.¹¹ Thus in 205 the first Macedonian war came to an end. Rome "hailed down the flag" before Philip, a thing she was not accustomed to do, but in the course of the struggle she had formed several friendships with the states of Greece that were later to be of great service to her.

A year later the foolhardy monarch set out upon a career that soon unified all his enemies against him. Full of conceit at his successful contest with Rome, he turned eastward for new fields to conquer. Treaties and friendships were as nothing to him. Believing that Rhodes would undertake to defend the free cities of the Ægean, he attempted — unsuccessfully to be sure — to cripple her by having her docks and arsenals burned. However, the death of Ptolemy Philopator, which left Egypt in the hands of a child, pointed to a surer way of conquest, and Philip entered into a bandit's agreement with the "Great" Antiochus to divide the possessions of the Ptolemies — at least the parts that were nearest the boundaries of the two signatories. While Antiochus marched upon Cœle-Syria, Philip began his campaign of brigandage in the Ægean. Seizing several of the Cyclades, he sailed off to possess himself of the prospering trading cities near the Hellespont. Then Rhodes protested, and, when the Cians and Thasians were taken and sold into slavery, she prepared for war. It now became evident that the established order in the Ægean was wholly to be disregarded, that no treaty rights were to be respected, and that, if no one interfered, the Eastern world, including Greece, would within a few years be entirely at the mercy of the two despots. The concert of powers was apparently at an end. Rhodes succeeded in securing the coöperation of Attalus, and the two powers gathered as strong a navy as possible in order to check Philip's progress. Then both sent envoys to Rome asking for aid. Egypt, the greatest sufferer, appealed to Rome about the same time (202-01),

recalling the fact that she had aided the Romans in their Punic war with a generous gift of corn. In the winter Philip increased his fleet to the utmost capacity, and in the spring took Samos, devastated the lands of Attalus, and set sail to attack Alexandria. On his way, however, he was met off Chios by the fleet of Rhodes and Attalus,¹² and defeated. So, after devastating the Egyptian and Rhodian lands in Caria, he turned home for repairs. Meanwhile, his generals had been operating in Thessaly, and, as a result of these operations, the Ætolians went to Rome with complaints. Finally, Athens became involved in a quarrel with Philip's ally, Acarnania, and being unable to protect herself against the attacks of the Macedonian army, she too sent envoys to Rome. Apparently all Greece felt that Rome had such cause to hate Philip that the appeal would not be in vain.

Could Rome heed the appeal? Even apart from the question of expediency, there were two very serious objections against aligning herself with the enemies of Philip: the strong disinclination of the people to undertake a new war, and the illegality of such a war from the point of view of the *ius fetiale*. The people would at first not hear of it, and voted down the motion.¹³ They had suffered too severely in the war just ended to desire a new one. The toll of dead and wounded had been appalling. Their fields were wasted. Taxes were high because of the interest on the public debt, and a part of the principal on that debt was already overdue.¹⁴ Experience had taught them that the state could no longer turn war into a profitable undertaking, since even the indemnity imposed upon Carthage would come in such small installments that they would hardly support one Roman legion. The populace yielded only when the leaders who favored the motion called the assembly together a second time and convinced them that Philip would invade Italy and devastate their fields as Hannibal had done, unless they forestalled him.

The second objection, that of legality, was also serious, for the people were not in a mood to invite the wrath of heaven by breaking the sacred injunctions of the *ius fetiale*.

The difficulty lay in the fact that the rules of the sacred college did not permit of any except defensive wars — that is, wars in defense of the state and her oath-bound *socii* of good standing; and the appealing nations in this case were not *socii*,¹⁵ they were only *amici*. The importance of this distinction may be brought out by a brief review of Rome's international policy. Since the old fetial rules had recognized only defensive wars,¹⁶ the state had built up its federation hitherto on defensive alliances, and had always been averse to treaties of mere neutrality or friendship. The *foedera* varied somewhat in content, granting privileges according to the deserts of the ally, but, wherever Rome had her own way, they were invariably based upon the central stipulation of mutual defense in case of an enemy's incursion. This form of treaty she had been able to impose upon every one of her hundred allies in Italy,¹⁷ and these alliances held "for all time." The *ius fetiale* was accordingly the dominant factor in the Italian federation. When, however, Rome met strong foreign nations which had for centuries employed other forms of treaties, she found that these nations were far from willing to make alliances with her at her own very exacting terms. If now Rome insisted upon her old practices, she would obviously be excluded from political association with the older nations. At first she was ready to accept an inferior advantage for the sake of retaining the old form, and thus in the case of the south Italian Greeks and Naples, she bound herself to protective duty, although requiring none from her ally. But with nations farther off, this was out of the question. Hence, during her distressing contest with Philip of Macedonia, she had signed alliances of *amicitia*¹⁸ and short-term *foedera* with the Greek states according to the Greek customs. But now the question came up as to the standing of these *amici* in fetial law. The Greek practice, whereby *amici* made free to form temporary coalitions against a common danger, seemed much more reasonable than Rome's; and several Roman admirals who had campaigned in the First Macedonian war with King Attalus and various Greek admirals had had every occasion to learn

the advantages of these coalitions. They knew that Rome could never assume a dignified place among the time-honored nations unless she were willing to participate in the Hellenic coalitions. Doubtless the senators who were experienced in diplomacy wished to break away from the old restrictions. But the fact remained that for a thousand years the Romans had acted on the belief that an infraction of the *ius fetiale* would bring a curse upon the state. Nevertheless, the Macedonian problem was referred to the fetial priests, and they were apparently influenced by the new school. They decided to disregard the vital distinction between *societas* and *amicitia* and to extend, for the present occasion, the provisions of the *ius fetiale* over the *amici*.¹⁹ It is characteristic of Roman legal-mindedness that the Romans then began to substitute the delusive phrase *socius et amicus* — which had hitherto had no legal standing — for the simple word *amicus*. They would stretch the fetial law to new needs, but they dared not disregard it.

Having thus convinced the populace of the necessity of the war and allayed their fears regarding the sacrilege it might incur, the Roman senate sent three envoys to investigate conditions and to consult with the appealing powers at Athens.²⁰ It is apparent that the senate gave the envoys general instructions to work for peace in the Ægean and to demand reparation for injuries done, but left the exact wording of the stipulations to the judgment of the envoys after they should have consulted with the injured states. At the Piræus the Roman legates spent a day with Attalus,²¹ who, together with the Rhodian envoys, then persuaded the Athenians to declare war. The advice of Attalus was apparently based upon instructions, or at least promises, given by the Romans. Philip answered the declaration by sending a force to attack Athens, whereupon the Roman envoys delivered their decision in the name of the senate that Philip must not wage war with any Greek state and must submit the claims of Attalus to arbitration (Pol. XVI, 27). The phrasing of this deliverance shows clearly the results of the day's interview with Attalus. His claims

alone are mentioned, and the particularistic doctrine that he advocated is adopted outright. Thus it was Attalus upon whom the responsibility for the phrasing of the proclamation rested. To the senate, which had determined upon war with Philip in any case if he continued to play his reckless game, the exact wording was not important, provided it accomplished its purpose, satisfied the appellants, and secured the greatest possible support for the common cause.

The envoys, following the old Roman custom of proclaiming international demands to all concerned, sailed the length of the coast of Greece, announcing their ultimatum — doubtless to the amusement of the more sophisticated Greeks — and then proceeded to Rhodes. A conference with the Rhodians resulted in the addition of two items suggested by the interests of that republic, and from this it is apparent that a full understanding with Rhodes had not been reached at the Athenian conference. The new demands were that the Rhodian claims, like those of Attalus, be submitted to arbitration, and that Philip cease interfering with the possessions of Ptolemy. These combined demands Æmilius Lepidus presented to Philip in the spring of 200 when the king was besieging the free city of Abydos. As the ultimatum was greeted with scorn, Rome declared war and sent her consul with an army to Illyricum, even before Philip had returned home from his sack of Abydos.

But what after all induced the senate to entangle itself in a new war when the state had just barely escaped destruction by Hannibal? This is a question upon which our sources are far from satisfactory. Livy holds that Rome was bound by her treaties to aid Greek states, but we now know that her treaties of *amicitia* with them entailed no such obligations. The senate, according to the same author, told the populace that Philip was on the point of invading Italy, but the senate could hardly have thought such an invasion imminent. Polybius, the Greek, to whom a coalition of friendly states seems wholly natural, does not even pause to set himself the question. Modern historians

are, therefore, left to their own conjectures. We are told, on the one hand, that the senate's decision was due to an outburst of sentimental philhellenism,²² and, on the other hand, that the real motive power was greed for empire hidden under a veil of hypocrisy.²³ One distinguished historian²⁴ affirms that Rome was forced by her position to accept the appeals of the Greeks, another²⁵ that Rome's interference was as criminal as the brigandage of Philip which she undertook to suppress. What shall we believe?

That the senate desired mere territorial expansion we cannot assume, since Rome took no land after the war, not even claiming Illyricum, which Philip had won from her in 205. There was, besides, more devastated land in Italy awaiting development than the capitalistic investments of Rome could hope to care for within a generation.

The impulse eastward came from other considerations. Rome had no love for Philip, and the desire to punish him for his treacherous attack at a time when she was defenseless must have been strong. The acknowledgment of defeat in 205 and the cession of the Illyrian mainland still rankled. Of course a treaty of peace had been made in 205, so that the preceding events could hardly be openly avowed as cause for hostility; but if both ancient and modern historians have excused the Barcids for keeping in mind the seizure of Sardinia, we must grant that Rome had even greater cause for resentment against Philip.

Mingled with this hatred of Philip was Rome's fear that his aggression might soon have to be met. Of course, we need not believe that an invasion of Italy was imminent. But Philip was a man of singular daring and force, and the Greeks had found him a lawless neighbor. In the year 201 he had a long series of victories to his credit: he had reëstablished the Macedonian power throughout the extent of Greece; he had gained control of the northern Ægean, the entrance to the Black Sea, Thrace, and several strongholds of Asia Minor. The Eastern world was, it seemed, about to be divided between him and Antiochus. That he had inherited the ambitions of Alexander was a matter of every-

day talk. The question for the senate to decide was not whether Rome might weaken a possible rival, — as yet Rome thought only of becoming a member of the Mediterranean concert of powers, — but whether Philip, her neighbor, was a man who observed the laws of neutrality and respected the ordinary rights of his neighbors. This Philip did not do. And Rome knew from her own experience with him and from the tales of the Greek envoys that Philip would honor his treaty with her only so long as she was in a position to defend herself.

But Rome had another reason besides fear and hatred of Philip for greeting this opportunity of entering the East. The Romans felt bitterly the slur conveyed in the term *barbari* which the Greeks still applied to them. They counted for nothing in the civilized world. In the voluminous world histories that Greek writers published year after year, every petty incident of effete Greek villages was recorded in detail, whereas Rome's epoch-making transactions were relegated to parentheses²⁶ and explanatory notes. Her heroes still remained unsung *carent quia vate sacro*. Entrance into the Ægean concert of powers would change all this, adding immeasurably to the dignified position of the state, gaining it prestige among the old-world civilizations, and, incidentally, ministering to the pride of Roman senators. We need not assume that the nobles whom such considerations influenced were aiming at any definite material advantages. Men like the Scipios, Flamininus, the Fabii, and Paulus did not have palms itching for gold, but they were to some degree touched by "that last infirmity" of all Romans; such men it was who stamped the Roman character on the words *gloria*, *fama*, and *dignitas*. They now saw the door open to a more dignified position. Who shall say that such enticements do not often outweigh economic considerations in world politics?

Finally, the great historian²⁷ was doubtless right who pointed out the importance of philhellenism as a factor in the decision. Never at Rome was the enthusiasm for things Greek so outspoken as during this time. The per-

formance of Greek tragedies and comedies in translations good, bad, and indifferent promised to become the national form of festival entertainment. The fountain of native literature was well-nigh choked by the wholesale importation of Greek products, and the entire nation was assimilating the form and substance of a transmarine art with an avidity that can hardly be paralleled. Even Roman senators began to write their nation's history in Greek. And the Hellenic culture was being woven into the very fabric of Roman institutions. The Roman gods had been identified with those of Greece, and the priests conducted many of the sacred rites *Graeco ritu*. The oracle at Delphi was resorted to as a final court of appeal in times of danger, and the Greek legends were being grafted into the main stock of Rome's national tradition. Later, to be sure, a day came when familiarity with the *Graeculus* bred contempt, and the discovery was made that Roman character was surrendering some of its best elements in exchange for an ill-fitting culture which carried corruption within. But that was later. In the year 200 men felt only the magic of Greece, and the appeal of the Greek states for aid in preserving their liberty struck a chord of response full of genuine good will for the imperiled people. Nor did this feeling subside during the war: within two years the senate enlarged its demands upon Philip by requiring not only that he desist from his attacks upon Greeks, but also that he liberate those whom he held in subjection.

These, then, were the motives that led the senate to abandon its ancient fetial practices, to adopt the Greek methods of international association, and to enter the Hellenic concert. And it must be borne in mind that this was not a war between Philip and Rome, but — in the beginning, at least — a war conducted by an Hellenic coalition of which Rome was but a modest member, participating with only a small part of her forces.

Philip opened the campaign²⁸ of the first year with an attack upon Athens. The coalition divided into two parts, the Pergamene and Rhodian forces, together with Rome's

naval contingent going directly against Philip, while the Roman consul with his two legions attempted to open a way into Macedonia from the side of Illyricum. Attalus, who seems to have been leader of the southern army, accomplished little, except the defense of Athens. The Roman consul, effectively blocked by the Macedonian mountain garrisons, made no headway. During the second year the coalition advanced in three divisions, since it had now gained the aid of the Ætolians. The Romans on the west broke through an Illyrian pass, but were stopped by an inner line of garrisons. The Ætolian division operating from the Thessalian plains was more successful, and engaged Philip's army during most of the campaign. The naval division under Attalus also met with some success in its attack upon Macedonian seaport garrisons in Thessaly. The third year began with disappointments for the coalition. The Roman army attempted a new route through Epirus, but failed, and about midsummer, Titus Quinctius Flaminius, who had now taken charge, found his army unable to move forward and was obliged to negotiate for terms of peace. To these, however, Philip refused to listen.²⁹ Then the tide turned. With the aid of Epirote guides, Flaminius found his way through the mountains, effected a juncture with the Ætolian army operating in Thessaly, and the two armies pushed Philip back to the defenses of his own country. These victories, furthermore, induced the strong Achæan league to join the coalition. The allied fleet, meanwhile, blockaded Corinth, and this city was promised to the Achæans in return for their support. Philip now asked for a peace conference, since he saw that if he persisted he could not hope to retain any of his conquests outside of Macedonia. The representatives of the allies met the king at Nicæa and presented their demands. Flaminius asked for nothing on Rome's behalf,³⁰ insisting only upon the previous demands of the coalition that Philip evacuate all Greek cities and restore to Egypt her possessions in Thrace and Asia Minor. Attalus claimed indemnity for the injuries sustained in Philip's raids of 201; Rhodes demanded the cession of the

Carian lands which Philip had taken in 201 and insisted upon the freedom of the Greek cities in Asia; the Achæans asked for Corinth and Argos. The Ætolians, while claiming to support the coalition's demands for the liberation of all Greek cities, nevertheless required a re-cession to their league of all cities that had ever been members of it. This disagreeable demand of the Ætolians threw the conference into a long-winded discussion, and several sessions were devoted to exhibitions of Greek oratory. The result was a growing conviction that Philip must treat with the Romans alone, if anything was to be accomplished. Here a peculiar circumstance, apparently of small moment, brought Rome into a predominating position. Philip, learning that Roman consuls were not legally empowered without a confirming vote of the senate and people to determine the terms of peace for Rome, requested that the conference be adjourned to meet at Rome. The Greek envoys were at first disinclined to see negotiations thus taken out of their hands, but having originally appealed to Rome for aid, they could not now disregard an important requirement of the Roman constitution. The consequences were more far-reaching than either the Greeks or the Romans at first realized. The necessity of settling the negotiations of the whole league in a discussion before the Roman senate not only made Rome visibly the predominant power in the coalition, but it placed the senate in the position of a signatory, not only to the Roman claims, but to the whole treaty. And when once Rome's signature was subscribed by vote of the senate and people to a document which affected the whole of the Ægean world, she would naturally be involved in the task of guaranteeing the integrity of that document. To be sure, the present conference at Rome ended in a disagreement, Philip's envoys refusing to yield to the senate's demands for the complete liberation of Greece, but a precedent had been set by the whole affair which pointed to Rome as the future arbiter of Mediterranean politics.

When the war reopened in 197, it was primarily a struggle between Philip and Rome. The fleet was no longer needed,

so that the Rhodians departed to take possession of the Carian³¹ lands to which they had laid claims. The Achæans were sent to help them. Perhaps they preferred not to take part in a battle against their former ally. Attalus returned home ill, and died soon after, leaving his kingdom to Eumenes II; his naval forces apparently did not again engage in the war. At the end, only the Ætolian contingent was left to aid Rome. Doubtless Flamininus was glad to have the task to himself; we are almost tempted to suspect that he had purposely found work elsewhere for his allies. Roman consuls were not used to following the orders of a *junto*; they were accustomed to make their own decisions. Flamininus, after gaining the adherence of the Bœotian league-cities, advanced directly against Philip, who, meanwhile, had taken up his position at Cynoscephalæ in northern Thessaly. The Roman force of 20,000 was supported by some 6000 Ætolians — courageous and well-trained soldiers — 1200 Epirotes, and a few mercenaries sent by the Spartan tyrant, Nabis. The two armies came to blows before Philip had time to mass his phalanx in a satisfactory manner. Consequently, the pliable Roman legions gained an easy and decisive victory, much to the astonishment of the Greeks, who still clung to the belief that the Macedonian phalanx was unconquerable.³²

Philip now offered to accept the terms he had rejected at Nicæa, and although the Ætolians demanded the king's deposition, the former treaty, with but slight revision, was again submitted by the consul. The only additions to the original articles were the Roman demands that the king surrender his navy and pay Rome a war indemnity of a thousand talents.³³ These terms were accepted.

Now came the difficult task of reaching a satisfactory agreement with all the allies concerning the disposition of the liberated territory. Rhodes occasioned no difficulties. She asked only for the return of a plot of Carian ground, and for the liberation of the cities of Asia Minor, — two items which were at once granted. Rome even undertook to request Prusias to liberate Cius, which Philip had presented to him.

The modest demands of the Pergamene king were also quickly conceded. The Achæan league received Corinth and Argos back into membership, as it desired. The Epirotes and the Macedonian tribe of Orestis, both of which had joined Rome during the war, were granted autonomy. So far everything went well.

But the Ætolians were insatiate. After regaining Phocis and Locris, which Roman arms had taken from Philip, they also demanded all Thessalian and Bœotian towns that had ever belonged to them. The other allies saw that the "liberation of the Greeks" would become a farce if Ætolia was to gather in the spoils. The senate accordingly took upon itself the odium of refusing the request, thereby incurring the bitter enmity of the league. The cities in question were made autonomous.

Finally, the senate left to the discretion of its commissioners and to Flamininus the settlement of a suitable date ³⁴ for the Roman evacuation of the three strong forts, Corinth, Demetrias, and Chalcis, the "fettters of Greece" which Philip surrendered to Flamininus. The reason for deferring a decision on this point was that Antiochus of Syria was beginning to invade the territory of Asia Minor which Philip was evacuating. Envoys had been sent to Antiochus to ask him to desist, but the senate felt that it would be dangerous to withdraw entirely from Greece until there was reasonable assurance that Antiochus would not make trouble. However, when the Ætolians saw that the senate was apparently hesitating, they seized the opportunity to raise the charge that Rome intended to take permanent possession of the three Greek forts. Flamininus, therefore, even against the wishes of the commissioners, insisted that Rome must at once prove the sincerity of her professions by withdrawing every garrison of hers upon Greek soil. And so, at the Isthmian games of 196, he was able to send out a herald with the proclamation ³⁵ that: —

"The Roman senate and Titus Quinctius, proconsul and imperator, having conquered King Philip and the Macedonians in war, declare the following peoples free, without gar-

ri-son or tribute, in full enjoyment of the laws of their own countries: *i.e.* Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Eubœans, Achæans of Phiotis, Magnesians, Thessalians, Perrhæbians.”

This satisfied the last doubt regarding the integrity of the senate’s intentions, and the joy of the Greeks was unbounded.

But the senate knew well enough that a mere proclamation was far from sufficient, and so Flamininus, whose sincere philhellenism was unquestioned by all but the disgruntled Ætolians, was continued as proconsul until the terms of the treaty should have been put into practice.

The magnitude of the task that Flamininus faced in attempting to establish a score of new states may well be imagined when one remembers to what extent the history of the Greek states is a record of revolutions and impractical experiments.

In helping the liberated states to shape new governments, Flamininus favored a form which was somewhat more aristocratic³⁶ than the cities were accustomed to under Macedonian rule. There were several good reasons for this. Philip, the absolute monarch, had, as might be expected, suppressed powerful individuals and had tried to gain the good will of the populace in every city. The people were, after all, his warriors. Consequently, it was always the aristocratic element in these cities that favored Rome, and naturally this element later desired to be recognized by Rome as predominant. Now Flamininus, himself a true senatorial, sincerely believed in the aristocratic principle and was glad enough to further the aims of the more congenial faction in each city. He believed that the men of property could conduct a stabler and more consistent government than the populace. Hence, wherever he was called upon to write a city charter, he based the franchise on a property qualification. He introduced these reforms, however, in a most liberal spirit, and the charters that he framed were even more democratic than those usual in Italian municipalities. He placed all legislation in the hands of a council (*boulê*) and a popular assembly,³⁷ whereas, in Italian cities, the council (*decuriones*) alone usually conducted all municipal business.

Unfortunately the necessity of thus sympathizing with the aristocratic faction later bore bitter fruit, for the populace all through Greece drew the logical conclusion that they had less to gain from Rome than from Philip. And Philip soon discovered that he could make capital out of this conclusion. But Flaminius could not have avoided the task even in the face of the troublesome consequences: he did his work with a sincere desire to establish the best governments possible.³⁸

After a year of this kind of reorganization, one very disagreeable task still remained. Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, had refused to give up Argos to Achæa according to the terms of the treaty, and Flaminius was therefore obliged to call out the allies for one more campaign. Nabis soon yielded, and Flaminius then drew up an agreement between Sparta and the Achæan league. The incident gained importance later when Nabis refused to carry out all the articles of this treaty also, and Rome was then called upon to support an agreement which she had guaranteed.

Finally, in 194, having done his utmost to start the new states upon a successful career, Flaminius withdrew his troops from the last garrison in Greece, and to the representatives of the Greek states who had assembled at Corinth he gave an account of his stewardship, earnestly counseling harmony and united action.³⁹ He then sailed for Italy. Yet even at that time Antiochus had seized several cities in Thrace and Asia Minor, contrary to the provisions of the treaty of 196, and Scipio Africanus was urging the need of holding Greece against the probable invasion of this new enemy.

It is the fashion to call Flaminius an impractical sentimentalist; and there is no doubt that his enthusiasm for the old Greek cry of liberty somewhat blinded him to larger political needs. He accepted as sacred the particularistic doctrine which had made the Greeks so futile in state-building. Furthermore, in his haste to prove that the Romans harbored no ulterior purposes, he chose to disregard the annoying approach of Antiochus. But if Flaminius was at fault, the senate was no less so. Two years before Flaminius

had wielded any influence in the state, the senate had adopted a general program of liberation, and in 198 it proved its continued faith in that program by reasserting in more emphatic form its demands for "freedom." It stood firmly by these requirements in the Roman conference of 197, and its envoys to Antiochus in 196 reiterated the doctrine in that striking message ⁴⁰ with its five unequivocal negatives: οὐδὲνα γὰρ ἔτι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔτε πολεμείσθαι νῦν ὑπ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε δουλεύειν οὐδενί. "No Greek shall henceforth be attacked by any man nor serve any man." The fact of the matter is that whatever arguments may have induced the senate to enter the war, a wave of philhellenism had swept over the state before the war was finished. The statesmen of Rome were carried away by a generous impulse — what nation's history cannot furnish at least one parallel? — and in their enthusiasm they forgot to count the cost or weigh the consequences. And who shall say that the consequences would have been better if the statesmen had acted with more sobriety? Could Greece have preserved a national form of government if unity had been forced upon her? Could the ingrained love of autonomy and individual existence, which lay at the very core of the Greek character, be stamped out in a day? Had not the Greeks proved that after all each futile city-state could beget men and matter that the great nations admired? And although Flamininus might have saved Rome a battle or two by holding Greece against Antiochus, he would have awakened a dangerous suspicion among the Greeks that Rome was seeking a pretext for remaining. The act of liberation — that one genuine, disinterested deed — set a wholesome precedent in the more prosaic days that followed, which acted as a restraining influence upon the Romans, and made them for a while at least better rulers of the empire they were winning.

In Greece the act was received with the intense enthusiasm it deserved. Polybius' account ⁴¹ of the proclamation at the Isthmian games is an attractive page in the history of Rome's foreign relations: —

"When the herald repeated the proclamation, there was

such an outburst of applause as is difficult to convey to the imagination. When at length the applause ceased, no one paid any attention to the athletes, but all were talking to themselves or each other, and seemed like people bereft of their senses. Nay, even after the games were over, in the extravagance of their joy, they nearly killed Flamininus by the exhibition of their gratitude. Some wanted to look him in the face and call him their preserver; others were eager to touch his hand; most threw garlands and fillets upon him, until between them they nearly crushed him to death." Polybius adds: "that the Romans and their leader Flamininus should have deliberately incurred unlimited expense and danger for the sole purpose of freeing Greece, truly deserved their admiration."

It was not the senate's fault that the Greeks no longer possessed the capacity to use the gift they had received. What was to be expected of a people who dedicated their public buildings:—

*To Titus and Apollo, and To Titus and Hercules,*⁴²

and founded a new cult whose votaries sang pæans:—

To Zeus and Rome and Titus and Rome's Good Faith!

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. Polybius, Bks. XVI-XVIII, is the best source for the "Second Macedonian war." Unfortunately, his text is occasionally in fragments, but Livy, who copies Polybius fairly closely in Greek matters, supplies many of the missing incidents. Niese, *Griech. und makedon. Staaten*, vol. II, and Colin, *Rome et la Grèce*, give the sources so fully that I have, to a great extent, dispensed with the citation of references.

2. Livy, XXXI, 1 and 2. Livy is, of course, in error when he calls these nations *socii* of Rome; they were only *amici*.

3. That principle was formally recognized for the Hellenic world in the Peace of Antalcidas, or the "Royal Peace" of 387. It had been disregarded by Alexander and some of his ambitious successors, but it had never been quite forgotten, and by the year 200 it was taken for granted by most of the states on the Ægean.

4. Cardinali, *Il regno di Pergamo*, 1906.

5. Polybius, VII, 12.

6. Bevan, *The House of Seleucus*, II; Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire des Séleucides*, 1913; Ferguson, *Greek Imperialism*, p. 183.

7. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire des Lagides*; Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 149; Lesquier, *Les institutions militaires de l'Égypte*.

8. Pol. IX, 45.

9. It is usual to attribute Philip's attack upon Rome to Rome's interference in Illyricum. But I have preferred to follow the motivation of Polybius. It is wholly improbable that Philip would be much concerned about the barren lands along the Adriatic coast. His plans were drawn on a far larger scale. See Pol. V, 101, 102, and 109.

10. Pol. VII, 9.

11. Rome seems to have retained only two islands and a fort on the mainland. Her alliances with Epidamnus and Apollonia, the cities of Epirus, and with Corcyra were not disturbed. See Livy, XXIX, 12, 13.

12. See Holleaux, in *Klio*, IX, 450.

13. Livy, XXXI, 6, 3: *ab omnibus ferme centuriis antiquata est*. The populace opposed the war to the very end: Livy, XXXIII, 25, 6.

14. Livy, XXXI, 13. The state, not having the money for payment, liquidated the debt by giving public lands to the creditors.

15. The Ptolemies had been *amici* of Rome since about 272; Rhodes, according to Pol. XXX, 5, since 306; but Holleaux (*Mélanges Perrot*) places the date a century later, while Täubler (*Imperium Romanum*, p. 205) plausibly argues for the date 205 B.C. She became an ally in 165. Attalus had been a temporary ally in the First Macedonian war, but was so no longer ("a coöperation that formerly existed," says Pol. XVI, 25; see also Livy, XXVI, 24, 8; XXIX, 11, 2; 12, 14). He was now an *amicus*. Athens had been a "friend" since 229 B.C., according to Zon. VIII, 19. Täubler (*op. cit.*, p. 216) places the treaty at 199, but on insufficient evidence.

16. See Chapter I. It was the oath, always used in making *foedera*, which sanctified the obligations connected with the *jus fetiale*. The breaking of an oath incurred the wrath of heaven.

17. The Etruscans in the early days secured Greek forms of alliance or friendship. They preserved neutrality or signed *foedera* for terms of years. However, Rome ultimately introduced her own customs there.

18. Miss Matthaei, *On the Classification of Roman Allies*, *Class. Quart.* 1907, 182 ff., has well explained the origin and significance of the Roman *amicitia*.

19. See *Class. Phil.* IV, 122. We draw this inference from the fact that the phrase *socius et amicus* displaces the legal term *amicus*. Livy, XXXI, 1, 2, betrays hopeless confusion when he asserts that the appealing nations were *socii*; however, it was easy to err on this point, since Rome did not later make a practice of aiding *amici*. It was, of course, high time that Rome broke with the narrowing demands of the *jus*

fetiale. She had received much help from her *amici*, particularly Hiero and Massilia, and it was illogical for her to remain less liberal than they.

20. Pol. XVI, 25 and 26.

21. It was apparently on this occasion that Attalus dedicated at Athens the bronze figures of "Gauls," the marble copies of which are still to be seen in museums.

22. Mommsen, *Roman Hist.* Eng. tr., II, 443.

23. Peter, *Zur Kritik der Quellen*, p. 41, so also Ihne and Duruy.

24. Eduard Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, 277 ff.

25. Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen*, 146. It is difficult to understand how the distinguished scholar could have reached the conclusion which he has set down upon this page.

26. Pol. V, 33. The desire of the Romans to establish for themselves a place among the Greeks is well illustrated by Flamininus, who had himself called *Æneades Titus* in the Greek verses made in his honor, Plut. *Titus*, 12. Ennius, the poet, apparently told of Rome's lineage from Troy in the introduction to his account of this war (Vah. 358).

27. Mommsen. See note 22.

28. A large part of Polybius' narrative has been lost. The fragments remaining show that he considered it a war of the Greek coalition rather than a Roman war; see, e.g. XVI, 25, 26, and Livy, XXXI, 45 (from Polybius). Livy, of course, finds little interest in the deeds of the Greeks, and enlarges upon the importance of the Roman campaigns. Since Livy's story is complete, historians have naturally adopted his manner of emphasizing the Roman interests.

29. The demands are more sweeping than in 200, for Flamininus insists on the liberation of all Greek cities; Livy, XXXII, 10, 3-7. He must have had instructions from the senate to do this, for a consul had no right to add to former stipulations at will — a point that deserves attention, since the philhellenic program is usually accredited to Flamininus alone.

30. Pol. XVIII, 1. The Illyrian frontier was to be restored according to the terms of the last treaty (205). What Philip finally ceded in Illyricum was given to a native prince, Pleuratus.

31. Antiochus was at this time advancing northward, and the coalition was considering measures to thwart him.

32. Pol. XVIII, 48.

33. Pol. XVIII, 44. Livy, XXXIII, 30, would have it that Philip had to surrender his independence in foreign affairs to Rome. Later events prove this to be an error. Philip was left by the treaty an independent neutral. A few years later he became an *amicus* and was then excused from paying the part of the indemnity still outstanding.

The Ætolians wished Philip deposed, but Flamininus argued that a strong power was needed in the north to safeguard Greece against barbaric invasion.

34. This was merely a question of date. The senate's instructions provided for the complete evacuation of Greece.

35. Pol. XVIII, 46.

36. Livy, XXXIV, 51. —

37. In every case Flaminius demanded that political exiles be recalled, whether they were democratic or aristocratic. The return of the democratic leaders to Thebes caused a revolt against the new government of Flaminius, but this is the only case of failure that we hear of. Livy, XXXIII, 29.

38. A letter addressed by Flaminius to the town of Cyretia has been preserved (*Inscript. Graecae*, IX, 2, no. 338) which shows the nature of Flaminius' task. Here he gives to the city certain properties that had fallen into the possession of Rome "in order that you may see how clean-handed the Romans are."

39. Livy, XXXIV, 48-50.

40. Pol. XVIII, 47.

41. Pol. XVIII, 46.

42. Plutarch, *Titus Flam.* 16.

CHAPTER IX

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS

IN his attempt to divide Ptolemy's possessions with Antiochus, Philip had fallen. Antiochus, however, although he had carried through his part of the task with as much energy as the Macedonian, was as yet unmolested. Reasons for this difference in the treatment of the two monarchs are not difficult to find. It is apparent that whereas Philip's operations at once threatened the safety of several different states, those of Antiochus caused immediate trouble to Egypt alone. Furthermore, Antiochus had the support of a far more plausible excuse, for he carefully announced that he was only retaking from Egypt the border territory of which his ancestors had been robbed. This claim may not have been a very good one, since Antiochus had surrendered his title to such lands after the defeat of Rapheia, but the announcement at least served to assure his neighbors for the time being that he was only following a reasonable policy which would not interfere with their well-established rights. Philip, on the other hand, seemed to assume in his promiscuous raids that he possessed the right of expansion and was immune from the necessity of furnishing pretexts for his actions. Probably this irresponsible assumption of Philip's brought him as much vigorous opposition as any of his acts of war. It is clear, therefore, that the Roman coalition refrained from interfering with Antiochus' advance southward, not only because it was busy elsewhere, but also because Antiochus had been careful to avoid giving a reasonable ground for intervention.

In the spring of 197 Antiochus, after securing Cœle-Syria,¹ turned westward and seized the Ptolemaic cities of Cilicia. In doing this he had practically the same justification as in

the preceding acts, and was still not endangering any free communities of the Greeks. But he was approaching more disputable ground. The Rhodians therefore notified him that they would oppose him if he advanced beyond Chelidon, the promontory of Lycia which had of old served as the boundary between Persian and Hellenic spheres.² They were afraid, they said, that he might go to the aid of Philip or that he would endanger the freedom of Greek cities. Could it be that the Rhodians, entirely unsupported, dared send this defiant order to the Great King, the conqueror of Asia? It is a significant fact that they had this very year been excused from the campaign against Philip that they might operate in Caria, and they had even received the aid of the Achæan contingent for this campaign. May we not conclude that Attalus and the Romans were supporting the Rhodians in their apparently daring order to Antiochus? The king responded somewhat evasively that he would do nothing to offend Rhodes, and that he was on good terms with Rome. Just then, — it was the midsummer of 197, — news of Philip's defeat came, and Rhodes, knowing that there would now be no danger of a union with Macedonia, and that stronger powers than she would have their hands free to deal with Antiochus if he became dangerous, did nothing more to support her order.³ Accordingly, before the season ended, the king, finding his path open, sailed northward, seized Ephesus, the chief Ptolemaic city of Asia Minor, and even Abydos.⁴ This city Philip had taken from Ptolemy, and Antiochus could not have been blind to the fact that with the rest of Philip's booty it must now be at Rome's disposal. Then, knowing well that in taking Abydos he was challenging Rome to war, he sent envoys to the Roman consul⁵ to see how the news of its capture would be received. The ostensible purpose of the envoys was to ask for *a treaty of friendship with Rome*, but while they were engaged in their pretended mission of peace, the king advanced still farther and seized every available stronghold on the coast of Asia Minor. He wished to be forehanded in the discussion that was bound to come.

Let us review for a moment the status of the disputed region. In 281 Seleucus⁶ of Antioch wrested from Lysimachus both Thrace and Asia Minor, which the latter had received out of the wreckage of Alexander's empire. During the half century that followed, the cities of Asia Minor passed through various vicissitudes. As the Syrian kingdom gradually weakened and lost its hold in the region, Attalus of Pergamum was able to shape himself a kingdom in the very center of it. He defeated the Galatian invaders, declared himself protector of the Greek cities, and succeeded the Seleucid kings as master of several interior tribes. Many Greek cities of Asia secured complete autonomy at this time, while others placed themselves under the protectorate of Attalus. The Ptolemies of Egypt in the meanwhile had gained by inheritance and by desultory attempts at expansion some important possessions in Asia Minor. And although Egypt failed to maintain her foreign power consistently throughout the century, nevertheless large parts of Lycia and Caria besides Thrace remained in the hands of the Ptolemies till the opening of the second century. Finally, Antiochus III, ambitious to regain all the lands that had been claimed by his powerful ancestor, Seleucus I, invaded the interior of Asia Minor in 216. He acknowledged the claims of Attalus to the territory about Pergamum, but won back for himself Phrygia, Pisidia, Lycaonia, and the larger part of Lydia, and established a court at Sardis. He even obtained alliances with several princes beyond the Halys. We may suppose that he included the capture of the Hellenic cities in his plans, but knowing that this attempt would meet with much opposition, he felt that he must first strengthen his empire and gain a reputation as a strong ruler and a friend of the Greeks.⁷ Be that as it may, he seems finally to have despaired of taking the Hellenic cities, for when in 204 Philip proposed a division of Ptolemy's possessions, Antiochus surrendered to Philip his shadowy claims upon these Greeks and promised to confine himself to Cœle-Syria and Cilicia.

In the light of this history it is not difficult to understand

why in 197, when Philip had to evacuate Asia, Antiochus again saw a possible prospect of becoming complete master of Asia Minor. Perhaps he even dreamt of regaining the whole of Alexander's Empire, including the possession of Greece and Egypt.⁸ The deeds of Antiochus loomed large in the flattery of his courtiers!

The status of the Greek coast towns at this time was as follows. A number of the stronger cities like Ephesus and Halicarnassus were still Ptolemaic, but some had been taken from Ptolemy by Philip in the years 202-200 and were now to be handed back to Ptolemy by Rome, Philip's conqueror. Others, particularly those on the Chersonese which had previously broken away from Egypt but had recently been taken by Philip, were to be set free by Rome and her allies. Lastly, several cities, such as Smyrna and Lampsacus, which had asserted their independence at various times during the century, continued autonomous. Many of these free cities were allies of stronger states like Pergamum and Rhodes and would hardly go under without a protest being raised by their friends. What was perhaps more important, Lampsacus and Ilium and other cities of the Troad belonging to a religious league which worshiped the Ilian Minerva had very close relations with Rome, whose descent had for over a century been traced to Troy. Ilium seems to have had an alliance of friendship with Rome, and the Lampsacenes addressed the Romans as kinsmen. During this very year, 197, the Lampsacenes, when troubled by the Galati, had sent envoys to Rome on the strength of this supposed relationship and had received letters from Rome in support of their wishes.⁹

In short, Antiochus was invading very dangerous territory: Rome, supported by Attalus and Rhodes, had for two years been announcing from the housetops that if she conquered Philip, she would give the appropriate part of his gains back to Egypt, and would guarantee freedom to another part; furthermore, it was well known that Rome had close relations with several cities and that Rhodes and Eumenes, the Pergamene successor of Attalus, were keenly interested in

seeing that no new despot invaded the region. Therefore, although the invasion of Antiochus may seem natural and reasonable in the light of his own policies and the history of Asia since Alexander's time, in view of the new situation created by the events of the decade preceding, it must be considered an exceedingly daring move. Antiochus, by surrendering to Philip his feeble title to the Greek coast in 204, had apparently left himself no defensible footing; his advance, in spite of the reiteration of his ancestral claims, was rightly regarded as a baseless act of aggression. And yet Antiochus was a very shrewd man and a careful diplomat. He had more resources at his command than he at first revealed, and he would probably have won his game in the end had he not grown overbold and been drawn on by new complications.

We know enough of his plans and his method of work to understand the reasons for his confidence. Unlike Philip, he was exceedingly cautious in maintaining his diplomatic friendships. While advancing past Rhodes he carefully abstained from giving the island republic direct cause for hostility, and he even seems to have aided her in clearing Caria.¹⁰ By similar methods he hoped to allay the opposition of Pergamum. The serious question for Antiochus, of course, was what attitude Rome would assume. And it was to discover this that he sent envoys to Flamininus as soon as he had seized Abydos. He seems to have argued that Rome had entered the war against Philip partly because of the appeal of her friends, partly because Philip's disregard of old and recognized rights made him a dangerous neighbor. Now, if he could preserve the friendship of Rhodes and Pergamum on the one hand and prove to Rome on the other that he was proceeding only to reclaim ancestral possessions and would limit himself strictly to this purpose, would not Rome be satisfied and shut her eyes to the promises of the Macedonian treaty? One can understand how a monarch, brought up in the expansionistic school of Alexander, would naturally conclude that a power which had so little interest in the East as to withdraw completely after an

expensive war would not trouble itself greatly over Asia Minor. Accordingly, his envoys stated his case carefully, but insisted with firmness that the king had no intention of receding from his position.

Now the weakest point in the king's position was his claim upon the land that had within the last decade passed from Ptolemy to Philip and that was now to be given back to Egypt by Rome. Antiochus knew that the senate was not in the habit of retreating from its professions, and so he entered into secret negotiations with Egypt ¹¹ with a view to purchasing the Egyptian rights directly, and thus shutting Rome out of the question, if she could not be made to connive at her old declarations. Egypt's price was high: no less than Cœle-Syria which had just been taken from her. Antiochus hesitated. He wished to try persuasion with the Romans first, but, if that failed, he determined to strike the bargain with Egypt. In the long run, he reasoned, it was better to have some cities in Asia Minor without Roman influence too near than to possess Cœle-Syria with Rome as chief arbiter of the Ægean.

Accordingly while his envoys were discussing affairs with Flamininus, in the spring of 196, the king, as we have seen, advanced over the disputed territory. One division of his army took possession of the chief cities upon the coast of Asia Minor, laying siege even to free cities like Smyrna and Lampsacus. With the other the king himself crossed into Europe, drove the Thracians back upon the Danube, and set in with all vigor to rebuild Lysimachia. The liberal expenditure of treasure in Thrace proves that the king was not merely making a feint in order to gain an advantageous position with a view to a later compromise. He hoped to hold Thrace permanently.

Flamininus meanwhile sent the king's envoys back with an uncompromising answer, an answer which was practically a reiteration of Rhodes' demand of the previous year that the king could not be allowed west of Lycia, and he even sent envoys of his own to carry this message to the king in person. The Roman stipulations were in detail these: ¹²

(1) Antiochus must abstain from attacking autonomous Greek cities in Asia. This demand had reference to the wishes of the Rhodians and Eumenes, who were only slightly less afraid of Antiochus than they had been of Philip; it also embodied Rome's own wish to protect friends like Lampsacus and Ilium. (2) He must evacuate the cities that had been subject to Ptolemy. This in the main referred to Rome's professions of guarding her friend Ptolemy. (3) He must evacuate the cities that had been subject to Philip, for, as the envoys added, it was ridiculous to propose that Antiochus should come in and take the prizes of the war which Rome had waged with Philip. (4) He must withdraw from Europe, "for no Greek was to be attacked henceforth or to be enslaved by any one." This fourth demand was actually covered by the second and third, and brought in a new element only in so far as it produced an additional motive. In short, Rome's work in Greece was not to be endangered, and to make sure of this, Antiochus' sphere of action must be permanently limited to Asia.

At this point, however, the king produced his secret agreement with Egypt. This completely took away the *raison d'être* of the second and third demands, and Rome had practically lost her case. She could hardly risk a war with the Great King for the sake of protecting a few Asiatic cities like Lampsacus, which claimed a mythical relationship with her, and for the sake of excluding the king's influence from Europe, when Ptolemy had just ceded him his own well-recognized rights in Thrace.

Thus it came about that within a month after the Macedonian treaty had been recited to the assembled Greeks at Corinth, the several clauses relating to Thrace and Asia were made void by the shrewd diplomacy of Antiochus. Even to the two other demands of Rome the king had ready answers. He professed readiness to refer the case of Lampsacus and Smyrna to Rhodes for arbitration. He refused, however, to recognize Rome's right to limit his realm to Asia, saying that he had never attempted to interfere in Italian affairs. Rome was clearly outwitted, and Antiochus

during the next year proceeded with his conquest of the cities of Asia Minor and of Thrace unmolested.

The situation was of course satisfactory to no one but Antiochus. If Rome withdrew her demands, a great many cities that had hoped for autonomy would fall to Syria, and Eumenes would have to surrender permanently a part of the kingdom which his father had possessed; he would be cut off from the sphere of influence of his best friend, and would effectually be bound by the wishes of Syria. Rhodes, whose commerce and political power depended upon the life of the particularistic principle, was equally dissatisfied, although Antiochus did his best to gain her good will. Even the cities of Greece seemed to be afraid that Antiochus would not long limit his ambition to Thrace. Embassies, asking for Rome's interference, came in numbers. For Rome the question became constantly more involved. The enmity of Ætolia grew stronger when her repeated demands for a larger share of spoils in Thessaly were refused, and her courage expanded with the hope that Antiochus would finally take up the cudgels against Rome. Nabis of Sparta, who had become hostile after his defeat in 195, was ready to break out in revolt at any time in an effort to regain the coast towns which he had been forced to surrender to the Achæan league. Finally, Hannibal who, in 196, had been banished from Carthage by the aristocratic government then in power, took refuge with Antiochus. It was no secret that he was urging the Syrian king to attack Rome and was promising to secure a revolt in Carthage if Antiochus would do so. It surely is no mere coincidence that in the year 194 Rome made provision for the colonization of every suitable unprotected seaport of southern Italy.¹³ The fear that Hannibal's policy of invading Italy would be adopted by Antiochus was apparently very real.

Events seemed to be pressing toward hostility, but the senate remained sluggish and on the defensive. It will be remembered that in 196 the senate, when proclaiming the liberation of the cities taken by Philip, had mentioned by name only one city that had fallen into the possession of

Antiochus. It is apparent that even then the senate did not desire to take an uncompromising stand; and in 194 the same attitude was again revealed by the readiness with which Rome, despite the advice of Scipio, withdrew her armies from Greece. In fact, for three years after the diplomatic defeat of 196, the senate avoided the question, and it came up again only when in 193 Antiochus sent envoys to Rome asking for an alliance of friendship.

To grant this request would of course be tantamount to a recognition of the status quo (Livy, XXXIV, 57); to refuse it would be to invite the king's hostility without securing any advantage. The senate decided upon a compromise and asked Flamininus, apparently the author of the suggestion, to word this response. It was to the effect that Rome would grant his request for friendship and would even refrain from interfering in Asia, if he would withdraw from Europe.¹⁴ This offer is interesting. It frankly confessed that the old ground for action, based upon the treaty of 196, had been rendered untenable by Antiochus' treaty with Egypt. It seems also to have abandoned Eumenes and Rhodes to the Syrian sphere of influence, though it may well be that the final treaty was to safeguard their interests. Most interesting of all, it proves that the senate was for the first time ready to adopt from the Greeks the theory of spheres of influence in an important matter. The adoption of this new policy does not necessarily mean that Rome intended to extend her political or economic interests over all of Europe. But a settlement along these lines would safeguard what was still practicable in the treaty of 196 and thereby save Rome's honor, and might satisfy the king, since he had actually suggested the doctrine of spheres in his previous negotiations. Nothing could have been better for the future of both Rome and the East than the adoption of this compromise. It is safe to say that the Greek cities of Asia would not have suffered severely under Syrian rule, that in fact they might have prospered under the philhellenic Seleucids, and it is equally apparent that the small states of Greece would have had a better opportunity to preserve their

autonomy in prosperity if Greece had not become merely a road station for Rome's eastern armies, proconsuls, and traders. But the settlement was not adopted. The envoys of Antiochus had no instructions to compromise,¹⁵ and so the offer came to naught. The senate, still hoping to reach a *modus vivendi*, let the matter rest at this stage, only announcing to the Greeks that it could not recede further. It is probable enough that the two powers could have reached an agreement but for the intervention of Rome's enemies in Greece, and the nervous tension wrought by the presence of Hannibal at the court of Syria.

The chief mischief makers among the Greeks were the Ætolians, who understood no political game except one that involved booty sharing. They had received a larger portion in the division of Philip's possessions than any other ally, but they were dissatisfied because Rome had checked their exorbitant demands. They were now ready to complain of Roman interference, for they saw a chance, if Rome should be driven back by Antiochus, of being free of her restraining influence and of participating in a new division of booty. Their plans were fairly ripe by the time that the Syrian envoys returned in 193. Hearing from these envoys that Antiochus and Rome had not come to terms, the Ætolians set to work offering Nabis of Sparta support if he wished to regain what he had lost two years before. A second embassy was sent to Philip to request his coöperation in an attack upon Rome. A third went to Antiochus to egg on his enmity against Rome, and to promise all manner of support if he would land in Greece and proclaim his intention of driving Roman intervention out of the land. They even went so far as to promise Philip's coöperation, of which they had not the slightest assurance. Antiochus, however, was not ready to act. In fact, Roman envoys who had visited him at the end of the year to discuss the situation further returned with the assurance that there was no immediate danger of war in sight.¹⁶

But Nabis of Sparta started hostilities (probably in the spring of 192) by seizing the coast towns that he had sur-

rendered to the Achæan league in accordance with the Roman treaty of 195. The senate, responsible for the integrity of this treaty, at once sent a prætor with a fleet to aid the league, and at the same time sent Flamininus at the head of a commission to labor with the Greek cities against the demoralizing influence of Ætolia.¹⁷

The Ætolians meanwhile proceeded with all vigor. Seeing that Nabis was losing in the contest with the Achæan league, they dispatched a troop to kill the tyrant and hold the city by force. Nabis fell, but the Ætolians were routed in their turn, whereupon the Achæans under the command of Philopœmen captured the city. Another troop which the Ætolians sent to Chalcis failed completely. But at Demetrias they were successful. They managed to seize the fort there and to put the Roman sympathizers to death.¹⁸ These acts of violence were, of course, open attacks upon Rome, but the senate still moved slowly, waiting to see what Antiochus would do.

The king was not yet ready to act. Several cities of Asia were holding out against him; moreover, he had only some 10,000 soldiers at hand. But when the Ætolians announced that they had captured Demetrias and had voted him the command of the whole Ætolian army, he could not refuse to undertake a war that had been begun largely because of reliance upon his aid.¹⁹ Hannibal, to be sure, urged the pursuit of an entirely different policy. He advised the king to attack Italy directly, invite the coöperation of Carthage, and labor for the complete annihilation of Rome. But Antiochus knew his own purposes better than Hannibal. The annihilation of Rome would doubtless be desirable, — particularly to Carthage, whose independence would thereby be won, — but the risks were too great for the Syrian king, who only wished a free hand in the East and at most a pre-dominating position in Greece. Hannibal's own experience had been sufficient proof of the hopelessness of a struggle in Italy, far away from one's base of supplies, against an enemy that would not treat for peace upon native soil. In not hazarding an invasion of Italy, Antiochus was wise. He

was even wise in deciding to strike quickly, though his force was small, for he had a reasonable chance of holding several strong positions in Greece until the rest of his forces could be brought over. His mistakes of judgment lay rather in overestimating his strength. He could hardly have known that the loquacious Ætolians would fail to support him, nor could he be expected to surmise after his successes in Asia that his soldiers were no match for the Roman legions.

The details of the brief and interesting war which followed are easily found in any of the handbooks and can be omitted here. Not long after landing in Greece, a Syrian division met some Roman cohorts that were apparently on the way from the fleet to Chalcis and routed them. Rome then declared war, and early in 191 sent the consul to Greece with a force of about 20,000 men. The Romans crossed quickly, being aided by Philip. They found Antiochus intrenched at Thermopylæ. A division under Cato cleared a pass on the heights and simultaneously attacked the flank and the front. The battle ended in a rout of the Syrians. Antiochus escaped to Chalcis with a mere handful of men, and from there set sail for Asia.

The consul next advanced upon the cities of Ætolia. The league was ready to surrender upon favorable terms, but refused to yield unconditionally, and a temporary truce was therefore arranged.

The following year Lucius Scipio as consul and his brother, Scipio Africanus, as "extraordinary" proconsul, were sent to invade Asia by way of Thrace. Antiochus had first decided to meet them north of the Hellespont, but after his fleet had been more than half destroyed in an encounter with the combined fleets of the Romans, Pergamenes, and Rhodians, he retreated to Asia for safety, and offered to accept the terms offered in 193, as well as to pay half the cost of the war. Scipio, however, was not satisfied. He assumed practically the position which Rhodes had taken in 197 *i.e.* that Antiochus must remain on the other side of Lycia, or, to be explicit, south of the Taurus mountains, and that he must pay the whole cost of the war (Pol. XXI, 14).

Antiochus refused these terms and offered battle. Toward the end of the year 190 he was decisively defeated near Magnesia, and he asked again for peace. Scipio offered the same terms as before, on the condition, of course, that they would satisfy the senate, whereupon the king sent envoys to Rome for an expression of the victor's wishes. The principal articles finally agreed upon were as follows: ²⁰ —

(1) There shall be perpetual peace between Antiochus and the Romans if he fulfills the provisions of the treaty.

(2) Antiochus shall evacuate Asia this side of the Taurus Mountains and be confined by sea within the promontory Sarpedon.

(3) He shall pay an indemnity of ten thousand talents in ten yearly installments and ninety thousand medimni of corn.

(4) He shall not wage war upon the islanders or dwellers of Europe, nor upon any allies of Rome unless he be attacked. If attacked, however, he may; but he shall not have sovereignty over such nations and cities, nor attach them as friends to himself.

(5) He shall surrender his elephants and all but ten warships, and send twenty hostages to Rome.

The status of Antiochus after the war is sufficiently defined by these terms. He retained his independence in a way that Carthage, for example, had not, for he preserved the right to defend himself in war even against Rome's allies, and he was not bound in any way to aid Rome in her wars. To be sure, his resources were weakened, and the burning of his fleet removed the possibility of his breaking the treaty by attacking Greece, but none of the territory which he had held before his advance northward in 216 was taken from him, and almost all of Asia remained at his disposal. He had a field for action which to an Alexander would have seemed the equivalent of Rome's. A strong line of successors on the throne of Antiochus could still have made Syria a worthy match for Rome, but unfortunately the Great King died two years after his defeat, and weaklings succeeded to his position.

After coming to terms with the king, the senate took up

the problem of settling Asia Minor, a territory of about 150 miles from north to south and 200 miles from east to west. The question was fully discussed in conjunction with King Eumenes, the delegates of Rhodes, and a great number of Greek cities of the territory affected. The Rhodians spoke vigorously in favor of granting autonomy to as many cities as possible. Eumenes, on the other hand, pointed out that this would mainly aid Rhodes, since it would greatly increase her prestige and bring large accretions to her league. Indirectly such a course would make it difficult for Eumenes himself to keep his territory in subjection. The senate and its board of commissioners reached a compromise which on the whole favored Eumenes²¹ more than Rhodes. The Greek cities which had not previously been subject to Pergamum were given freedom, except for a few which had strongly supported Antiochus. These latter were made tributary to Eumenes. Several of the free cities were granted an increase of territory in payment for their good services during the war. As for the interior, Eumenes was given sovereignty over the region north of the Meander, thus nearly quadrupling his territory; and Rhodes was given Caria and Lycia south of the Meander.²²

Unfortunately this paper agreement did not in itself suffice to reorganize the whole region. Several communities were disposed to disregard the alterations, and the peoples of the interior were especially slow to recognize the new order. The fleet had to be sent to Caria to compel the acquiescence of some dissatisfied communities there, and later to Thrace to remove the Antiochene garrisons at Ænus and Maronea and to set those cities free.²³ Even the free communities offered difficulties by presenting claims against each other which the commissioners had to adjust. And each decision involved the sovereign state in a fresh series of obligations.

The new consul, Manlius, was sent into the interior with the Roman army and a strong contingent of Pergamenes to demand a recognition of the new status there. His ultimate destination was Galatia, the larger part of which had forsworn its friendship for Eumenes in order to join Antio-

chus. Manlius, however, turned aside from his path to settle disputes and to impose his orders upon several communities in Pisidia and Pamphylia which adjoined the new empires of Rhodes and Pergamum. These tribes seem to have furnished large contingents to Antiochus during the war,²⁴ and although according to the terms of peace they were to be left independent, it seems that the consul thought best to impress them with Rome's strength and to exact treaties of "friendship" from them. When they did not grant these treaties voluntarily, he imposed an indemnity, and in some cases even punished the recalcitrants by devastating their territory.

He then proceeded against the Galati. Polybius (from whose account Livy, XXXVIII, 12 and 20 are doubtless taken) seems to explain this expedition by saying that the Galati not only had forsaken the friendship of Eumenes and aided Antiochus, but they were such dangerous neighbors that the removal of Antiochus would have no value for the peace of Asia Minor unless they were first weakened. These barbarous Celts had seized their position in Asia some eighty years before and had since then been a constant menace to the Greeks. They were at one time strong enough to exact tribute from the whole of Asia Minor, even from the Seleucids beyond the Taurus. About 240, Attalus, in a war which is still famous wherever the Pergamene marbles are known, had compelled them to respect his boundaries, but after his power had weakened they again began to menace the Greek cities far and wide.²⁵ It appears that at the time of Magnesia only one minor chieftain had remained Eumenes' friend. From the others who had joined Antiochus, Manlius now requested an indemnity and a pledge of "friendship." They refused and gathered their forces for defense, but were routed in two battles. When they finally agreed to submit, Manlius ordered their envoys to meet him at Ephesus, where he intended to consider the matter with Eumenes. There he announced that they might have peace *with Eumenes* on the condition that they would confine themselves in the future to their own territory (Livy, XXXVIII, 40). This specification seems

to imply that the campaign was undertaken chiefly in the interest of Asia, and not of Rome, and that Eumenes was ordained to retain a protectorate over the Galatians. At the very end of the campaign, Ariarathus of Cappadocia, who, as an ally of Antiochus, had been of no little service at Magnesia and who also had recently given aid to the Galati against the consul, now sent envoys to apologize.²⁶ The consul set the price of pardon at 600 talents, which was reduced by half at the request of Eumenes, who meanwhile had come to an excellent understanding with the Cappadocian.

This campaign of Manlius, which so loaded down the Roman army with plunder that at times it could hardly proceed, raises several difficult questions. The source upon which Polybius' account is based concerned itself chiefly with the campaign itself; Polybius, on the other hand, fixed his attention upon the benefits derived from it. Neither undertook to explain Rome's purposes. It is easy to dispose of the entire matter by adopting either the conventional explanation that this campaign of Manlius was merely a raid for booty undertaken by an avaricious consul, or the equally orthodox view that it was an attempt to establish on a permanent basis the sovereignty of Rome in the East. Manlius, it must be admitted, was at times merciless and often interfered with affairs seemingly outside of his proper sphere. Even the later Roman annalists felt shocked at his procedure and invented a senatorial discussion upon the question whether Manlius should not be denied a triumph for attacking the Galatians without a formal declaration of war.²⁷ The probabilities are, however, that the campaign was planned by the senate in accordance with information furnished by Eumenes and at the recommendation of the Scipios, and that it was undertaken only after full deliberation regarding the necessity of some such action. Rome realized that although Eumenes, according to the terms of the treaty, was about to gain a large extent of territory, he possessed only the merest fragment of an army, since Antiochus had stripped him of almost the whole of his kingdom.

Immediately behind this defenseless expanse were the Galatians, a tribe accustomed to levy blackmail upon the length and breadth of the region. It would have been a serious mistake for the senate to leave the country without forcing from the barbarians an explicit recognition of the new order, and proving to them that Eumenes, at least until he grew into his position, had the support of a power whose word bore meaning. Moreover, another source of danger lurked in the fact that these Galatians and the Cappadocians near them had been allies of Antiochus. They could conceivably prove to be a very tinder box of revolution if the Great King should again dare to cross the Taurus.

For these reasons it was that the consul was sent to demand a recognition of the inviolability of Eumenes' new empire, and incidentally to impress upon the tribes the weakness of their former ally and the strength of Eumenes' friend. The Galatians were to pay the cost of the expedition in the form of an indemnity for having participated in the battle at Magnesia. The cost perhaps would also serve to impress the new arrangements upon the memory of a people who were disposed to forget such matters. We may conclude then that, from the point of view of Asia's welfare, the campaign was a political necessity, and that Polybius²⁸ justly sums up the campaign by saying that nothing so pleased the whole of Asia Minor as the removal of all fear of the barbarians and a respite from their insolence and lawlessness.

To the important work directed against the Celts, the other acts of the consul were incidental. So far as we can now judge, the detour into Pamphylia was self-imposed and his behavior there unjustifiably harsh; and yet we may well understand that it served in the south the same general purpose that the main expedition accomplished in the east. The consul's behavior illustrates the fact that the Romans had been learning in their recent Spanish and Gallic wars the dangerous lesson of fighting barbarians with barbaric means. They no longer felt the need of applying to all opponents alike the old standards assumed by the fetial

law. While willing in Greece to do as the Greeks did, in Barbary they were learning to practice a harder form of warfare. One may point out, however, that the Greeks had long before this time learned the same lesson, and that men like Eumenes and Antiochus probably saw no reason for being shocked at the behavior of the Romans. We surely find no criticism of it in Polybius, even though the later Roman annalists felt constrained to apologize for it.

While the more pressing work of ending the contest in Asia was progressing under Manlius, Fulvius Nobilior, the other consul, was busy in Ætolia. It will be remembered that the Ætolian league had twice refused to surrender unconditionally and, in the spring of 190, had been granted a truce of six months by Scipio. Even before the end of these six months, however, the league had lent its army to aid Amynder in driving Philip, now a Roman ally, out of Athamania. It followed up this success by pursuing Philip to the very bounds of Macedonia.²⁹ In the spring of 189, the period of truce having expired, Fulvius again took up the struggle against the Ætolians. He first advanced upon Ambracia, a strong and rich city held by an Ætolian garrison. After a long, unsuccessful siege, described by Ennius, who accompanied the consul, Athenian and Rhodian envoys arrived to beg for mercy for the league. This was actually the third time within two years that Athens had interceded in their behalf. The consul accepted the good offices of the intermediaries and found that the senate was also ready to withdraw its previous insistence upon an unconditional surrender. To be sure, Philip complained vigorously to the senate of the attack upon him, but the Athenians persisted in their mission, even at Rome, and met with success. Ambracia surrendered upon honorable terms, losing apparently only some of its public treasures. The amount of indemnity originally demanded of the league was reduced by half. Rome demanded, however, that the league agree to surrender all claims upon the cities and communities it had lost during the war, as well as upon the island of Cephallenia; and that it acknowledge the sovereignty of Rome and

support her in war. In other words, the Ætolians, like the Italian tribes of the past, were to remain autonomous, but also, like these, they were in the future to be a subordinate ally. The league, however, escaped being placed among the tributaries of the class of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain. The stipulation made regarding Cephallenia is explained by the next move of the consul. He immediately asked these islanders to accept the sovereignty of Rome. All the cities did so with the exception of Same, which was then besieged and taken by storm. Its inhabitants were sold into slavery. The desire of Rome to possess the island is probably to be explained by the fact that it was infested with pirates who had tried to close the sea to Roman transports during the preceding summer.³⁰

We have arrived at the conclusion of two serious wars that were dreaded by Rome in prospect as much as any that she had ever undertaken; for the military fame of Macedonia and Antiochus far outranked even that of Carthage in her best days. After these wars, the statesmen of Rome must have realized that there was now no power left that could cause them serious trouble. If, however, we have rightly interpreted the senate's purposes in the last two chapters, we may feel certain that during this decade Rome was fighting neither for the sake of aggrandizement nor even with the more general purpose of removing potential rivals.

It still remains to be seen whether in the final settlement before the second withdrawal of her forces she made any provisions for a possible future assertion of sovereignty in the countries which her armies had traversed. Antiochus had come out of the contest as free from any mark of direct dependence as he had been before, although his sphere of action was somewhat restricted since Rome's friendships were now more extended and since he had agreed not to sail west of a certain point. Rome's advantages consisted *de facto* in the knowledge that Antiochus had this once been defeated, and *de jure* in the fact that she did not pledge herself to any of the restrictions which bound Antiochus. But

this difference in the status of the two opponents might disappear if only the monarchs of Syria could establish as firm a hold upon their boundaries as Rome had upon hers. The senate showed no undue desire to emphasize its advantages over Syria in the succeeding years. The Seleucids were henceforth the *amici* of Rome, and neither Antiochus nor his son Seleucus IV had any reason to complain of Roman officiousness.

Rhodes remained a friend as before. Her wishes had carried great weight during the war; her naval policy was adopted by the Roman admiral in 190, her pleas in behalf of the Ætolians were granted by the senate, and her suggestions for the liberal treatment of Asia were largely accepted. After the war a slight dispute arose regarding the exact meaning of the clause of the treaty relating to Lycia, but the senate refused to press its interpretation, Rhodes carried out her measures to suit her own understanding of the matter, and the affair passed off amicably. A few years later the island again exerted her influence at Rome, requesting that the senate intervene in favor of Sinope.³¹ On the whole, however, Rhodes assumed a dignified and independent bearing, and took care not to entangle herself or her friends in any Roman problems which might necessitate the mediation of the West.

The situation of Eumenes was peculiar, for the larger part of his empire had practically been given him by Rome. He was shrewd enough to see that success in ruling his possessions without having to raise a costly army depended upon his spreading the opinion among his neighbors that he had Rome's support. Accordingly, he pursued a policy of bringing Roman embassies into Asia whenever possible, and tried to impress the senate with the fact that the general safety of the region required their presence. Thus it is that in 183, when his realm was invaded by Pharnaces, he chose rather to complain to Rome than to repulse the attack himself. The senate sent envoys to plead for a peaceable settlement, but when Pharnaces refused to listen, the matter was dropped by the Romans. Eumenes himself then carried the war to a

successful end, and at its conclusion made a treaty without in any way referring to Rome, although the rearrangements which he proposed involved several of Rome's friends. That Eumenes was entirely unrestricted in his foreign policies is shown not only by this, but by several other instances, — for example, when he aided Rhodes in her Lycian war; when he undertook a new war with the Galatians, subjugating them completely; when at various times he extended his influence among the Greek states by means of gifts; and when he actually sent his forces into Syria to aid Antiochus IV to establish his throne.³² It is not apparent that before the war with Perseus the senate took any heed of Eumenes unless appealed to by him. He evidently enjoyed the degree of independence that he desired and that he was ready by personal effort to secure for himself. Thus the relations existing between Rome and Asia in the year 188 were fairly well defined. Rome had apparently no intention as yet of considering any part of Asia as a dependency; and although she doubtless regarded herself as responsible for the general peace and safety there, at least for some time to come, she was actually ready to disregard numerous changes in her own settlement of the region.

Rome seems therefore to have evacuated Asia without intending to return. From Greece she could not so completely sever herself. For not only did the definition of her sphere of influence in 193 proclaim a conditional protectorate over Greece, but the subjection of Ætolia to the position of an obedient ally established her sovereignty on the coast of Greece. Furthermore, her relations with the several states had become so complicated that only the wisest of statesmanship could have diminished the need for further interference, and Greece had few wise statesmen at this time.

Philip of Macedonia had come out of his war in 196 without any explicit definition of his status towards Rome.³³ Later, to be sure, he had asked to be enrolled as a "friend" of Rome, whereupon the still unpaid installments of his war indemnity were remitted and his hostages returned. In the war of 191 he had occasionally aided Rome, but only when

he saw some prospect of increasing his own domain thereby. He sent no troops to accompany the Scipios to Asia. There seems to have been some misunderstanding regarding his position during the war,³⁴ the king apparently assuming that he had the liberty of overrunning Thessaly and Epirus, and the right to retain all he could take from the Ætolians, while the Romans, being responsible for the status as organized a few years before, saw that this would be impossible. Flamininus accordingly placed obstacles in his way, but was careful not to offend him by presuming to give any commands. After the peace of 189 Philip spent much time in extending his boundaries on the north.³⁵ Presently he fell into difficulties with the senate by taking possession of Ænus and Maronea, which the Romans had left free in 189 after removing the garrisons of Antiochus from them. This peculiarly reckless move of the king's — duplicated indeed in Thessaly — brought on threats from the senate which annoyed him. However, it is clear that he blundered in this case and that his independence had been entirely respected until he did so.

The Athenian republic was a Roman *amicus*, and enjoyed the most liberal privileges. We never hear of Athens requiting Rome for various deeds of armed protection except by regaling the senate with elegant orations. For a long time after other allies had become *de facto* subjects, Athens, like Massilia, was allowed to keep up the form of an independent power.

The Achæan league was technically on the same footing as Athens, and could well have remained so if it had maintained a dignified and consistent policy. But the league had grown so accustomed to assuming a heroic rôle while actually accepting the protection of some stronger power that it had acquired a kind of fitful fear lest it might not always appear thoroughly independent. This distemper, combined with a misplaced and not always scrupulous ambition, made it an easy prey for rash leaders. When the Roman consul, for instance, attacked Athamania because of its part in the war with Antiochus, the Achæan league

presumed to purchase from the representatives of the now defunct government the island of Zacynthus, which had belonged to that country, but which of course after the fall of the government must necessarily be at Rome's disposal. A great many of the Achæans had acknowledged from the first that the act was imprudent, and yet they made free to accuse Flaminius of officiousness when he asked the league to revoke its action. Then again Sparta was a thorn in the flesh, bringing about a disagreement between the two states for which neither was actually to blame. On the death of Nabis in 192, Philopœmen, the Achæan prætor, had entered Sparta and annexed it to the league. In this Rome acquiesced, and, since Nabis had been her ally, became a party to the treaty drawn up between Sparta and the league.³⁶ Trouble arose when Philopœmen now claimed that the league was sole sovereign in Sparta, and under that claim refused to carry out the terms of its treaty regarding the political exiles. This refusal induced Sparta to send clamorous protests to the senate. The disastrous results of this quarrel will become apparent later.

The minor states suffered but few changes in the war with Antiochus. The Bœotian league seems not to have been punished for its espousal of Antiochus' cause, and most of the Thessalian communities, as well as the Epirotes and Illyrians, remained in the position they secured in 196. Both of the Locrian leagues and that of Doris continued as members of the Ætolian league, which had in fact lost little.

What now was Rome's position beyond the Adriatic after the wars with Philip and Antiochus? Had she adopted the theory of conquest held by the Eastern monarchs—a theory she had inherited in Sicily through Hiero and Carthage? Obviously not, for Rome did not assume proprietary rights in a single foot of soil as a result of either conflict. Had she then followed her own ancient methods and extended her federation? Not even this; for her associates in the war, Rhodes, Achæa, Athens, the kings of Pergamum and Egypt, remained *amici* as before, and her defeated enemies, Philip and Antiochus, were added to that list of "friends."

Rome's participation in Eastern affairs had in fact followed a line of reasoning wholly new to her statesmen ; it resolved itself into nothing more nor less than a frank adoption of the Greek particularistic policy. The Scipios and their circle, men who had felt the magic of Hellenic civilization and were eager to draw Rome out of her stolid and monotonous materialism, were hastening the day when Rome would no longer be a despised "barbaric" nation, but would take her place beside enlightened peoples. And the easiest way of approach seemed to them participation in the counsels of the respected group of republics which was wont to safeguard the peace and autonomy of the *Ægean* states.

It is a great mistake to call the Scipionic policy imperialistic. These men may have seen that Rome's sphere of political influence must widen through their work, but that was to them an incident, not an aim. In fact, the cultural influence which Greece would exert over Rome in consequence of closer contact was, in their eyes, a more desirable thing than Rome's political dominance over Greece. No, the policy of these statesmen, if logically carried out, was fundamentally anti-imperialistic : it would forever preclude Rome's expansion beyond the *Adriatic*.

However, experience was soon to prove that the Scipionic group had undertaken the impossible. On the one hand, there was a very strong and ever growing party at Rome which did not sympathize with the new-fangled doctrine, and in 188 there were already signs that this party might easily gain control of the government and revert to more orthodox methods. On the other hand, the puny Greek states proved incapable of playing the game with so strong a partner. When Eumenes came to Rome to the general conference of powers which was to settle Asiatic affairs, he was greeted by the senate as a splendid and powerful monarch ; but when he rose to speak, he betrayed the spirit of a lackey ; instead of giving his counsel as an independent member of a coalition, he cringingly "entrusted his interests unreservedly to the hands of the Roman senate." This course paid him well, for the senate proved generous in the

face of such humble reliance, but what "concert of powers" could there be with men of his stamp? Yet the philhellenes were still too enthusiastic to see the reaction that must inevitably come. In their eyes Rome's work beyond the Adriatic seemed to be complete in 188. In the future the senate would have little to do, they thought, but share with other nations in the fruits of the peace that had been established throughout the world.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

1. Livy, XXXIII, 19; the objections of Rhodes: *ibid.* 20.
2. By the "Royal" treaty of 387.
3. Niese, *Griech. und maked. Staaten*, II, 640, is not entirely accurate when he says that the Rhodians helped Antiochus plunder Ptolemy. Rhodes rather protected Ptolemy's possessions; Livy, XXXIII, 20, 11. She did not seize Caunos, but purchased it. To be sure, Rhodes finally received a large portion of Ptolemy's Asiatic territory after the battle of Magnesia, but that was when Ptolemy had given up all claims to it.
4. Polyb. XVIII, 41. Livy, XXXIII, 38, proves that Antiochus had a garrison in Abydos in the spring of 196.
5. Polyb. XVIII, 47.
6. Bevan, *The House of Seleucus*, vol. II; Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire des Séleucides*; Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.* (III, 2, p. 264), discusses the limits of Ptolemaic and Seleucid possessions in Asia. Max Nicolaus, *Zwei Beiträge*, proves that Macedonia had no possessions in Caria until 201.
7. Several inscriptions show that he was employing his diplomacy to the utmost to gain a good reputation with Greek cities, Bevan, *op. cit.* II, p. 53.
8. Polyb. XVIII, 41; XXVIII, 20; Cassius Dio, fr. 60.
9. Ditt. Syll.² No. 276 (cf. Dittenberger's note 10). The Lamp-sacene envoys apparently set out in the summer of 197, so that the motive of the embassy was rather to secure moral support against the Galati than against Antiochus, who was then far away. Note also that Rome's answer was addressed to several kings — not to Antiochus.
10. Livy, XXXIII, 18; Polyb. XXXI, 7; Hicks, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*¹ 174. Antiochus had also incurred the enmity of Eumenes by laying claim to a large part of his kingdom, but he apparently intended to purchase Eumenes' good will when the proper time came; Polyb. XXI, 20.
11. Niese, *op. cit.* II, 674.
12. Polyb. XVIII, 47 and 50.

13. Maritime colonies of 194: Sipontum, Croton, Tempesa, Buxentum, Salernum, Puteoli, Liternum, Volturnum, and, possibly, Pyrgi, also Latin colonies at Thurii and Vibo in 193-2. It is a forceful commentary on Rome's depleted condition that Rome had to send Latins to two of these maritime colonies and also fill the quota of the citizen-colonies with non-Romans; and yet only some three thousand men all told were needed.

14. Livy, XXXIV, 59; Diod. XXVIII, 16.

15. Livy, XXXIV, 59.

16. Livy, XXXV, 22.

17. Flamininus used his influence to secure the control of Athens, Chalcis, and Demetrias for the propertied classes. This policy was quickly effective, but it brought unpleasant consequences later; Livy, XXXV, 31 and 50.

18. Livy, XXXV, 34-8.

19. Livy, XXXV, 42, 2, and App. Syr. 12. Kromayer (*Antike Schlachtfelder*, II, 127) has clearly demonstrated the impracticability of Hannibal's program.

20. Polyb. XXI, 45, 46.

21. Since Antiochus had offered Eumenes all that had ever belonged to Attalus as the price of an alliance (Polyb. XXI, 20, 8), Rome could hardly do less.

22. In the settlement Ptolemy was, of course, disregarded, since, by his secret treaty with Antiochus, he had forfeited all rights to his Asiatic possessions. The status of Pamphylia was left under dispute. Later, a part of it was assigned to Eumenes, while a part was set free.

23. Livy, XXXVII, 60, 7, and XXXIX, 27, 10. An inscription of Heraclea, reproducing a letter of the Roman consul (Ditt. *Syll.*² 287) proves that Manlius and the ten commissioners did not always settle the status of old cities on broad principles. The purport of this letter is, "We grant you freedom and autonomy *because you supported our cause.*" The spirit of the letter hardly accorded with the intention of the senate to sever political relations with Asia in the future. See also Manlius' settlement of a dispute between Samos and Priene, Ditt. *Syll.*² 315.

24. Livy, XXXVII, 40, and XXXVIII, 14.

25. See the inscription of Lampsacus (Ditt. *Syll.*² No. 276); also, Livy, XXXVIII, 16 and 47.

26. Livy, XXXVII, 40; XXXVIII, 26, 4; and Polyb. XXI, 47.

27. Polyb. XXI, 36, and Livy, XXXVIII, 44 ff. (from Valerius Antias).

28. Polyb. XXI, 43. Cf. *ibid.* III, 3, where the Greek author credits the Romans with freeing all the nations west of the Taurus from the violence of the Galati.

29. Polyb. XXI, 25-30, and Livy, XXXVIII, 1 ff.

30. Livy, XXXVII, 13, 12. For the capture of the city, see Polyb. XXI, 40, and Livy, XXXVIII, 29.

31. Rome and Rhodes: the naval policy, Livy, XXXVII, 15 and 17; Rhodes' good offices accepted, Polyb. XXI, 24; Lycian dispute, Polyb. XXII, 5; the affair of Sinope, Polyb. XXIII, 9.

32. Rome and Eumenes: the war with Pharnaces, Polyb. XXIII, 9; XXIV, 9; XXV, 2; Eumenes aids Rhodes, Polyb. XXIV, 9; war with the Galati, Niese, *op. cit.* III, 72; aid of Antiochus IV, *Inscr. von Perg.* No. 160; App. *Syr.* 45.

33. Polyb. XVIII, 44; Livy, XXXIII, 35, informs us that he later became a friend. Livy's loose phrase *societatem amicitiamque* reflects the new interpretation of the fetial rules which was to bring the policy of the Scipios under cover of the *mos majorum*; see Chap. VIII.

34. Philip's claim that he had a right to make conquests under Rome's protection was wholly untenable. The independence of the Greeks established a few years before could not be disregarded. He had been more than liberally rewarded for his military aid, for he was permitted to hold a large part of Magnesia, the Dolopians, and four cities of Thessaly (Livy, XLII, 56 and 67).

35. Livy, XXXIX, 35 and 53; Polyb. XXIII, 8.

36. Rome and Achæa; the affair of Zacynthus, Livy, XXXVI, 32; the Spartan treaty, Livy, XXXVIII, 33, 9; XXXIX, 36, *in vestro foedere*.

CHAPTER X

REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS

THE general withdrawal of Rome's Eastern armies in 188 seemed for the moment to prove that the Scipios had succeeded in completely reforming Rome's foreign policy. Instead of fighting for an extension of empire, the senate had during ten years proved its willingness to act as a member of the Ægean concert of powers, to enter into temporary alliances and coalitions, and to withdraw its forces when its main work had been done. In 188 it was apparent that if this policy could be conserved long enough to eradicate the old Roman idea that an ally was a subject, Rome might become a permanent member of the Hellenic coalition whose purpose it was to propagate the Greek particularistic doctrine. But the philhellenic group in the senate was not strong enough to bend the nation to a course so un-Roman. The Scipios soon fell from power, and with them their policies; or perhaps, if we knew the whole truth, we should find that these leaders fell because their philhellenic policy could not withstand the vigorous assaults of conservative Romans like Cato. We can readily understand why the doctrine that underlay the work of this decade was not popular. Firstly, it broke utterly with the *mos maiorum*. The creators of Rome's old institutions had formed scores of alliances, but always with the understanding that each and every one of their allies should surrender its foreign affairs to Rome's supervision. It made old-fashioned Roman senators uncomfortable to observe that they had signed away their privilege of lording over the East by accepting alliances of friendship instead of insisting upon the far more advantageous forms of treaty which former senators had imposed upon Italian states. Many of them felt that the Greeks did not deserve any privileged position among Rome's allies and that

there should be a leveling in favor of consistency. Secondly, the conservatives were not accustomed to entering upon expensive wars for sentimental reasons. They cared little whether or not Athenian orators pronounced them uncivilized for living outside the pale of Greek politics. Philhellenism, particularism, and applause at Greek games did not seem to them things for which one should spill Roman blood and appropriate public moneys. Their great ancestors had usually secured a substantial indemnity of money and territory in return for citizens' blood. But criticism was directed not only against the policy, but against the results of the war. Men like Cato pointed out that the soldiers who had fought in Greece and the East came home with new-found vices and that the generals' staff brought back an un-Roman taste for everything from Greek cooking to marble statuary. The oft-repeated statement of the annalists that the deterioration of Rome's morals dated from the return of Manlius' army was doubtless secured from Cato's speeches. And finally we may infer from the support which Cato's attacks upon the Scipios received in the democratic assembly that there was also political opposition to the philhellenic policy. Ever since the Roman army had crossed the seas in 264 the senate had steadily grown in prestige at the expense of the popular assembly. The believers in popular sovereignty were surely shrewd enough to see that if the state became involved in a mass of international disputes whose delicate points the populace could not hope to understand, the senate would of necessity become a stronger and stronger administrative body. That body would have to shape the government of a large empire, and its members would travel as ambassadors to all parts of the East; in fact, the nobles were already assuming superior airs in consequence of the almost divine honors they had received from the servile peoples of the East. Not for centuries had the aristocracy of the senate possessed the power that it controlled in 190. The people saw the danger to their own prestige that lay in continuing along the road which the Scipios had laid out.

All this dissatisfaction was ready to be unified into effective

opposition when the right leader should be found, and that leader presently emerged in the person of Cato. He seemed ideally suited to the task, combining all the sympathies and prejudices which would make him the natural opponent of the Scipios. He hated them personally because Africanus had insulted him. He hated their policies because he was a narrow-minded and practical farmer of the type that instinctively favors expansion only if it pays and does not involve a breach of a legal code: there was no room for sentiment in his politics. By temperament he was conservative to the core. Innovations, whether in politics or in food, in vices or in virtues, in religion or in art, he could not endure. At the same time he had no little sympathy with the populace and the principles of popular sovereignty, especially if the people cried out against the power of the aristocratic cliques. In what follows we shall have occasion to observe how he gathered about himself all the opposition to the Scipionic régime, and, when the time was ripe, let loose the forces which effectively crushed it. Once in power he recalled the senate to the old heavy-handed policy of conducting all international dealings upon strictly business principles; and then the Greek allies of Rome awoke to the fact that they were allies only in the sense that the Italian *socii* had been; that they were no longer independent states, but Roman subjects.

In tracing this change of the senate's attitude towards the Greeks — a change which eventually led to a new war in Macedonia — we need not enter into every dispute that arose. The history of the Achæo-Spartan imbroglio will lead to the main crisis and will sufficiently illustrate the point. According to the treaty of 191, which was signed by Flamininus, the Achæans, and the Spartans, Sparta was to surrender its coast cities to the Achæan league, was itself to become a member of the league, and was to recall to full rights the men that Nabis had exiled. The recall of these exiles, however, would of course necessitate a redistribution of the property which Nabis had taken from them and handed over to his partisans, — a proceeding to which the men then

in possession naturally objected. They accordingly hesitated to comply with the demands. Flamininus wished to settle the matter at once, but Philopœmen, either thinking that the time was not yet ripe, or hoping to carry the measure in a manner more advantageous to his league by dispensing with Roman aid, actually prevented Flamininus from beginning action.¹ The Spartan possessors were elated; and when the exiles appealed for aid to Flamininus, whose renewed request for a speedy settlement was again refused by Philopœmen, the Spartan possessors concluded that they had the Achæan sympathy, and accordingly made bold to storm a coast town where many of the exiles were living and put not a few of them to death. Then Philopœmen finally prepared to take action. But Sparta, now thoroughly frightened, declared itself free, and offered to give itself to Rome, sending envoys first to the consul Fulvius, and later to the senate. The Achæan envoy at Rome, Lycortas, again pleaded against intervention,² and the senate refused to interfere.

The results of the senate's inaction were disastrous. Philopœmen, who really desired to put a complete end to Sparta's claims as an independent state, advanced upon the city and demanded the surrender of the citizens who were guilty of the recent disturbance. These offered to come forth for trial under a pledge of safe conduct, but their appearance was the signal for a riot in which several of them were killed. The next day Philopœmen, in a farcical trial,³ condemned all the rest to death, and thereupon carried out the project he had so greatly desired. He incorporated the city into the league, replaced the old Lycurgan constitution with one of his own making, destroyed the city's walls, and ordered the landholders to give up their possessions for redistribution. Those who refused to leave the territory were sold into slavery, — some three thousand in number. Then he brought back the old exiles, hoping that because of this kindness they would prove friendly to the league. Of course this entire procedure absolutely disregarded the Roman-Spartan treaty of 191, and the senate doubtless felt

the insult. But the senate, still believing that Greece should be left to her own ways, said nothing.

Two years later the question came up again. This time, strange to say, it was the returned exiles who appealed to Rome. They complained that in restoring them to their former property Philopœmen had banished too many inhabitants. They also asserted that the league held the reins of subjection too firmly, and that the walls of Sparta should never have been destroyed. They were even willing that their former enemies should return in order that the city might regain its former size and dignity. To answer these complaints the league had also sent envoys Rome-wards.⁴ The senate answered both disputants by letter, stating that, although it did not approve of the league's treatment of Sparta, it would not interfere in the matter.

The position of the senate under the Scipionic régime is well illustrated by the fact that this one answer was the full extent of its interference for four years in the face of very strong provocation. However, in 186-5, matters assumed a different aspect, the reason for which we may with probability trace to the fall of Africanus, and the threatening attitude of Philip. Several years before this Cato had begun a systematic attack upon the aristocratic leaders. In 193 he brought suit against the ex-consul Minucius Thermus for alleged cruelty to some Gallic prisoners, but apparently with little success, for the defendant soon became an officer in Scipio's campaign against Antiochus. He next attacked Acilius Glabrio, the friend of Scipio, and the general under whom Cato himself had served with such distinction at Thermopylæ. Glabrio was charged with trying to gain popularity by means of lavish gifts to the soldiers, and Cato was so far successful in his prosecution of the case as to compel his opponent to withdraw from the contest for the censorship (Livy, XXXVII, 57). The effort made in 187 to deprive Fulvius and Manlius of triumphs is doubtless attributable to another attempt of this same indefatigable leader to discredit the aristocratic clique and to establish a precedent, if possible, by which to strike higher up. Finally

in 186 Cato directed the ultimate blow when a demand was made in the senate that Lucius Scipio account for the moneys obtained by him in the Asiatic campaign. Africanus,⁵ who well knew that the attack was in reality directed against himself, answered, justly enough, that a consul was not accountable by law, and forthwith tore up the records openly. As the sequel proves, however, Cato actually gained his point in the matter, for he succeeded in spreading the suspicion among his partisans that the Scipios had reason to fear an accounting. He thereupon brought action in the assembly directly against Africanus, charging him with having accepted bribes from Antiochus. As proof, he cited the fact that Antiochus had met with strikingly liberal treatment, and he dwelt upon the incident of the Eastern king's generosity in sending back Africanus' captive son as a free gift. The populace, which had little understanding of the Scipios' liberal diplomacy, apparently found this evidence plausible, and Africanus seems to have avoided trial in a sufficiently haughty manner to excite even further adverse criticism. The trial, to be sure, fell through when Africanus appealed most effectively to the memory of his past deeds, and the whole matter came to naught later when he accepted a commission from the senate which removed him from the city. Cato, however, renewed his attack upon Lucius, and won his case before the popular assembly. In this emergency, Africanus appealed to the tribunes for aid, but the only one who heeded was Gracchus, a man of democratic sympathies and his personal enemy. Lucius, through the influence of Gracchus, was saved from prison, but the acceptance of service from such a source was naturally a surrender of all political influence. The Scipionic régime was completely at an end. Africanus withdrew to his villa, where he soon after died. With this victory Cato reached the height of his power. It is in 186-5 that we first notice a new trend in the foreign policies of the senate.

The second important incident to which we referred was the aggression of Philip. It will be remembered that in 191 Acilius Glabrio had given Philip permission to campaign in

northern Thessaly, with the understanding that the king might take and retain such cities as had *voluntarily* aided the enemy.⁶ The king, however, overstepped his agreement and failed to evacuate certain cities that did not properly fall into this class. He went even further, for during the succeeding years he quietly insinuated his partisans into several free Thessalian cities, and by diplomatically working one faction against another, by removing his opponents, and by colonizing cities with Macedonians, he extended his power considerably. In Thrace he was still bolder. There he employed factional disturbances as a means of introducing his garrisons into Ænus and Maronea, which the Roman general Fabius had left free in 188; and, finding that Fabius had designated the public road as the boundary line of these cities, he altered the road so as to secure an addition of territory for himself. The seizure of these cities was a signal for protests from every aggrieved source, and Eumenes gladly joined the complainants, hoping to gain possessions in Thrace if Philip were forced to recede. It is very difficult to understand how Philip dared to risk a contest with Rome, but his conduct is probably to be explained by his knowledge that the Scipios were not wholly in favor, and that Cato, who would apparently succeed them, had little respect for the Greeks and would scarcely take great pains to support measures instituted by the preceding régime. What Philip failed to understand was that Cato, although neither philhellenic enough to care for Scipio's policy, nor imperialist enough to desire a foothold for Rome in Greece, was too much of a patriot to let an insult to the state pass unchallenged.

The senate did indeed take heed, and dispatched an embassy under Cæcilius Metellus to hear complaints, even assuring protection to all who wished to speak. Philip, to be sure, had provoked the humiliation involved in this procedure, but it must be admitted that Metellus conducted the proceedings with little consideration for the sovereign rights of the king. To Rome's final decision, however, so far as we can make it out, we can scarcely object. The two Thracian cities were again declared free (Livy, XXXIX, 29),

and were not, happily, given to the tale-bearing Eumenes. We are less clearly informed concerning the disposition of the cities in Thessaly. We know that the king later possessed Demetrias with most of Magnesia, the greater part of Dolopeia, the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which Antiochus had once taken from him, and, if we may judge from what Perseus ⁷ appears to possess in 170, several cities in northern Thessaly. It seems therefore that the trial board decided the issue on the basis of Philip's understanding with Acilius in 191. Whatever territory he had occupied in disregard of that agreement, he was ordered to evacuate.

The king was extremely angry, and warned his enemies that his last sun had not yet set. The orders he had received he took no pains to expedite. The envoys that came to investigate what progress was being made, found that he was still dallying; and when finally he evacuated Maronea, he spitefully had the leaders of the city murdered.⁸ Livy adds, perhaps on good authority, that he was secretly urging the Istri to invade northern Italy at this time, and the suggestion has been made that the colony of Aquileia at the head of the Adriatic was founded (181) in view of such activities. At any rate, for several years after 186 there was intense fear at Rome that the trouble with Philip would soon end in another Macedonian war. This fear it was that in turn shaped Cato's policy after he had overthrown the Scipios. Cato was in no sense an imperialist. He would have preferred to withdraw from Greece completely and to have forbidden all intercourse with the country which seemed to him the bane of Roman ideals. He was practical enough, however, to see that Rome could not favorably withdraw in the face of a threatening war. The only alternative possible to Cato's conception of politics was to remain in Greece as master of the situation, and to require that the petty states of Greece quit dallying with excuses and meet their agreements seriously. This is the spirit in which Rome's envoys dealt with the Greeks after 186. The new régime even made a point of employing more practical men for the diplomatic service, men like Cæcilius Metellus,

who had once imprisoned the poet Nævius⁹ because of a pointed Saturnian, Marcius Philippus and the Popilii, trained in devious methods by their experiences with the barbaric Ligurians, and Appius Claudius, who conducted his foreign mission with all the proverbial haughtiness of his clan. Even Flaminius,¹⁰ to whom the Greeks had sung pæans as to a deity, adapted himself to the new trend of things and became the servile tool of a senate which blotted out the splendid work of his early career.

In the Achæo-Spartan imbroglio, it was Cæcilius Metellus who, on his return from the harrowing conference with Philip in 185, visited the Achæans and reopened the question regarding the league's treatment of Sparta. This was of course a complete reversal of the senate's former position, for it had in the preceding year notified the league that it would take no further action. Moreover, Metellus conducted his business with the league in an offensive manner. He came without proper credentials, abused the Achæans for what they had done, and asked them to call a full meeting of the league in order that measures of restitution might be adopted. His demand was refused on the ground that it was illegal to call a meeting of the league at the bidding of an allied power unless properly drawn up instructions were presented (Pol. XXII, 13). For this perfectly justifiable action of the Achæans the senate administered a sharp rebuke, and instructed its next envoy to Philip, Appius Claudius, to stop in Greece and renew the request for the desired action. Upon his return from Macedonia in 184, Claudius accordingly asked for an assembly of the league and presented the senate's complaints against the Achæans for the legal murders of 188, the destruction of Sparta's wall, and the changes in her constitution. The league's president, Lycortas, replied that the league could make no amends. Claudius retorted brutally that the league would do well to listen to the senate's suggestions before it was compelled to obey its commands. Thereupon, Lycortas answered with bitterness that if changes were to be made in the Spartan constitution, the senate might do it and save the league from

the crime of breaking an agreement sealed with oaths. And so the matter went to the senate for review. But that body hardly distinguished itself for wisdom.

A commission of three men, Flamininus, Metellus, and Claudius, was delegated to draw up a final decision, and this it did in a session held at Rome. In its verdict Achæa's position as a sovereign power was completely disregarded. In fact, the Achæan envoys present were asked to sign an agreement which openly involved their breaking the laws and treaties of the league; and they signed it.¹¹ By this decision Achæa was to restore the exiles of 190 and to rebuild Sparta's walls, but not a word was said about the important question of redistributing Spartan property. Marcius Philippus was now sent to deliver this decision to Achæa, but the league, in a rage, voted not to accept it, taking the stand that if the senate would rehear the case, it would annul the commission's verdict. Some time later, the league, still disregarding Rome's decision, entered into a new agreement with Sparta, accepting her as a league-member on the signed promise that the exiles were *not* to be recalled.¹² The senate must have resented this show of independence, and yet, not being willing to compel obedience by force of arms, it remained silent.

Meanwhile the situation in Macedonia had been growing more serious. Demetrius, whom the Romans had hoped to see as Philip's successor, had been poisoned, apparently by the agents of Perseus. Rome no longer had any way of checkmating her enemies in Macedonia except by direct interference. Accordingly in the year 180, she sent a note to Achæa stating that the commission's decision must be enforced. This brought on the crisis. Lycortas, taught in the Fabian school of Philopœmen, proposed trying persuasion with the Romans again, and his motion carried, but, unfortunately for his plans, his enemy, the pro-Roman Callicrates, secured a place on the embassy sent to Rome. This man, reckoned by later Greeks as one of the most infamous of traitors, did not carry out the instructions of Lycortas and the league, but instead, describing the division of parties

in the Greek cities, advised the senate that if it would but encourage the aristocratic factions in the various cities and reward those who favored Rome's wishes, its influence would soon predominate and its rescripts would be heeded, regardless of Achæa's laws and constitution (Pol. XXIV, 11). The result of this advice was decisive. The senate, under the influence of Cato, determined to use its power directly in the establishment of pro-Roman parties throughout Greece, and that determination, according to Polybius (XXIV, 12), begins a new era in the history of Græco-Roman relations. On the strength of Rome's support, which was publicly expressed throughout Greece, Callicrates secured his own election to the presidency of the league and carried out the stipulations of the senate to the full.¹³

This incident, so tedious in its petty details, shows as nothing else how domestic and foreign events conspired to inveigle the senate in a policy of intervention with reference to Achæa. The further history of the Macedonian quarrel explains how the same policy came to be adopted for the rest of Greece.

After 183, Philip had tacitly yielded to the senate's demands that he cease interfering in Greek affairs. He turned all his energy toward strengthening his empire in other directions; he increased the population of his kingdom by wise inner colonization, he reorganized the finances of the state, and trained his army by waging war with the tribes on the north. He even invited the Celtic tribe of the Bastarnæ from beyond the Danube to come and live in the vicinity of Macedonia, for by this move he would rid himself of his neighbors, the pro-Roman Dardani, and secure the service as mercenaries of a strong and friendly tribe. All this activity was of course known at Rome, nor was its ultimate purpose a secret, but no excuse for protest was available. The subject furnished the senate no little anxiety — and much food for reflection upon the ultimate consequences of the Scipionic policy.

When Philip died in 179, Perseus succeeded to the throne and to the purposes and policies of his father. He renewed

the "friendship" with Rome, and in so doing he specifically recognized the recent agreement made between his father and the senate,¹⁴ but his subsequent behavior shows that from the first he did not intend to heed it in too literal a sense. Philip's work of internal improvement he continued. He also began to store up grain and treasure for war purposes. But his greatest success lay in his diplomacy. Close alliances with Seleucus and Prusias, sealed by dynastic marriages, attracted the attention of the whole East to him. He secretly aided native princes in the vicinity, who created difficulties among the Illyrian chiefs friendly to Rome. Most important of all, however, he succeeded in building up a remarkably strong pro-Macedonian party throughout Greece, and this last work, revealing, as it does, the extremely complicated nature of Rome's peculiar position, deserves fuller notice.

The great instability of government that existed among the Greek city-states is proverbial. It is safe to say that during the fourth and third centuries there were few cities that did not undergo a bloody revolution at least once every generation. And these revolutions were thoroughgoing, often involving a complete redistribution of private property as well as a change in the form of government. Politically, it was usually a question whether the city should be a pure democracy or an oligarchy; but practically such revolutions had more than political importance, for the party in power quite regularly banished its opponents, confiscated their lands, and either devoted these to state purposes or simply redistributed them among the victors.

Now the entrance of Rome into this field was soon discovered to be an influence for stability and for a stricter legal observance of permanent property rights. Wherever Flamininus, for instance, was called upon to reorganize the constitution of a state, it was noticed that two principles immediately came to the front. Firstly, all political exiles were called back, for stable government was impossible so long as one faction was excluded and waiting on the border for its opportunity to raise an insurrection. Secondly, the

preponderance of legislative power was placed, as at Rome, in the hands of property owners; in other words, a mild form of aristocracy was regularly recognized. The meaning of this trend was soon observed, and it reacted directly or indirectly upon the greater part of Greece. In the enthusiasm for the new order represented by the proclamation of 196, the oligarchic parties came to the fore in very many states. The leaders of these aristocracies felt instinctively that the presence of a Roman protectorate would work for stability of government and consequently guard their property rights, that in fact nothing would again bring back the danger of revolutions or encourage "tyrannies" and pure democracies so much as the reestablishment of the old Macedonian protectorate. Accordingly, the leaders of such states became more and more anti-Macedonian, that is, more and more pro-Roman.

Needless to say, the new order did not satisfy all. Many who believed sincerely in the democratic form of government saw that it was now in danger of disappearing. And of course the unpropertied and the whole class of those who fall into economic difficulties under whatsoever régime saw in the new stability the end of a convenient and profitable mode of readjustment. This class grew strong in many cities, and being in the political opposition at home, they naturally included in their platform a plank with reference to the larger main question. Perseus knew, of course, that any enemy of Rome might have the sympathy of this class, and therefore undertook to create out of that sympathy a positive force. At all frequented shrines of Greece he posted edicts inviting home all absconding debtors and political exiles who had left Macedonia (Pol. XXV 3). The immediate inference throughout the land was that Perseus would be a friend of the oppressed, and that if he had the opportunity, he would throw his influence in favor of democracies throughout Greece. The consequence was that secret missions began to flock to the king from every direction extending sympathy, making promises for the future, and asking for his support. The Bœotian league, where the democratic

forms were still in force, went so far as to make a close alliance with him, — Perseus' sanction of which seems to have been a violation of his treaty with Rome. We may add that the royal correspondence which later fell into the hands of Paullus contained letters from this period that brought many prominent Greeks into disgrace at Rome.

Thus before any directly hostile act from either side had been observed, opposing factions in all cities of Greece were instinctively aligning themselves under the names of pro-Roman and pro-Macedonian. But economic considerations, we must hasten to add, were not the only issue between the two parties. There were even leaders of moderate political views who never gave up the fear that Roman influence would ultimately prove a menace to Greece. With a long and varied history from which to judge they instinctively and rightly suspected the professions of Rome, even when they were sincere. The compelling movements of political events had so frequently given the lie to the most altruistic of beginnings, and the Greeks had so frequently been "liberated" with disastrous results that they had grown suspicious of the effectiveness of the most genuine promises. The worst was that since 185 even kind words had begun to fail and the senate's disinterestedness to pale. When occasionally benefits ¹⁵ were still bestowed to prove the reliability of old pledges, they were too often brought by tactless men who conveyed them in somewhat the blunt and unsympathetic way that Russia, for instance, befriended the Slavs of Bulgaria after the war of '78 — and with similar results.

Relations then were badly strained all through the third decade of the century. Perseus was rapidly gaining strength and sympathy. He might conceivably march south with a strong army, in which case he would undoubtedly meet with enthusiastic support. If Rome did not wish to repudiate all her past work in Greece and give up the land again to Macedonian dominance, she must sooner or later face the issue with decision. The only question was whether to wait for Perseus to act and accept the war at a disadvantage, or be forehanded, make a demonstration upon the border of

Macedonia, and exact terms that would leave the king harmless.

The king was himself in no enviable position. His father's attempt to displace pro-Roman tribes on the west by the introduction of friendly Celts had been met by the extension of Roman alliances in the direction of Thrace. This indicated that the king might eventually be deprived of the privilege of aggression, even on the north. If this successor of Alexander found such a situation growing intolerable and gave vent to his anger in secret action contrary to the spirit of his promises, it cannot be wondered at. Such action, however, brought upon him further irritating orders from Rome, bidding him observe more care in his dealings with his "friend." When finally Eumenes came to Rome in 173 with an overfull catalogue of Perseus' suspicious acts,¹⁶ the senate was convinced that it was wise openly to counteract the king's influence in Greece. It therefore sent a group of envoys to the several Greek states, calling upon them to break off relations with Macedonia and commit themselves unequivocally in favor of Rome. These envoys succeeded after a time in gaining the allegiance of almost every state, but in some places only with great effort. When, for instance, the Bœotian league hesitated, Marcius Philippus, the Roman envoy, at once disregarded the sovereign position of the league and asked the cities individually to sign agreements with Rome. All but three yielded, not daring to face her displeasure. Thus the Bœotian league came to an end. The Achæan league, which submitted to pressure so readily in 180, had been forehanded enough in divining the pleasures of Rome and had severed its commercial relations with Macedonia as early as 175, though it thereby made the kingdom a safe refuge for all runaway slaves from the Peloponnese.

The envoys went even to Asia to obtain new assurances of support in case of war. Here Rome had troubled the various states so little that a greater degree of good will existed. Prusias, who was Perseus' brother-in-law, declared that he would observe neutrality because of his relationship.

Eumenes' friendship was of course unquestioned. Syria had been absolutely unmolested these fifteen years, so that Antiochus was well enough pleased with the course of events. He, too, promised to observe friendship. Rhodes was less well satisfied. The predominance of Eumenes in Asia Minor was at times galling, while a recent declaration of the senate that the treaty of 188 intended Lycia to be an ally rather than a tributary of Rhodes had cost the island a war with its subject.¹⁷ However, its recent unprecedented prosperity was so clearly dependent upon the even balance at present maintained that Rhodes could have had little desire to see the return of the Diadochian régime which would follow the success of Perseus. Rhodes readily promised aid therefore.

Of course this open activity against Perseus was intolerable to that king, but, instead of meeting it with arms as it deserved, he began to quail before the contest, and meekly asked what was desired of him. He was told that his activities against Rome's allies were considered infractions of the treaty and that he could have peace only upon complete submission to Rome.¹⁸

During the first year of the war which followed this ultimatum, the Roman army fell into incompetent hands. The consul Licinius Crassus lost his first battle and peevishly threw the blame for his defeat upon the allied troops. Then he tried to show results by plundering disaffected Bœotian cities during the winter.¹⁹ C. Lucretius, the prætor in charge of the fleet, was of similar caliber, evincing inexcusable cruelty toward the Bœotian cities of Haliartus and Thisbe for closing their gates to the Romans. His successor was no less intemperate in seizing every pretext to pillage hostile cities and request supplies from friendly ones. In fact, the senate, which was not yet wholly corrupt and was prudent enough to see that it was losing the moral support of its allies, had to adopt vigorous measures against its generals. It sent an order that no requests for supplies were to be heeded unless they bore the senate's authorization²⁰; it took measures to right the wrongs inflicted upon the Greeks, punishing several of the miscreant officers by fines and banishment.

The second consul, Hostilius, devoted most of his time to bringing his army into a better condition and the allies into a more sympathetic attitude. His attempt, however, to force his way into Macedonia failed.

Q. Marcius Philippus, the third consul, was a rough-and-ready man who stood well with the populace, but had a bad blot upon his military record because of having led his army into a disastrous ambushade in Liguria during his first consulship in 186. His Macedonian campaign of 169 nearly ended in the same fashion. By a hazardous stroke, he pushed his army over the pathless mountains above the well-fortified pass of Tempe into the closed corner of southeastern Macedonia. As he was wholly dependent upon making connections with his transports, which nevertheless failed to appear for a long time, he fell to all appearances into hopeless straits. Perseus, however, who naturally inferred that Marcius had established the necessary communications, withdrew all his garrisons in the rear, thereby unwittingly saving his opponent. Even so, little of worth had been accomplished by Marcius. The little nook into which he had forced his way was readily locked off, and the consul had to waste the whole season. Marcius, seeing this, his second campaign, also in danger of ending to his discredit, seems to have lost his courage, for he suggested to the Rhodian envoys who visited him that they use their good offices in trying to reestablish peace. Certain it is that several of Rome's allies, seeing the apparent inability of Rome's army to push forward, began at this time to waver in their support. The Illyrian king made overtures to Perseus, the anti-Roman faction in Rhodes was rapidly becoming a powerful party, and even Eumenes entered into secret communications with the king. In fact, the autumn of this year was the darkest period of the war for the senate.²¹

When the Rhodian envoys returned home and reported Marcius' request, the pro-Macedonian party immediately drew what was doubtless the correct inference, that the consul had despaired of success. They made the most of the occasion, secured a majority in the state, and voted to

send a friendly embassy to Perseus, assuring him of their good will, and to invite a group of states to coöperate with them in bringing pressure upon the senate to end the war. Unfortunately ²² for them, their envoys did not reach Rome until after Perseus' defeat, and their offers of mediation then only served to offend the senate, which already had good reason to suspect their loyalty.

Even Eumenes was touched by the contagion. Polybius relates that he kept up an extended secret correspondence with Perseus, offering to intervene in his behalf for a stipulated sum of money. The story in this form hardly seems to accord with the character of Eumenes, but it is more than probable that there was an interchange of messages. Probably the Pergamene was shifting his course, and tentatively hid his real sympathies under a pretense of business forms, in case the letters should be intercepted. One can readily understand that Eumenes saw as well as others the danger in too complete a success on Rome's part, and hoped that now when the army seemed to be at bay an agreement could be reached which would somewhat moderate her power. Even if Rome won, there could be little further profit for him, since he already had everything that was reasonably available; Roman success would simply place him in danger of being overshadowed by his protector. On the other hand, he was now so strong that if Rome could be excluded from Greece, he might hope to be one of the three or four dominating powers of the East in the future. However, his negotiations with Perseus came to naught; and in the end he succeeded only in bringing down the wrath of the senate upon his head.

The Achæan league likewise, which had been so ready with aid at the inception of the war, was now far less enthusiastic. The party that stood for independence and neutrality was led by Lycortas, the father of Polybius, a man who for the first time in years seems to have secured a majority for his policy. Although Lycortas studiously avoided committing an overt act of hostility to Rome, — Paullus found no letters in the king's archives incriminating any Achæans, — he

betrayed a remarkable inclination to involve the league in Egyptian affairs, in order, of course, to keep it as far as possible from the Roman imbroglio. All in all, Rome, during the autumn and winter of 169, was rapidly losing the support of her discouraged friends. It was high time for more effective work.

However, the public conscience was also awakened, and in 168, Æmilius Paullus, a tried general of high principles, was sent to Macedonia. Within a few weeks he outflanked the enemy, forced him to fight, and, by his complete success at Pydna in the midsummer of 168, ended the reign of Perseus.

The senate had long decided that Perseus must be dethroned. Indeed, Paullus, and doubtless the preceding consuls as well, carried instructions not to address him as king after his defeat. But the settlement of Macedonia was of an unprecedented nature. The senate decided that the Macedonian people should be autonomous, that they should not live under a Roman administrator, but should pay an annual sum to Rome of one hundred talents, *i.e.* somewhat less than half the amount they paid in direct tax to their king; and furthermore, that the royal mines and estates should be closed.²³ Paullus and the ten commissioners made the final arrangements upon this basis. The extraneous possessions gained by Philip in 190-189 were severed, the island possessions being given to Athens. Macedonia proper was divided into four independent republics according to the natural geographical lines so clearly marked out by the high mountain ranges and rivers of the country. In order to break up the national feeling that might readily emerge into perilous action if a pretender to the throne should appear, *connubium* and *commercium* were declared void between the four various states. Charters were devised for the cities and states by Paullus with such good judgment that they seem still to have been in force two centuries later.²⁴ We may well believe that the cities received the conservative form of government so strongly favored by Rome in those days.

The constitution²⁵ devised for the four republics was one

of the most remarkable of ancient times, if we interpret the evidence correctly. Indeed, it was apparently nothing short of a unicameral, representative government. The chief magistrate, doubtless elected annually, was chosen by the direct vote of a popular assembly. The magistrate seems, however, to have received his ordinances, not from the popular assembly, as was usual in Greek states, but from a senate or *synedria*, whose members were chosen by the individual communities.

To be sure, the principle of representation was not a discovery of Paullus, for it had been employed to a certain extent by the old Boeotian league,²⁶ and probably by several of the other leagues. The innovations of Paullus, however, are very significant. Whereas in the leagues the senates were regularly subservient to the decisions of a primary assembly or a board of archons, here the representative senate — probably for the first time in history — formed the real government of the state. The primary assembly retained only elective powers, being considered unfit for governmental duties. Secondly, the central government of each Macedonian republic was made relatively stronger than in any of the leagues, for the reason that the Macedonians had lived together as a homogeneous and united people in a territorial state under a strong central government, whereas the leagues were more or less artificial aggregates of independent cities. As a result of all this, the republics founded by Paullus, so far as forms are concerned, must have very closely resembled those of modern territorial states.

Paullus and the commissioners adopted several other measures of an innovating character. While the states were given the right of coinage, which was regularly considered a mark of sovereignty, they were nevertheless required to pay Rome an annual tribute equal to one-half the tax they had paid their kings. Livy adds that all the mines were at first ordered closed. Finally, the export of timber as well as the importation of salt was forbidden. These strange measures deserve a word of explanation, for they are usually interpreted as meaning that Rome went to great lengths,

not only in enriching her state treasury, but also in creating monopolies for the benefit of her merchants. The tribute need not be taken as a mark of subjection. Its very smallness, about 100 talents per year, proves that it was not a tax of the usual kind. Rome had, in the past, been in the habit of demanding a war indemnity from those she conquered to help pay the expenses of the struggle; in this case, however, the government with which she had fought was now defunct and could not pay such an indemnity. The tribute therefore was doubtless considered as a sort of interest on a capital that would have equaled a fair indemnity. Be that as it may, the republics were regarded as "free" by their neighbors, and all through Greece there was astonishment at the liberality with which the Macedonians were treated.²⁷

The importation of salt ²⁸ was not forbidden in order to benefit traders of any class. The Macedonian kings had doubtless created a state monopoly in salt for the sake of revenue, a custom, as we know, of most of the Hellenistic monarchs. This monopoly Rome confirmed to the new republics in order to aid their revenues. The prohibition of timber exports was due to similar causes. The Macedonian kings had owned large forest tracts, and, in order to protect the royal revenue, had forbidden the private export of timber. These tracts, which had been the king's personal estate, now became Rome's public property. However, Rome had not yet decided to send her agents to manage these properties, for the presence of Roman publicans would scarcely be welcomed by a "free" people, and furthermore, the senate was not at all sure that it desired to retain possessions so far from home. Accordingly the old royal prohibition was reimposed until a final decision could be reached. The mines had also been royal property, as was usual in those days. Paullus decided to let contractors (probably the Macedonians already in charge) continue to work the iron and copper mines upon favorable terms, so that the state would not have to keep constant watch over the production. The gold and silver mines were closed for the same reason

that the forests had been. In 158 they were reopened and probably leased to Roman contracting firms.

The effects of the war with Macedonia spread far beyond Greece. When the senatorial commissioners had reorganized Asiatic affairs in 188, they had tied Rome to future obligations in Asia as little as possible, establishing relations with the several states, if at all, by treaties of friendship, but not by alliances. They furthermore left the implication that the weaker states were to be within the respective spheres of guardianship of the Pergamene and Rhodian governments rather than of Rome. It does not appear, therefore, that the Roman lawyers had as yet proposed any theory to the effect that by the battle of Magnesia the sovereignty of the cis-Taurian region had actually passed from Antiochus to Rome and had then been granted as precatory to the various states which were left in charge. Antiochus had been looked upon simply as an invader who had not yet established his sovereignty in the region. His advance and retreat had not on the whole affected the question of ownership. It was only when some city had voluntarily aided Antiochus that the allies chose to consider its rights forfeited to the victors. The allies also assumed possession of the former Egyptian possessions in Asia Minor on the ground that they had been forfeited by Ptolemy's bargain with the Syrian king. But during the war with Perseus it seems that a new theory was gaining acceptance at Rome, the theory that since the senate had organized Asia in 188, it too could make whatsoever arrangements it saw fit in any part of cis-Taurian territory.

The first indications of this change appear in Rome's new dealings with Rhodes and Pergamum. We have remarked that Rhodes incurred the enmity of Rome in 169 by exerting her influence in an unfriendly way towards bringing the war to an end. Feeling ran high at Rome when this fact was discovered. A prætor even called an assembly and proposed a declaration of war, but Cato, who hated the whole Eastern entanglement, minimized the importance of Rhodes' act and insisted that proof of an unfriendly attitude could not be considered a just cause for war so long as

there was no overt act of hostility. The tribunes were accordingly ordered to break up the prætor's assembly, and the senate, while voicing its displeasure at the action of the unfriendly state, gave assurance that there would not be a war.²⁹ Some punishment, however, the senate meant to inflict, and envoys were accordingly sent with the order that Rhodes must grant Lycia and Caria autonomy in accordance with the settlement of 188. The following year when Rhodes asked for a permanent alliance, the senate showed its continued displeasure by tabling the request. Presently the senate entertained the exiles of Stratoniceæ and Caunos, who complained of Rhodes' harsh rule, acceded to their wishes, and ordered the Rhodians to liberate both cities. Not till 165 was the requested alliance granted the penitent islanders, who then became virtually subject to Rome. We shall recur to this incident presently.

Eumenes suffered even more severely, though perhaps more deservedly, than Rhodes. The senate, says Polybius, was convinced that he had attempted to betray Rome, although it had no absolute proof of the fact. Yet it acted on its conviction. Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, was told that if he laid claim to a part of his brother's kingdom, Rome would support him, but Attalus, much to his credit, was true to his brother. Then Eumenes set out for Rome to defend himself, but was met at Brundisium with a message from the senate not to come farther. Finally, when the Galati revolted against the overlordship which he had recently established over them, the senate declared them autonomous.³⁰

These imperious acts against Rhodes and Eumenes clearly indicate a changed policy at Rome. In severing the Galatians from Pergamum, and the Lycians and Carians from Rhodes, the senate may have based its action on an ostensible desire to reaffirm the permanency of its former Asiatic settlement. Even so, the action was significant, since it intimated that Rome would perpetually keep an observant eye on the Eastern states. But the liberation of Caunos and Stratoniceæ signified very much more. It will be remem-

bered that Rhodes had gained possession of these cities before the war with Antiochus, that is, before Rome had ever set foot in Asia. These cities were, therefore, not gifts from Rome which might justly be recalled at any moment that the sovereign chose to scrutinize the terms of its arrangements. On what grounds could this decision have been made? Apparently it was made on the broad claim that in virtue of the defeat of Antiochus³¹ and the relegation of that king to the territory south of the Taurus, the victor became sovereign over the cis-Taurian territory. Such a theory would hardly have borne scrutiny before a court of law, but there was no power left competent to dispute it. And even if Rhodes and Eumenes were now inclined to chafe under the claim, they could not consistently oppose it, for they had made the theory possible by having so freely accepted Rome's arbitrament in 188, knowing as they did that they were to be recipients of the booty. This, then, is the most important result of the Macedonian war for the East. It begot the theory that Rome was sovereign as far as her conquests of 189 had extended. We must hasten to add, however, that the theory was not often reasserted by the senate during the next century, nor were its consequences ever accepted in their entirety. But a theory once acted upon is never afterward wholly without effect.

The Roman senate had also come to a surer conviction of its position in Greece. The leaders of both parties advocated local autonomy for Greece, though on different grounds. Both held that Rome could not create a province in any part of the country or assume the direct responsibility of government. Paullus may well be considered the spokesman of what remained of the Scipionic circle. His love for things Greek was fully as genuine as that of the former leaders, though perhaps it expressed itself in a less sentimental form. In his employment of practical political methods he justifies the inference that he did not subscribe to all the enthusiastic sentiment that Flaminius had uttered in his after-dinner speeches in 196. But his party still intended to show that the promises of those days had

an enduring vitality, that at least no agent of Rome should hold residence in Greece as a sign of permanent occupation. Cato's reasoning differed widely from that of the philhellenes, but he reached similar conclusions. In the fragment of a speech ³² which a late writer has fortunately preserved, he says that "Macedonia must be set free, since we cannot hold her." The Macedonians and the Greeks meant little to him. It was not from sentiment that he argued. Rather, hardheaded, conservative farmer that he was, distrusting a scheme that would inevitably lead to a change in Rome's social life and in the very nature of her constitution, he advocated a continuance of the old peninsular policy. So the two parties agreed well enough on the main point, that the Greeks should be left "free."

However, the word "free" could never again mean what it had. After the war it came to signify nothing more than local autonomy and exemption from the payment of tribute to any foreign power. In everything else the senate expected obedience to its wishes, and it undertook to demonstrate this by severely punishing all who had committed themselves to friendship with Perseus. The royal correspondence (Livy, XLV, 31), now in the consul's hands, was searched for evidences of guilt. The disagreeable work began with Ætolia. There the Romanizers had already banished or put to death some 500 opponents, and Paullus, upon reviewing the evidence, gave his approval. Then the investigation was carried into Acarnania, Epirus, and Bœotia. The leaders of revolt were condemned to death, and many, against whom no evidence could be found except of incorrect sympathy, were sent to Rome ostensibly for trial, though in reality for banishment. Against the Achæans no incriminating evidence was found. But the Romans felt that the state had shown needless zeal in the cause of neutrality when as an ally it was expected to give direct aid. At an informal investigation, some suspected Achæans, in their conviction of innocence, offered to go to Rome to stand trial before the senate. The offer was accepted, and a thousand of the foremost members of the neutral party were called upon to go.

When they arrived, the senate postponed their trial indefinitely, assigning the men to exile in various Italian municipalities. The senate apparently realized that a trial would only publish abroad the innocence of the Achæans and the errors of the senate. Preferring the charge of cruelty to ridicule, it kept the men for seventeen years as hostages of Achæa's good behavior. This unjust detention aggravated the hatred of the league till it broke out in one of the bitterest wars of Roman history.

NOTES TO CHAPTER X

1. Plut. *Philopæmen*, 15-17; Paus. VIII, 51, 1; Livy, XXXVI, 35.
2. Livy, XXXVIII, 32, 8.
3. Livy's account (XXXIX, 37) reproduces Polybius' report of his own father's speech. It is apparent in the well-ordered apology which Polybius presents for his father's friend that the historian's usual fairness deserts him. We may add that while Polybius reports that eighty were slain, a pro-Spartan writer (Aristocrates, in Plut. *Philopæmen*, 16) reports 350.
4. Polyb. XXII, 3 and 9. Polybius, in his desire to exculpate his friend Philopæmen, obscures his account. Historians have been misled into the belief that Rome interfered when not invited. A careful scrutiny of the evidence will show that Rome was invited by both disputants to pronounce judgment; see *Class. Phil.* 1909, p. 133.
5. See Mommsen, *Die Scipionenprocesse in Röm. Forsch.* II, 417, and Bloch, three articles in *Revue des Ét. Anc.*, 1906. For subsequent researches, see Fraccaro, *I processi degli Scipioni*, in *Studi Storici*, 1911, p. 218.
6. Livy, XXXIX, 25-28. The protests against Philip are recorded by Polyb. XXII, 8.
7. Livy, XLII, 56 and 67.
8. Polyb. XXII, 15, 17, and 18.
9. Marx, *Nævius*, in *Verh. sächs. Gesell.* 1911, p. 69, gives a different explanation.
10. It is interesting to note that Flamininus, who had for several years done no work of importance, seems to come to the front in a meaner rôle after the death of the Scipios: see Pol. XXIII, 3; Livy, XXIX, 51; and Plut. *Titus*. Apparently, his ambition was stronger than his convictions.
11. Polyb. XXIII, 4; Paus. VII, 9.
12. Polyb. XXIII, 18, and XXIV, 11.
13. Polyb. XXIV, 12.

14. Livy, XLII, 25 and 40.

15. Polybius (XXVII, 10) speaks of the many benefits derived from Rome. Achæa, Rhodes, and many of the Greek cities attained to a new prosperity in the years following the Second Macedonian war.

16. One item of this list of complaints, namely, that Perseus had abetted the Northern tribes in their raids upon the Greeks, occurs in an inscription at Delphi. Cf. Reinach in *Bull. Corr. Hell.* 1910, p. 249.

17. Rome is usually criticized severely for this decision, but the truth seems to be that Rhodes took advantage of an indefinite clause in the settlement of 188 and imposed a heavy tax upon Lycia. The senate, not desiring to appear officious, connived at the offense, until, several years later, it was officially asked for a definition of the clause. Not a little of the senate's vacillation of this period is explained by an interesting sentence of Polybius (XXIV, 12): "The Romans, having the feelings of men with a noble spirit and generous principles, pity all who have met with misfortune, and show favor to all who appeal to them for protection; but as soon as any one claims anything as a right on the ground of having been faithful to their alliance, they at once draw in and correct their error to the best of their ability."

18. I have taken no notice of the story that Marcius tricked Perseus into a six months' truce so that Rome might have time to prepare for war. I have elsewhere (*Class. Phil.* V, p. 358) pointed out the objections to this tale.

19. Livy, *Epit.* 43. The action of Lucretius against Haliartus — he sold the inhabitants as slaves — seems to have passed as justified. The territory was later given to Athens. The senate, however, seems to have made amends for his harshness to Thisbe. The *senatus consultum de Thisbæis* (*Ephemeris Epig.* I, p. 278; I. G. VII, 2225) shows that the senate on reviewing the case called for a restoration of all its rights and properties. (Mommson surely cannot be correct in the contention that the inhabitants were henceforth stipendiary to Rome.) The senate also repudiated the consul's punishment of Coronea, and restored the captives; the populace finally imposed a fine of a million sesterces upon the offending consul, Livy, XLIII, 8; Zon. IX, 22, 6.

20. Polyb. XXVIII, 3; Livy, XLIII, 17.

21. The behavior of Marcius — as indicated above — is usually explained in other ways. Polybius, who was far from friendly to the consul (*Class. Phil.* V, 358), professes to suspect a deep-laid scheme on the consul's part. He suggests that Marcius may have been trying to implicate the Rhodians in a quarrel with Rome so that the senate would have a pretext for seizing the island. This is too Machiavellian, not to say improbable, to be accepted merely on the basis of an enemy's half-uttered suspicion.

22. It is exceedingly difficult to determine whether Rhodes went so far as to deserve Rome's enmity. Livy (XLIV, 14) follows an anna-

listic source which proves its own unreliability by misdating the event a full year, while the main part of Polybius' report is lost. However, we have the important judgment of Polybius that the Rhodians committed an inexcusable blunder (XXIX, 10). We may infer, therefore, that they did much more than offer their good offices toward making peace, for both Rhodes and Athens had frequently done that without offense.

23. Livy, XLV, 18, 29, 32; Plut. *Æm.* 28; Diod. XXXI, 8, 9.

24. Justinus, XXXIII, 2.

25. The evidence is not wholly conclusive. Such as it is, I have presented it in *Class. Phil.* IX, p. 49.

26. Bonner, *The Bœotian Federal Constitution*, *Class. Phil.* 1910, p. 405.

27. Polyb. XXXVII, 2; Diod. XXXI, 8.

28. The purport of the specifications regarding timber and salt are explained more fully in Chapter XIV.

29. Polyb. XXX, 4. Cato's ringing appeal for justice to Rhodes, *Orat.* (Jordan), XXXIV. The punishment of Rhodes, Polyb. XXX, 5; XXV, 4, and XXX, 22.

30. Polyb. XXXI, 2, about 165 B.C.

31. Sulla in his speech to the Asiatics in 88 seems to assume, if we may trust Appian (*Mith.* 62), that Roman dominion in Asia rested upon the conquest of 189, and not only upon the bequest which Attalus made in 133. He actually refers to Rome's severance of Lycia from Rhodes to prove that the senate considered that Rhodes and Eumenes had only precatory rights over the land disposed of in 189. (The mention of this intricate legal point lends plausibility to Appian's report.) Ferguson, *Am. Hist. Review*, XVIII, 38, has recently tried to prove that Rome's assertion of sovereign rights in the East rested upon the basis of Rome's deification by the Eastern cities. In this I have not been able to follow him.

32. Cato, *Orat.* (Jordan) XXXIII, *Macedonas liberos pronuntiavit quia teneri non poterant.*

CHAPTER XI

PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY

IN the three or four decades that follow the fall of Perseus it is difficult to find in the Roman senate what might be termed a consistent foreign policy, since no leader arose with power enough to direct that body along a well-marked course. Æmilius Paullus, who seemed in his Macedonian settlement to be the master of a comprehensive and generous imperial plan, not unlike that of the Scipios, died (about 160 B.C.) before the time of greatest need arrived. Tiberius Gracchus, who had so often served with wholesome effect on missions to the East, seems to have lost his influence about the same time. To be sure, these men had never quite gained control over the clique that specialized in practical politics, but they had often been employed when efficient work in the field or conciliatory tactics in the council chamber demanded the support of respectability. Had these two lived and worked together, they might have left the impress of their statesmanship upon the imperial government.¹ As it was, their influence lived on only in the circle of the younger Scipio Æmilianus which came into power for a brief season after the senate had definitely committed the foreign administration to a more despotic course. Cato, to be sure, lived through the critical period, but he can hardly be held solely responsible for the course which the senate pursued, for he was too insistent upon personal views to become a successful party leader. His dislike for entangling alliances had favored a laissez-faire policy in the disposal of Macedonia, and his characteristic insistence upon the letter of the law had resulted in some degree of justice to Rhodes, even as it had frequently protected the provincials from misgovernment. On the other hand, however, his practical-minded patriotism

left little room for sympathy with the peculiar needs of subject peoples. Cato's refusal to let the senate give audience to the distressed Achæans typifies the spirit which brought on the Achæan revolt in 149. His cruel insistence upon the letter of the bond with Carthage led the senate to adopt what was perhaps the harshest measure in its long era of rule. But in general it is true that Cato's influence was neither strong enough to control the senate for long periods, nor was it directed along sufficiently consistent lines to create a definite administrative policy.

More influential than the power exerted by any single individual was that which emanated from the governing cliques of the senate, and which was quickly reducing public office to private privilege. There was a time during the Punic wars when the years of public office were a term of self-sacrificing and strenuous service. Now no dangers or hardships attached even to the duties of the consulship. The easy victories gained over the world-famed monarchs of Macedonia and the East had accustomed Roman consuls to expect inordinate rewards from the office. Young men of noble families were tempted to look upon triumphs, booty, and honorary *cognomina* as their prescribed right. They cast their vote on questions of foreign administration with a view to personal advancement rather than to the needs of the state and the welfare of the province. Never was "triumph-hunting" in Liguria and Spain and Dalmatia a more shameful evil than during the middle of the second century B.C.

However, out of the very evils of the senatorial régime there grew up an antidote for those evils. Aristocratic governments dread the strong individual, and for this very reason, when for no other, the Roman senate was inclined to avoid war. A score of times when the senate's wishes had been disregarded by the allies and a lucrative contest was in prospect, the senate refused to sanction vigorous action, contenting itself with sending envoys to cajole, urge, threaten, and compromise, but not to commit the state irrevocably to war. A victory would mean great honor for some

general and consequent influence with the populace which might endanger the power of the nobility ; on the other hand, a defeat redounded to the dishonor of the senatorial régime. Hence, the senate was inclined to deal in diplomacy rather than in arms.

Finally philhellenism was still a power, though not in the same degree as during Flamininus' day. That early sentiment had been based upon a deep, if somewhat unreasoned, respect for Greek culture. Familiarity with the Greeks themselves, however, had bred the proverbial contempt. In Greece the Roman generals seemed to find a race of men who theorized about ideal states but misgoverned their own, who prated about the nature of the ethical sanction but accepted bribes and misapplied state moneys. Their enthusiasm for Greek liberty had accordingly chilled perceptibly. Later, however, the overpowering attraction of Greek literature reasserted itself, and a group of young aristocrats proved by their devotion to Greek studies that the best of the Romans were not ashamed to acknowledge discipleship to a subject nation. The spirit animating these young men was the same as that which later inspired Sulla and Cæsar and Cicero and Nero : because of their gratitude to the great Greeks of the golden age they were ready to forgive the descendants much. This new philhellenism was a very strong force with Scipio Æmilianus and his friend Lælius, and with many of their associates and friends : Mucius Scævola, pontifex and consul ; the Mummii, both effective generals ; Ælius Tubero, consul and scholar ; Fannius, consul and historian ; Furius Philus, consul and philosopher ; and many others. To such men Greece owed not a little for patient attention to futile squabbles.

We have said enough by way of preface to indicate how the cross currents of individual policy, of selfish ambitions, of class jealousy, and of more generous sentiments so opposed each other as to prevent the growth of a consistent imperial policy² during the middle of the second century B.C. Against this background we must now view the actual behavior of the senate and its agents in dealing with the problems of

empire which presented themselves in Asia, in Greece, in Spain, and in Carthage.

Eumenes of Pergamum had incurred the suspicions of Rome in the last war and had from that time on met with unfriendly treatment, but in 160 he was succeeded on the throne by his faithful brother, Attalus II, a man who was in all respects what the Romans considered a desirable client prince. He was not so subservient as to make the senators feel embarrassed in his presence. He even showed that he was, *de jure*, an independent monarch by transacting much foreign business without asking the advice of Rome. When Rome was in difficulties in the East, he quickly volunteered to help her, and when he in turn was in trouble, attacked by his aggressive neighbor, Prusias³ of Bithynia, he at once asked his "friend," Rome, for aid. And Rome aided him, in a way that was becoming more and more customary. She sent envoys to investigate, and to warn the enemy, and, if this failed, to threaten. When these measures proved unavailing, and even the envoys were besieged, she annulled her alliance with Prusias, and sent word to her other Eastern friends to aid Attalus. In the end Attalus gained his point: a restoration of his losses and a war indemnity. This event will illustrate how Rome gradually began to substitute ambassadorial messages for armed forces in satisfying her national obligations. Attalus, on the whole, had no reason to complain of his relations with the great republic. Surely the aid Rome gave him was as effective as any he ever rendered in return, and during his twenty-one years of power he was not once troubled by the unrequested interference of the stronger power. It must be added that he gave Rome little cause for interference. He had no territorial ambitions. He was satisfied to encourage art, play the patron of men of letters, and build cities, and he died at a ripe old age in 138, leaving a prosperous if unincreased kingdom.

The Seleucids⁴ fared less well at the hands of the Romans. During the war with Perseus, Antiochus Epiphanes had availed himself of the opportunity to seize a part of Egypt.

As soon as possible after the battle of Pydna, the senate sent an envoy, Popilius, to order Antiochus off the territory of Rome's friend, a task which the envoy carried out with no little display of haughtiness. The Romans never wearied of telling how Popilius, drawing a circle in the sand around the Syrian king, demanded that the king give his answer to the senate's demands before he left the spot. Antiochus acquiesced, and Rome accordingly demanded no further penalty of him. After this he was left entirely free to carry on his empire building in the interior, and, had he lived, he may well have regained a large part of Alexander's empire in Asia. He died in 165, when Rome was still carefully watching the sequel of the Macedonian war. The senate seized the occasion to warn the Syrians that the terms of the treaty of 189 must be more strictly adhered to in the future, and demanded that the newly constructed navy of Syria be burned. It also used its influence for a while to prevent Demetrius, the rightful heir, from reaching the Seleucid throne, favoring instead the nine-year-old son of Antiochus, who gave promise of being a more pliant tool of Rome. The next half century of Syrian history is a constant record of dynastic warfare, which soon placed the kingdom beneath Rome's notice, not to say her solicitude.

With regard to Egypt,⁵ Rome's course was exceedingly vacillating. The two Ptolemies, Philometor and Euergetes, nicknamed Physcon, could not agree as co-rulers, and in 164 Physcon, the younger brother, drove the elder out. When the latter appealed to Rome, the senate sent him back with arbitrators, who arranged that Philometor should have Egypt and Cyprus, while Physcon should rule over Cyrene. This seemed to be satisfactory to all parties at the time, but presently Physcon asked the senate for a more even division, in fact, for the addition of Cyprus to his allotment. The senate, seeing the advantage that would accrue to Rome if Egypt were weakened, treacherously suppressed the decision of the envoys and voted in favor of Physcon's request. However, Philometor boldly disregarded the senate's vote and continued to hold Cyprus. He not only drove Physcon

out of that island, but attacked him in Cyrene, cajoling the Roman envoys all the while. In 158 the senate revoked its alliance with him and encouraged his brother to seize Cyprus once more, but to no avail.⁶ Four years later the senate even sent Physcon some triremes and issued a circular letter inviting the aid of the Eastern "friends" for the seizure of Cyprus, but Physcon's expedition again failed, and the island continued to be a part of the kingdom of Egypt as long as Philometor lived. We need not be surprised that Rome assumed a right to arbitrate in Egyptian affairs, for the Ptolemies had twice accepted protection from Rome and had thereby virtually admitted their dependence. What amazes the modern reader is that Rome should have vacillated and allowed her repeated requests to go unheeded for fifteen years. The consequences of this indecision must have been far-reaching, for we may fairly assume that neither Carthage nor the Achæan league would have been so ready to disregard Rome's wishes if she had acted with more vigor in the case of Egypt. The affair well illustrates the ineffectiveness of the aristocratic rule. Probably the senate was divided on the question of imperialism so that it was difficult to gain a constant majority either for or against an aggressive policy. Probably, also, the dread of the military hero, which so often found expression in the senate here as elsewhere, preferred procrastinating diplomacy to a decisive war.

We now come to Greece. The four Macedonian republics⁷ established by Paullus in 168 seem to have fared unusually well in view of the fact that the people were totally unaccustomed to self-government. Only once do we hear of factional strife, and then the son of Paullus was asked to arbitrate. In 158 the senate found order so well established that it opened the royal mines and gave the republics the right of coinage. A few years later, a man who claimed to be a son of Perseus, and who very much resembled him, tried to gain support in Macedonia for his claim to the throne, but without success.⁸ He then tried to win the sympathy of the Syrian king, but failed in this also. When, however, the

sister of Perseus, who was living in Thrace, recognized him, his task became easier. The Thracians furnished him with funds and a strong army, and with this he marched towards Macedonia. But the republics, hastily raising an army, defeated him. He returned with additional troops and successively defeated the armies of two Macedonian republics, after which the rest acquiesced and he was proclaimed king of Macedonia. What is most noteworthy in the whole affair is the evident aversion of the Macedonians to experiment with a new monarchy. They were, apparently, not eager to revolt from Rome. Her division of the nation into separate republics had, it seems, not wakened the opposition that a similar act would evoke to-day. We may well conclude that the national spirit,⁹ which became so strong a political factor in the nineteenth century, was of little moment in the Græco-Roman world. Once the pretender had gained his throne, however, he found no few adherents among his people who, whether from loyalty or fear, supported him to such an extent that he was able to defeat the Roman prætor who had been sent with a legion to drive him out. But his days were numbered. In 148 Cæcilius Metellus arrived with two new legions, quickly cleared Macedonia, and put the region out of future danger by declaring the territory a Roman province, and the permanent residence of a prætor.

This arrangement imposed few changes upon the natives. The internal regulations of Paullus continued in force.¹⁰ So far as we know the tribute was not increased, but the restrictions on commerce and intermarriage were removed. The presence of the prætor would in the future safeguard the northern frontier, which had hitherto been none too well protected from raids. From the viewpoint of the empire the new settlement was more important, since now for the first time a permanent governor was to be placed east of the Adriatic. Under his sphere of administration was also to be included Illyricum and probably Epirus. That the occupation was conceived of as permanent is shown by the fact that one of the first prætors undertook to build a paved road through the province from the Adriatic to the Ægean.¹¹

In this period, too, falls the destruction of the Achæan league, which marks the complete end of all hopes for independent national life in Greece. Unfortunately, the history of the incident is a patchwork of contradictory and incomplete sentences. Pausanias, who proves to be an untrustworthy historian, has left the only unbroken account we have, but inscriptions are constantly coming to light which refute his statements on the most vital points. The fragments of Polybius are but few, and they happen to dwell mostly upon the stupidity and inefficiency of his countrymen's leaders, telling us but little of the real causes of the war. From these accounts, such as they are, one fact stands out unmistakably: the populace of Achæa so consistently supported the anti-Roman leaders, even after convincing proof of their inefficiency, that the historian is forced to assume that Rome was badly at fault in her general policy with Achæa.

It was apparent that even before the war with Perseus the insistence of the senate that its requests be considered authoritative in Achæa aroused much bitterness. Yet, if these requests had come directly, the Achæans might have submitted without much ado to a necessary state of dependency. The galling aspect of the situation was that Achæa was urged to elect magistrates from the pro-Roman party, whether she would have them or no, and then receive through these magistrates the sovereign state's requests in garbled form. This method, of course, lightened the senate's work, but it also bred hatred.

The senate's worst blunder was its invitation to the thousand prominent citizens to stand trial at Rome. The senate soon discovered that no evidence could be produced against these men, and so attempted to save itself from the necessity of having to confess its mistake by detaining the whole number in Italy on the pretense that their return might endanger the peace of Achæa. Of course, the detention of all the anti-Roman leaders left Achæa thoroughly cowed and wholly at the mercy of Callicrates' party. For fifteen years this man was absolutely the dominant factor in the Pelo-

ponnese, and the state was officially all friendliness. But it is not difficult to picture the feelings of the inhabitants during this time from the events that followed. Few there were who did not loathe the senate for the act of injustice. And though for the present obedience and the reëlection of Callicrates' nominees were considered necessary, silent prayers arose from every household that condign punishment might some day be visited upon Rome for her tyrannous action. There are signs that after a few years the senate regretted its blunder and made some effort to establish better relations with Greece. It hardly dared dismiss the Achæan détenus, and therein it probably adopted the only political course possible. But it tried to spread faith in the justice of its acts by other means. The envoys whom it sent across the Adriatic in the middle of the century were just and conciliatory men like Tiberius Gracchus, who was repeatedly dispatched to the East; Marcius, the envoy to Epirus, in 156, who was charged with the task of undoing the work of Charops; Junius, sent East in 164; and Torquatus and Merula in 162. Nor did the senate henceforth decide all disputes in favor of its friends. When Charops proved utterly unfit, he was rejected, and Athens, always an obedient friend, was nevertheless compelled to submit to penalties for injustice in 156-50. The quarrels of Oropus and Athens were referred to the arbitration of Sicyon, the Achæan city, in 156, and in 164 the boundary dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis was referred to the decision of the Achæan league.¹² This course of conciliation might have served to abate the hatred in Achæa had it not been that Callicrates was ever present as a proof of Rome's past sins. His unpopularity, which went so far that the children on the streets greeted him with cries of "traitor," reacted upon Rome's reputation.

We need not go into the long and intricate dispute which ensued, and which is only half explained in our sources. We find, however, that, about 150, the pro-Roman party somehow lost its leadership, that men like Diæus and Damocritus, who had been banished probably at Callicrates' behest,

were recalled and elected to power.¹³ We are not told whether the three hundred hostages, who had now finally returned, — all that were left of the original thousand, — had any direct influence in this act. It may be that although their courage and energy were too broken to make them good leaders, their presence served as a strong reminder of past mistreatment. It is more probable that the Achæans mustered courage to reject the pro-Roman leaders because they observed that Rome was now involved in great difficulties. In fact, added to a dangerous and widespread revolt in Spain, there had come the war with Carthage, and the sudden rising of pseudo-Philip in Macedonia. The Achæans seem to have reasoned that since Rome had recently attempted to be conciliatory and had seldom enforced her requests and decisions by use of arms, she would certainly now, when distracted by several very dangerous wars, overlook their effort to rid themselves of disagreeable leaders and to establish a precedent of independence regarding the Spartan disputes. Pausanias and Polybius both add that Diæus pursued his desperate course because he was involved in charges of bribery. This is probably true, and may explain his mad persistence, but it does not explain why the populace supported his cause so unflinchingly. Theirs was, apparently, the heartfelt purpose that refused to question the reputation of any man who would lead them against the hated master.

The immediate occasion for the renewal of the old dispute was again Sparta's dissatisfaction with her position in the league. Diæus, without regard to Rome's wishes, secured the death penalty against twenty-four of his enemies in Sparta. Rome retorted with an edict that the cities which the league had gained through her aid might sever their connections with the Achæan league so far as she was concerned.¹⁴ The senators who bore this announcement to Corinth were met by a mob, from which they were rescued with difficulty. The senate then dispatched new envoys with conciliatory messages, but this only produced the impression that Rome was afraid to take a decisive stand. At

the advice of Diæus, the Achæans now declared war against Sparta and Heracleia, the first two cities that acted upon Rome's decree and seceded from the league. This declaration was, of course, virtually directed against Rome, and Metellus, who had just defeated pseudo-Philip, marched southward to meet the Achæan force besieging Heracleia. This he readily defeated, and Mummius, his successor, who presently arrived with four legions, in one brief battle completely routed the main army of the enemy. Mummius then entered Corinth, and took captive the few inhabitants who had not left the city.¹⁵

The senate, acting through Mummius and the usual commission of ten, now took in hand a thorough reorganization of the political affairs of the Peloponnese. The Achæan league was disbanded, and its cities were made individual allies of Rome. Although for the time being deprived of commercial relations with one another, they were left autonomous and apparently free from tribute.¹⁶ They were ordered, however, to adopt an aristocratic form of government according to a model charter prepared for them.¹⁷ Corinth was razed to the ground. Some of its territory was given to Sicyon to help defray the expenses of the Isthmian games which that city was to conduct in the future, and the rest became Roman *ager publicus*. Rome also confiscated the personal property of Diæus, and, proscribing a number of his partisans, seized their property also, except where there were parents or children surviving to claim it. Having made these provisions, the consul evacuated Greece, commissioning Polybius to go up and down the land to explain the nature of the new city charters. Greece, however, was not made a Roman province¹⁸ for over a century.

The destruction of Corinth, Achæa's foremost city, seems needlessly cruel. Livy (*Epit.* 52) explains it as an act of resentment at the attack upon the senate's envoys. Justinus (XXXIV, 2) is probably nearer the truth in judging that the punishment was intended to serve as a warning example. As a matter of fact, Rome was once more leaving the Greeks to themselves. The vacillations of a decade

had borne disagreeable fruit, and the senate felt that decisive action of some sort was called for, if its word was to be obeyed. The sequel shows that Greece well understood and never forgot the lesson taught at Corinth.

The imposition of an oligarchic polity upon the cities of Achæa may perhaps be more justly criticized, since this form was unpopular, and hastened the accumulation of property in the hands of a few men. But the senate concerned itself only with its own advantages. It was by this time incurably convinced of the excellence of its own constitution; furthermore, it could deal more quickly and with more dignity through city councils of propertied elders than through democratic assemblies.

And now we again come to the old question why the senate did not assume the responsibility of government and shape a new province out of its conquests. The answer is not difficult. The senate had not yet forgotten the Isthmian games of 196 and the proud boast that the Greeks were now forever free. It is inconceivable that any senator who respected the *mos maiorum*, as Romans were wont to do, should have thought it possible to impose a tribute upon Greeks at that time. And unless the sovereign could collect tribute, it hardly cared to burden itself with the task of governing. Nor was there great need for a supervising governor. External dangers were eliminated by the fact that the Macedonian proconsul could protect the only exposed frontier. There would hardly be any political uprisings within the country itself after the swift punishment visited upon Corinth; and, as for Roman citizens who sojourned or traded in Greece, they could well trust themselves and their affairs to the justice of Greek courts. In all other contingencies where the sovereign's decision might be required, the cities were probably advised to address the Roman senate or its representative in Macedonia.¹⁹ We may add that after a few years Rome removed all barriers placed upon inter-city *commercium* in Greece and also allowed the Greeks to re-establish their leagues, though only for social and religious purposes.

Spain; apparently, had the faculty of laying bare the worst flaws of senatorial rule. This province had been acquired from Carthage by the Second Punic war and had been brought into tolerable order during the stern but able governorship of Cato in 195. In 179 Tiberius Gracchus carried the work of pacification to a more enduring stage by meting out rewards as well as punishments and arranging a series of compacts that were satisfactory to the natives. For twenty-five years the province prospered and enjoyed peace under his settlements. Unfortunately, some of the succeeding governors imposed unjust burdens upon the province. The tribute in Spain, which was only one-half the usual provincial tithe, was collected by the natives themselves, but it seems that the governors were prone to go beyond their rights in estimating the amount and in sending officers to collect it.²⁰ In 171 the Spaniards sent envoys to the senate, requesting that the old methods be adhered to. The senate promised to correct the abuses of the governors, and peace continued till about 154. Then came some misunderstanding about the right of certain Spanish towns to build fortifications, and a distressing war resulted. This war was apparently near an end in 151 when Lucullus arrived. He, it is charged, through greed for booty and a desire for a triumph, attacked an innocent tribe on flimsy pretexts and broke faith with the people after they had surrendered. Galba, during the same year, was accused of even worse treachery, and, in fact, was brought to trial at Rome by Cato, but escaped punishment because of political influence. After such deeds as these it is not surprising that the revolt spread widely. The contest dragged on for about twenty years. At times the Romans displayed good generalship, but its effect was offset by the blunders of several inefficient and dishonest men. Fabius, in 140, saved his army from slaughter by signing a disgraceful treaty; Servilius, in 139, secured the death of his worthy opponent, Viriathus, by a bribe; Mancinus, in 136, marched into a trap, and then saved the lives of his soldiers by a treaty promising independence to Numantia. The crowning disgrace, however, rests upon the senate, which refused to

ratify Mancinus' terms, and, in order to escape the vengeance that falls from heaven upon the violators of an oath, delivered up Mancinus to the enemy, stripped and bound, but forgot to surrender the advantages it had gained by the treaty. The war was finally brought to a close by the younger Africanus in 133, and the province started on the road to the great prosperity it enjoyed in Augustus' day.

Such is the unpleasant story that Appian ²¹ tells regarding Rome's rule in Spain. To be sure, our source is not wholly reliable, but, after all possible allowances have been made, we must still conclude that the history of Spain between 150 and 135 reveals an unspeakable amount of inefficiency and treachery. The lack of success is partly accounted for by the fact that Romans of reputation avoided the province as unprofitable and difficult, and partly by the fact that the senate never fully realized the seriousness of the contest there. The treachery, of course, deserves no excuse, but it may perhaps be in place to consider why the Roman character developed its worst traits in Spain. The Romans regularly spoke of the Spaniards as peculiarly treacherous peoples. Now it is quite conceivable that the rules of the game were not the same in the ancestral customs of Spain and of Rome. Such differences often preclude an intelligent appreciation of an opponent's real temperament, and they alone would be sufficient to give rise to misunderstandings and charges of dishonesty. But it must be remembered that in facing the conquering Romans the defeated tribes allowed themselves the privilege of breaking treaties. It is natural, and has always been natural, for weak tribes, when compelled to surrender before the irresistible power and superior diplomacy of a strong nation, to sign the articles of submission with a mental reservation. They feel, and justly, that theirs was never a fair chance. They are in the position of an individual who has signed a contract under compulsion. The law does not support such a contract in the case of the individual, and the conscience of the native is quite logical in not demanding adherence to such a contract in the case of the tribe. For this reason, if for no other,

the Spanish tribes constantly disregarded their oaths and treaties, and thereby gained the reputation at Rome of being peculiarly deceitful. Obviously, this condition must have reacted upon the generals who carried on the wars of the sovereign people. They learned to fight the native with his own weapons. They, too, when driven into close quarters, made treaties with mental reservations. The history of our wars with the Indians, and of the British conquests in East India, will sufficiently illustrate this tendency and explain some of the ugly facts of the Spanish period that we are considering. In the Italian wars of the fourth century the opponents had been on very nearly the same plane of civilization, and the customs of war were then practically the same on both sides. Hence, we hear little of such charges from either contestant at that time. In Spain, on the contrary, vital differences existed. The deterioration in the character of Roman diplomacy and warfare that Polybius noticed in his later days is traceable in some degree to this reaction of the barbarian methods of warfare upon Rome's armies.

There was also another cause for misunderstanding which the later Roman historian did not always appreciate. During the second century the senate had become so powerful that it asserted the right to revise or reject any treaty made by its general in the field. This, of course, was not the practice later: Sulla, Pompey, and Cæsar were so strong that they could compel the senate to ratify their arrangements to the last word. Nor had any such right been assumed by the senate before the Punic wars. The old consuls of the fourth century had employed the senate as an advisory body, but they were not compelled to submit their acts to it for supervision or correction. Whatever arrangements they made in the field were practically final. It is not difficult to see that diplomatic confusion must have resulted from the senate's encroachments upon the powers of its generals during the second century. The senate hardly dared reject the arrangements of a Scipio, to be sure, but, when a young prætor in Spain agreed to disgraceful terms in order to extricate his army from a trap, would the treaty be binding?

The Spanish tribes probably thought ²² it would be, since they were supposed to be bound by the pledge of their chief. The Roman general who signed for Rome may have felt that he stood on constitutional ground in binding the state. But for a few decades at least the senate, in the heyday of its power, undertook to assume revisory rights. To the senators it became a constitutional question of great importance whether the senate must not, whenever possible, support the new aristocratic theory of government and compel the general to submit himself to the senate. We understand, therefore, why the problems presented by the treaty of Mancinus were not easy to solve. Not only did differences in customs and practices of war make it impossible for the Romans and Spaniards to understand each other, but constitutional changes affecting the Roman senate made it difficult for that body to decide the fate of Spanish tribes on the merits of each individual case. In the end, Spain became the burial ground of Rome's pristine fame for fair dealing.

Finally, this period includes the destruction of Rome's ancient rival, Carthage.²³ At the end of the Second Punic war the Carthaginians agreed among other things to restore to Masinissa, the Numidian king, all territory that had belonged to him or his ancestors (Pol. XV, 18). Now, since they had also agreed not to carry on any war in Libya without Rome's consent, it is obvious that it might pay Masinissa well to find ancestral claims to various Libyan lands. It seems that after about thirty years ²⁴ of peace the Numidian king decided to seize some of the cities southeast of Carthage on the strength of such claims. A series of disputes arose which had to be referred to the senate. Envoys came and went, and, as Polybius says, the Carthaginians invariably got an adverse decision from the Romans, not on the merits of the case, but because the judges were convinced that such a decision was to Rome's interest. In fact, it soon became apparent that a strong faction in the senate desired to see Carthage completely crushed. Few incidents of Roman

history are as widely known as the constant repetition of the phrase *Carthago delenda est* in Cato's perorations. Nevertheless, we are far from possessing a unanimous judgment regarding the causes of the hatred that found expression in Cato's words. Was it fear of commercial competition, or need for more territory for an expanding population, or simply dread of a political rival? The first of these reasons is frequently alleged and has been pointedly expressed by Mahaffy to the effect that "it was the commercial monopolists and not old Cato and his figs who destroyed Carthage." Nevertheless, I think we shall presently find in a detailed survey of Italy's economic conditions that neither Roman shippers nor Roman landseekers are likely to have brought heavy pressure to bear upon the senate at this time. The only explanation offered by the trustworthy sources for the policy of Cato and his following is that the Romans firmly believed that if Carthage ever grew strong enough, she would renew the bitter war of revenge which Hannibal had so long sustained. Cato based his whole plea on the conviction that Rome's future would never be assured until Carthage was destroyed; his fellow envoys supported his contention by emphasizing the spirit of hostility they had found in Carthage and the vigorous preparations for war. Even Nasica, who opposed Cato, founded his arguments upon the same assumption, for he advocated sparing Carthage in order that Roman discipline might be preserved through fear of a strong political rival (App. *Pun.* 69). Polybius²⁵ has preserved for us some of the comments of contemporary Greeks upon Rome's policy, and it is interesting to find that they were engaged in justifying or condemning Rome's purpose of removing "*a perpetual menace*, and destroying a city which had disputed the supremacy with her and *might still do so if opportunity offered*." It was on account of this fear of an old enemy, therefore, that the senate encouraged Masinissa's encroachments upon Carthage and refused to grant the wronged city the right to defend itself. Cato, who in 153 had been one of the envoys that visited Carthage on a mission of arbitration, was strongly impressed

by the hostile attitude of the city and by the stores of supplies there that seemed to be reserved for use in war. He proposed that the city be destroyed at once. Scipio Nasica could not agree with this attitude of a man who naïvely claimed for his state the privilege of annihilating a neighbor simply because it was strong and ill-disposed. He even argued that rivalry was on the whole beneficial to Roman character, and added that Rome must at least await a plausible pretext.

In two years the pretext came, for the impetuous democratic party at Carthage had come into power and had declared war on the still encroaching Numidian king. The aggressive party then gained a majority in the Roman senate, despite the protests of Nasica, and the Carthaginians fled home from a defeat in Numidia only to be met with the news that Rome was mustering an army. In their terror they sent envoys with instructions to do the utmost to preserve peace. These envoys offered unconditional surrender, whereupon the senate assured them that the Carthaginians would be allowed to retain their liberty, their laws, and their possessions, but that they must give hostages and await the arrival of the consul with further orders. When the consul arrived with his army before Carthage, he demanded that all arms be surrendered. This order the Carthaginians obeyed; then the consul commanded them to abandon their city and build elsewhere, at least ten miles from the sea.

This indirect procedure brought upon the senate the charge of double-dealing, but it was able to retort that it had broken no explicit promise and, furthermore, that since Carthage had sent an unconditional surrender, she was not in a position to bargain for favorable terms. We may even add that Carthage might well have expected an order to move the city, since this had long been one of the senate's methods of rendering enemies harmless. A century before, the people of Falerii had been compelled to rebuild their homes on a level plain three miles from their ancient citadel. In 177 the Ligurians were deported from their mountain fastnesses to public lands in Samnium, and in Spain it had

become a customary proceeding to divide tribes and colonize the various sections in less dangerous positions. In the case of Carthage, the senate's decision was apparently a compromise between the cruel proposal of Cato and the liberal attitude of Nasica. It did not contemplate destroying or enslaving the inhabitants, or enlarging the Roman domain, but it intended to weaken the state permanently by cutting off access to the sea, its greatest source of gain. In fact, the senate proposed the same position for Carthage that Bismarck in 1871 proposed for France, that of "a vanishing republic."

The senate's ultimatum threw the Carthaginians into a rage of despair; they closed their gates and set to work manufacturing new arms. For two years, under two different consuls, the Roman army attempted to storm the city — and failed. Then the people, determined to put a general in the field who could succeed, disregarded the law relating to consular qualifications, and elected Scipio Aemilianus consul, despite the fact that he was then applying for the ædileship. Then, overriding the senate's constitutional right to allot provinces, they directed Scipio to take charge of the war. After months of the severest effort, Scipio finally was able to capture the city, but the Carthaginian losses had been so heavy that there were only a few survivors to surrender to him at the end.

In the settlement Rome assumed direct ownership ²⁶ of all the land belonging to the people that had taken part in the war; that is, the whole Carthaginian state, except seven cities headed by Utica. A large portion of this territory she gave up immediately. Utica, for instance, was handsomely rewarded for her support by the gift of the whole coast between her city and Hippo. All who had deserted the enemy during the war were given private allotments.²⁷ The eastern portion near Cyrene was presented to Numidia. The native Berber population, apparently the tribes that had formerly been tributary to Carthage, were assigned ²⁸ to their former holdings as tributaries of Rome. The land left in Rome's direct possession after this distribution was probably a large part of what had constituted the private prop-

erty of the Carthaginians. This the state disposed of in any way it saw fit. Fortunately, the splendid bronze tablet containing the agrarian law of 111 B.C. gives us some insight into the history of this *ager publicus*. There we find that the state sold ²⁹ a part of it for cash, probably at once, since the state treasury had borne enormous expenses in recent years. Some of it Gaius Gracchus assigned to the colonists ³⁰ of Junonia (Carthage) in 122; and, though the colony's charter was revoked the next year, the colonists were given title to their land (*Lex Agr.* 59-61). Finally, considerable portions of it continued to be *ager publicus* and were leased by the censor to citizens or strangers at whatever they would bring (*Lex Agr.* 82). The seven friendly cities were left free from tribute and autonomous. Utica particularly prospered, becoming the most important seaport of Africa. One notes with surprise that the Romans did not have enough interest in commerce to build or retain a harbor of their own.

The Romans, in fact, became agriculturists in Africa.³¹ The men who bought and rented the land there from the state were largely Italians, since the native population had suffered severely. To judge from the condition of things revealed by later inscriptions we may safely conclude that slave labor found little encouragement in the development of this land. The peasants worked the soil themselves, and where they prospered and increased their estates, they sublet them in small lots to tenants. Thus free labor prevailed in Africa, and very successful it was, too. Before long we begin to hear that this province was taking Sicily's place as the chief grain-producing land of the empire.

We have now reviewed Rome's methods of provincial administration during the middle of the second century. However much she may be criticized for vacillation, inefficiency, and cruelty she can scarcely be charged with greed for territorial acquisition, since she might readily have incorporated Greece, and showed less liberality in giving away portions of the Carthaginian territory. She might even have availed herself of some of the many insults offered by Ptolemy Philometor to acquire a part or the whole of Egypt. On

the other hand, the senate showed no consistent inclination to follow the laissez-faire policy of Cato's early day, for it very jealously watched the behavior of every state that evinced the least sign of independence. The whole period is a season of meddling, even where the meddling is ineffectual. Finally, the old Scipionic policy of making Rome a member in a fraternity of civilized Hellenic states had become an impossibility forever, after Rome discovered how feeble the Eastern powers actually were. The destruction of Carthage was the first avowed concession to the feeling which had been growing for half a century that Rome was the destined ruler of the world, and might therefore be a law unto herself. Henceforth, the possibility of real *foedera aequa*, of genuine *amicitia*, of arbitration, and of healthy emulation between states passed away from the ancient world. With the conviction of supreme power came a hardening in the character of the ruling people which even the contemporary Greeks were quick to notice. According to Polybius their comment upon the destruction of Carthage was that Rome's character had changed after her great successes, that she had gradually and insensibly become perverted to the same ambition for power that had characterized other successful conquerors, and that this had led her to commit an act of irretrievable cruelty.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XI

1. Among the other mediocrities of this epoch only Scipio Nasica and Claudius Marcellus call for mention. The former, consul in 162 and 155, apparently supported the old Scipionic foreign policy which aimed at friendly coöperation with outside nations rather than conquest and exploitation. He fought Cato vigorously when the latter advocated the destruction of Carthage, and when finally both Carthage and Corinth were razed, he remarked sarcastically that there were now no longer any nations which Rome need either fear or blush before. However, Nasica was too weak a leader to command the attention of the senate so long as Cato lived. After Cato's death, Nasica was recognized as the *princeps senatus*, but it was then too late to bring back the principle of coöperation, for there were no strong civilized nations left in independence. Claudius Marcellus resembled Gracchus in his

combination of skillful generalship and clemency in administration, but he too seems to have fallen before the practical politicians. When he was consul for the third time in 152, Cato forced through a law, apparently directed against him, which forbade reelection to the consulship (Cato, Jordan, *Orat.* 36).

2. A recently discovered inscription of Delos clearly betrays the indefiniteness of the senate's policy (Cuq, *Le Senatus-Consulte de Délos*, 1912; Roussel, *B. C. H.* 1913, p. 310, dates the inscription 164 B.C.). The Athenians to whom Rome had given Delos in 167 had banished a priest from the island. This man appealed to Rome for restitution. The Roman senate neither assumed full authority to decide nor admitted lack of jurisdiction. It announced equivocally: "so far as we are concerned, he may return," and passed the matter on to Athens. The Athenian boulé "discussed the matter for a long time," then restored the plaintiff. Query: Who was master in Delos?

3. See Niese, *Griech. und maked. Staaten*, III, 326, and Dittenberger, *Or. Graec. Inscr.* 327: Προυσίαν . . . παραβάντα τὰς διὰ Ῥωμαίων γε[νομένης συνθήκας].

4. See Bevan, *op. cit.*; Bouché-Leclercq, *op. cit.*; Niese, *Griech. und maked. Staaten*, III, 207. Tiberius Gracchus was sent to Antioch on a tour of inspection in 166. He became convinced of the king's loyalty (Pol. XXXI, 5). In 164 Octavius was sent to order the destruction of the Syrian fleet which had been built contrary to the treaty of 189: "to arrange affairs according to the will of the senate . . . and generally to weaken the forces of the kingdom." This embassy was so unpopular that Octavius was murdered in a public building in Laodicea (*ibid.* 12-20). Later (160), when Demetrius seized the throne, Gracchus was sent to sound him, and made a favorable report to the senate (Pol. XXXII, 4). But since Demetrius had come into power by setting aside Rome's choice, the senate never favored him, and finally, in 152, when a strong coalition was formed in the East to depose him, the senate expressed itself in favor of the undertaking (Pol. XXXIII, 18). After this one hears little of Syrian affairs at Rome. So far as we can judge, Rome excused her course of intervention by citing the articles of the treaty of 189. But it is apparent that occasionally the senate was also ready to use the advantages of prestige and skillful diplomacy to secure a favorable incumbent for the Syrian throne. A dedication by Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, raised at Delos in honor of Masinissa, king of Numidia, was recently discovered (*B. C. H.* 1909, 484) which strikingly demonstrates how Roman diplomacy was connecting the far ends of the world. East and West had doubtless met at Scipio's house in Rome, and there formed this strange friendship.

5. Mahaffy, *Empire of the Ptolemies*; Niese, *op. cit.* III, 207.

6. Polyb. XXXI, 18; XXXI, 28; Diod. XXXI, 33.

7. See Chapter X. Wilcken, *Pauly-Wissowa*, s.v. *Andriskos*;

Niese, *op. cit.* 331; Colin, *Rome et la Grèce*, p. 639. The new epitome of Livy (l. 126; see Kornemann, *Klio*, Beiheft II) proves that the Roman prætor did not arrive in Macedonia until 148. Thus pseudo-Philip had a whole year in which to establish himself there.

8. Zon. IX, 28; Diod. XXXII, 15, 7; Polyb. XXXVII, 2-5.

9. See Kaerst, *Hist. Zeitschrift*, 1911, p. 530, who points out that modern historians, and particularly Mommsen, have overemphasized nationalism in ancient history.

10. Justinus, XXXIII, 2: *Leges quibus adhuc utitur, a Paulo accepit*. In view of this statement, it is surprising that Niese should hazard the supposition that the tribute was increased. There is no ground for supposing that it was, for the war was not a Macedonian revolt; it was imposed upon Macedonia quite as much as upon Rome.

11. The Macedonians continue to strike the old coins bearing the image of Alexander the Great (cf. Brit. Mus. Cat. *Maced.* No. 87).

12. *Inscr. v. Olymp.* No. 47, Ditt. I², 304. In this decision the league recognizes Rome as the protector and sovereign of the Greeks.

13. Polyb. XXXIX, 10.

14. Corinth, Argos, Orchomenus, and Heracleia are specified by Pausanias, VII, 14. Justinus, XXXIV, 1, goes so far as to state that the legates had secret orders to dissolve the league; but this is not true. Polybius had also heard this charge and denies it (XXXVIII, 7).

15. Paus. VII, 16.

16. The proof for this is not conclusive. Pausanias alone mentions a tribute, and his account is full of gross errors. Later epigraphical evidence indicates that from time to time some Greek city was freed from tribute, and this is sometimes (cf. Kuhn, *Verfassung*, II, 70 ff.) taken as evidence that tribute was levied in 146. However, all of these passages can be explained as referring to special war contributions or to a much later age. The senate was not yet ready to annul the full the decree of 196. We must have one good piece of evidence before believing Pausanias here.

17. Pol. XXXIX, 16. Note, for instance, the inscription recently unearthed at Argos (*B. C. H.* 1909, p. 176) which proves by its form that the government of the city was vested in archons and a synedrion without the participation of the demos. This was soon after 146.

18. Here, too, Pausanias is in error. The evidence is well reviewed by Colin, *Rome et la Grèce*, p. 640. The first inscription that recognizes a proconsul in Greece before 27 was recently found. It was erected at Delos in the year 57 in honor of the Macedonian proconsul (*B. C. H.* 1909, p. 504). However, the appearance of this inscription hardly disproves our statement, since we know that Piso, the partisan of Cæsar, was given an extraordinary province, covering Achæa. See Cic. *in Pis.* 37 and 96, and *pro Domo*, 60.

19. An interesting instance of this is revealed by a Delphian inscrip-

tion (*B. C. H.* 1899, 5 ff.) which proves that the dispute of some Greek actors was first referred to the Macedonian governor. Again, when about 120, the populace of Dyme attempted to displace the charter given by Rome, a prætor, Fabius, punished the guilty, Ditt.² 316 (cf. *Class. Rev.* 1900, p. 162). We do not know whether Fabius was the governor of Macedonia or a prætor at Rome.

20. Livy, XLIII, 2.

21. See Appian, *Iber.* 44 ff., and the critique of Appian by Schwartz in *Pauly-Wissowa*, sub. voc. 220; Kornemann, *Klio*, Beiheft II, on the new epitome of Livy, and Schulten's exemplary article on *Hispania* in *Pauly-Wissowa*. Appian gives the only consecutive account of Spanish affairs, and he is here particularly untrustworthy. A part of his record is based upon Polybius, who, in his enthusiasm for Scipio, belittled the work of other governors in Spain; a part rests upon Posidonius, who is always inclined to see the dark side of Roman provincial government; the rest is based upon late rhetorical annals, which were seldom accurate.

22. An interesting illustration of the constitutional confusion is supplied by Livy, XXXII, 2, and Cic. *pro. Balb.* 34; the city of Gades made a treaty with the Roman general in 206, but later suspecting that the general's sole pledge was not authoritative, requested the senate to add its confirmation.

23. Meltzer, *Geschichte der Karthager* (vol. III by Kahrstedt, 1913); Münzer, in *Pauly-Wissowa*, IV, 1443; Kornemann, *Klio*, Beiheft II.

24. Appian's chronology, as so often, seems to be uncertain here. Polybius (XXXII, 2) leaves no doubt that these events took place not long before the year 161; Kahrstedt, *op. cit.* p. 592.

25. Pol. XXXVII, 1. Later writers also held that political reasons alone demanded the destruction of Carthage; see Sallust, fr. 11, *stante Carthagine metus pacis infidæ fuit*. Kahrstedt, *op. cit.* 616, is correct in denying that commercialism supplied the motive, but he hardly carries conviction with his hypothesis that the war was brought on by a desire to stem Masinissa's growing power.

26. For agrarian conditions in Africa see Mommsen's commentary on the Agrarian Law of 111 B.C., in *Jurist. Schr.* I, 65; Weber, art. *Agrargeschichte* in *Handwörterb. der Staatsw.* I, 170; Hardy, *Six Roman Laws*, p. 35; Strachan-Davidson, ed. *Appian*, Bk. I; Rostowzew, *Gesch. d. röm. Kolonates*, p. 313.

27. Appian, *Pun.* 135; *Lex Agraria*, l. 80; Livy, *Epit.* 50.

28. *stipendiariis adsignatus*, *Lex Agr.* ll. 76, 77, 80.

29. The date of sale is not made clear; since it is discussed in the law before the colonial lands assigned in 122 (*Lex Agr.* l. 45), I think the sale was probably made soon after 146. It will be remembered that the state also sold much of the land it confiscated in Achæa in 146. The state did not give a clear title to the lands thus sold in Africa, for they are called *ager privatus vectigalisque*, that is to say, private prop-

erty still liable to a tribute. We do not know what this implies. If the land was sold at full value, the tribute still due must have been nominal. On the other hand, if the tribute was considerable, the sale price must have been nominal. The former view is probably correct. The state needed money at once far more than it needed future tributes; secondly, the land could hardly have been designated *ager privatus* if the tribute was considerable. The state's purpose in levying a nominal tribute was doubtless to make the land redeemable in case too much of it fell into the hands of natives and began to support a hostile population.

30. These allotments were large, apparently 200 jugera per colonist (about 160 acres). There may have been nearly 6000 allotments (cf. Lex Agr. ll. 60, 61, and App. B. C. I, 24).

31. Lex Manciana and Lex Hadriana, reprinted in Bruns, *Fontes Juris*⁷, 295 and 300. Rostórzew, *op. cit.*, points out that the peasants were later attached to the soil in Africa, which would indicate that the land was settled by tenants, not worked by slave labor in large plantations, as is usually assumed.

CHAPTER XII

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A SOCIALISTIC DEMOCRACY

It was an unprecedented event, nothing less than the acquisition of a rich and extensive kingdom by testament, that next presented the question of territorial expansion to the Roman people. Attalus III, who, in 138, had succeeded his uncle, Attalus II, as king of Pergamum, died after a brief but petulant reign in 133. He was the last of his line, and through some unexplained caprice deeded his kingdom, together with all his personal property except his slaves, to the Roman state,¹ even appointing the legatee as executor. The only conditions prescribed, so far as is known, were that certain cities, including Pergamum, should be autonomous and free from tribute.

The testament reached Rome at the very time when Tiberius Gracchus was submitting his agrarian proposals to the populace. Provincial affairs properly belonged by established custom to the senate's sphere of activity; but Gracchus, who needed the Pergamene treasures for the furtherance of his expensive schemes, and who, furthermore, wished to reëlevate the plebeian assembly to the powerful position it had once held under the law of 287, proposed a bill in the assembly whereby it should at once accept the legacy of Attalus and take full charge of the administration of the new Asiatic possession. The assembly voted to accept the legacy, but before further action could be taken, Gracchus was slain, and the senate, reassuming its customary administrative functions, appointed a commission of five to take charge of the Asiatic province. A recently discovered inscription² contains a fragment of the senatorial order, providing that the stipulations of Attalus should be followed in full.

The kingdom³ of Attalus embraced the territory in Asia Minor lying between the Hellespont and the river Meander, and between the Ægean Sea on the west and Cappadocia on the east, with the exception of several Greek coast cities which were independent states. Since the Attalids had built the kingdom out of various fragments of Alexander's conquests, the Oriental⁴ theory of land tenure which had descended from Persia to the Diadochi was still in vogue. Consequently, Rome found in Asia a system not unlike that which Hiero had introduced into Sicily. An illuminating passage in Plutarch⁵ relating to the early conquests of the first great Attalid clearly reveals the fact that the king claimed the soil of the native Anatolian population as his private property on the theory that he had inherited the privileges of the Persian crown through Alexander, whose successor in Asia Minor he claimed to be. When he needed funds for his treasury, disregarding the possessory rights of the natives and their princes, he sold large strips of the land to the highest bidder. In a word, the king was proprietor, and the gentiles — to use a Scriptural translation of the current term *Ethne* — were his tribute-paying vassals. If the proprietor chose, he could evict his vassals, treat their land as personal property, and rent or farm the soil, as he saw fit. However, both for sentimental and political reasons, the Attalids, like the Seleucids, followed the custom of treating Greek subjects better than the non-Greek *Ethne*. The Greeks were regularly allowed their own municipal governments. A few of their cities were, for various reasons, exempt from tribute, but even the tributary ones were favored to some extent by being allowed to collect their own tribute — a fixed amount leniently estimated. Over such cities the king claimed the right of eminent domain, but did not assert proprietary rights in the soil. In fact, the Attalids, like the Seleucids, found it advisable to plant Greek cities on the crown-lands, for though they thereby diminished the area of tithe-paying possessions, they secured more loyal subjects for the army and better farmers for their stipendiary cities. And obviously, an increase in the productiveness of

a given district would ultimately justify the exaction of an increased stipend for the treasury.

After a century of empire building along these lines, the Pergamene kingdom had come to be a complex of (1) royal estates ⁶ (ιδία), (2) crown-lands ⁷ (χώρα βασιλική), (3) dependent tribute-paying Greek cities, and (4) protected Greek cities which either from favor or from policy were exempt from tribute. The revenue that accrued to the royal treasury from these different classes naturally varied in amount. From the royal estates the king secured all the profits that his managers could obtain, whether the estates were worked by the king's slaves or sublet to tenants. The crown-lands probably paid a tithe ⁸ in kind on grain and fruit and a certain proportionate fee on pasture lands. The tribute-paying Greek cities annually contributed a fixed amount apportioned by the king according to the city's wealth. The tithes of the crown-lands were brought in by the king's agents. It is not apparent that the king employed the contractor system of taxgathering, though he may have done so in the collection of port revenues, octroi, and poll taxes, since the system was known in Syria and Egypt.⁹

Such was the kingdom which Attalus gave Rome. However, the king apparently saw no reason why his legatee should draw all of his revenues, and perhaps he was not unmindful of the benisons that would flow to his deified spirit for one act of mercy: he provided accordingly that in the future the Greek cities should be exempt from tribute.¹⁰ Even so, the Romans had reason to be pleased with their gift, for the royal estates and crown-lands together with their rents and tithes fell to them. As late as Cicero's day one still hears of *ager publicus*, called *agri Attalici*,¹¹ in the province of Asia.

Before the Roman commissioners, delayed by the Gracchan dissensions, could arrive in the East, Aristonicus, a bastard son of Eumenes, laid claim to the throne. From the kingdom itself he attracted no large following, for the future seemed bright according to the terms of the testament. But a part of the Pergamene army ¹² (which would now be dis-

banded), some of the non-Greek natives, many slaves, and several non-Attalid Greek cities that were afraid of Roman aggression, lent support to the pretender. The Romans thereupon had to send an army to Asia, and since they moved slowly, Aristonicus was able to capture several cities in the kingdom before their arrival. The first consul sent over underestimated his enemy's strength, and suffered a disgraceful defeat in consequence. But in 130 the pretender was effectively routed, and a new commission of ten men was delegated by the senate to complete the work of reorganization. This board still recognized the terms of the will as in general binding, but it brought into the province and subjected to tribute several Greek cities¹³ which had supported the pretender. On the other hand, it lopped off and gave away a large part of the interior, apparently fearing lest its unruly tribes should prove to be a new thorn in the flesh like Spain. To Mithradates, the Pontic king, it ceded a part of Phrygia. The house of Cappadocia¹⁴ received Lycaonia. The Pamphylian and Pisidian tribes were set free to rule — or rather, misrule — themselves.¹⁵ A part of Thrace seems also to have been set free. The taxes of the provincials were also lightened¹⁶ in order to secure their good will.

In all this we may see a tendency to revert to the senatorial policy of the great Scipio. In fact, the younger Scipio Nasica was an important member of the first commission, and the younger Africanus, a philhellene and anti-imperialist,¹⁷ was the most influential member of the senate which sent the commissions. These men deemed it wise to accept as a province only that part of the kingdom which could be ruled without needless warfare; they sought to gain the favor of the inhabitants by the remission of some of their taxes and the good will of neighboring provinces by a show of moderation. Their policy, like that of the old senatorials, smacked of inefficiency in that it carelessly adopted a complicated series of relationships, which in the eyes of Rome actually had no *raison d'être*. It sprang from the old *laissez-faire* conservatism which was ready to accept a modicum of the honors

and privileges of empire while thrusting aside the severer duties as well as the more doubtful prizes of sovereignty.

However, the senate had not been in charge of the Asiatic province very long when in 123 Gaius Gracchus, the bitter opponent of the senate, came into power as tribune. This vigorous reformer had a penchant for "efficient management."¹⁸ He found that the tithes due Rome from the crown-lands were dwindling because the state had no trained corps of taxgatherers to take the place of the despot's skillful bureau of taxes, and because the years of anarchy in Asia had given the tenants a taste of freedom from surveillance. Furthermore, he did not understand why the distinctions that obtained under Attalus need necessarily dictate the regulations of a Roman province; why, in short, the inhabitants of cities should be free from tribute while the villages were obliged to pay their tithe. He therefore passed a law¹⁹ that the censors should let contracts at Rome for the collection of the Asiatic tithe to the highest bidder and that the tithe should be exacted from the property owners of cities as well as of crown-lands. We must add that he, too, exempted²⁰ a few cities from stipend, but his exemptions were based wholly upon reasons of Roman policy and not upon the stipulations found in the will of Attalus.

That this measure of Gracchus was inexcusably unjust in thus annulling the codicils of Attalus' will while receiving the benefits of the legacy cannot be denied. In fact, it points to a characteristic weakness of this enthusiastic reformer; for Gracchus, though personally a man of integrity, did not always have the courage to withstand the clamors *ciuium praua iubentium*. But the criticism often made that the contract system of taxgathering was unfeelingly introduced by Gracchus to subject the natives to the spoliation of Roman *publicani* for the sake of currying favor with the moneyed classes seems to be unmerited. Gracchus' whole career proves him a man of wide sympathies, deeply concerned in the honest administration of Roman subjects, and exonerates him from the charge of treachery regarding Asia. His father before him had been famed as the constant advocate

of wronged allies and provincials, and his brother, Tiberius, had accepted as his chief adviser the stoic philosopher, Blossius, a man who, true to his creed, had tried to found the Gracchan political policy upon *aequitas*.²¹ Gaius as quaestor for two years in Sardinia had gained the love of the provincials by his fairness and integrity, and in one of his first public speeches at Rome he succeeded in securing an indemnity for the Spaniards who had been wronged by Fabius. Long before his tribunate he had risked his influence with rich and poor alike by his insistent advocacy of the Italian cause, and we may judge for ourselves of his sincerity by the excerpts from his speeches conserved by Aulus Gellius.²² It is impossible to imagine that the man who made these speeches could have framed the Asiatic law with a cold disregard for the welfare of the provincials. In fact, Appian²³ incidentally betrays the fact that Gaius' measure was at first considered lenient because the gathering of a tithe was not as oppressive in years of crop failure as the Attalid exaction of a fixed annual tribute, whatever the harvest — a matter of considerable weight in the semi-arid plains of Anatolia. Of course, taxgathering by contract later proved to be an abominable system. But it seems that Gracchus adopted it in all good faith as the only efficient system available for Asia, and that its terrible flaws were not foreseen by him and not yet demonstrable.

The contract system of revenue collecting was the natural system in the ancient city-state²⁴ of conducting any extensive public business. Athens and other Greek cities had employed it from time immemorial, and Rome had relied upon it throughout the republic. It is not difficult to understand why. When magistrates hold office for but a year and are not chosen because of technical knowledge of their official duties, it is obvious that they cannot direct work which must extend over a term of years and which requires special training. They can only issue specifications and let contracts accordingly, relying upon their successors to see that the specifications have been satisfied when the work is complete. Even the Hellenic monarchs of Egypt and

Asia employed this system in the collection of minor revenues, although they were in a position because of life tenure to establish trained corps of officials for most of the civil service. That Roman statesmen saw the necessary connection between constitutional forms and systems of civil service is shown by the fact that although Julius Cæsar did not abandon the contract system during his consulship when he revised the provincial laws, he adopted a direct tax just as soon as he became dictator. He then observed that it would be possible to create a responsible and permanent treasury bureau.

To be sure, Rome had employed other systems of tax-gathering in Sicily, Spain, and elsewhere, though not with marked success. But those systems were not practicable for Asia. In Sicily, for instance, the cities gathered in their own tithes, and in Spain the native tribal states collected the revenue that was due Rome. But in Asia at least half of the province had no political organization corresponding to the cities of Sicily or the tribes of Spain. Furthermore, had the Sicilian tithe system been adopted for Asia, the state would have had an enormous amount of raw produce to dispose of. This produce would have been too far away to be available for the Roman market, and a governmental grain trade in the Orient was not an inviting undertaking.

It may be in place to note here that the accusation that Gracchus passed this law in order to catch the votes of the Roman corporations is a modern invention. The senatorial historians accused Gracchus of devising various other laws with a view to winning the *equites*, but they never made such charges against this one. As a matter of fact, at this time the *equites* were not deeply involved in tax farming: they could not yet foresee the advantages that Asia would bring them. A fuller discussion of this subject will be found in Chapter XIV. Suffice it to say here that no ulterior motive can be proved against Gracchus in the framing of this law.²⁵ We are therefore led to the conclusion that Gaius Gracchus organized the only system which he sincerely believed could efficiently bring in the Asiatic revenues.

If for a moment he suspected that the tax farmers might resort to extortion, he had reason to hope that such evils would quickly find a check in the tribunate which he was then elevating to all-sufficient power.

It remains only to indicate the attitude of parties and party leaders at Rome toward the Asiatic legacy and the bearing of the new legislation upon movements tending towards further expansion. It is at once clear that imperialism *per se* was not a burning question at the time. The discussions of the day dealt mainly with domestic affairs and tended to realign parties on new platforms which had little to say regarding foreign policies. So far as Asia was concerned, the real dispute was not whether to accept the gift, but whether the senate or the tribal assembly should manage the business. Probably both parties were equally ready to extend Rome's empire when so rich a gift was thrust upon the state in so flattering a way. The senate showed by the action of its commissioners that it was mildly expansionistic in the old Scipionic way — provided the constitution was left unimpaired; that is to say, provided the senate itself might peaceably administer the new accession.²⁶ The Gracchans favored acceptance, especially since the province brought new revenues with which to finance their contemplated measures. And the populace, of course, under normal conditions was always favorable to expansion if it did not cost too much. It is interesting to note that Tiberius Gracchus,²⁷ in one of his early campaign speeches supporting his agrarian laws, attempted to stir the imagination of the crowd by arguing among other things that if Italy continued her system of slave-worked plantations much longer, there would soon be a dearth of free men for the armies, and "with a strong army," he concluded, "you have hopes of becoming masters of the rest of the habitable world." The speech smacks of the hustings and contains a threat-burdened appeal to the self-interests of the voters; it reveals the attitude of the populace rather than any heartfelt ideal of the speaker, and is worth noting therefore as an indication that now as before the instinct of acquisitiveness

was not far below the surface in the crowd, ready by a simple transmutation to appear in the nationalized form of imperialism. That the Gracchans would ever have made a serious dogma out of this part of the speech we can hardly believe, for their sympathies, by inheritance, by teaching, and by nature, lay in the direction of equitable, not to say generous, treatment of allies and foreign nations.

Concerning Rome's theories at this time regarding her *dominium in solo provinciali*²⁸ we unfortunately get no clear light. The senate did not have to face the question, since the acceptance of Attalus' legacy brought no forms of ownership that did not readily conform to those already in vogue in Sicily. The free cities of Asia corresponded to the *liberae et immunes* of Sicily. The other cities differed from these only in the degree of dependency. The crown-lands were in theory the equals of the Sicilian *decumanae*, while the king's estates of the East corresponded to the "*censoriae*" which had been Hiero's private property. The younger Gracchus, however, made vital changes when he extended the tribute over the free cities. Was he aware that he was carrying the theory of *dominium in solo* a step farther than even the Seleucids and Attalids had done? Perhaps he reasoned that since the Greek cities in Sicily were *decumanae* it was only consistent that the Attalid cities should be. If so, he was applying Hiero's idea to Asia. Or perhaps he argued that Rome had originally fallen successor to Antiochus by the victory at Magnesia and that she now had a right to assert the ownership which the senate had then waived. Be that as it may, after the work of Gaius Gracchus was complete, Rome had but little more to learn about this question from Hellenic rulers. It was now time for the lawyers to formulate their theories.

The most important effect of the Gracchan tax law so far as it concerned foreign policy was that it directly attached the welfare of the business corporations to the resources of a rich province. These firms of capitalists, hitherto small and of little influence, grew rapidly on the wealth of Asia. Not only did they take the legitimate profits of shrewdly

made contracts on the tithes; they were also able to store their produce for profitable markets, to lend money to delinquent cities at usurious rates, to avail themselves of business opportunities in the province, and, finally, to extort overfull measure from cities that fell into their power. With their increasing wealth their political power grew. And since their power was due to profits on provincial revenues, it is apparent that their voice would some day be heard in every question of foreign policy. Where they were in control, they called for protection; where they were not they desired new fields of operation. To this evil we shall have occasion to recur.

Finally, the Gracchan method of legislating was fraught with danger for the time-honored senatorial policies of empire. Both the Gracchi believed fully in popular sovereignty, and they did not hesitate to disregard the senate's assumed right to administer foreign affairs. If the tribal assembly could revise the provincial revenues, what could it not do? The senate considered such action unprecedented, but dared not annul it. Perhaps some senators remembered that their own right to administer the provinces had come to them, not by any constitutional measure, but only by the unquestioning acquiescence of the sovereign people. After Gracchus' death the senate reassumed its old administrative functions as though nothing had occurred, but the precedent set by the tribunes was never again forgotten. Marius followed it when he desired the province of Africa. The knights brought it up when they desired Pompey as general to end a war in the East which was destroying their profits, and, finally, Caesar proved himself the apt pupil of Gracchus by asking the populace for an army with which he conquered Gaul and presently made himself the imperial master of Rome.

We cannot leave this period without mentioning some of the innovations that took place during it in Spain and Gaul. Gaius Gracchus, it will be remembered, had not only continued his brother's policy of assigning small leaseholds of public lands to Roman citizens, but, during his second trib-

uneship,²⁹ had also devised an extensive scheme of colonization. His plan was to send colonies of picked men, apparently both Italians and Romans, to various points in and out of Italy where important cities had once flourished; such places, for instance, as Carthage, Tarentum, and perhaps Capua. He probably reasoned that the former prosperity of these places proved that they lay at points naturally adapted for colonization. Tarentum and Scylaceum were soon successfully settled, though, it must be added, they hardly justified the hopes of the founder. He had apparently failed to see that the commerce which had made these points important in the past had since been diverted into other channels. His commendable attempt to colonize Carthage did not meet with the consideration it deserved. The senate, finding that the populace disliked to be sent so far from home, chose the measure as an issue by which to attack the tribune. Baiting the people with the offer of more attractive colonies nearer home,—promises that were never fulfilled,—it secured the repeal of the measure and thus weakened the tribune's prestige.

This opposition of the senate, however, cannot be taken as an indication of its general attitude toward extra-Italian colonization, since it allowed two military colonies to be planted in the Balearic islands³⁰ about this time, and since—as is proved by the agrarian law of 111 B.C.—it approved of selling public lands in Africa to citizens and allies both before and after the proposal of the Gracchan law. Of course there were speeches delivered in the senate directly attacking the wisdom of Gracchus' bill. Velleius (II, 7) seems to be giving the gist of such a speech when he expresses the belief that Carthage if colonized might have outstripped Rome as in the past it had outgrown its mother city, Tyre. However, such flimsy arguments, trumped up to serve the occasion, clearly did not represent serious convictions. The senate's attack was ready to burst out at any point where it saw the possibility of breaking the majority of the Gracchan bloc.

The measure itself, though it did not contemplate direct

territorial expansion, deserves attention for the breadth of view it betrays regarding the direction of the state's possible development. If we can accept Plutarch's chance remark ³¹ that the colonists of Carthage and Tarentum were to be picked men, we may conclude that the plan, unlike the agrarian laws, was not socialistic in spirit. Gaius apparently intended to build up industrial and commercial cities such as Tarentum and Carthage had formerly been, apparently trusting that the same power which had created industry in these places in the past would do so again. His hurried work may perhaps betray a lack of keen analysis, but it must be remembered that no one had as yet blazed the trail before him. And indeed the conservative respect for *mos maiorum* is so ubiquitous a factor in Roman history that one greets the courageous experimenter with pleasure. Still more gratifying it is to find a statesman ready to think in terms non-Roman, to put his faith in large schemes of development, to utilize the waste energy of the empire without considering just how the profits from the schemes would flow into Roman purses.

The immediate results were of course not startling, for the rabble lacked Gracchus' imagination and refused to follow to the end. When the law was repealed, the settlers already at Carthage were allowed to retain possession of their allotments, but no city was organized to do the work that Gracchus had planned. Had his scheme been successful and carried out to a legitimate conclusion, it is possible that a representative government ³² would have been devised to serve the needs of far-distant citizen-colonies, and a solid and healthy republic might have come into being. As it was, the plan bore fruit only when Cæsar adopted it, but then monarchy was already at hand and the natural results of an extensive colonization could not come to maturity.

Gaul was also opened to the Romans in the Gracchan days, and in a very strange manner. As early as 154, Rome, at the request of Marseilles, had subdued the Alpine peoples who made a practice of raiding the Greek settlements near Nice and Monaco. After the subjugation of these peoples

the Roman general had given their territory to Marseilles and had then withdrawn. In 125 Marseilles again appealed to the senate for aid, this time against the Salluvii and Vocontii, whereupon the consul Fulvius Flaccus and his successor, Sextius, administered the requisite punishment. It is probable that the senate now arranged with Marseilles that Rome should secure a strip of land in Gaul wide enough for a permanent road from Italy to Spain, since the senate presently obtained an alliance with the Ædui in the hinterland and followed up its first successes by planting a military fort at Aquæ Sextiæ between Marseilles and the barbaric tribes. The defeated king of the Salluvii had meanwhile taken refuge with the strong Gallic tribes of the Arverni and Allobroges, which refused to surrender him to Rome. The senate, realizing that, unless its demands were obeyed, it would lose the respect of the Gauls, prepared to take action. Domitius, the consul of 122, and Fabius, the consul of 121, were sent north, and in two costly battles defeated the enemy. Domitius then set about the task of building the military road to Spain through territory which thus became a Roman *provincia*, though apparently not tribute-paying territory. A chance reference in Caesar's commentaries³³ reveals the fact that the Arverni, although conquered in war, were neither subjected to tribute, nor included in the *provincia*. What treatment the Allobroges received at this time we do not know. The intention of the senate apparently was simply to secure control of a strip of territory which would permit the laying of the coast road, guard the passes into Italy and Spain, and include the fort north of Marseilles.

But the Gracchan ferment was doing its work, and the senate presently lost control of the situation. Some tribune introduced a bill establishing a colony at Narbo, a seaport town in the province, fronting rich farm lands west of the Massiliot territories. The senate fought the measure, feeling apparently that, since there were no natural boundaries near, the colony would open up costly military problems and invite further expansion. When, in spite of all it could do,

the plebiscite was passed, the senate awaited a favorable opportunity and then introduced a bill to repeal the colonial act.³⁴ The orator Crassus, just then beginning his illustrious career, surprisingly enough came to the rescue of the original measure and carried the day. Narbo was founded in 118 and became the center of a very vigorous trade between the Gallic tribes and Rome. Politically, however, little more was done in Gaul for sixty years. It was Cæsar who seems first to have conceived the idea of absorbing Gaul, and the story of how he conquered it is known to every schoolboy.

The movements in Gaul are usually credited to the expansionistic designs of the Gracchan party, because the first step in 125 was taken in the consulship of Fulvius Flaccus, a Gracchan supporter, and the final settlement of Narbo in 118 was accomplished in opposition to the senate. This view, however, is not well supported. The salient facts are that Rome in 125, as in 154, acted only upon the request of Marseilles; that, in 125 when the first army was sent, the senate was in control at Rome; that the succeeding generals who carried on the northern war and laid down the terms of peace — Sextius, Domitius, and Fabius — were all senatorials; and, finally, that in the organization of the province the senatorial policy of occupation for military purposes only was followed. All these facts show clearly that the Gallic affair in its initial stages was inspired by the senate and was not due to any popular program of expansion.

The settlement of Narbo, on the contrary, was surely dominated by the Gracchan spirit. It may even have been suggested in 122 by Gaius himself as a continuation of his work at Carthage and Tarentum, though the suggestion naturally came as a result and not as a cause of the whole movement. The most significant thing about the colonization of Narbo is the support lent it by Crassus. This man, though a senatorial, belonged to a family holding extensive investments and had developed a keen intuition in commercial affairs. His interest in the colonization scheme suggests that the measure must have been carried in the face

of senatorial opposition by the united efforts of the populace and the knights to whom the new settlement would offer the inducements of proletarian colonization, on the one hand, and mercantile expansion, on the other. The later history of the colony at least proves that it satisfied both of these purposes.

A review of the extra-Italian activities during the Gracchan decade justifies the conclusion that the democratic reformers were not aggressive imperialists, though they may ultimately have been forced by their policy into imperialism if they had lived longer. In this respect they differed but little from the senate. The latter faced the problems of the frontier from the political viewpoint, desiring to govern its possessions with as little expenditure of blood and money as possible. The Gracchans, while disclaiming a policy of aggression, desired to develop the state's possessions as far as possible and make them profitable. They desired the provincial tribute to yield funds with which to ameliorate domestic conditions; they wished to colonize neglected farm lands and harbors throughout the whole empire, thus developing wasted resources as well as caring for Italy's idle population. If they had been able to pursue this positive program for several years, it may be that they would have been drawn into territorial expansion, but there is nothing in our sources to show that they ever openly advocated it, and possibly their Stoic training and their keen human sympathies would have restrained them from adopting such a course.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XII

1. Livy, *Epit.* LVIII; Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* 14; Fränkel, *Inscr. von Pergamum*, 249; Momm. *Hist. Schriften*, I, 63; Foucart, *La Formation de la prov. rom. d'Asie*; Cardinali, *Il regno di Pergamo*, 294.

2. *Athen. Mitth.* XXIV, 192; Foucart, *op. cit.* p. 314; Ditt. *Or. Inscr.* 435. Scipio Nasica, one of the envoys, died while abroad. On his epitaph, which was recently discovered, he is called *πρεσβευτής*, *Athen. Mitth.* 1910, p. 484.

3. Chapot, *La province romaine d'Asie*, Chap. III; Niese, *Griech.*

und makedon. Staaten, III, 61. Cardinali, *op. cit.* p. 99, gives a list of the free and Attalid cities.

4. Ramsay, *Cities and Bish. of Phrygia*, I, pp. 103, 131, 259, 260. This scholar has shown how the monarchs drew into the royal estate the extensive possessions of the numerous temple-states. Rome seems to have continued this policy. Most invaluable is Rostowzew, *Geschichte d. röm. Kolonates*, 240-312. For the history of a typical temple-state, see Buckler and Robinson in *Am. Jour. Arch.* 1912.

5. Plut. *Eumenes*, 8. As the successor of Alexander he even claimed possession of territory he had not conquered. When he sold such territory, he furnished the purchaser troops with which to bring it into subjection in case the natives refused obedience.

6. The land which Cicero (*leg. agr.* II, 50) calls *Attalicos agros in Cherroneso* had been the personal estate of the king, and not "crown-land," for Cicero calls it *agri regii*. See also *Inscr. von Priene*, III, 112: ἡ πρότερον εἰργάζατο βασιλεὺς Ἀτταλος; Cardinali, *op. cit.* p. 182, has a list of royal estates. The fact that the king owned a large army of slaves may indicate that he cultivated extensive estates as private property quite apart from the crown-lands.

7. The gentiles (ἔθνη) had no municipal organization, but lived in tribal villages (κῶμαι) governed by the king's agents. They are often called the king's vassals (λαοὶ βασιλικοί), and their land χώρα βασιλική, the royal domain. See Rostowzew, *op. cit.* p. 247.

8. This subject has been discussed by Pelham, *The Imperial Domain*, in *Essays on Roman History*; Chapot, *op. cit.* 324; Cardinali, *op. cit.* 173 ff.; Rostowzew, articles *s.v.* *Fiscus* and *Frumentum* in Pauly-Wissowa, and Hirschfeld, *Die Kaiserlichen Verwaltungsbeamten*², p. 121.

9. Rostowzew, *Geschichte der Staatspacht*, *Philologus*, Supp. IX, p. 336.

10. This is not absolutely established, but it seems probable. Inscriptions indicate that Pergamum (*Inscr. v. Perg.* 249 = Ditt. *Or. Inscr.* 338) and Sestos (Ditt. *Or. Ins.* 339) received freedom from the testament. Livy, *Epit.* 59, *legata libera esse deberet*, and Appian, *B. C.* V, 4, imply that Attalus intended most of the Greek cities to be immune from tribute. A Pergamene inscription honoring the envoys who went to Rome to plead for the freedom of Pergamum was recently found: *Athen. Mitth.* 1910, 408 = *Inscr. Gr. Rom. Pert.* IV, 292.

11. Cicero, *leg. agr.* II, 50.

12. Diodorus, XXXIV, 3.

13. Cassius Dio, XLI, 25, 3, mentions Phocæa. Perhaps Miletus and Clazomene were also deprived of liberty at this time, since they had been free before, whereas in the year 78 they belonged to the province (*C. I. L.* I, 203). However, the vicissitudes of the Mithradatic war may account for the change. Most of the Greek cities of Asia which were independent states and "friends" of Rome before 133

remained so at least until the Mithradatic war. See Niese, *op. cit.* III, 371.

14. Atilius, the consul at the head of the commission, was accused of having been bribed by these monarchs to bestow these gifts. That he was tried on the charge proves little; his acquittal proves no more. It is well to remember that the consul could hardly have acted without the full approval of the ten commissioners, who had general instructions from the senate, and that the populace no more understood the senatorial moderation now than in the days when they suspected Scipio of accepting bribes because of his leniency toward Antiochus. The senate ultimately yielded, for in 120 it recalled its gift to Pontus, thereby offending the Great Mithradates, who was now king; cf. Ditt. *Or. Inscr.* 436.

15. Here the withdrawal of a responsible government caused no little harm. The mountains were soon infested with brigands, and Rome was later (102) compelled to establish the province of Cilicia in order to protect herself.

16. App. *B. C. V.*, 4. Perhaps the poll taxes were removed, though the passage — a reputed speech of Mark Antony's — will not support a heavy load of inference.

17. Cf. Val. Max. IV, 1, 10; and *Athen. Mitth.* 1910, p. 484.

18. His quaestorship was noted for its efficiency. We may reasonably suppose that he expected to finance his grain laws without loss to the treasury merely by economically storing and distributing the Sicilian tithe. The success of his road building was never questioned. His hobby was to increase revenues and thus develop the state's resources to their utmost. Cf. Gell. XI, 10, *uti vectigalia vestra augeatis quo facilius vestra commoda et rem publicam administrare possitis*, and Cic. *Tusc.* III, 48, *patronum aerarii esse dices*.

19. The references are unsatisfactory. See Cic. *Verr.* III, 12; App. *B. C. V.*, 4; Cic. *ad Att.* V, 13; Marquardt, *Staatsverw.* I, 338.

20. Foucart, *op. cit.* p. 338. Pergamum apparently remained exempt from tribute by the Gracchan law. It seems, however, to have lost its privileges in the Mithradatic war, but, according to a recently unearthed inscription, *Athen. Mitth.* 1909, p. 330, to have regained them by a gift from Julius Caesar. Strabo, XIV, 642, says that the Ephesian temple-state was granted exemption by the Romans, though this had been denied it by the kings. See also Ditt. *Syll.*² 334; *Or. Inscr.* 440; *Athen. Mitth.* XXIV, p. 177; Josephus, *Antiq. Jud.* XIV, 247.

21. There are several useful studies which aid in the sifting of Gracchan sources, notably, E. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, p. 383; Warde Fowler's essays in the *English Historical Review*, 1905; Kornemann, *Klio*, Beiheft I; Pöhlmann, *Sitz. Bay. Akad.* 1907; and Cardinali, *Studi Graccani*, 1912. Concerning the influence of the Stoic theories on the Scipionic and Gracchan policies, see Schmekel, *Die Phil. d.*

mittleren Stoa, p. 439 ff.; Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 380 ff. Was Blossius following the example of the Stoic Sphærus, who supported Cleomenes in his agrarian reforms at Sparta a century before?

22. Gell. X, 3. For the other points see Gell. XV, 12; Plut. *C. Gracchus*, 3 and 6; Aur. Victor, 65.

23. *Bell. Civ.* V, 4.

24. See Rostowzew, *Gesch. d. Staatspacht*, *Philologus*, Supp. IX.

25. This is but a feeble protest against a score of ill-considered judgments of which the following may serve as samples: Pour accroître l'opulence des chevaliers, C. Gracchus fit deux choses: il créa la dime, et il la fit affermer par les censeurs, Chapot, *op. cit.* 326; "we are left to guess how a man of high character came to hand over the people of Asia to the mercies of the *publicani*," Heitland, *The Roman Republic*, II, p. 304.

26. If the speech of Cato cited by Festus (Lindsay, 266) belongs to this period, we may conclude that the younger Cato followed the policy of his father in preaching the doctrine of "hands off." The title of the speech was *In dissuasione de rege Attalo et vectigalibus Asiae*. He could hardly have had a large following in such a cause.

27. Appian, *B. C.* I, 11.

28. Mommsen holds that the doctrine of *dominium in solo provinciali* was first consistently applied to the inheritance of the Attalid kingdom; *Staatsrecht*, III, p. 731. However, Gracchus simply extended to Asia the practice already in vogue in Sicily. I do not believe that lawyers were yet applying the doctrine universally in Cicero's day.

29. Livy, *Epit.* 60, *ut complures coloniae in Italia deducerentur et una in solo dirutae Carthaginis*; Vell. I, 15, *et post annum Scolacium Minervium, Tarentum Neptunia, Carthagoque in Africa*; Plut. *C. Gracch.* 6, 8, and 10; App. *B. C.* I, 23; Vell. II, 7; *Lex agraria* 60, 61 (see Hardy, *Six Roman Laws*, p. 73, footnote).

30. Strabo, III, 167. Metellus, the proconsul who founded these, was a very strong senatorial. The colonists were apparently Roman soldiers who had served in Spain.

31. Plut. *C. Gracchus*, 9. This has been admirably discussed by Greenidge, *A History of Rome*, p. 224.

32. Representative government was never far from the trial stage at Rome. See *Class. Phil.* IX, p. 50.

33. Caesar, *Bell. Gall.* I, 45: *Bello superatos esse Arvernos et Rutenos ab Q. Fabio Maximo, quibus populus Romanus ignovisset neque in provinciam redegisset neque stipendium imposuisset*. For these wars see Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, III, pp. 1-40. However, I have not followed this scholar's explanation of the war as due to the intrigues of a land-seeking democracy.

34. Cicero, *Brut.* 160; *pro Cluent.* 140.

CHAPTER XIII

SENATORIAL LAISSEZ FAIRE

IN the peaceful days before the Gracchan upheaval it was not unusual for a group of prominent men to gather at the house of Scipio to discuss problems of political science.¹ The philosopher Panætius discoursed upon the ideal state of Plato and the Stoics, the nature of the usual forms of government, and the dangers that lay inherent in each. Polybius would point out how the Greek states had fallen short of the ideal, how in Athens the rabble had impulsively followed ill-considered courses, while Sparta, though properly combining the true principles of government, had failed to meet successfully the exigencies of international politics. Then Scipio took delight in demonstrating that Rome had so wisely combined the elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy in its consuls, senate, and assembly that the state which the wise Greek philosophers had devised in imagination, but could not bring into existence, had unwittingly been realized by the untutored farmers of Rome. In this state all classes were evenly represented. Each at the same time checked and supported the others. Here at last was a government which promised harmony at home and victory abroad.

Then came Gracchus with his merciless indictments against the government, challenging the senate to work out the necessary reforms. When the senate refused, he resurrected the tribunician machinery and with that set about the task himself. A war of classes resulted. The philosophers awoke to the fact that the different classes no longer either supported or checked each other. The symmetrical constitution described by Polybius in accordance with the theories of Scipio and Panætius had proved to be a fiction.

Harmony was destined to return only in the form of universal subservience to the will of one man.

Gracchus was, of course, not the wrecker of the constitution. He merely served as the inevitable instrument that pried open fissures hitherto unobserved. From the inception of the republic till 287 B.C., Rome had struggled away from oligarchy towards frank democracy. Under the Hortensian law the popular assembly led by the tribune was practically supreme at Rome. But with the advent of the foreign wars the assembly began to realize its limitations. Unable to cope with large international problems, it stepped into the background again, and, with its acquiescence, the senate entered upon an ever-widening sphere of action. Within a century the once humiliated senate had regained, *de facto* at least, enormous administrative, judicial, and even legislative powers, and after the death of Cato it was not far from being the ruling power of the state. The Hortensian law had not become wholly a dead letter; occasionally during the second century the tribunician machinery was employed.² But in general the senate so firmly controlled the action of the tribunes that popular sovereignty seemed to be doomed. Few senators could then have thought that the assembly would ever again become wholly independent of the senate's control. But Gracchus shattered their hopes by introducing the principle of "the recall," whereby tribunes who fell under the senatorial influence could be deposed by the people. After that measure the assembly attained greater independence than it had ever before enjoyed, and Gracchus employed it not only in disregard of the senate's wishes, but by way of humiliating the senate. The senate on its side insisted that the accumulated power of a century faithfully used, even if not legally granted, had vested it with unassailable rights which it intended to preserve at all costs. And thus in 133 there were two powers working side by side, each claiming sovereignty, and Rome awoke to the fact that the state was a house divided against itself. From this time on a consistent foreign policy was impossible. Not only did the home government incessantly change, but factional

quarrels constantly subordinated imperial to domestic questions. Nor was there any hope of harmony. Neither party could ever again forget the power it once had held and acquiesce in the supremacy of the other. And the bitterness of the hatred stirred up by the struggles of 133-121 made compromise impossible. It is against a background of civil contention that the action of foreign politics must now be viewed. Obviously, measures supporting or opposing wars and treaties can no longer be used as an index of party attitudes. Tribunes will be found opposing measures inaugurated by either party merely by way of obstructionistic tactics, regardless of the merits of the case, even as our presidents, for party reasons solely, sometimes veto bills passed by an opposition congress.

The first event that thoroughly tested the temporary peace of factions after the death of Gaius Gracchus was the Jugurthine war³ in Numidia. The son of Masinissa died in 118, leaving his kingdom to his two sons, Hiempsal and Adherbal, and to his nephew, Jugurtha, a forceful and ambitious, but unscrupulous, soldier, who had effectively led a contingent of Numidians under Scipio in the siege of Numan-tia. As the Numidian kings had recognized Rome's sovereignty for a century, and as all the important acts of the kingdom during that period had been submitted to the senate for approval, it is obvious that the senate was involved in the duty of preventing wasteful civil wars, or at least such wars as utterly disregarded the pacts that bore the seal of its approval. What now occurred was briefly this. Jugurtha first expelled Hiempsal in 116. The senate ordered and secured the fugitive's restoration. Nevertheless, Jugurtha employed agents to assassinate him. Then Adherbal, the brother of the dead prince, took up arms against Jugurtha, but was defeated and fled to Rome. After much quibbling the senate dispatched a commission which divided the kingdom between Jugurtha and Adherbal, giving the former the better portion, "because of bribes," says the democrat Sallust. No sooner had the Roman peacemakers departed than civil war again arose, and Jugurtha besieged

his rival in the stronghold of Cirta. Roman envoys came once more to attempt a settlement; Jugurtha spoke them fair, made promises, but continued the siege. Again the senate sent envoys with threats of war, but they too departed *re infecta*. Jugurtha stormed the town, put Adherbal to death, and with him, a number of Italians and Romans who had been trafficking in Numidia. This was in 112. Now, finally, the senate was stirred to action — by the accusations of a tribune, says Sallust — and declared war.

Calpurnius Bestia, the consul, was sent to the scene of action, and with him several prominent members of the senate, "to share the blame for whatever mistakes might be made," according to our anti-senatorial authority. At first Bestia succeeded well, storming several coast towns of the enemy. But then came the real test, for he had to pursue the light Numidian horsemen through the desert sand dunes with his stolid Roman legions, and any reader of Sallust who has pictured to himself the tantalizing inconclusiveness of such a task will hardly blame Bestia and his council of war for compromising with Jugurtha when he presently offered to come to terms. The Numidian did not offer much: a few horses and elephants, some munitions of war to grace a "triumphal" procession, and a pretended unconditional surrender made under pledge that the kingdom would after all be left him. Bestia accepted the offer, gave Jugurtha his kingdom, and peace was declared. The tribunes at Rome now cried out that the senators must have been bribed to accept such humiliating terms. One of them, Memmius, proposed a bill requesting Jugurtha to come to Rome and tell whom he had bribed. The king came, but when about to speak, he was forbidden to do so by another tribune. We do not know whether this tribune had been bought by the senate, as Sallust holds, or whether, as is more likely, he felt that a sovereign state must not wash its linen, whether clean or dirty, before a vassal prince. At any rate, the daring Numidian employed his time in Rome to some purpose by having a possible rival, his cousin Missiva, murdered there, whereupon the senate once more was obliged

to declare war. But this time the Romans fared even worse than before. While the new consul, Albinus, was at Rome engaged in state business, his brother, who was supposed to be drilling the army in Numidia, rushed into a battle, was hopelessly defeated, and saved the remnant of his army only by a shameful capitulation. The indignation of the populace at Rome knew no bounds. The people had been fed upon rumors, suspicions, and charges of venality for five years now, and, meanwhile, a petty usurper in Africa was sending Roman legions under the yoke. A new tribune, Mamilius, satisfied the excited populace by proposing to establish a special court⁴ empowered to investigate all charges of collusion with and support of Jugurtha. The jury was drawn from the *equites*, and even Sallust admits that its work was done in a spirit of bitter partisanship. Bestia and Albinus were banished at once and with them three other nobles whose connection with this war is not as evident as their opposition to the popular movement in general.

Meanwhile, the new consul, Metellus, an honest noble, and no mean soldier, was sent to the war. For two years he did what could be done with a cumbersome army against a slippery foe, wisely developing his cavalry and light-armed contingent so far as his resources permitted. But the people at home were clamoring for evidence of telling results. When the democrat, Marius, a lieutenant of the consul, convinced the people that he could bring the war to a successful end, they elected him consul for 107, and when the senate exercised its old prerogative in foreign affairs by reappointing Metellus as proconsul, the populace overrode that body and passed a plebiscite giving Marius the army. Marius worked vigorously, but the task was difficult and required time. The senate continued his term in the field as proconsul, glad to have peace at home. Finally, Jugurtha was caught by means of the purchased treachery of his former ally, the Moorish king, and the war which had ruined so many reputations finally came to an end after six stormy years.

Numidia was not incorporated in the Roman empire. A

portion was given over to Gauda, the only remaining representative of the old Numidian line. Bocchus, the Mauretanian king who had caught and surrendered Jugurtha, received the western half of the kingdom. Only Leptis on the east of the African province, which Rome had long before adjudged to Masinissa, and which declared for Rome in 116, was added to the Roman province.

This war and its conclusion will serve as an indication of Rome's complete apathy to foreign expansion during this period, an apathy apparently shared by all political parties. The senate was utterly averse to the war from the beginning. Sallust states freely his belief that this aversion was due to the friendships that Jugurtha had made while campaigning with the Romans in Spain and to the lavish bribes that he distributed at Rome. But Sallust is so reckless with facts — even with facts of his own day — and his judgment is so warped by party prejudice that one must in all justice question his motivation⁵ of this war. There may have been bribery — there doubtless was, for Rome had not a few corrupt politicians at the time — but the senate's hesitation did not have to be bought on this occasion, since that body had good reasons of its own for avoiding the war. As a matter of fact, the senate had found for the last half century that client-princes — like the Ptolemies and Seleucids, for example — usually obeyed its requests so promptly that a declaration of war was unnecessary. It naturally expected Jugurtha to follow this same course, especially after the dangers of disobedience had been intimated to him. Indeed, the senate did not wish to remove Jugurtha if it could retain him as a friend. In case of his removal, Rome must either take Numidia as a province, which she did not desire to do, or hand it to some weakling of the royal line like Gauda, a prince who would not have enough force to keep peace on the border of Rome's province. In short, the senate needed Jugurtha where he was. Furthermore, the senate dreaded a war which had to be fought in the desert. The Roman legion was too unwieldy for such warfare, and it would take time to gather an army of light-armed, quick-moving mer-

cenaries and allies. Meanwhile, the populace would cry for results, charge the senate with inefficiency, and hint at collusion. In fact, the nobles saw themselves facing a loss of prestige in a cause for which their practical good sense could have little sympathy. It is more than probable that Bestia had secret instructions from the senate when he went to the war to attempt first to gain such success in the field as might reasonably be called a satisfaction for Jugurtha's past insults to the national honor, and then to make peace as quickly as possible.⁶ There is some support for this view — aside from its reasonableness — in the fact that Bestia took with him a group of the most influential Romans of the time to bear the blame at home for the treaty which he hoped to secure, but which he knew would probably not satisfy political opponents unable and unwilling to understand the nature of his task. It is clear, then, that the senate dreaded this war with good reason, avoided it as long as possible, and eagerly seized the first opportunity of ending it. The settlement of Numidia upon Gauda and Bocchus proves, moreover, that the senate was determined not to increase its foreign possessions. The old instinctive aversion to standing armies with their consequent elevation of a military class, and the knowledge that the probable income of a province in Numidia would hardly cover the expense of occupation, plausibly explain this decision.

It is not so clear what the desire of the populace and *equites* was in the matter. However, when one considers that during the last years of the war the opponents of the senate were powerful enough to obtain whatever they desired, and that Marius had charge of the final arrangements, it may fairly be concluded that the democratic party agreed with the senate in deciding against creating a new province. The party that could pass the Memmian and Mamilian rogations and override the senate's appointments with a plebiscite giving Marius the command could readily have rejected the senate's disposition of Numidia, if it had really favored expansion.

Yet the knights are usually credited with an aggressive

policy through this period. Is not all the evidence against such an assumption? Can we be sure that the traders who were massacred in Cirta were more than a few adventurers? Have we any right to suppose that they represented the business firms of Rome or that Roman money was invested in Numidia to any extent? If Roman capital was as heavily involved as is usually assumed, pressure could have been brought to bear to attach Numidia to the province of Africa, or, at least, to keep all of Numidia as a Roman protectorate under Gauda, instead of giving more than half of it to the Moorish king who was still left unattached. And these arrangements were carried out by Marius, who had himself been a business man at Rome. The obvious conclusion is that neither the capitalists nor the populace had any real interests to safeguard or promote in Numidia. Their cry for war, or rather their cry against the senate charging procrastination, inefficiency, and dishonesty, was not inspired by jingoism or imperialism; it was created by party animosity emanating from opposition leaders who found in the senate's dilemma a chance to manufacture campaign material.

The whole affair then shows that none of the Roman parties at this time had any imperialistic designs. Unfortunately, it does reveal a cankerous condition in the state. When, at a time of war, the energies of the nation could thus be wasted in bickerings and mutual accusations, disaster threatened the constitution.

The struggle⁷ with the "Cimbri and Teutoni," which overlaps and follows this war, would hardly come within the scope of the present inquiry were it not for the military aspect of the war. In 109, while Metellus was campaigning in Africa, the Cimbri in Gaul attacked and routed his colleague, Silanus. Two years later the consul Cassius was defeated and slain by a part of the invaders; his successor in command saved his army only by marching under the yoke. Servilius, the consul of 106, refused to coöperate with Mallius, the consul of 105, because the latter was not of his political party, and both were defeated at Orange, with a loss, it is said, of 60,000 men. Once more the populace

intervened, set aside the constitutional provisions against the reëlection of a consul, appointed Marius to the command for the year 104, and continued to reëlect him, until in his fifth consulship he put an end to the war.

For the present inquiry the important points are the nature of the reforms which Marius introduced into the army and the unconstitutional reëlection of Marius. According to an old practice which dated from the time when the state did not pay its soldiers nor furnish their armor, the legions were, until the time of Marius, recruited from property-owning citizens. In the days when property consisted mostly of farms, this system was excellent. The middle-class farmers were hardened to difficult army work by labor in the fields, and were deeply concerned in the welfare of the state of which they were full citizens and in which they held their property. But this class rapidly decreased in number during the second century. Under the plantation system, the owners of the soil became, for the most part, absentee landlords who lived in leisure in the city, and naturally were not inured to severe campaigning. The men who actually tilled the soil belonged largely to the slave class, or, at best, to the class of free tenants who went down in the census rolls as proletariat and were therefore ineligible for ordinary army service. The middle-class population was not numerous in the city because of the inactivity of industry and commerce. Moreover, the liberal corn distributions introduced by Gracchus encouraged pauperism. Thousands of men who might have created an independent income for themselves were satisfied to live a shiftless, hand-to-mouth existence. All these able-bodied but unpropertied men were ineligible for service in the legion according to the old régime, and Rome, accordingly, found difficulty in making up a respectable levy in time of war.

Marius presently took matters into his own hands and called for volunteers ⁸ from all classes. The senate probably realized that the new experiment was necessary. In fact, it must have remembered that a precedent for such a reform had already been established during the Punic war. For-

tunately for Marius, the barbarians of the north made an excursion into Spain so that he had time to train his rabble into good legionaries; and Marius possessed the qualities of leadership which quickly brought out the fighting spirit of such men.

However, in order to make his levy a success, Marius had spread a report abroad that the state would allot lands to the army after the war, and the sequel to this report was entirely in character. Marius, acting through his spokesman, the tribune Saturninus, introduced a comprehensive agrarian law⁹ by which he intended to pay his promises. The public lands of Italy were gone, but he proposed to give his men whatever public lands the state owned in Greece and Macedonia. The senate opposed the scheme, and riots ensued, in which the tribune acted with such violence that Marius himself had to throw in his support with the senate. The measure, therefore, was lost, but Marius finally succeeded in obtaining for his men a plot of land in Corsica and the site of the battle field in Cisalpine Gaul where he had defeated the Cimbri.¹⁰

The success of Marius' army reform in securing a large army marked it as the accepted method henceforth, and subsequent events prove that his allotment of lands to his soldiery also became a precedent. Henceforth, the army was recruited from the city proletariat, a class that had little to lose by joining the ranks, a nervous, unoccupied people, brought up to seek excitement, and ready to stake life on a chance for adventure, booty, and a possible gift of public land at the end. Obviously the commander who promised most succeeded best in securing such recruits. Obviously, also, the general who could at the end of the war procure good allotments for his soldiers might, in the future, command a strong personal following in whatsoever cause. Such soldiers fought for the liberal paymaster, and the time was not far distant when they were found ready to fight for their paymaster, whether for or against their country.

It was partly because of this reorganization of the army that the repeated reflections of Marius introduced a new

danger into the state — the danger that some one popular leader might gain control over the army and employ it for his own ends. The senate had always realized that it must suppress individualism in order to retain control of the state, but, so long as the army remained small and consisted of a citizen soldiery which had the welfare of the state at heart, there was little to fear from unscrupulous leaders. During the Punic war the senate had never hesitated to prolong indefinitely the command of efficient generals. Curiously enough it was Cato's democratic faction which, fearing the domination of powerful noble families, introduced the laws ¹¹ that required a long term in the civil service as preparation for the consulship and then forbade reelection to that high office. The Gracchan experiments, however, revealed to both parties the true tendencies of individualism. When that popular leader proposed that tribunes should be allowed to stand for reelection, the senate realized that a leader who gained the attention of the voters could virtually make himself an autocrat in the state. It therefore saw the necessity of consistently upholding the constitutional limitation to one term in the consulship as well as in the tribuneship; and so long as the Republic remained, this was a very important plank in the senatorial platform. After Marius had demonstrated the possibility of recruiting an army from the unstable rabble, taught by recent factional fights to criticize the state and the *mos maiorum*, the necessity of limiting the power of the commander who controlled so dangerous an implement became all the greater.

The Jugurthine and Cimbric wars first revealed the dilemma into which territorial expansion had brought the state. Possessions beyond the sea needed more skillful generals than the constitutional limitations admitted, and they required larger armies than conservative principles could provide. The day was soon to come when the military organization required by transmarine domains would remold the constitution of the state to its own needs, and Rome herself be forced to accept an imperial master.

Several incidents of minor importance, which neverthe-

less bear upon our subject, occurred during this period. The Cimbric hordes in the marches and countermarches of a decade between the Danube and Spain had set the whole of central Europe in commotion and, in particular, had pushed the Balkan tribes upon the borders of Roman Macedonia. The senate accordingly had to send consular armies into that region for several years, and Macedonia soon became the favorite field of operation for triumph-hunting consuls. Some of the generals secured the desired honor by simply defending the province. Others seized the occasion to push the war into the hinterland, and, as a result of their operations, the province of Macedonia was extended eastward into Thrace and northward through Dalmatia.

Coincident with these troubles came the need of suppressing Cilician¹² brigandage and piracy. Rome was prodded on to her manifest duty regarding these pirates along a very sinuous route. When the king of Bithynia facetiously wrote the senate that he could not furnish the contingent he wished to send because the Roman publicans had kidnaped so many of his citizens, the senate decided that it must investigate matters. It forthwith sent out a decree requiring provincial governors to find out whether any slaves in their provinces had been illegally obtained, and, if so, to set such slaves free. These investigations raised the hopes of slaves all over the empire. In Sicily, when the proceedings were brought to a close because of riots, the disappointed slaves rose in revolt *en masse*, and Rome had a disagreeable war to face. The search, however, had revealed the fact that the tribes of Cilicia and Pamphylia, which Rome had severed from the province of Asia and set free in 128, were engaged in brigandage and piracy. Their favorite occupations were kidnaping slaves in the interior of Asia Minor to supply the Greek and Roman slave markets, and fitting out privateers which would carry their captives to market and prey upon the Ægean shipping as well. The senate thoroughly realized now that its neglect of these growing evils had brought upon itself not only the sarcastic taunts of the Eastern kings, but also a slave war in Sicily. The prætor

Antonius was accordingly sent to drive the pirates off the seas, and to seize the ports of Cilicia from which they sailed. He succeeded in his mission, but what Rome actually did with her new possessions is not clear. She apparently did not reclaim Cilicia and Pamphylia and reattach them to the province of Asia, which would have been the logical course. The authorities, indeed, speak of a province of Cilicia from this time on, but these coast towns could hardly have been a province in the ordinary sense. They furnished little else than a sort of "beat" for a prætor on police duty, and they were the kind of acquisition that the populace most disliked, involving burdens but bringing little return in revenue.

The same leitmotif of laissez faire also runs through the minor incidents of the period. A son of Ptolemy the Corpulent, one surnamed Apion, had ruled Cyrene since 117, and when he died in 97 he left his kingdom of five cities and some Berber tribes to Rome. His generosity is as inexplicable as that of Attalus, who had bequeathed his realm to Rome some years before. This new gift, however, was hardly as profitable as the previous one, and the senate was in a quandary whether or not to accept a new field for triumph-hunting governors. Acting in character, however, it accepted the king's personal property, set free the five cities, which were more or less hellenized, exacted the royal tribute from the non-Greek natives, and left the place without a governor.¹³ Now the royal tribute was collected in kind, and amounted annually to thirty pounds of the country's staple product, silphium. This the natives dutifully sent to Rome each year. But the savory herb appears to have been a drug upon the market at Rome which the treasury officials were obliged to lay aside in the storeroom. At any rate, when Cæsar, fifty years later, took stock of his treasury, he seems to have found all of it still intact, — 1500 pounds of asafetida, according to Pliny.

A superficial review of the three decades beginning with the tribunate of the elder Gracchus might tempt one to call the period expansionistic that brought into the empire Asia and Cyrene, and strips of Gaul, Cilicia, Africa, and Mace-

donia. A careful examination of the behavior of the home government, however, reveals the significant fact that a complete indifference to expansion, at times verging upon a positive aversion, existed at Rome. The Asiatic province and Cyrene constitute the only considerable territorial additions, and these were gifts, accepted in both cases with certain restrictions. In Africa, Gaul, and Cilicia, Rome took charge of the least rather than the largest possible portion of territory at her disposal. The senate was, of course, the center of the anti-imperialistic sentiment, discouraged, it would seem, by its experiences in Spain, and wholly out of sympathy with the military developments necessitated by foreign possessions. But apparently neither the populace nor the commercial classes did anything to promote expansion; the former caring little for opportunities to colonize land in distant countries, — as Gracchus discovered to his sorrow when he offered them African allotments, — the latter being still too small and disorganized to exert any appreciable influence in politics. At most, these two classes merely reveal a readiness in the Asiatic reorganization and the Narbonese settlement to make profitable use of what the state already possessed. To obtain increased dominion, they seem to have made no effort. In fact, all parties were completely absorbed in questions of home politics and in taking revenge upon one another for the vicious factional onslaughts of the Gracchan riots. They had no time to devote to the administration of extra-Italian possessions and protectorates. Never was expansion so dead an issue, and yet this is the period in which militarism and monarchical principles, the forerunners of imperialism, came into prominence.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII

1. See Cicero, *de Rep.* I, 15; *de Off.* I, 90; Polybius, bk. VI; XXXII, 9; Vell. I, 13; Cic. *Acad. pr.* II, 5. For Scipio Æmilianus and his political views, see Münzer in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. *Cornelius*, No. 335; for Panætius, Schmeckel, *D. Mittl. Stoa*.

2. See Botsford, *Roman Assemblies*, 346 ff.

3. Greenidge's account of this war in *A History of Rome* may be criticized for adopting Sallust's account of the campaigns too unquestioningly; but it is unsurpassed in its analysis of the political cross-currents of the time. Consult also Bloch, *M. Æmilius Scaurus*, in *Mélanges d'histoire ancienne* (Université de Paris, 1909). A convenient compendium of sources and references is Greenidge and Clay, *Sources for Roman History*, 133-70.

4. *uti quaeretur in eos quorum consilio Jugurtha senati decreta neglegisset, quique ab eo in legationibus aut imperiis pecunias accepissent* — qui de pace aut bello cum hostibus pactiones fecissent, Sall. *Jug.* 40. In such a court any man who had been seen conversing with Jugurtha might find himself in difficulty. Cicero, *Brut.* 128, says that the two generals, Bestia and Albinus, were condemned, also Galba, C. Cato, and Opimius. Cato was unpopular because of the defeat he incurred four years before in Thrace. Opimius was, of course, the very unpopular consul of 121 who had led the senate in the murderous assault upon Gracchus. When Lucilius calls him "this Jugurthian Opimius" (Marx. *Lucil.* 418), he may refer seriously to his proved guilt, or sarcastically to the court proceedings.

5. See Lauckner, *Die Ziele der Monographie Sallusts über den Jug. Krieg.* 1911, a good study of Sallust's historical methods, though inclined to attribute slips of carelessness to party bias and stylistic demands. Schwartz, *Hermes*, XXXII, 554, and John, *Neue Jahrb. Suppl.* VIII, 203, are studies of the *Catilina* which illustrate Sallust's methods. Bloch, *M. Æmilius Scaurus*, does not overstate the case for the *Jugurtha*. Sallust's political prejudices betray themselves in phrases like: *tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obviam itum est*, *Jug.* 51.

6. The senate may also have hurried negotiations because the Cimbri who had defeated Carbo at Noreia in 113 were now entering Gaul. At this time of party strife many charges of bribery were bandied about to which Sallust had access. We need not believe all that the prosecutors at the Mamilian court proclaimed. The popular revulsion against the excesses of this court soon reached such a pitch that Servilius was able to pass a law restoring the jury panels to the senate. A given quantity of smoke does not prove the existence of the same amount of fire south of the Alps as north.

7. Strabo, VII, 292 and 3; Livy, *Epit.* 63, 65, 67, 68; Licinianus, p. 17; Plut. *Marius*.

8. Sall. *Jug.* 86; Gellius, XVI, 10, 10; Val. Max. II, 3; cf. Polyb. VI, 19, for the old custom.

9. Appian, *Bell. Civ.* I, 29; *de Vir. Ill.* 73 (*Siciliam, Achaeam, Macedoniam novis coloniis destinavit*, and *ibid.*: *ut gratiam Marianorum militum pararet legem tulit ut veteranis centena agri jugera in Africa dividerentur*); Cicero, *pro Balbo*, 48.

10. The choice of the battle field seems to prove that, for the moment, they considered the land occupied by the invading Cimbri as Cimbric territory, and, accordingly, by virtue of the victory, as Roman. This is a strange doctrine, but not at all unusual for a Marius, who confessed that "in the din of battle the feeble voice of the law was not always audible." Metellus went into exile rather than support such a doctrine. Eporedia: Strabo, IV, 205; Pliny, *N. H.* III, 6, 80, *Marianam a C. Mario deductam*, a colony in Corsica.

11. *Lex annalis*, by a tribune in 180; Plut. *Cat. Maior*, 8; Livy, XL, 44; Livy, *Epit.* LVI: *vetat quemquam iterum consulem fieri*; Cato, *Orat.* (Jordan), XXXVI.

12. Livy, *Epit.* 68; Obsequens, 104, gives the year as 102 B.C. For the province, see Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*, I, 379. The Asiatic system of taxgathering was in vogue in Cilicia in Cicero's day, but was probably introduced by Pompey in 63.

13. See Marquardt, *Staatsverw.* I, 459. A generation later (74) Cyrene became a province, and a few years later Crete was annexed and placed under Cyrene's governor.

CHAPTER XIV

COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION

WE have repeatedly referred to the contention that commercial and capitalistic interests played an important rôle in shaping Rome's foreign policy during the second century B.C. Mommsen¹ and Colin took cognizance of these interests in explaining the war of 200 B.C. Wilamowitz refers the attack upon Rhodes in 167 to the "treacherous tradesman's politics of Rome." We have already quoted Mahaffy's belief that the "commercial monopolist" of Rome secured the destruction of Carthage. "In the treatment of Corinth," says Mommsen, "mercantile selfishness had shown itself more powerful than all philhellenism." Such authoritative statements cannot be disregarded, and we have only postponed consideration of them for the sake of gathering the scattered evidence together and reviewing it in the light of related facts.

In the first place, the reasons for assuming an extensive Roman maritime commerce during the early republic do not bear examination. They are usually based upon Livy's statement that in the seventh century B.C. a maritime colony was planted at Ostia to serve as a Roman port, and upon inferences drawn from Rome's early commercial treaties with Carthage. The historian should have been warned by the nature of Ostia's position, its government, and its cults that it could not have been as old as Livy would have it; as a matter of fact, the excavator² is proving that its earliest remains do not date before the third century B.C. We know that the Tiber so loaded its lower course with silt that transmarine merchandise bound for Rome had to be transferred from the larger ships into barges or warehouses at the mouth of the river, and for

this a well-equipped harbor was necessary. The establishment of a late date for the Ostian port, therefore, compels us to revise our conception of Rome's shipping.

The usual inferences drawn from the early Punic-Roman treaties also need revision.³ The date and substance of the first treaty, given by Polybius (III, 22), are still under dispute, but the second treaty (Pol. III, 24), which dates from about 348 B.C., can safely be used. This treaty forbids the Romans to traffic or found cities in any part of northern Africa, southern Spain, and Sardinia; in fact, it pronounces all the Carthaginian ports, except those of Sicily and Carthage proper, as *mare clausum*. And yet it stipulates for Carthage unlimited trading rights on all Roman territory and forbids the Carthaginians nothing except acquisition of land in Latium. Finally, it requires that injuries done to individual citizens of either party while trading shall be referred for settlement to the government of the injured person.

There is not the slightest doubt that this treaty is one-sided, securing full privileges for the Punic trader while affirming the old doctrine of *mare clausum* against Rome. Apparently it was drawn up by the old trading state⁴ in her own interests, and was accepted by the then insignificant Roman state because the latter had little concern in foreign trade. It is not reasonable to suppose that the Romans would have signed away an equity in the Mediterranean trade if they either had or cared to have any. In fact, at about this same time Rome, with similar negligence, promised Tarentum that no Roman ships should sail as far as the Tarentine Gulf. In short, the treaty shows Rome to be the merest novice in commercial politics, ready to accept for the sake of friendly relations any and every limitation upon whatever Roman commerce might arise.

If further evidence of the fact that the early Romans avoided the seas were needed, there is the additional testimony of archæology. It has been found, for example, that although the early tombs of the Etruscan towns near by are store chambers of Oriental and Egyptian wares, Roman

tombs ⁵ of the same period show no such evidences of extensive trading. The foreign articles found in these Roman tombs were brought by Sicilian and Massaliot passers-by. And this evidence agrees with the fact ⁶ so often pointed out that none of the technical naval terms employed by the Romans except those relating to the simplest parts of small craft are of Latin extraction. They have all been borrowed from the Doric Greek and were picked up from the vocabulary of Sicilian merchants. Apparently the passages in later Roman historians which refer to an early seaport at Ostia and to an extensive commerce are to be attributed to patriotic megalomaniacs who represented the state and pomp of Romulus and King Marcius in terms more appropriate to Augustus' day. Even Ostia remained only a small village throughout the republic. Not till 42 A.D. was the sand bar in front of the Tiber's mouth dredged and jetties built so that laden seafaring vessels could anchor in still water. In the meantime the most serviceable port of Rome was Puteoli, nearly 150 miles away. Does this imply that shippers had a strong lobby in the Roman senate?

Let us now examine a number of political measures adopted during the last two centuries of the republic which have frequently been interpreted as implying the existence of a mercantile policy in the Roman senate, for it is largely upon these that historians have relied in blaming commercialism for deeds like the subjection of Greece, the destruction of Corinth, and the annexation of Carthage.

1. The senate passed a bill ⁷ defining the status of the Ambracians after their subjection in 189 in which the stipulation was made that Romans and Italians should have free entry at the port of Ambracia. It is usual to infer from this sole instance that the senate regularly included a clause in its treaties with subject allies requiring exemption from port dues in order to gain advantages for Roman trade. There are, however, several specific facts militating against this generalization and none, to my knowledge, favoring it. There are in existence several treaties, including the very important ones with Carthage (201 B.C.), Philip (196 B.C.),

and Antiochus (189 B.C.), none of which contain this clause. Egypt quite certainly did not grant any such privilege, for the Ptolemaic system of monopolies would preclude such a practice. The treaty with the Termessians,⁸ 71 B.C., which explicitly grants transit to tax collectors, says nothing of others; and from a passage in Cicero⁹ it is certain that not even the governor of Sicily enjoyed the freedom of the Sicilian port either in Roman cities or in allied towns like Messana and Halaesa. It is safe to say, therefore, that the early treaty with Ambracia contained an exceptional rather than a normal stipulation. But even granting that such a stipulation may have been inserted in several other treaties, it is difficult to understand how it would aid Roman commerce to any appreciable extent, since it would grant the same privileges to the traders of a score of other Italian towns, partly Latin, partly Greek.

2. In Cicero¹⁰ we hear of another peculiar measure which has also been used in support of the view that the senate was swayed by a commercial policy. Some time before 130 B.C. Rome seems to have specified in her dealings with a Transalpine tribe that the latter should refrain from the cultivation of wine and oil. The younger Africanus is represented as saying that the purpose of this measure was to aid the Roman fruit-grower. Modern writers¹¹ have added that it would also aid the Roman carrier. Now, before 130, a Roman army had fought battles in Transalpine Gaul only once, and that was at the request of Rome's most loyal ally, Marseilles. When the war had been successfully ended and a treaty signed, — the terms of which were naturally dictated by Marseilles, — the Romans withdrew. Marseilles was a wine-growing state, and if a market for wine was created in Gaul, she naturally profited. A copy of the treaty was of course carried to Rome, since her legions had secured the victory, and its purpose may well have been misunderstood by later Romans, but we need not doubt that Marseilles and the Gauls were the real contracting parties. Had the Romans intended to create a market for their own produce by legislation, why did they never pass measures affecting

Spain, Greece, Africa, and Asia, which were actual rivals in such products?

3. The clause¹² in the Macedonian constitutions of 167 forbidding the importation of salt and the exportation of timber has also no reference to Roman commerce. We know from several sources¹³ that the Macedonian kings had regularly supported a timber monopoly, forbidding all exportation without special consent. Apparently the chief forests, like the mines, were crown-lands. Now, when Rome fell heir to these royal forests and mines in 167, the senate was not at once ready to decide what final disposition to make of them. It hesitated to take full possession and place state contractors in charge, since their presence, as a visible indication of overlordship, would cause undue trouble.¹⁴ It therefore permitted the Macedonian contractors to work the iron and copper mines at half the former revenue, closed the other mines for the time being, and simply — also for the time being — reënacted the old royal prohibition on the exportation of timber. In 158 it sent state contractors to open and work the closed mines, and probably at the same time leased the royal timber lands. The provision against the importation of salt can, in the light of this, only mean that the senate found a royal monopoly of salt also, and, in behalf of the Macedonian state treasuries, reëstablished the monopoly and gave it over to the new states. The senate then protected its gift by continuing the stipulation against imports. To be sure, we have no direct reference to a previous monopoly in salt in Macedonia, but the assumption that there was one seems justifiable, since we know that all the other Hellenic powers¹⁵ which succeeded Alexander established such monopolies.

4. There is one more regulation which bears, in the view of some authorities, the earmarks of mercantilism. From the fact that, in 169 B.C., Rhodes asked the senate's permission to buy grain in Sicily,¹⁶ it is usual to draw the inference that the senate somehow controlled the Sicilian grain market. Was this supervision undertaken so as to control the import that might flood the markets needed by Roman landlords,

or was it undertaken in order to secure shipping for Roman merchants? Both suggestions have been made, but neither is in accord with the senatorial policy of this time. The real purpose of this supervision so far as it existed was political, not commercial, and is best illustrated by Hellenic precedents. When we remember that Rome, when hard pressed for food during the Hannibalic war, was compelled to ask Ptolemy's permission before corn could be bought in Egypt, we can understand where the senate found its precedent and why it adopted the regulation. Ptolemy¹⁷ had accumulated great stores of corn from his tribute and was therefore able by controlling the Egyptian markets not only to secure a market for the royal stores, but also to gain a certain amount of political prestige through his power to aid friends and injure enemies. From an inscription we may infer that the Seleucids in Syria pursued the same policy, and we have recently learned that the little republic of Samos bought for public use the semipublic temple-tithes of the island. Of all these practices the senate doubtless had heard, and of others besides, concerning which we now know nothing. It could see that a real political power lay in so controlling the corn market that the purchaser must ask the sovereign's permission to buy. It could see that corn production was dwindling in Italy and that the state might be made helpless in times of war, unless, like the Eastern monarchs, it could control a surplus. In the East the control had been established partly for the personal profit of the king; when the practice was adopted at Rome, it served a political purpose only, for the state never attempted to sell the grain at a profit. Nor are we justified in drawing very sweeping conclusions from one passage. We know only that the Sicilian grain market was controlled by Rome in 169, a year of war. Since we have no other reference to such closure, we may well doubt whether the regulation was continued for an extended time. In Cicero's day Sicilian ports were apparently open to all traders.¹⁸

We have now reviewed all the evidence that can be cited in favor of commercial influences in republican politics. In

the several treaties of the early part of the second century we find that there is no special privilege for the Roman trader. The treaty with Antiochus safeguards the commercial privileges of the Rhodians, but asks nothing more. In 167 the royal monopoly of salt is confirmed to the Macedonian republics. In 154 Marseilles was able by the aid of Roman support to free her wine market from the competition of a hostile Gallic tribe. Rome guaranteed the strength of the treaty by her signature, but the wording of it was dictated by the Greek city. The Ambracian treaty is the only one in which special commercial privileges were exacted, and these were accorded to the numerous Italian rivals of Rome as fully as to the Roman traders. On the other hand, the Termessian treaty and the Sicilian regulations mentioned by Cicero sustain the view that Rome seldom asked subject-allies for the freedom of the port in behalf of her merchants.

Supporting this positive evidence, there is the solid authority of the republic's failure to adopt a number of measures that might effectively have aided her merchants if she had desired to favor them. Rome might, for instance, have put an end to Carthage's policy of closing Punic ports either in 241 or in 201. But nothing of the kind was done. Africa remained closed ground until Carthage fell in 146, if we may believe Fenestella.¹⁹ Furthermore, during the republic we hear of no export and import prohibitions regarding Italy such as are shown by the occasional enactments of Athens, no differential tariffs such as appear during the empire, no new commercial monopolies such as were at times created in the Hellenic world, no direct encouragement of harbor improvements by subsidies and insurances such as the Emperor Claudius later introduced. In view of these facts the historian can hardly continue to hand on the conventional statements that the commercial lobby of Rome directed the foreign policies of the senate in the second century B.C., much less that it secured the destruction of Corinth and Carthage.

When Carthage fell, no Roman harbor was provided in

Africa. Utica, a free city, inherited Carthage's commerce, and even handled the produce of the Italian farmers who settled in Africa. When Corinth was destroyed, the Delian harbor profited, to be sure, but, as we shall presently see, Delos was a port already filled with Greek, Syrian, Egyptian, and South-Italian merchants, and these enjoyed the full privileges of the port as much as did the Romans. Cæsar was the first Roman statesman who formed comprehensive plans to further Roman commerce; but, as he fell before these plans could be executed, the task had to await the patronage of Claudius. Then can one speak of state encouragement of commerce at Rome.

The supposed mercantilism of the last two centuries of the republic thus disappears under examination. Apparently the state was not greatly interested in foreign trade. Can we determine the extent and importance of this trade? There is no ancient estimate now in existence, and yet we are not left wholly to conjecture. The best indications are to be found in the recently excavated inscriptions of the famous island-city of Delos. Since the city was never rebuilt after its destruction by Mithradates in 88, its numerous inscriptions have lain undisturbed in the ruins until the present day; and since Strabo informs us that it was the center of the Roman foreign trade during the republic, we may in some measure restore the history of that commerce from these inscriptions.

Now, these inscriptions at once prove that the Romans were late comers at Delos, that in fact they were not at all a vital element in the Ægean trade during the days when the Roman state was spreading its political influence through the East. During that period the mercantile associations of the Orient predominate at Delos. Syrian cults had entered the island early in the second century,²⁰ and Syrian mercantile societies erected dedications there from 160 on. No. 2271 of the Corpus of Greek Inscriptions is a decree of the "synod of Tyrian merchants" dating from 153, and Roussel²¹ gives a collection of inscriptions of the merchants' association (Poseidoniastæ) of Beirut, Syria, from the second

half of the century. Egyptians entered Delos even earlier. Temples to their deities existed there in the third century, and their inscriptions, some of which go back to the third century,²² have come to light by the score. In the latter half of the second century, when Alexandrian merchantmen came in even greater numbers, new temples were raised to Egyptian gods.²³ Other tablets recording honors and gifts show an influx of Easterners from a dozen different cities soon after Delos was made a free port in 167. The cities most frequently mentioned are Alexandria, Antioch, Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Aradus, Ascalon, Heraclea, and other cities of the Pontic sea. It is the peoples from these places who gained most when in 167 Rome declared Delos a free port and when in 146 Corinth fell.

Occidentals, however, are by no means absent. In fact, before the end of the second century they seem to predominate, and though they are called "Romans" by the Greeks ("Italici" by themselves), a close examination of their names²⁴ reveals the fact that a very small percentage of them were Romans. The greater number of those whose birthplace is indicated on inscriptions came from Naples, Velia, Syracuse, Heraclea, Tarentum, and Ancona; that is, from Greek cities allied to Rome. The Italian names that occur are very largely such as are found, not at or near Rome, but in inscriptions of Campania and southern Italy. In other words, the merchants and shippers, the bankers and money lenders, who followed the Roman flag eastward, were men who came from the old mercantile cities of southern Italy, cities which, when allied to Rome, were able to extend their field of operation under the protecting power of this all-dominating ally. No clearer evidence could be needed to prove that Roman citizens had very little interest in maritime commerce, or to confute the oft-repeated statement that it was the Roman commercial interests engaged in Eastern trade which brought about the humiliation of Rhodes and the destruction of Carthage and Corinth.

These conclusions are supported by the distressing record of the state's neglect to keep the seas clear of pirates. Rhodes

had formerly policed the Eastern seas to protect her commerce, but found herself unable to bear this burden after the loss of her independence. Piracy flourished disgracefully at the end of the second century B.C., and the senate then made a half-hearted effort to suppress it. This work, however, was not thoroughly done until the year 67, when Pompey was assigned to the task. Meanwhile, even the Roman port of Ostia had been sacked by these Eastern buccaneers. One can hardly understand this remissness except upon the assumption that the traders in the provinces were looked upon at home as a somewhat low class of adventurers²⁵ who had little connection with the vital interests of the state, and it is certainly incorrect in view of the slight attention paid to this most pressing of their needs to suppose that they exerted any considerable influence upon the policies of the senate.

If one is inclined to wonder why trade was slow to "follow the flag" during the century of growing political prestige, a reference to census statistics may be of interest. The following record of citizens is taken from Livy, the estimate of acreage of purely Roman territory from Beloch's²⁶ careful reckoning:—

<i>Year</i>	<i>Citizens</i>	<i>Acreage</i>
203 B.C.	214,000	6,700,000
193	243,000	9,200,000
173	269,000	13,700,000
168	312,000	"
163	337,000	"
153	324,000	"
141	327,000	"
135	317,000	"

It will be seen that in the thirty years after Zama the number of citizens increased only 25 per cent, while the Roman acreage in Italy increased over 100 per cent. Whence could the capital have come in the poverty-stricken state to develop this enormous increase of land? We know now that neither sufficient men nor funds were forthcoming. The first in-

crease of about 2,500,000 acres resulted from the state's appropriation of the South-Italian country which had been so thoroughly devastated by the last years of the war. Along the coast of this territory the state planted a string of small citizen-colonies as a military measure when an invasion by Antiochus seemed imminent. But except for these settlements, little was done in the south. Even the fertile Campanian land which fell to the state in 210 was so neglected that squatters seized large portions of it.²⁷ The north needed more immediate development. Along the Po the state was busy punishing Gallic tribes that had aided Hannibal. As fast as the offenders were pacified or driven out, it was necessary to plant citizen-colonies in order to assure permanent success. The lands of the north were far richer and more inviting to settlers than those of the south, and they could not easily be held unless colonized. We cannot doubt that for thirty years all the available capital and colonists were sent northward. What became of the southern public lands we may infer from the agrarian legislation proposed by the Gracchi later. Since the state could find no buyers or renters for them, it simply permitted chance squatters and ranchers to use them, asked no uncomfortable questions, and even neglected the records. Some cattle grazers who had gone through the formality of leasing the five hundred jugera allowed by law gradually increased their holdings when they discovered that the adjacent lands were still unoccupied. It will be remembered how in Gracchan days the descendants of these same squatters were compelled to surrender the surplusage, despite their appeal to vested rights, and how the democrats who then wanted lands for colonization could not understand why the senate had ever pursued so reckless a policy as to disregard the state's titles to its public lands. The explanation, of course, lies in the fact that from 200 to about 160 the land market was so enormously glutted that the senate saw no reason for asserting its title. From this it will readily be understood why with all the available capital thus invested in lands for at least half a century after the Punic war there was so little at hand for commerce. In

fact, it is generally true that Rome's rapid territorial expansion throughout the republican period constantly opened up a market for real-estate investments in advance of capitalistic needs and as constantly attracted Roman capital away from industry and commerce.

It is interesting to note that at the end of the republican period when the Mediterranean commerce finally began to be concentrated in the hands of Roman citizens, these citizen-tradesmen were chiefly of foreign extraction, not members of the old Roman stock. Very many of them bear Greek and Græco-Syrian *cognomina*, which means that ex-slaves and their sons had become the merchants of Rome.²⁸ The explanation of this fact is not far to seek. We know that the enormous loss of life throughout Italy during the Hannibalic war depleted both shop and farm to such an extent that a great many Eastern slaves were imported to work the industrial machinery of Italy. When later the exploitation of provincial resources invited thousands of Roman citizens to emigrate, the economic vacuum was again filled by new importations of slaves. These clever Easterners were employed by their masters in all kinds of lucrative occupations at which the slaves might make their own profits. They were placed in bakeshops, shoeshops, and wine booths, in the stalls of the vegetable and the fish markets. There was nothing they could not do. It is not surprising to find that a thrifty slave could save enough to buy his liberty in eight years. Slaves in personal service were frequently set free by generous owners who put them into business and shared profits with them on a partnership basis. These are the people who were handling Rome's merchandise at the seaports of Italy. They came originally from trading and seafaring people. Thrift, cleverness, and fidelity were the qualities which gained them their liberty, and these were the same qualities which soon turned them into successful merchants and shipowners. They had little difficulty in outstripping the Romans in these occupations, for the Roman was always a landlubber. In the late empire the only rivals with whom they disputed the traffic of the seas were the

descendants of their own ancestors, the Syrians of the East.²⁹

In reviewing the status of Roman commerce during the last two centuries of the republic, then, we have found that at first the Italians who lived near the Greek seaport towns of southern Italy were actively engaged in the Mediterranean trade. Roman citizens did not gain importance there until after 130, when they began to exploit their new province of Asia. These citizens, however, always lovers of *terra firma*, gradually drifted into capitalistic enterprises on land, leaving the freedmen of Oriental and Greek stock in Italy and their sons to gain control of the shipping. In the light of these facts we can readily comprehend the attitude of indifference that the senate regularly assumed toward commerce.

Thus far we have dealt only with the commercial classes that were concerned in carrying Rome's imports and exports. Quite apart from these, there grew up a strong group of capitalistic firms that acted indirectly as the state's agents in many of its financial transactions. These were the associations of *publicani*, whose members were usually *equites*, the nobility of wealth at Rome. Because of its theory of magistracies, Rome could not well create a permanent treasury department capable of collecting all the state revenues and directing the execution of public works; accordingly, it had to let contracts to firms of private citizens for the performance of all such tasks. Obviously the firms that thrived upon these works were directly interested in the size of Rome's revenues and disbursements, and accordingly in the growth of the empire that necessarily increased their profitable operations. The question arises whether this interest converted itself into an effort to influence the state in favor of expansion, and if so at what period.

The *locus classicus* for a discussion³⁰ of this question is a passage in Polybius' description of the Roman constitution, which was written about 140 B.C.³¹

"In like manner the people on its part is far from being independent of the Senate, and is bound to take its wishes into account both collectively and individually. For con-

tracts, too numerous to count, are given out by the censors in all parts of Italy for the repairs or construction of public buildings; there is also the collection of revenue from many rivers, harbors, gardens, mines, and land — everything,³² in a word, that comes under the control of the Roman government: and in all these the people³³ at large are engaged; so that there is scarcely a man, so to speak, who is not interested either as a contractor or as being employed in the works. For some purchase the contracts from the censors themselves; and others go partners with them; while others again go security for these contractors, or actually pledge their property to the treasury for them. Now over all these transactions the senate has absolute control. It can grant an extension of time; and in case of unforeseen accident can relieve the contractors from a portion of their obligation, or release them from it altogether, if they are absolutely unable to fulfil it."

Without belittling the importance of this passage, one must nevertheless indicate the inadequacy of the historian as a witness in the matter. Polybius left his native Greek village at a time when the wealthiest man in Greece was not worth \$300,000 and when the state budgets of the several Greek states were mere bagatelles. Nothing so astonished him at Rome as the sums of money dealt with there. Rome's budget — in his day about \$5,000,000 — now seems a trifle for a world-state, but to him it was enormous, and it is not surprising that he should have overemphasized the importance of the state's operations. Moreover, Polybius in this passage is developing his favorite political philosophy that the ideal constitution is composed of a system of "checks and balances." He is attempting to prove that Rome's great success is due to her possession of a Polybian constitution, and he accordingly strains his material to fit his system. To make the three sides of his triangle exert an even pull, not only must the consuls check the senate, but the senate must check the people. It is very doubtful, however, whether any one unacquainted with Polybius' theory of this endless chain of control would have discovered

the enormous dependence of the people on the senate that so impressed him.

As an indication of the amount of influence exerted by capital and its interests, let us try to measure the extent of the operations in which they were engaged. Before the Punic wars *publicani* were needed at Rome for the collection of port and pasture dues and perhaps of the rent of public lands when any existed. The citizen-tribute was apparently paid to the treasury without intermediary. In those days *publicani* were necessary to the state, but they had no control over any large funds. The conquest of Sicily extended their field of operation to the collection of port and pasture dues upon the island, but it is noteworthy that they made little or no effort to bid for the tithe-gathering there. In 214, during the Hannibalic war, they were publicly asked to supply — on credit — provisions for the army in Spain. Nineteen publicans, members of three firms, responded to this request, making the condition that the state insure their cargoes.³⁴ Later several firms offered to execute on credit the public works that would be needed until the war should end.³⁵ These are the first references we possess to firms of publicans. After the war we do not often hear of them, although we know that expensive public works were occasionally let.

In order to form an estimate of the amount involved in the annual operations of these firms, we must try to determine what part of the annual budget passed through their hands in dues and contracts. In the year 63 B.C. we hear that the treasury had an income ³⁶ of about \$10,000,000. In 150 B.C. we may fairly estimate it at half of that, or less, since the state had not then acquired its most profitable provinces of Asia and Africa nor the tribute of several Greek cities which became stipendiary during the Mithradatic war. Of this hypothetical \$5,000,000, the Roman publicans did not collect half, for the Spanish, the Sardinian, and the Macedonian stipends were paid directly, while the Sicilian tithes were still gathered by native collectors. There probably passed through the hands of the publicans at this time in port and

pasture dues, fishing licenses, and occasional mining contracts an average of about \$2,000,000 per annum. Furthermore, some of the firms also engaged in public works, road building, the construction of walls, sewers, aqueducts, and the like. For such matters the senate of the second century usually appropriated a fifth ³⁷ or a tenth of the year's income; that is, from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000. In the rest of the expenditures — practically all for military purposes — the publicans seldom had any share, for the military quaestor usually managed the finances of the army, receiving the requisite appropriation directly from the treasury.

We may safely conclude, therefore, that the annual sum in the hands of the *publicani* both for collections and contracts did not on the average reach \$4,000,000. If we estimate ³⁸ that there were about 20,000 *equites* in the year 150, with an average census of \$20,000 each, — a low estimate, — we have a private capital of \$400,000,000 in the hands of the *equites* alone. In other words, the public contracts at that time involved only 1 per cent of the possessions of the *equites*. The total area of *ager Romanus* at this time was about 14,000,000 acres, which at the average price of unimproved lands given by Columella ³⁹ (fifty dollars per jugera) would mean a thousand million dollars in soil value alone, even if we take no account of investments in land of the allies. It must be evident that throughout the middle of the century the one all-absorbing field for investment was Italian land, and that in proportion to the amount devoted to this field the capital engaged in state contracts before the Gracchan legislation was insignificant. Had the tax-farming firms been looking for a more extended field of operation, they could readily have competed for the collection of Sicilian tithes, and the slight inconvenience of employing an agent in Sicily would scarcely have deterred them from doing so if they had been very eager for such state contracts. We must conclude, therefore, that before the Gracchan period the *equites* were hardly so deeply involved in public finances as to be seriously concerned about the problem of territorial expansion. The attempt so persistently made to explain

second-century wars by reference to the supposed machinations of the knights has no foundation in our sources or in any accurate understanding of the knights' position in the economic world of that day.⁴⁰

It cannot be denied, however, that the knights did become a strong political power in the first century, and it was the Gracchan revenue law of 123 which opened the way for their ultimate high position. This law gave them contracts which at once doubled the amount of their operations for the state. But what benefited them even more were the incidental profits derived from these new contracts. After collecting the Asiatic grain, for example, they could hold it for winter prices and thus double their gains. They could carry the taxes of delinquent cities at usurious rates of interest. Individuals engaged in these operations in Asia found rich opportunities for investing in lands and industries. And the lessons they learned in Asia they applied elsewhere. Not only did they now enter the Sicilian field of tithe-gathering, but individual investors connected with the public firms overran all the provinces in search of bargains and profits. Furthermore, Gracchus had given dignity to the firms by bestowing political privileges upon the class as a whole. Henceforth the economic interests of the firms found a respectable champion in a compact, ennobled body that occupied a definite place in the state's machinery. Within a few years the voice of the knights can be heard favoring the suppression of devastating wars. In the days of Pompey, they even went one step farther. Then they demanded that the Great General be put in charge of the Eastern war, because they had reason to believe that he favored the forcible annexation of Syria and would be willing to expose it to the tender mercies of the lucrative contract system.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV

¹ See Mommsen, *Rom. Hist.* (Eng. tr. 1900) III, 238, 274, 295, 415, 421; Colin, *Rome et la Grèce*, p. 90 et passim; Wilamowitz, *Staat und Gesell. der Griechen*, p. 182: *die perfide Kaufmannspolitik der Römer*; Mommsen, *Rom. Prov.* (Eng. tr.) I, p. 279; see also, Heitland, *The*

Roman Republic, II, pp. 156, 157, 165; Ferrero, *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, I, pp. 20 and 38; Speck's very unreliable *Handels-geschichte des Altertums*, *passim*. One welcome exception to the general belief is found in Kahrstedt, *Geschichte der Karthager von 218-146*, p. 616: Nirgends in der guten antiken Literatur ist das bezeugt, was die Modernen, selbst Mommsen, als Grund der Zerstörung Karthagos angeben, die merkantile Eifersucht der italischen Grosskaufmannschaft. A part of the present chapter is reprinted from the *Am. Hist. Review*, XVIII, p. 233 ff.

² Taylor, *Cults of Ostia*, p. 2.

³ See Mommsen, *Rom. Hist.* (Eng. tr.), II, 48.

⁴ Täubler, *Imperium Romanum*, p. 264, lends support to this interpretation of the treaty by observing that its form is Carthaginian, not Roman. The clauses requiring the surrender of the site of a plundered city and the submission of private disputes to public settlement do not elsewhere occur in Roman treaties.

⁵ *Monumenti Antichi*, vol. XV (1905).

⁶ Saalfeld, *Italogaeca*.

⁷ Livy, XXXVIII, 44. The phrase *socii nominis Latini* of course includes all Italian allies (Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, III, 661). *Ac* is understood. The inferences usually drawn from this passage are found in Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, III, 691.

⁸ Bruns, *Fontes*, p. 94.

⁹ Cicero, *Verr.*, II, 185.

¹⁰ *De Rep.* III, 16.

¹¹ Mommsen's view of this passage, expressed in *Roman History*, III, 415, is usually adopted, but Polybius, XXXIII, 11, says that the Gauls gave their hostages to Marseilles, not to Rome. Speck (*Handels-geschichte*) enumerates similar prohibitions that are mentioned in the late imperial codices, but they cannot be used as evidence for the republic. Neither should he use the testimony of the Plautine comedy which is translated from the Greek. Rome's temporary prohibition of interstate trade in Macedonia and Achæa was imposed in order to break up political unity. As soon as this purpose was accomplished, the prohibition was withdrawn. This old practice never had an economic purpose.

¹² Livy, XLV, 29. Niese, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten*, III, 181, says: "Der Sinn dieser Bestimmung ist unklar." Heitland, II, 120, "Perhaps it in some way favored operations of Roman capitalists." Speck has no doubts about the purpose of the prohibition, vol. III, pt. 2, p. 349.

¹³ Diodorus, XX, 46; Andocides, *Return*, 11.

¹⁴ This is the meaning of Livy's original, which he, in the spirit of his own time, puts thus (XLV, 18): "Ubi publicanus esset, ibi . . . libertatem sociis nullam esse."

¹⁵ See Rostowzew, "Staatspacht," *Philologus*, Suppl. IX, p. 411.

¹⁶ Polyb. XXVIII, 2. For the usual interpretation, see Rostowzew, art. *Frumentum*, 130, in Pauly-Wissowa.

¹⁷ On Egypt, see Rostowzew in Pauly-Wissowa *Reallex. s.v. Frumentum* VII, 139; on Syria, Köhler, *Sitz. Akad. Berlin*, 1898, p. 841. The Samian decree is discussed by Wilamowitz in *Sitz. Akad. Berlin*, 1904, p. 917.

¹⁸ Cicero, *Verr. V*, 145, *quaecumque navis ex Asia, quae ex Syria, quae Tyro, quae Alexandria venerat*. Cf. *ibid.* 157.

¹⁹ Peter, *Hist. Rom. Fr.* p. 273, *nullo commercio inter Italicos et Afros nisi post deletam Karthaginem coepto*.

²⁰ *Bulletin de Corr. Hellénique*, VI, 295.

²¹ *Ibid.* XXXI, 335-377 (1907).

²² *Ibid.* XXXII, 397 (1908).

²³ Ferguson, *Klio*, VII, 226 (1907); *id. Hellenistic Athens*, ch. IX.

²⁴ Fortunately the complete list of Italic inscriptions at Delos is now available in Hatzfeld, *Les Italiens résidant à Délos* (*Bull. Corr. Hell.* 1912). It bears out the argument set forth in the *Classical Journal*, 1910, p. 99, that the Romans had but a small part in the trade of Delos before 130 B.C., and corrects once and for all the erroneous conclusions of Homolle (*Bull. Corr. Hell.* VIII).

Some of the important facts now proved by the four or five hundred Italic names listed from Delos are as follows: There was no *conventus civium Romanorum* at Delos so far as we know. There were only clubs of *Italici*. The club of Hermaistæ dates from about 150 B.C.; a club of Poseidoniastæ and one of Apolloniastæ date from about 130. These three clubs contained freeborn men and freedmen, Romans, Latins, Italic allies, and southern Greeks alike, that is to say, all *Italici*. There was also a club of Competaliastæ consisting of Italian slaves and freedmen. We know, furthermore, of a club of oil merchants, *olearii*, the members of which came mainly from Velia, Heraclea, and other cities of Magna Græcia.

No inscription bears the Latin title *Romanus*; the title *Italici* is the regular one on the Latin inscriptions. About twenty names on Greek inscriptions bear the designation *Ῥωμαῖος*, but this word is loosely used by the Greeks as a translation of *Italicus*; several who bear the name are demonstrably not Roman citizens, e.g. *Ἀχιλλεύς Ἡρακλείδης Πέττιος*, Maraius Gerillanus, *Σέρδων* and *Σωτίων*. Only one of the twenty can be proved to be a citizen of Rome, and that by the fact that on one inscription he gives his birthplace as Lanuvium, a Roman municipality. Most of the rest have names which, like Babullius, Pactumeius, Sehius, and Staius, point to the south of Italy. Only two names at Delos attest Roman citizenship by the addition of the Roman tribus, — these are Orbius and Attiolenus, both on relatively late inscriptions.

Hatzfeld also dates the building of the Italian Agora at about 100 B.C., instead of 130 B.C., which was Homolle's date.

²⁵ Among the occupations called *illiberales et sordidi* is *mercatura, si tenuis est*, Cic. *de Off.* I, 150; if conducted on a large scale it is not so discreditable, *non est admodum vituperanda*.

²⁶ *Italische Bund* (1880), and *Bevölkerung der Griech.-Röm. Welt* (1886). The hectare = almost $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres; the acre is a trifle over $1\frac{1}{2}$ jugera.

The decrease in population between 160 and 130 is partly due to a new standard of living that accompanied the influx of wealth and Greek ideas, and partly to the fact that after the public lands had been occupied, the small farmer who was giving way to the plantation owner did not attempt to preëempt a new homestead, but sought his fortune in the provinces. With the Gracchan realloiments the census figures took a decided bound upwards again.

²⁷ Livy, XLII, 19.

²⁸ Parvan, *Die Nationalität der Kaufleute* (1909).

²⁹ Scheffer-Boichorst, *Zur Geschichte der Syrer im Abendlande*.

³⁰ See especially Heitland's index under "Capitalists, influence of, on Roman policy," with his forty-one references; Deloume, *Les Manieurs d'Argent à Rome, passim*; Greenidge, *A History of Rome*, pp. 44 ff.; Ferrero, *passim*; et al. Most writers have exaggerated the influence of the capitalist of the second century.

³¹ Polybius, VI, 17.

³² This is of course not quite correct. The tributes and tithes of Sicily, Spain, Sardinia, Macedonia, and Africa were collected by the natives in various ways and paid directly to the treasury.

³³ Here again Polybius is misleading. In the public works the firms employed little free labor. Slaves did most of the work, and they of course had no political influence. We should also note that the most extensive piece of work in the days of Polybius, the great Marcian aqueduct, was not let out to these firms. The ædiles took charge of the work and assigned it in some 3000 small lots to individuals. It would seem that the regular contracting firms were not capable of handling so large a task.

³⁴ Livy, XXIII, 49, 3.

³⁵ *Ibid.* XXIV, 18.

³⁶ This figure is assured by a combination of Plutarch, *Pompey*, 45, and Cicero, *Pro Sestio*, 55. Ptolemy's income from Egypt about the same time was about three fourths this sum (Diodorus, XVII, 52). For the sake of comparison we may note that the Gallic tribute was about \$2,000,000 under Augustus, that of Asia about \$1,500,000 under Hadrian. Sicily's tithe in 70 B.C. was worth about \$450,000, if we accept from Cicero, *Verr.* III, 163, the average price of three sesterces per modius of wheat, or about sixty cents per bushel.

³⁷ Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung*, II, 87.

³⁸ The knight's minimum census was probably lower in 150 than the 400,000 HS. required by law in the first century. But our estimate is hardly too high for an average. Crassus, the consul of 130, considered the richest man of his day, was worth 100,000,000 HS. I have also estimated the number of knights. In the census of 234, there were 19,000 Roman knights in a citizen-population of 270,000. Since the citizen-census of 153 showed a population of 324,000, our number is probably fair.

³⁹ Columella, III, 3. Land was doubtless cheaper in 150 B.C., especially since so much colonization had recently taken place then. Some of the Roman land was of course not arable, yet on the whole it included the choicest parts of Italy. The estimate may go for what it is worth. Columella, at any rate, doubles the value when the land is planted with vines.

⁴⁰ Of the many Italians that Mithradates found in Asia in the year 88, the greater part were doubtless from southern Italy, if we may draw inferences from the situation at Delos. There, at least, five of the six *τραπέδιται* were from Magna Græcia. See *B. C. H.* (1912), p. 142.

CHAPTER XV

CONSEQUENCES OF LAISSEZ FAIRE

IN the year 90 the Italian allies of Rome attempted to secede from the federation, and Rome had to pay in costly bloodshed for her long neglect of those who had supported her so loyally in the great wars. The Italian, or so-called "Social," war involved no new acquisitions of territory, but it was itself an effect of Rome's expansion, and it indirectly resulted in wars which ultimately led to further expansion.

The federal scheme devised after 340 contemplated, at least *in posse*, a progressive Romanization of the central part of Italy. For a century and a half the senate followed that scheme in the most liberal spirit until most of the Aurunci, Hernici, Æqui, Picentes, Sabines, and parts of other tribes were full citizens of Rome. Incorporation seems to have progressed as rapidly as the Italians desired it, perhaps in some instances even more rapidly, for there were cities near Rome which took pride in remaining legally the "equals" of the great imperial city.¹ It is well-nigh amazing that Tibur and Præneste, for instance, only twenty miles from the walls of Rome, were "independent states" when Rome was supreme from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea!

However, the ever increasing growth of the state led to an impatient disregard of the rights of weak Italian allies. The consuls, the senate, and the populace, grown accustomed to rule vast dominions, meted out imperious decrees to their old friends in the Italian federation, as they did to slippery princes on the borders of the empire. The just grievances of the Italians accumulated rapidly during the second century. Their officers and soldiers were often assigned to the more disagreeable military duties. Their proportion of troops frequently outnumbered the fair quota. The meaner or smaller portions of conquered land and booty

often fell to them. With the settlement of Mutina, Parma, and Saturnia in 183, the senate definitely adopted the custom of allotting conquered territory to Roman citizens² instead of to all Italians, as had previously been the custom. This disregard of old privileges seemed the more unjust since foreign wars were now fought, not in the common defense of Italy, but in accordance with the political purposes of the senate and people of Rome. Rome, moreover, irritated the Italians by various other domineering acts. The senatorial decree directed against the worshipers of Bacchus,³ which has accidentally been preserved, shows clearly how Rome, as early as 186, presumed to exercise police supervision in the religious concerns of the allies. The cities involved doubtless sympathized with Rome's desire to suppress an outburst of fanaticism at home, but they could hardly have looked complacently upon senatorial interference within their own jurisdiction. They had a legal right to adopt an insane cult if they so desired. Worse than this interference in their rights of autonomy was the imperious behavior of certain Roman magistrates toward them. Gaius Gracchus, when pleading the cause of the allies, was able to point to several instances⁴ where magistrates had applied martial law for the most trivial offenses. In the army, conditions were even harder to bear, for, although citizen soldiers of the ranks had by law the right of appeal to the people from a commander's decision, neither soldiers nor officers of the allied contingent had any redress when unjustly punished by Roman generals.⁵

Demands for the alleviation of all these abuses began early, and since the *socii* soon found that it would be futile to refer back to their treaty rights, they decided to urge their full incorporation in the Roman state. After the battle of Cannæ, Carvilius, a highly respected senator of democratic sympathies, had actually proposed that each "Latin" city be represented by two members in the Roman senate.⁶ The motion, though conceivably based upon purely pro-Roman considerations, doubtless accorded with the expressed wishes of the "Latins." It met, however, with little attention:

naturally the senate, jealous of its prerogatives, felt itself capable of administering affairs of state alone. After the passage of the agrarian laws of Tiberius Gracchus, the allies took aggressive steps toward gaining a hearing, for they had reason to fear that the Roman populace might infringe upon their possessory right in the public lands. They came to Rome to lobby for favorable legislation in such numbers that their opponents, despite the vigorous opposition of Gaius Gracchus, passed an alien exclusion act. Flaccus,⁷ a friend of Gaius, then proposed to grant citizenship to all who desired it and at least the right of appeal against martial law to the rest, but he found little enthusiasm for his measure. What government has ever volunteered to give away a part of its powers? But some of the Italians were in bitter earnest. The Latin colony of Fregellæ openly revolted, only to be crushed by force and severely punished. The senate even instituted an inquiry to find out what Romans had encouraged the revolt, and Gracchus among others was forced to submit to trial on a charge of treason. He secured an acquittal, and in 122, after he had carried through his agrarian reforms, staked his all on an enfranchisement bill.⁸ There is reason to think that many senators sympathized with the allies, but they treated the bill purely as a party measure. Obviously here was a proposal in which the Roman populace was not personally interested, and which might afford an opportunity to defeat the tribune and break his prestige. And Gracchus, as was to be expected, fell, deserted by the populace in the first proposal which did not convey them a gift.

After this the allies appealed to Rome from time to time, only to be met with new alien exclusion acts,⁹ until, in 91, Drusus,¹⁰ a senatorial, constituted himself their champion. This man, it seems, thought it possible to break the factional strife which was crippling the state by skillfully realigning the parties so as to form a new *bloc*. By proposing to transfer the court juries from the control of the knights to that of the senators, and by offering the populace corn and land, he hoped to combine the senate and the people in a success-

ful party against a minority of the middle-class rich. An important part of his program contemplated the enfranchisement of the Italians, whether from sympathy for their cause, or in order to allay their opposition to a new colonial scheme. At any rate, the Italians entered into his plans with unbounded enthusiasm, which turned to despair and rage when Drusus met his death, apparently at the hands of a political assassin. They had formed an organization throughout Italy in order to support Drusus, and this they now employed in planning a future campaign. In their bitterness they turned to drastic means, eventually deciding to ask Rome for no more favors, but instead to form a republic of their own wholly independent of Rome. The Marsi, Paeligni, Vestini, Picentes, Marrucini, Samnites, and Lucanians — the soundest stock in Italy — formed the new state. Their constitution,¹¹ if we may trust Diodorus' brief account, must have been one of the most interesting of ancient times, combining ideas from Rome, the Hellenic federations, and their own municipal governments in such a way that the resultant constituted a unicameral representative government. From Rome they adopted the biconsular magistracy and a senate of about 500. From the Greek federations came the principle of representation which allowed each municipality to have its own deputies in the senate. A select committee of the senate, apparently chosen from and by the senate, constituted a preparatory council to shape and propose bills to that body — a plan also practiced in many Greek cities and leagues. Finally, from the custom in vogue in a large number of the Italian cities where the *ordo decurionum* managed city affairs without reference to the assemblies, they borrowed the idea of placing legislation in the hands of the senate rather than in the popular assembly. In other words, these state builders adopted practically the same measures that Æmilius Paullus had embodied in the constitution for the Macedonian republics some seventy-five years before.

The struggle of the allies resulted in a compromise, most of the seceding tribes laying down their arms in 89 when Rome

promised citizenship to those who would sign the citizen rolls within a given period. The city of Rome extended henceforth over the whole length of the peninsula. The contest had, however, continued so long that Mithradates the Great, whose ambitions had formerly been checked by senatorial commands, had had time to ally himself with the secessionists and, in conformity to a common plan, had swept over the Roman province of Asia. And since Asia is the center of Roman imperial politics during the next generation, it may be well to review the situation which Mithradates created.

At the end of the second century the principalities of Anatolia were, for the most part, at peace. Bithynia had long been faithful to Rome. Paphlagonia consisted of a group of insignificant principalities immediately beyond Galatia, which had been liberated from Pergamene rule by Rome, was now governed by a dozen princelings and was being rapidly Hellenized. Cappadocia, east of Galatia, alone was unsettled, having lost its king, who had fallen in a contest with Aristonicus, undertaken at the request of Rome. Pontus, after the death of its king in 120, had been ruled by a weak queen; the boy heir — destined to become famous under the title of Mithradates the Great — had recently returned from adventuring in Greece and Asia, where he had gained much worldly wisdom which he later turned to good use. Tigranes the Armenian was building for himself a strong kingdom out of the eastern wreckage of Syria. The Armenian plateau remained his stronghold, but he soon added to it a considerable portion of Mesopotamia, and (to anticipate) by 83 he had seized the whole of Syria. At the end of the second century the Roman protectorate extended over the provinces of Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, and Cappadocia, all *amici* of Rome: within this territory the senate preferred to see no important political changes. What happened beyond was of little concern, provided it did not disturb the peace of these useful buffer-states.

Now in 105, Mithradates¹² invited Nicomedes of Bithynia to share in a partition of Paphlagonia. The senate was asked

to intervene, but was too busily engaged with the Cimbri to heed, and the two kings divided their spoils without molestation. A few years later they invaded Cappadocia also, and, in fact, fell out over the partition of their prize. The senate now (96 B.C.) ordered the two bandits to give up both Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, and they felt constrained to obey. Mithradates, however, made an alliance with the young and ambitious king of Armenia, promising to support him if he would seize Cappadocia. Tigranes did so, but in 92 the senate sent Sulla, the governor of Cilicia, to restore the kingdom its autonomy. The senate even suggested that the Cappadocians create a republic and live "at liberty." But they knew their inexperience in self-government and elected a king. When in 90 the Social war threw the whole of Italy into a life-and-death struggle that required Rome's utmost strength, Mithradates encouraged the allies with promises of help and then on his own account quickly possessed himself of Cappadocia, Galatia, and Bithynia, and with a victorious force invaded Roman Asia.

Here he had the wisdom to observe what Philip and Perseus had seen in Greece, that Rome's adherents belonged chiefly to the propertied classes, and that, therefore, an appeal to the democratic parties of the cities and the promulgation of a socialistic program would be most effective in bringing him support. He accordingly announced himself the advocate of the financially and politically downtrodden, and visited effective punishment upon any who withstood him. The propertied classes, of course, were in the minority, and the Asiatic populace had been rendered more than normally dissatisfied by the exactions of the taxgatherers. Moreover, Mithradates was at hand with his efficient army, whereas the Roman armies were far away fighting what might prove to be their last battle. Most of the cities accordingly opened their gates to the king; and when, in the year 88, he had come into complete possession, he issued an edict ordering all Italians to be put to death on a fixed day. He was apparently obeyed with a will. Eighty thousand Italians are said to have fallen by that decree.

This is not the place to describe the war that followed. The story is well known how a democratic plebiscite directed Marius to conduct the war, although Sulla was consul; how Sulla marched upon Rome with his army, drove his opponents out of the city, and secured the command for himself from the senate; how he then defeated the Pontic forces in Greece, made terms with Mithradates, reorganized the Asiatic province, returned home with his army, crushed his enemies in a fearful civil war, and made himself dictator.

Considering the havoc the king had wrought in Asia, we are surprised that Sulla could dismiss him upon his promise to pay an indemnity of a mere 2000 talents and to withdraw to his kingdom. Evidently Sulla was more concerned about his own future position at Rome than about the outposts of the state. With the province, however, he dealt most sternly. A large number of Greek cities and states that had been free before had during this crisis been compelled to declare for Mithradates. All these cities were now attached to the Roman province. From this time on we hear of very few *civitates immunes et liberae* or *civitates foederatae* on the coast of Asia Minor. Rhodes¹³ and Chios retained their freedom. Ilium was favored for having withstood Sulla's personal enemy, Fimbria. The cities of Caria and Lycia had apparently lain so far from the road of Mithradates' army that they had been able to remain neutral, and thus keep their former status. Inscriptions¹⁴ prove that some minor cities like Laodicea and Stratonicea also succeeded in withstanding the king and were rewarded by Sulla. But aside from these, the cities of Asia Minor were henceforth subjected to Rome.

Sulla dealt with the province in a peculiarly selfish manner. Receiving no funds from the senate,—the Marian party had gained control during his absence,—he fell into financial straits, and since the indemnity he could secure from the king was wholly insufficient for his needs, he chose to exact a heavy sum from the province under the pretext that it had been guilty of revolt. The provincials probably retorted that they had best served the interests of the state

by speedily submitting to Mithradates, since they had no means of defense and Rome was so tardy with aid. But excuses were of no avail. Sulla placed his "indemnity" — which included a cash prepayment of five years' tribute — at the enormous sum of 20,000 talents. The cities had little ready money, for Mithradates had also scoured the province for gold, but they mortgaged their public buildings to money-lenders at usurious rates ¹⁵ and paid the sum. Much of the later distress that is usually charged to the unlawful exactions of taxgatherers had its root in the unexcusable demand of this aristocratic governor. Nor was this the last time that the provincials had to suffer in consequence of a Roman civil war; again, in the days of Brutus and Cassius they experienced the truth of the Horatian maxim: *quicquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi*.

One wise regulation, however, is accredited to Sulla. He apparently organized the province into taxing districts, apportioned the annual tribute among them,¹⁶ and stipulated the exact amount each was to pay, thus removing the illegal exactions of the Roman publicans. In doing this he seems to have grasped the idea that if he succeeded in becoming dictator at Rome, he would then be able to establish a permanent fiscal bureau dependent upon himself alone which would do away with the employment of middlemen firms and the contract system. To be sure, Sulla's arrangement disappeared a few years ¹⁷ after his death, and the publicans regained their field of operation, but he had at least found a fruitful idea which Cæsar successfully adopted as soon as he became dictator.

That Sulla was little concerned with the extension of Rome's empire is apparent in all his acts. An imperialist would have assumed control of the principalities that Mithradates had conquered and been forced to evacuate. Sulla, on the contrary, restored the former régime. In fact, as soon as he turned his back on Asia, Tigranes took possession of the whole of Syria, which had long been a Roman protectorate, and Sulla, though supreme at Rome, looked on in silence. He seems not even to have made a protest. This

attitude toward imperialism is exactly what one would expect of a thorough senatorial chiefly concerned with his own welfare. Sulla incurred a civil war with Marius for the sake of securing the command against Mithradates in 88, and when he had overcome Marius, he immediately abandoned Rome to his enemies in order to drive back the Eastern aggressor, but an interest in the imperial boundaries seems at no time to have been the mainspring of his action. It is not too harsh a criticism of Sulla to assume that he attacked Marius solely for the sake of political self-preservation and that he personally conducted the war against the Eastern invader because he dared not intrust a strong army to any one else.) The time had come when the drift toward a military monarchy was apparent to all. The safety of the frontier was more and more becoming, not a primary political duty, but rather a pretext for some ambitious leader to grasp controlling power. The clever politician, Crassus, betrayed the trend of events in a remark ¹⁸ that the Romans often quoted as particularly shrewd: "No man with political ambitions is now sufficiently wealthy unless he can support an army on his own income." It was the concurrence of the civil disorder and his own self-centered temperament that made Sulla the anomaly in Roman history that he is. That he, a senatorial, should have been the first to avail himself of the democratic-monarchical lessons taught by the careers of the Gracchi and Marius simply testifies to the overweening self-interest of the man. That he stopped short of the natural consequences of his acts and failed to establish an aggressive military monarchy as Cæsar did, must be attributed to his lifelong association with advocates of the senatorial doctrine. Sulla left the empire very much as he had found it in extent, but he had weakened it both at home and abroad, and he revealed to Cæsar how to apply the lessons of Marius.

Sulla died in 79, and with him Mithradates' fear of Rome: the Eastern tyrants, themselves individualists, were always disposed to think in terms of personalities. When, therefore, the king of Bithynia died in 74 and bequeathed his kingdom to Rome,—this is the third inexplicable bequest,—

the Pontic king invaded the land and placed his own appointee upon the throne. The old Marian leader, Sertorius, who was now resisting Rome in Spain, sent him encouragement — and Roman drillmasters. To reclaim Rome's inheritance, the senate dispatched the consul Lucullus, a noble who had done excellent service upon the seas under Sulla, to Bithynia. This skillful governor pushed the Pontic king back slowly but doggedly. In two years the king was so thoroughly beaten that he was compelled to abandon his country and take refuge in Armenia. The next two years Lucullus used in establishing Rome's foothold in Pontus and in relieving distress in Asia. He found that the cities had borrowed money at usurious rates to meet Sulla's exactions and had so completely fallen into arrears that in 14 years the debt had risen to about sixfold the original sum. Not only had Lucullus no love for money lenders, but he also realized that the province could not long remain faithful in such distress. By way of relief he resorted to very drastic measures: with one edict he canceled two-thirds of the public debt, and levied a tribute of 25 per cent of the harvest for the next four years, so that the old debt would be completely cleared off in a short time.¹⁹ From private debts he annulled all the outstanding interest still due, reestablished the legal rate of 12 per cent, and made arrangements for annual payments of installments out of yearly incomes. There was, of course, an outburst of objections from the Roman money-lending firms and their shareholders, and, henceforth, a vigorous campaign was carried on at home to blacken the general's reputation and effect his recall. In the field he had also made enemies: he was a strict disciplinarian, far from affable, and, to the disgust of his troops, he habitually accepted the peaceful capitulation of cities that had been besieged, without observing the old custom of abandoning them as loot to his soldiers. He was particularly kind to Greeks, and even after a town had been stormed, the Greeks, who would most likely have yielded the richest booty, were allowed to depart unmolested with their possessions.

After the settlement of Asia's finances he turned his attention to Armenia, where Mithradates had taken refuge. He requested Tigranes to surrender Rome's enemy. The Armenian refused, and Lucullus with a small picked army set out through hundreds of miles of mountains and deserts to find his enemy. According to a report which probably has come from his autobiography, the forces of Mithradates and Tigranes outnumbered his own small army twenty to one.²⁰ He won his battle, however, with small loss, and succeeded in taking the capital of Armenia, the newly founded Tigranocerta, for the population of which Asia Minor had been scoured by Tigranes. The inhabitants were directed to go back to their former homes. Tigranes raised a new army, but Lucullus felt that his work was so nearly done that he could safely sever Syria²¹ from Armenia and give it back to Antiochus. His fortunes, however, soon changed for the worse. The enemy's forces grew, even Phraates, of the far-distant Parthian kingdom, sending encouragement to the fugitive kings, and when Lucullus undertook to follow his enemy farther into the interior, his soldiers refused to accompany him. In fact, the best of his troops had been in the East almost 20 years and had outserved their term. Lucullus retreated, only to find that Mithradates had proceeded to Pontus and was recapturing his kingdom. Before the Roman could recover it, he received the news that he had been superseded.²² Pompey, who for personal reasons had become the champion of the popular, capitalistic party, received the command of Lucullus and was destined to reap the fruits of that general's long and weary work.

Lucullus has been called the "creator of the new imperialism" of Rome,²³ and has been compared to Alexander and Napoleon, because he followed Mithradates into Armenia. This characterization gains some plausibility from the charge bandied about among his many enemies at Rome that he prolonged his command needlessly by not forcing the issue with Mithradates on a field nearer home. The charge may be false, or it may be based upon an accurate knowledge of

the general's ambition to continue in command. It does not, however, in the face of definite proof to the contrary, stamp Lucullus as an expansionist. One very significant fact stands out as irrefutable proof of his policy: he gave the vast and opulent empire of Syria back to Antiochus, who not only had lost it to Tigranes, but had even been abandoned by his own subjects. Rome had never had an easier opportunity to acquire a rich province than when Syria fell to her disposal by the defeat of Tigranes, and Pompey's subsequent revocation of Lucullus' cession of Syria is good evidence that the Roman people were not ready to subject themselves to such self-denial. Lucullus, however, was only following the ancient doctrine of his party in the senate, a doctrine which aimed at keeping the empire within bounds. His pursuit of Mithradates and Tigranes so far afield was nothing but the performance of a plain duty that any conscientious magistrate must have assumed. If Rome were willing to leave Mithradates unpunished after the Asiatic "vespers" of 88 and the attempt to grasp Bithynia in 74, she could never again hope to meet with respect. If Tigranes were allowed to rob Roman *amici* with impunity, as he had robbed Antiochus, the senate's policy was manifestly a failure. It must be evident that Lucullus had no choice but to visit appropriate penalties upon the offenders who had so persistently crossed the Roman frontier. His work of reorganization in Pontus²⁴ in 70 indicates that he intended to add Mithradates' own kingdom to the newly inherited Bithynia and thus create one province of the two, but this clearly was a political necessity, since the king could no longer be tolerated as a neighbor.

The period between 90 and 70, during most of which men of aristocratic training were in control at Rome, provides the last opportunity of gauging the work of the senate in imperial matters. The period began with a thoroughgoing revolt of the Italian allies induced chiefly by the senate's failure to follow the liberal course its predecessors had mapped out. The worst results of the senate's timid and hesitating foreign policy emerged when Mithradates, encouraged by

the past vacillation of the sovereign state, crossed the Roman frontier and devastated Asia, and when Sulla left his Eastern task less than half done because this latter-day weakness of the senate no longer concerned itself with making Rome respected abroad. However, the good old traditions of the third century senatorial policy emerged in Lucullus, who fought once more to establish law and order, irrespective of territorial acquisition, and who organized the subject peoples with reference to the empire's stability and general prosperity, rather than to the state's immediate material advantages. Unfortunately, the senate had been compelled to grant both Sulla and Lucullus a long and extraordinary *imperium*, a fact that soon served the opposition — who were willing enough to draw the logical inference — as precedents upon which a military régime was finally established.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XV

1. During the Punic war, when it was offered, Præneste had refused incorporation in the Roman state. The last grant of full citizenship of which we have a record was made to Formiæ, Fundi, and Arpinum in 188; Livy, XXXVIII, 36.

2. Livy, XXXIX, 55.

3. The *senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus*, C. I. L. I, 196: l. 7, *nequis ceivis Romanus, neve nomen Latinum neve socium quisquam*. The existing copy was found in Calabria.

4. Aul. Gell. X, 3.

5. Sall. *Jug.* 69, *condemnatus verberatusque capite poenas solvit, nam is civis ex Latio erat*.

6. Livy, XXIII, 22.

7. Appian, *Bell. Civ.* I, 21 and 34; Val. Max. IX, 5; the revolt of Fregellæ; Livy, *Epit.* 60.

8. Vell. II, 6; App. *Bell. Civ.* I, 23; Plut. *C. Gracch.* 5; the authorities vary between *Italians* and *Latins*. The speech of Fannius against the proposal was entitled "*de sociis et nomine Latino*," Cic. *Brut.* 99. It is not unlikely that Gracchus proposed progressive incorporation.

9. The first restrictions upon immigration were made at the request of the allies themselves, who wished to prevent their own citizens from emigrating to Rome: Livy, XXXIX, 3; XLI, 8. The later exclusion acts were passed partly to prevent undue lobbying on enfranchisement bills, partly to keep down the number of recipients of public corn.

10. The sources are gathered in Greenidge and Clay, pp. 99-106.

11. Diodorus, XXXVII, 2, says that the senate chose the consuls, while Strabo, V, 241, implies that the people voted for them. Since Diodorus generally follows Posidonius in this section (Schwartz, *s.v. Diodorus*, 690, in Pauly-Wissowa), he is to be accepted in preference to Strabo. Kiene, *Der röm. Bundesgenossenkrieg*, 1845, long ago pointed out that the Italic constitution seemed to be based upon the representative system, but Mommsen (*Rom. Hist.* III, 506, Eng. tr.) set the fashion of preferring Strabo. When we consider that Carvilius had in 216 proposed to make the Roman senate representative, and that Æmilius Paullus adopted this system for Macedonia, we can hardly hesitate any longer to accept the logical inferences that follow from Diodorus' account.

12. For this period the full collection of references in Drumann-Groebe under *Sulla* and *Lucullus* is very useful; also, Greenidge and Clay, *Sources for Rom. Hist.* 133-70 B.C. See also Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator*; Chapot, *La province rom. d'Asie*; Bevan, *The House of Seleucus*; Stähelin, *Gesch. der Galater*²; Niese, *Rhein. Mus.* 1883, p. 577; Eckhardt, *Die Armenischen Feldzüge des Lucullus*, *Klio*, 1910. For a keen analysis of the political movements of this period, see Heitland, *The Roman Republic*.

13. Chapot, *op. cit.* p. 37.

14. *C. I. L.* I, 587, and *B. C. H.* 1885, p. 462.

15. Brutus is found receiving 48 per cent in Cyprus later, although the legal rate was 12 per cent. Since the debt of 20,000 talents incurred by the exaction of Sulla quadrupled in about fifteen years, one might estimate that the money lenders were charging about 24 per cent compound interest. However, Cicero intimates that the province fell into arrears with the tribute also, and the debt may have increased from this source, Cic. *ad Quint.* I, 1, 33. Hatzfeld, *Bull. Corr. Hell.* 1912, p. 132, has recently pointed out that the money lenders of the East in the early part of the century did not belong to the class of Roman knights to the extent that has hitherto been supposed. They were largely Greeks, even South-Italian and Sicilian Greeks.

16. Cic. *ad Quint.* I, 1, 33, *quod aequaliter Sulla discripserat*. This may possibly refer to the war indemnity, but Cicero says "vectigal."

17. In the year 70 Asia was again subject to the *locatio censoria* of the Gracchan law, Cic. *Verr.* III, 12. Pompey apparently restored the Gracchan system when he reinstituted the censorship in 70. This would explain why the censorship was so keenly desired by the democratic-plutocratic bloc which elected Pompey; Cic. *in Caec.* 8.

18. Cic. *de Off.* I, 25.

19. This seems to be the meaning of App. *Mith.* 83, and Plut. *Luc.*

20. See also Cic. *Acad. pr.* II, 3.

20. Memnon, a native of Heraclea, gives the number as 80,000 (*F. H. G.* 57). Lucullus apparently counted noncombatants.

21. Justinus, XL, 2, 2.

22. At first Lucullus had an extensive command: the charge over both Asia and Cilicia, as well as the war over the Bithynian bequest. Apparently his powers were curtailed gradually. In 68, the consul Marcius Rex was assigned to Cilicia, and in 67, by the Gabinian law, Bithynia was given to the consul Glabrio, who, however, did not reach the army before Pompey was given supreme command over the whole East by the Manilian law of 66. See Drumann-Groebe, IV, p. 173.

23. Ferrero, Eng. tr. I, 200. He also supposes that Lucullus intended to invade Parthia, but this is disproved by Eckhardt in his account of the Armenian campaign; *Klio*, 1910.

24. Memnon, fr. 45, in *Frag. Hist. Graec.* and Appian, *Mith.* 82.

CHAPTER XVI

POMPEY'S ARMY IN THE SERVICE OF CAPITALISTS

THE senatorial régime which Sulla left in full control at Rome upon his resignation of the dictatorship in 79 was overthrown in 70 by Pompey, Sulla's most highly trusted lieutenant. Pompey, like Sulla, was one of those military commanders whom the senate, despite all constitutional objections, had to employ in order to hold together the overgrown empire. Under Sulla he had proved himself an able officer, so that the senate was eager to use his services in 77 against a threatening democratic revolution. Then since the Marian refugees under Sertorius seemed to be on the point of conquering Spain, despite the efforts of the Roman consul, Pompey was again called upon to save the state. He refused to go unless he were given full proconsular power, although he had held none of the subordinate offices which legally preceded the consulship. To grant his wish was to confess senatorial government bankrupt. But Rome sorely needed Pompey, and he was sent on his own terms. By 71 he had cleared Spain, and, returning home with his strong, victorious army, he announced his candidacy for the consulship. The senate was in a quandary, for its own creature and servant was demanding legal exemptions that would have surprised even a Gracchus or a Marius; but it dared not suggest forceful opposition, since the candidate had his army with him, eloquently encamped outside the gates.

Pompey, however, disliked bloodshed, and when he discovered that his party would exert all possible influence against him, he made overtures to the democrats. He found that Crassus, an old-time rival who was influential with the knights, the middle-class nobility of wealth, was eager to unite with him in a common canvass. Together

they issued a program which promised to gain a heavy vote: the populace was offered a restitution of the tribunate, and the knights, a restoration of their former position on the jury panels. The democratic-plutocratic *bloc* carried the day, the two new consuls kept their election pledges, and popular sovereignty again held sway in Rome.

At the end of his consulship, Pompey retired to private life, since no proconsulship worthy of his efforts seemed available: the only war within the empire was apparently nearing an end under Lucullus. Two years later, however, pirates were again afflicting the shipping of the East, and Gabinius, a tribune, introduced a bill to grant Pompey an extraordinary command¹ over all the seas and seacoasts of the empire. This the senate attempted to oppose on constitutional grounds. A friendly tribune was found to interpose his veto, but Gabinius answered by applying the Gracchan discovery of "the recall" against the undemocratic tribune, and the senate once more had to confess defeat. Pompey, with a decent show of reluctance, responded again to the summons of the state, and every schoolboy knows how brilliantly he performed the difficult task described by Cicero in his "Manilian law." Pompey not only drove the pirates from the seas, but, to insure the permanency of his work, he colonized them in Cilicia and in Greece, and even placed some of them on state lands in southern Italy. It is a pleasant commentary on this wise colonization that Vergil, a generation later, found the inspiration for one of his most memorable descriptions of nature in the garden plot of one of these ex-pirate farmers.² Pompey's imperialistic tendencies revealed themselves in a very significant manner on this occasion. He bluntly took possession of eastern Cilicia for several of the colonies that he founded, although that region had belonged to Syria since 188 and had recently been given back to Antiochus, with the rest of Syria, by Lucullus.³ To the Romans this act proved unmistakably that Pompey had no sympathy with Lucullus' moderate arrangements and that, if he had been sent East in the place of that general, Rome would have gained an

extensive province. There can be little doubt that the knights quickly grasped the significance of his act.

While Pompey was still engaged in the maritime war, news reached Rome that Lucullus had again lost ground to his enemy, and immediately the people and the traders interested in Asiatic investments began demanding that Pompey be placed in command of all the provinces of the East with whatever forces he might need to end the war. The senate once more opposed his appointment on constitutional grounds. It desired its own consuls and proconsuls to hold all commands regularly and in due order. If the work were serious and lasted more than a year, it desired to reserve to itself the privilege of extending commands. Various motives inspired the faction supporting Pompey. No doubt many of the populace — always impatient of slow and far-distant campaigns — looked with favor upon a general who had proved his efficiency and who had, moreover, shown his good will toward their party by restoring the tribunate. The investing public which held shares in Asiatic taxing corporations and Eastern investment companies naturally wished to see the war speedily ended, so that dividends on their stocks might be renewed. Their losses for twenty years had been very heavy. In 88 Mithradates had killed the agents of the companies and had swept away all portable property, and then for three years he had been in active possession of the province. When Sulla reached Asia, he had abolished the most profitable features of the taxing system. To be sure, the companies then attempted to profit by lending money at usurious rates to the debt-burdened cities, but presently Lucullus cut off, at one stroke of the pen, the greater part of the accumulated interest. There can be no question that for a score of years, Asiatic stocks must have yielded very poor returns on the capital invested in them. Investors desired a governor more likely to establish permanent peace and to respect vested interests than Lucullus had been.

This support of Pompey was, of course, entirely legitimate, but the evidence seems to indicate that the capitalistic

clique was working for a much greater prize than its spokesman, Cicero, has mentioned, — a prize which he, in his lofty idealism, did not pause to consider. These people were expecting nothing less than that Pompey would annex several new provinces in the East and would in his settlement extend the lucrative contract system over all of them. This is, of course, what he ultimately did, and historians have freely inferred that the knights may have had reason to expect such a course from Pompey when they supported his appointment. We may do more than infer this, however: we may accept it as a certainty that Pompey had made his policy absolutely clear in at least two acts of his which preceded the Manilian law.⁴ In the first place, it was Pompey⁵ who, during his consulship in 70, restored the Gracchan tax system to Asia after Sulla had replaced it by the more merciful Attalid system. And the knights had every reason to think that since Pompey had given them Asia to exploit, he would also turn over to them whatever new provinces he might acquire. In the second place, Pompey had shown by his seizure of Syrian Cilicia⁶ in 67, that he did not believe in the anti-expansionistic policy of Lucullus and the senate, but was ready to assert the principle that Roman conquest implied Roman ownership. And if this principle were logically applied, Rome might annex at least Syria, Cappadocia, Galatia, Pontus, and Paphlagonia. Such was the background of the knights' program in giving Pompey a free hand in the East.

We need not, of course, go so far as to infer that Pompey made a bargain with the knights, openly paying for his command by a betrayal of the empire's best interests. Pompey was himself a knight, and had imbibed their doctrines from youth. He never had a political policy of his own; in fact, he never in the least understood the art of politics. He simply adopted the doctrines of his associates, carrying them through by means of his military prestige — and so came to look upon himself as a statesman and leader. Later on, when circumstances threw him into close association with the senate, he gradually, and unwittingly, absorbed sena-

torial doctrines till he became the same kind of passive leader and figurehead in the aristocratic party. If ever he swerved in the least from the direct course of his borrowed convictions, it was perhaps when tempted by the lure of a military command, for he felt at home only at the head of his legions, and sincerely believed that he could serve his country better than any other man as commander of its armies. But it must be admitted that he always made some effort to follow the stolid sense of honor he possessed to the extent of disregarding even this bribe.

However, whether or not there was a bargain between Pompey and his supporters, the knights were at any rate relying upon a certainty in securing the great general, and he obtained the kind of command that had always been the ambition of his life,—a command made all the more extensive in its powers because his supporters knew that his settlements would secure more empire for Rome and, therefore, more profitable arrangements for them than any senatorial commission would ever propose. He seems, in fact, to have obtained unlimited power⁷ to make war or peace as he liked and to proclaim nations friends or enemies according to his own judgment. No Roman had ever been granted such authority before. It is not surprising that many Romans expressed the fear that Pompey would return from the East in the same way that Sulla had, and that the republic was nearing its end.

Pompey's first act in the East was to annul the arrangements of Lucullus. He served notice that he would recognize none of the agreements of his predecessor. Pompey knew well enough that the gift of Syria to Antiochus, and the senatorial taxing system which Lucullus and the senate's commission had planted in Bithynia and Pontus did not meet with the approval of the present home government.

His military task proved to be easy, for his reputation was such that neither Mithradates nor Tigranes dared oppose him. The former, after warily retreating for a time, finally fled precipitously to the Crimea, where he later died. The latter surrendered voluntarily and begged for merciful

treatment. Thus Pompey reaped the fruits of a brilliant military career. Tigranes was allowed to retain Armenia, becoming a "friend" of Rome, but was asked to surrender Syria to her — as though Lucullus had not already received it from Tigranes and given it to Antiochus. Despite criticism, Pompey turned his back on his real enemy, Mithradates, in order to take full possession of Syria, fearing apparently that if he disposed of Mithradates first, the senate would urge his recall before he could go farther afield. To Pompey the most important business was the gathering in of provinces.

In claiming Syria, Pompey desired full measure: nothing less than the well-rounded kingdom of the earlier Seleucids which extended from the Taurus Mountains to the Red Sea. To be sure, the later Seleucids had long ago lost the southern portion of the kingdom: the Nabatæi had seldom been thoroughly subdued, and the temple-state of Judea had maintained its independence for over half a century. Such trifles, however, mattered little to Pompey. Tigranes was willing to claim that he possessed the whole of Syria, even though he had never seen the southern portion, and he therefore ceded to Pompey the whole of it: Syria,⁸ Phœnicia, and even, humorously enough, Cilicia, of which Pompey had taken possession two years before. With this deed of cession Pompey marched southward to prove Rome's title. Cilicia and Syria proper caused no difficulties. The temple-state at Jerusalem probably disliked being given away in this high-handed manner, but Pompey shrewdly explained that Rome's title had already been established and that his only purpose was to settle the civil war between their high priests. Fortunately for him, the two claimants to the high priesthood were more concerned in attaining office than in asserting their nation's liberty. He accordingly aided the elder, who seemed to have the better claim — besides showing a marked readiness to serve Rome. The opposing claimant and his faction fortified themselves in the great temple at Jerusalem, and it took Pompey three months to dislodge them. Pompey, to be sure, committed the indiscretion of

entering the sanctum, but he proved his contention that he had not undertaken a war of conquest by leaving the rich temple treasure undisturbed.⁹ South of Judea he also met with some opposition; nevertheless he quickly established his power as far as the desert. Thus, by the annexation of the whole of the Seleucid Syria, Rome obtained a new province. However, Pompey proved at this time that even his imperialism recognized certain limits, for he refused a request of Ptolemy's to enter Egypt and aid in repressing a rebellion there,—a request which might readily have led to the annexation¹⁰ of that very wealthy kingdom also.

In reorganizing the province of Syria, Pompey seems to have adopted many practices of the Seleucids. The kingdom¹¹ consisted of many different peoples living under varying conditions. There were numerous autonomous cities with wide domains of their own—for the older Seleucids had been vigorous city builders. Pompey favored such cities as much as possible. He severed a great number of them from the princes and petty tyrants to whom they had fallen subject, and made them directly dependent upon Rome, thus at least saving them the payment of an extra domestic tribute. In this way, for instance, the coast cities of Palestine which the Maccabees had subjected were elevated to their former status, and a number of old foundations on the Jordan River dated a new era of autonomy from Pompey's day. He also built a number of new cities, employing perhaps the royal domains for this purpose, even as the Seleucids had done in days past. We can hardly suppose, however, that he exempted these cities from tribute. In the old days of philhellenism, the Romans had been very ready to grant that, whatever happened to others, Greek cities should be free and, as a matter of course, exempt from tax. But more and more the distinctions between Greek and *ethne* were breaking down. Pompey left the cities autonomous as before. In fact, Rome much preferred that they look after their own internal economy, but she was growing increasingly chary of losing any portion of her

tribute. By Pompey's time, most of the cities of the Asiatic province were paying tithes, and it is possible that few cities of Syria escaped this burden. In the interior, petty princes ruled most of the tribes, but there were also some temple-states or theocracies like Judea. Rome brought both these types of states under her sovereignty with as little disturbance of old customs as possible, for their princes and priests served the same purposes as the municipal machinery of the cities in keeping order and carrying out her desires. The stipend due Rome from these states probably averaged about a tithe, though there was no uniform rule. In Judea, for instance, she recognized the institution of the Sabbatical year, and seems to have remitted the tribute for that year. The regular stipend at Judea was, in any case, very low at first, being apparently about one-third of the seed.¹² Since the seed is usually estimated at about one-tenth of the harvest, the tribute must have been only about one-third of the usual tithe. Unfortunately, the native high priest — and later the ethnarch, who inherited the political position of the high priest — exacted for himself a full tithe of the harvest, according to the Levitical law, so that the combined burden became extremely hard to bear.

It may be interesting to note that the hatred of the "publicans,"¹³ so noticeable in the Gospel narratives, is not all to be charged to Roman oppression. The contract system of collecting direct revenues did not exist in Judea during the New Testament period, for Cæsar had abolished it there the last year of his life. But the Roman dues proved burdensome, because, in addition to them, the ethnarchs, who had fallen heir to the powers of the high priests, continued to levy a full tithe for themselves. Moreover, since the Jewish state claimed to be a theocracy, the priests interpreted obedience to Rome as a mark of religious disobedience; religious zeal and patriotism were accordingly so interrelated that hatred of Rome's agents became a duty. Now, since the contract system had been abolished, the "publicans" involved could not have been Romans. They were, in fact, natives like Zacchæus and Matthew, employed by the local

authorities to gather in the stipend which the individual communities paid Rome. But the people hated them all the more because they were natives, regarding them as renegades who served the interests of the heathen. And it is therefore not altogether surprising that in ordinary parlance "publicans" were classed with "sinners."

Pompey at once appointed Scaurus as governor over the whole province of Syria (in 63) and left him two legions with which to preserve peace. In Asia Minor he completed the arrangements he had begun. Bithynia¹⁴ was at once made a province, which had, in fact, been the original intention ten years before when the Roman people inherited it. To this was now added Pontus and the whole southern coast of the Black Sea, the former kingdom of Mithradates. The three Galatian¹⁵ tetrarchs who had survived the sword of Mithradates were confirmed in their possessions, but became princes tributary to Rome. After a few years, however, we find Deiotarus in possession of the whole territory. Cappadocia was also given back to its king as a tributary possession, and since Tigranes had herded off some 300,000 of its inhabitants¹⁶ to Armenia a few years before, Pompey founded eight cities within the kingdom to start it on the road to a dignified existence. He even seems to have lent¹⁷ the much-harassed king some money with which to set up a respectable court, so that presently the Cappadocian throne became a synonym for bankrupt display. Tigranes received better terms, for he remained a non-stipendiary *amicus*; his state now served the same purpose as the others had before: protecting Roman possessions against the unknown tribes beyond. Between the province and this ally existed about a dozen minor princes and high priests of temple-states, all of whom were confirmed in their offices upon the payment of an indemnity and submission to tribute. The new annual tribute¹⁸ that Pompey acquired for the state from all these provinces and princes amounted to 35,000,000 drachmas, whereas the whole annual revenue of the state before his arrival in the East had been only 50,000,000 drachmas all told. We may fairly estimate that the acquisitions

of Pompey about quintupled the amount of revenue that the province of Asia had hitherto yielded.

Although, as we have seen, most of the tribes in the Anatolian principalities continued to serve the same kings and princes as before, Pompey's coming instituted important internal changes. Formerly, these kings and princes were "friends" of Rome, but paid no tribute. Their kingdoms served chiefly as buffer-states. Rome might ask them for a contingent when hard pressed, and, in return, she was supposed to give them aid upon request. Now, however, they became practically vassals after the Persian type and had to pay tribute. The inhabitants therefore not only had to contribute to Rome like the provincials of Asia and Syria, but they had, in addition, to support their own — frequently very expensive — courts. It may be thought that the double burden was unreasonable and that Rome should have abolished these courts at once, making provinces of the principalities. But the fact is that these Eastern peoples needed their princes even as the natives of India need the client princes who serve England to-day. Pompey simply found the system established and, like Alexander and his successors, adopted it as a necessary element in the government of the Orientals. It was an expensive luxury, but the natives were not yet ready for local self-government, and it would obviously have been imprudent for the sovereign to force its own officials into every required position. These princes, then, served as Rome's local governors for the present, but they naturally would not need to be kept in that service after the people could organize local city governments capable of taking care of their domestic concerns. And, as a matter of fact, during the empire one after another of these states was absorbed into provinces and thenceforth dealt directly with Rome.

The most striking and the most beneficial work accomplished by Pompey was his organization of village groups into self-governing cities, and his building of new cities at important points. Among the records of his achievements, carried somewhat too ostentatiously in his triumph,¹⁹ was

a list of 39 cities founded by him. This work, continuing the policy of Alexander and his marshals, became a fruitful example for Augustus and the later emperors. By inviting Greeks to settle at fertile points in the interior and thus form a nucleus of civilization for the native Anatolians, Pompey gained many desirable objects: the institution of better methods of cultivating the soil, the inculcation of civic lessons where most needed, the preservation of peace and order, the spreading of Hellenic culture into the hinterland, and, what was of greatest moment to the home government, the creation of a machinery for collecting tribute in the least offensive way by the city's own officials. Perhaps it was this last advantage — the good points of which he had doubtless observed in the Asiatic cities already in existence — which Pompey particularly strove to attain.

The references showing how greatly the *equites* benefited by Pompey's arrangements for revenue collecting are incidental, and, to some extent, inadequate, but they suffice to establish the main point. The historical works still extant unfortunately do not deal with the more prosaic parts of Pompey's work, and, since Cæsar revised the provincial taxing system within twelve years of Pompey's return, a comparatively short period exists from which to expect inscriptional references. However, regarding Syria there can be but little doubt. Cicero in a speech ²⁰ delivered in 56 says that the Roman publicans gathering taxes in Syria had sustained heavy losses, not because of reckless overbidding (*non temeritate redemptionis*), but because of the adverse rulings of the Syrian proconsul Gabinius. The governor had in fact annulled several of their contracts (*pactiones*) with cities of Syria and exempted from tribute other cities upon whose revenues the publicans had reckoned in submitting their bids. This gives us all the evidence we need. It proves that Pompey combined the Gracchan with the Sullan revenue system. In other words, he organized the taxing districts of the new provinces as Sulla had done in Asia, and he laid upon their native organizations the burden of bringing in the tax. But he left the stipend to be paid a

proportionate ratio rather than a fixed amount, so that the state required contractors who would bargain with the taxing districts for the amount to be collected. The system protected the provincials from some of the worst abuses that had grown up under the Gracchan law, but there is little reason why any loopholes for publican oppression should have been left, since a half century of experience had revealed all the possible evils of the method. It must be apparent that the *equites* exerted undue influence in the shaping of the new system.

That Pompey extended the system as far as possible, there can be little doubt. It was in vogue until Cæsar's day in the temple-state at Jerusalem,²¹ where it might readily have been avoided by the simple method of estimating revenue on the basis of the temple-tithe. The same method, which bears the hybrid character of Pompey's works, is in vogue in the province of Cilicia a few years later. Here also the Roman *publicani* are found bargaining with bankrupt cities for their tribute.²² Pompey had no excuse for interfering in the financial organization of this province, since it had been established forty years before his coming. There happens to be no information regarding the tithes of Bithynia,²³ but the great expansionist undoubtedly favored the capitalists there as elsewhere.

Pompey, then, stands out as the first prominent figure in Roman imperialism. He may well have insisted that he never violated the fetial rules, which forbade aggressive wars. In point of fact, he generally confined his activities to territory already acquired in a defensive war. When rounding out the Syrian boundaries, he based his claims upon the cession of Tigranes, and, whenever he felt himself on dubious ground elsewhere, he assumed the rôle of arbiter and reorganizer, rather than that of conqueror. However, his purpose in the East was confessedly to end the confining policy of the senate and to extend the boundaries of the empire as far as a liberal interpretation of civilized international practice would permit. Up to his day expansion that was in any sense intentional had been merely sporadic and unsup-

ported by any definite policy. The democratic leaders of 282 and 264 followed a natural tendency in accepting available invitations to extend Rome's boundaries, but in neither instance had they been actual aggressors, and the impulse toward growth soon died out when the cost in bloodshed and suffering was counted. The Scipionic régime aggressively entered a wider sphere of political activity, but it consistently shunned territorial acquisition. The succeeding anti-Scipionic government proved not unwilling to extract material profit from the political influence acquired abroad by its predecessors, but it, too, had checked the native impulse for new possessions. Occasionally, also, an ambitious proconsul had invited border quarrels in order to earn himself a triumph. But Pompey seems to be the first general frankly sent out for the purpose of extending Rome's boundaries. Pompey himself may have adopted his policy without comprehending its real significance; perhaps he simply followed an instinct that grew naturally out of a long, one-sided military training,—an instinct bred of the habit of acquiring possessions by force of arms and strengthened by an impulse to justify the use of force by a show of positive returns. But, after all, Pompey was merely the figurehead of this expansionistic movement. The real impetus came from the desire of the capitalists at Rome who employed the vote of the impulsive and megalomaniac populace to gain immediate profits for themselves and to widen the field of their lucrative activities. In order to secure their prize, they were willing to ride roughshod over the constitution and to risk the imposition of a military monarchy on Rome; and it was only due to Pompey's self-restraint that the logical conclusion of his extraordinary command awaited the good will of his younger rival, Cæsar.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI

1. The Gabinian law gave him proconsular power for three years over the whole Mediterranean and fifty miles inland over all shores; and it also empowered him to call upon allies for aid. It granted ships, to the number of 500, and troops and money as needed. For sources, consult the convenient collection in Drumann-Groebe, IV, p. 415.

2. See Vergil, *Georg.* IV, 127, and Servius' commentary on the line. It has been suggested that Vergil saw the colony on the tour which Horace describes in *Sermones*, I, 5.

3. Plut. *Pomp.* 28. This portion had never belonged to Rome. The Seleucids had governed it, and of late Tigranes had held sway there (Appian, *Syr.* 48, *Mith.* 118). Rome did not obtain formal possession until Pompey took the title of it from Tigranes two years later; see Livy, *Epit.* 101.

4. For a fuller statement of the case, see *Classical Philology*, IX, No. 2.

5. The evidence for this seems to be clear: Sulla abolished the Gracchan system in Asia in 84 (Cic. *ad Quint.* I, 1, 33); it was restored before 60 (Cic. *Verr.* III, 12), but not before 75, for the consuls were then letting the usual censorial contracts (*Verr.* III, 18). Since the *equites* did not secure any favors from the senatorial government after 75 until the consulship of Pompey in 70, we are forced to the conclusion that Pompey's restoration of the censorship in 70 (Cic. *in Caec.* 8) brought with it the *censoria locatio* and the restoration of the tax-contract system.

6. See note 3.

7. Appian, *Mith.* 97. This statement has been questioned because Pompey insisted upon having his acts confirmed by the senate when he returned; but it is probable that Pompey desired this confirmation — even though the Manilian law did not require it — because, according to time-honored practice, the senate considered itself as the final authority in foreign affairs. See also Plut. *Pompey*, 30; Cassius Dio, XXXVI, 42; Livy, *Epit.* 100. No authority quotes the Manilian law *in extenso*.

8. Livy, *Epit.* 101: *eique ademptis Syria, Phoenice, Cilicia*.

9. Marquardt seems to be right in assuming that Judea fell under the Syrian governor's control at once; *Staatsr. u.* I: 405. Schürer follows the more usual view that it was not incorporated with Syria till some eight years later, *i.e.* in 55. Unger holds that even Gabinius failed to incorporate it (*Süssb. bayr. Akad.* 1897). The evidence is not conclusive, nor is the date important, since Judea certainly became tributary to Rome when Syria did. The Syrian governor supervised it, and Roman publicans dealt with its tribute as early as 50.

10. Of the same nature is Pompey's somewhat slipshod way of avoiding a definite understanding with the aggressive and independent Parthian king for fear of being involved in a troublesome contest. This neglect of his duty caused Rome no little trouble presently. Just ten years after Pompey's settlement of Syria the Roman legions under Crassus sustained one of the worst defeats in Roman history at the hands of these people.

11. Rostowzew, *Gesch. d. röm. Kolonates*, section III, contains an

admirable analysis of the social and political conditions of Asia Minor and Syria. See also *id. Staatspacht*, p. 356.

12. This is a moot point. In 47, after Caesar had been saved from perilous straits in Alexandria by a contingent from Palestine, he decreed that in the future the Jews should pay a fourth of the *reed* (instead of the usual third?) in the second year of the *lustrum*. He seems to confirm this in 44 when he says that in the second year they shall have an exemption amounting to one *corus* (about ten bushels, but we do not know what proportion of the whole this forms), and that no one shall contract for the tribute in the future (*Josephus, Antiq. XIV, 10, 5, 6*). Now it is usual to interpret this passage in the light of *Antiq. XIII, 2, 3*, which implies that the Jewish tribute to the Seleucids was *one-third the harvest*. This seems to me impossible. Caesar, who was so grateful to the Jews of Alexandria as to secure them Roman citizenship outright and to confer great favors upon their people in Palestine, could hardly have left them under a heavier burden than all other peoples. Nor had Pompey any reason to be severe with them, else he would have taken some part of their rich temple treasure.

13. Cf. Rostowzew, *Staatspacht*, p. 475.

14. An incidental reference in Pliny's letters (*ad Trajan. 79*), shows that Pompey gave new municipal charters to the cities of Bithynia. Curiously enough, he seems to have copied the form of the Italian municipal charters, which was too conservative to suit the political ideas of the eastern Greeks. Pompey did not always remember which party he belonged to, and he seldom showed a capacity to think for himself.

15. Stähelin, *Gesch. der Galater*², and Brandis, in *Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. Galati*. These Hellenized Celts were soon among the most prosperous people of Asia.

16. In the year 77, *App. Mith. 67*. Strabo, who was a Cappadocian, vouches for the fact that Tigranes depopulated twelve cities; Strabo, *XI, 532*.

17. In the year 51, when civil war was imminent and Pompey was collecting all his resources, we find him dunning the impecunious Ariobarzanes (*Cic. ad Att. VI, 1, 3*). The debt probably dates from a loan made in 63. This mingling of business and war may appear indelicate, but Pompey was not a man who would extort moneys for his own use, which seems to be the implication of Drumann's words: *mit Schuldscheinen beladen kehrte er nach Italien zurück* (Drumann-Groebe, *IV, 479*).

18. *Plut. Pomp. 45*. That is, the state's income before 63 was about ten million dollars. The sum coming from the Asiatic province had been about 1½ millions. Pompey's three new provinces and the many subject-states brought in a sum of about 7½ million dollars. For the sake of comparison, we may note that Pompey's new revenue was about

the same as the annual budget of Egypt. Wheat was at the time worth about 60 cents per bushel, but labor was very much cheaper in proportion.

19. Plut. *Pomp.* 45; Zon. X, 5; App. *Mith.* 117.

20. Cic. *prov. cons.* 10.

21. Josephus, *Antiq.* XIV, 10, 6; Cic. *prov. cons.* 10; publicanos — tradidit Judæis et Syris.

22. Cic. *ad Att.* V, 13, 1, *confectae sunt pactiones*; V, 16, 2, *omnium venditas*; that is, the cities had mortgaged their revenues in order to procure funds with which to pay the publicans the tributes due.

23. See Brandis, *s.v. Bithynia* in Pauly-Wissowa. We hear of publicans engaged in gathering the pasture dues in Bithynia, but this does not show how the grain tithes were collected.

CHAPTER XVII

CÆSAR AND WORLD CONQUEST

THE imperialism of Pompey bore the stamp of his character. Naturally distrustful of his own understanding of governmental matters, he readily yielded to the opinion of men of more positive temper, and yet a stolid respect for law and order, bred perhaps of his very diffidence, restrained him from following his advisers beyond the pale of justifiable procedure. Thus it is that Pompey, in the service of the capitalistic party, pushed Rome's expansion as far as a very liberal interpretation of the *mos maiorum* permitted, but that in the end he stopped short of frank aggression.

With Cæsar, however, we come to a man of an entirely different character, a man who was a law unto himself and who cared for ancient formulæ only in so far as wise policy dictated obedience to them. Cæsar was the first candid imperialist of Rome, and though his policy found expression in deeds rather than in words, there can be little doubt that the Gallic war is the clearest instance of deliberate expansion in the history of the Roman republic.

Few books have been studied as intensively as Cæsar's *Bellum Gallicum* and yet with as little gratification of the reader's curiosity regarding the author's motives of action. Cæsar gives merely the cold facts: regarding intentions he generally prefers to remain silent, and Cæsar's silences are well-nigh impenetrable. Why did he choose Gaul as his field of activity? What was his purpose in asking for an extraordinary term of five years? Did he proceed into Gaul with a view to the best interests of the state or to his own advancement? Was he convinced that the Gallic situation required a war, or did he create pretexts for the sake of conquest? The questions one might raise are endless, and they have been answered in all possible ways, but

the terse, matter-of-fact commentaries, although insisting at every step that Cæsar's actions are based on legal grounds, absolutely avoid every question of the author's main purposes.

Considering the objectivity of the narrative, one is somewhat surprised at the care with which the author seeks to justify each new advance in Gaul. This diligence is not always rightly interpreted. It was probably not begotten of a scrupulous conscience, ever eager to accord full justice to the enemy, for even as prætor Cæsar had created a war in Spain for personal ends. It probably did not arise from a desire to soothe the feelings of anti-imperialists at Rome. There was never any strong opposition to Pompey's and Crassus' modes of conquest. Nor could Cæsar have been attempting to pacify any scruples which the Romans might entertain regarding the rights¹ of barbarous tribes. Triumph hunting at the expense of such peoples had come to be looked upon as legitimate game. No, Cæsar felt obliged to justify his procedure only because in those times of revolution the whole state was watching to see whether the man with the army would grow overdangerous. Few men at Rome thought of asking what advantages the accession of Gaul might bring the state, much less whether Roman civilization would benefit Gaul. What did interest them was Cæsar's growing power. They remembered that during his consulship he had played the revolutionary, that he had imprisoned obstructing tribunes, disregarded the constitutional rights of his colleague, and insulted the senate; and now when he was illegally adding legion after legion to the army voted him, and advancing from one victory to another, they were chiefly concerned to know how Cæsar would use his cumulating power. Cæsar, of course, thoroughly appreciated the nervous tension at Rome, and it was only to prevent its reaching a breaking point that he took pains to justify his course of action.

Can we penetrate beneath Cæsar's tactful silence regarding his motives into the real purpose of his action? Estimates of Cæsar vary incredibly; not only because his capacity was so great and his genius so many-sided that critics are in

danger of grasping merely half of his program, but for other reasons as well. Cæsar lived in a time of such lawlessness that strong traits which would have begotten constructive forces if exercised in a well-ordered state frequently spent themselves in prodigal waste. In his earlier days, when he was still thinking the thoughts of his own time, he devoted his extraordinary powers to the game of demagoguery, a game which later, after he had outstripped his contemporaries, he scorned to play. Now the conquest of Gaul falls between these two periods, and one is tempted to believe that it was conceived in the spirit of his earlier days and carried out in that of his best years. Had Cæsar been born into an era like that of the Punic war, when the struggle for the state's very life fostered ideals of patriotism, when the welfare of the nation became man's chief interest by very inheritance, his wide sympathies, his clear vision, and his scientific efficiency would have placed him at once in the front ranks of constructive statesmen. He would then have been spared the years wasted in currying favor with the voters, and we should now know by what standard to judge his proconsular schemes. As it is, his efficiency and foresight are not questioned, but of his purposes we cannot be sure, for he, like his fellows, must have been tempted at this time pregnant with monarchy to think and act in terms of self. Men of force become individualists of necessity at such times.

Mommsen,² in a strong protest against Drumann's³ cynical estimate of Cæsar's purpose, affirms "that it is an outrage upon the spirit dominant in history to regard Gaul solely as the parade ground on which Cæsar exercised himself and his legions for the impending civil war." To be sure, Drumann's view is not tenable, but, on the other hand, Mommsen's Hegelianism fails to take into account the human foibles and weaknesses apparent in Cæsar's early career. Cæsar must have seen that the empire had already outgrown the state's capacity to govern well, that inner reforms were needed far more than new burdens of government. For undertaking the addition of Gaul to Rome at such a time he must be convicted of indifference about con-

sequences to his state or of an overweening ambition to live out his own career. In either case, the conquest of Gaul must be viewed as incidental to Cæsar's ambition.

The fact is patent to any one who reviews Cæsar's career up to this point. His career is that of a man whose political ideals were molded by the revolutionary spirit of Sullan days, days when individual ambitions displaced principles as the mainspring of party activities. The best that Sallust,⁴ his partisan and apologist, could — or at least did — say for him was that he sought office and power and the command of armies that he might thereby gain distinction. One might suspect that Sallust lacked the capacity to grasp the finer qualities in the great man's character, were it not for the fact that he shows himself able to appreciate the rigid disinterestedness of Cato and the sincere patriotism of Cicero. In accepting the judgment of this friend of Cæsar we cannot be charged with unfairness. Sallust's estimate certainly provides the most consistent explanation of Cæsar's course of action up to the time of his consulship. His prodigality with borrowed money during his ædileship reveals how early he was aiming at the popularity that would bring office. His support of the Manilian law in 67, we are plausibly told by a writer who closely follows Livy,⁵ was based upon a desire to create a precedent which he himself might use when the appropriate time should come. His close association in 65 with the lawless element surrounding Autronius and Sulla, his endeavor, in the same year, to have himself appointed commissioner to annex Egypt, and his long-continued support of Catiline, reveal him as a reckless and unscrupulous demagogue during the earlier part of his career. Perhaps the most significant act of this period is his attempt to force through the Rullan bill⁶ in 63. That bold measure proposed to give a board of ten men (and practically, of course, the leader of the ten) the power during five years to carry on unlimited colonization. In order to accomplish this purpose they were to have the disposal of all property throughout the empire which had accrued to the state since the year 89. Judicial power was to be

granted them to decide what constituted public land, as well as a sufficient army to enforce their decisions. Cicero submitted the bill to a thorough analysis and came to the apparently well-founded conclusion that its real purpose was to permit Cæsar to declare Egypt a Roman domain, to muster an army with which to seize it, and to assume and dispose of Pompey's recent acquisitions. In a word, Cæsar hoped by this bill to become the arbiter of Pompey's conquests and to place himself at the head of an army in Egypt, whereby he would be equal in power to Pompey. Thus the bill, which on the surface appeared to be only a popular renewal of the Gracchan land commission, in reality harbored one of the most dangerous of revolutionary measures. Thanks to the persistent warnings of Cicero, its real meaning was revealed, and it had to be withdrawn.

As proprætor in Spain in 61, Cæsar, though he proved that he could sympathize with the best interests of the provincials, did not fail to create a war by which to gain military experience and a claim to military honors. His consulship in 59 reveals very little statesmanship. He spent the year mainly in paying his political debts to his fellow triumvirs, Pompey and Crassus, who had helped him to office, and in paving the way for his own future progress. Perhaps his legislation during the year was no worse than that of other recent consuls, but his methods of procedure were subversive of all constitutional safeguards. That he insulted the senate was to be expected of a consistent democrat: the Hortensian and Gracchan constitutions intended to dispense with that body in general legislation in any case. That he took no notice of his colleague's augural vetoes showed that he had the courage to lop off obsolete obstructional machinery. That he disregarded a tribune's opposition only revealed his acceptance of the theory originated by Tiberius Gracchus and established by Gabinius that the populace had the right to "recall" any tribune who undertook to veto a measure desired by the sovereign people. But when he turned his back upon all constitutional checks and appealed for support to the armed force of private citizens⁷

in order to carry out his program, he clearly showed that he considered his own career paramount to law and constitution. The time was to come when Cæsar would prove himself more than an unequaled politician and a military genius; when, in fact, he would reveal himself as a statesman of unparalleled insight, sympathy, and effectiveness. But that was only after he had worked his way out of the slough of partisan politics into a sphere of sole responsibility. He was a man who towered above his work when he could face it squarely and alone. But prior to his proconsulship he rarely exhibited either the power or the will to labor for anything but his own aggrandizement. Up to that time Sallust's characterization does him full, and perhaps overfull, justice: *magna imperia, exercitus, bellum novum exoptabat ubi virtus enitescere posset*.

Such was the man who in 59 demanded and secured for himself an extraordinary command of five years over the two Gauls⁸ and Illyricum. The large field of activity at the head of Italy would furnish his legions a training ground and enable him to become the predominant force at Rome if he chose. How inclusive his conscious ambitions were at this moment we do not know, but his course of action from his ædileship to his proconsulship, and the fact that in the revolutionary epoch in which he lived the desire "to gain distinction" must express itself in terms of a strong army warrant the assertion that the conquest of Gaul represents an incident in the history of Cæsar's personal ambition rather than an expansionistic movement emanating from Rome.

The situation⁹ in Gaul which Cæsar well knew would offer a desirable pretext for conquest was as follows. Beyond the Transalpine province that for 60 years had included a strip along the Mediterranean coast and the eastern bank of the Rhone as far as Lake Geneva, the Gallic tribes were in a turmoil because of the pressure of the Germans then crossing the Rhine. These Germans had first come at the bidding of the Sequani and Arverni and had recently, under their king, Ariovistus, subdued the Ædui, a large tribe

which had been recognized as an *amicus* by Rome during the wars of the previous century. Other Germans were pressing upon the Helvetians living around Lake Geneva and had made them so uncomfortable that they had decided to seek new homes farther west. Since it was a clan of these very Helvetians which had defeated a Roman proconsul during the Cimbric migration in 107, the report of the new movement in 60 caused such concern at Rome¹⁰ that a levy without exemptions was ordered throughout Italy. Then matters quieted down for a while, probably because of the death of the Helvetian prince, Orgetorix. However, the Romans soon learned that the tribe still entertained their plan of migrating, and Cæsar, who was now consul, doubtless sent scouts to keep him informed regarding the tribe's movements. It is a significant fact that during Cæsar's consulship Rome formally recognized¹¹ Ariovistus as a "friend." That Rome should have recognized as a friend the prince who was oppressing her other "friends," the Ædui, would seem to indicate that Cæsar was promoting complications in Gaul in order to pave the way for Roman intervention at the appropriate moment.

As surely as Cæsar observed these Gallic movements with care, so surely did he propose to become the Marius who would check the migrating Gauls. He refused to accept the province over "highways and pastures" that the senate assigned to his proconsulship. He asked the assembly to override this assignment of the senate, and give him Gaul for a term of five years, — which they promptly did. His determination to have a free hand with the Gauls shows itself particularly in the very unusual clause of this bill which gave him the province even during the remainder of his consulship. Obviously Cæsar intended to prevent the senate from sending an interloper for a few months who might pacify the tribes and avert the possibility of interference before his own term should commence. This provision betrays a very serious conception of the task that Cæsar thought Gaul might offer, and indicates that he was measuring all the possibilities involved and reckoning those possi-

bilities on a very liberal scale. In view of his extraordinary measures for securing the Gallic province, of his habit of laying his plans with the greatest care, and of his purpose, held for years, to outstrip Pompey, whose chief glory lay in his far-reaching conquests, it is highly probable that Cæsar had planned the conquest of Gaul before he ever set out from Rome.

It would be ungenerous not to add that his commentaries reveal a sane appreciation of the country. The fact that Gaul, unlike the Eastern kingdoms, had no rich cities to plunder might make it seem contemptible to some, but Cæsar had better judgment. He perceived from the first that the Gaul would make a good soldier,¹² and he had reason to know that Italy could no longer raise the legions it had in former days. On his way to Spain he had noted the richness of the soil of Gaul, as frequent references in the commentaries prove. A relative of Marius and a student of his career, he knew that Rome's most dangerous enemy was sure to come from the north. His references to the Cimbri¹³ show what a vivid impression the Marian story had made upon him. Cæsar, in fact, was one of the first to appreciate the barbarian of Europe and rate him above the Oriental. The call of the East never possessed the fascination for him that it had for so many Romans. He made the Cisalpine Gauls his friends and, as soon as he became dictator, granted citizenship to the whole province and Latin rights to all the inhabitants of Narbonese Gaul. During his campaigns it mattered little to him whether his trusted helpers were citizens or Gauls; both received equal recognition. It is apparent that his final goal was a Romanized Gaul, a Gaul which should be not merely a source of revenue and a field for commercial exploitation, but rather an integral part of the citizen-state of Rome.

Cæsar's methods in conquering Gaul seem to betray the caution and orderliness of a deep-laid plan. He did not risk his chances for a war by commanding the Helvetians to remain at home, but waiting until the tribe had committed an act of war by trying to force a way into the province,

he followed his moral advantage to the full. Even before receiving any invitation from the Ædui, he ordered all his legions to the front and, without senatorial permission, enrolled two new legions and crossed the frontier to drive the migrants back. When he had disposed of the Helvetians, he penetrated northward on the strength of the *senatus consultum* of 61, which, by its provision that the Gallic governor should protect the Ædui,¹⁴ served as a blank order to proceed against Ariovistus at his own discretion. After the Germans had been driven across the Rhine, he did not withdraw to his province, but quartered his legions for the winter in the territory of the Sequani. This he had the formal right to do, since the sovereignty over the Sequani had, by his victory, passed from Ariovistus to Rome. He probably did not at once assert that he intended to make his conquest permanent, and he may have mollified the inhabitants by assigning as his purpose a desire to stem further German migrations. The actual effect of the act, however, was probably exactly what he wished. The Belgæ drew the plausible conclusion that Cæsar was in Gaul to stay, and they accordingly banded together to drive him out. When one tribe, the Remi, refused to act with the rest and allied itself with Cæsar, it was attacked, and then Cæsar secured a legitimate pretext upon which to advance. As a result of the ensuing victories over the Belgæ, most of the other scattered tribes of the West sent envoys offering to submit to Cæsar's dictation. Thus in an orderly advance of two years, every step of which could be justified by the rules of civilized warfare, practically the whole ¹⁵ of Gaul was brought to acknowledge the sovereignty of Rome. Of course the conquest was not yet complete, but Cæsar had gained the immense moral advantage of having secured the formal submission of the tribes. Henceforth, if any tribe arose against him it stood convicted of "rebellion," and a breach of treaty. Such rebellions inevitably came as soon as the burdens of subjection began to be felt, but Cæsar usually managed to keep the discontented tribes separated in purpose as well as in position until at last the entire country

came to understand the necessity of obedience to the all-conquering power.

The direction and manner of Cæsar's advance also give some interesting clues regarding the scope of his expansionistic designs. There is a certain consistency in the successive campaigns which suggests that he formed the main plan of action early in the first year. It will be remembered that before his second year he had, at his own expense and without legal authority, enrolled four legions, in addition to the four legally provided him. This act, which brought upon him such severe criticism from the senate, and was sure to arouse the jealousy even of Pompey and Crassus, would hardly have been committed had he not already determined upon a vigorous and far-reaching war. It is also significant that he chose his line of aggression along the Rhine, boldly securing the frontier first, and leaving the southern tribes, the Arverni and Aquitani, for a later day. The ordinary adventurer and triumph hunter would have begun near the province and gradually pushed northward. It was not any legal necessity that induced Cæsar to spare the south, for the southernmost tribe, the Arverni, had recently made war on the Ædui, Rome's "brothers," and even the Aquitanians had repeatedly given the Roman proconsuls of Spain severe trouble (*B.G.* III, 20). But he disregarded these tribes wholly at first and created complications¹⁶ along the length of the Rhine. The purport of this maneuver seems to be that Cæsar had determined very early in his term of office to extend Rome's boundaries to the Rhine. We reach the same conclusion if we note his insistent distinction between Gauls and Germans. In the very first book of his commentaries he lays down the rule that Germans should not have any consideration south of the Rhine. He sends the Helvetians back to their home *ne Germani, qui trans Rhenum incolunt . . . in Helvetiorum fines transirent* (I, 28). He refuses to treat with Ariovistus on any other terms except that he surrender his conquests in Gaul, for, *paulatim Germanos consuescere Rhenum transire . . . populo Romano periculosum videbat* (I, 33), and in the

victory over the Germans he pursues them to the Rhine with a harshness that contrasts strikingly with the clemency he usually showed the conquered Gallic tribes. It is noticeable also that the only sale of captives recorded in the campaigns of the first two years is that of the Atuatuca, who were the descendants of the Cimbri (II, 29). The importance that Cæsar attached to the question of boundary is strikingly shown in his relentless, not to say treacherous, treatment of the Usipetes and Tencteri (IV, 6-15). These German tribes entered Gaul in the year 55, at the very northwestern part, which had not yet acknowledged submission to Rome. Cæsar's attack upon them, therefore, could not be justified on the ground of defending Roman possessions. He no sooner heard of their arrival, however, than he bluntly ordered them to withdraw across the river, telling them that there were no lands to be had in Gaul. When they hesitated to obey, Cæsar for once disregarded all the rules of civilized warfare. He lured their chieftains into his camp, and then, while the people were without responsible leaders, attacked them and cut them down. His attempt to gloss¹⁷ over the affair only heightens the impression of treachery, but it also discloses the lengths to which Cæsar would go in a crisis in order to establish the Rhine as the frontier line between Roman and German empire.

Taken all in all, then, the commentaries seem to reveal a plan of campaign, even though the author does not deign to mention it. This plan was apparently formed early in the first year's work, if not — as is more likely — even before Cæsar approached Gaul. In the main it contemplated a rapid conquest of the whole of Gaul up to the river Rhine. The method of procedure was to push boldly through and define the frontier at once, then to conciliate the Gauls so far as possible, gaining their good will and submission by a show of clemency, and by granting power and influence to all who submitted; on the other hand, the Germans were to be driven back with severity, not only for the sake of definitely outlining the frontier, but also in order to furnish terrifying examples to the Gauls in a way that would awaken

the least animosity on their part. When this had been done, Cæsar apparently hoped to secure the accession of the southern tribes without a dangerous struggle.

The work proved more difficult than Cæsar had expected, however, and, after the first two years, he perceived that the remaining two years of his term would not suffice to finish it. He therefore renewed his secret understanding with Pompey and Crassus in order that his term as pro-consul might be extended an additional five years. Thus, although Cæsar entered the work with a view to his own advancement, when once the task lay before him, he measured its full significance in terms of the state's welfare, and determined to bring it to absolute completion.

Cæsar himself was recalled from the task of organizing the new province by the quarrel with the senate that led to the civil war and the monarchy. The temporary regulations which he laid down, however, became the basis for the reorganization of the territory which Augustus made in the year 27 B.C. In these regulations the liberal spirit of the best days of Roman rule is in evidence. Cæsar revealed no tendency to impose the Oriental principle of *dominium in solo provinciali* upon Gaul: so far as we know, not a foot of soil was claimed as Roman public land. The natives were left in possession everywhere, apparently with full rights of ownership. A fixed tribute was imposed upon most, if not all, of the tribes, but this tribute was small — about one and one half million dollars — and seems to have represented the government tax which the natives had formerly paid their rulers. Cæsar, though avowedly the successor of the Gracchi, distinguished himself by rejecting the Gracchan system of taxgathering which Pompey had reimposed in the East at the behest of the *equites*. The Gallic tribes were allowed to collect and pay their own *stipendium* without the interference of greedy Roman middlemen.

Cæsar left the native governments unchanged.¹⁸ The civic units were the tribes (*civitates*), of which there were about sixty. At first he was inclined to favor the aristocratic form of government, a form quite generally prevalent

in Gaul, but later he avoided showing partisanship, and accepted whatever form of government prevailed, whether democratic or monarchical, in order to gain the adherence of the natives without hostility. In fact, Cæsar proved unmistakably by his ordinances in Gaul as well as by his bestowal of citizenship and even high offices of state upon individual Gauls, that he looked upon the new provincials not as subjects to be exploited for the profit of the conqueror, but as possible candidates for full Roman civilization in the near future. His attitude was that of the early Roman statesman towards conquered peoples, an attitude that had long since fallen out of fashion. Even now the state was not ready to grasp the idea, and Augustus was forced by the objections of the conservative element at Rome to reject it. But Cæsar's precedent of liberality bore good fruit later. The emperor Claudius, reverting to Cæsar's policy, freely accorded citizenship to Gauls. Galba, Otho, and Hadrian, each in turn, extended the privilege to new tribes, and in the fourth century Gaul was the soundest and, probably, the most highly civilized portion of the whole empire.

It is one of the many paradoxes of Cæsar's strange career that although he proved himself Rome's most aggressive expansionist while still under the republican constitution, he brought no new acquisitions to the state after he became sole monarch.¹⁹ This fact is of course due wholly to the accident that he was so completely occupied during his short reign with the task of suppressing his opponents and establishing his régime within the state. It is more than probable that if he had reigned a score of years, he would have extended Rome's boundaries to the Euphrates and the Danube, through Egypt and Germany and Britain, in a word, to the limits of the world then known. This supposition may seem overbold in view of the scant literary references to proposed conquests, but the close student of Cæsar's career is inevitably drawn to the conviction that the military monarchy directed by a leader endowed with such irrepressible energy, ability, and ambition could not, and would not, have stopped at less. We have no authentic

statement from Cæsar regarding the nature of his proposed scheme of government or of his foreign policy. But a report ²⁰ arose — whether derived from a knowledge of his character or from some indiscreet betrayal of the secrets of the council chamber — that he intended to declare himself king and establish at least a temporary throne in Alexandria or at Troy, the reputed ancestral home of the Julian family. The advantages to an absolute monarch of an Eastern capital were obvious. At Rome Cæsar could not overcome the ingrained love of liberty which refused to bear the yoke of a king. Alexander the Great, whom he recognized as a kindred spirit, had already demonstrated ²¹ the facility of overriding constitutional forms and European democracy by accepting divine homage from servile Orientals. Alexander had proved that by assuming the position of a demigod, a being in which credulous Asiatics were ready to believe, he could rid himself of the necessity of respecting past treaties and time-honored customs. As divinity he would be exempt from the obligations entailed by human institutions. Cæsar had already invited divine honors at Rome in order to elevate himself above the need of observing constitutional requirements which obstructed his way toward needed reforms. When, however, such honors came grudgingly and only incited the populace to hatred, he saw the obvious advantage of proclaiming his position in the more submissive East, whence the spirit and forms of obedience might in time permeate the West. That these rumors correctly reported Cæsar's intentions may be inferred from the behavior of Antony after Cæsar's death, for this second-rate emulator of Cæsar, who knew more of Cæsar's secret plans than any other man, assumed the position and dignity of an Oriental monarch-god, establishing his court with Cleopatra in Alexandria and even contemplating, it would seem, the maintenance of a second court at Troy. ²²

If this view of Cæsar's projected monarchy is correct, he must be looked upon as a new Alexander, the founder of a military absolutism of the Oriental type which, by its very nature, had to live and justify itself by military success and

world-wide imperialism. It is then not difficult to understand why, in the last year of his life, Cæsar raised the enormous army of sixteen legions for his proposed Parthian campaign, a campaign obviously intended to match Alexander's in extensiveness and brilliancy in the East, and to invite by its very success a recognition of heaven-sanctioned absolutism throughout the Orient and thence ultimately throughout the West. Perhaps he also hoped by means of a brilliant campaign in the East to justify a marriage with Cleopatra, which would in turn secure the annexation of Egypt and the legitimization of the new Julian dynasty whose throne would then remain in Alexandria or Troy until its claims had been accepted by the West. In the light of such intentions we can also accept as well founded the report²³ that Cæsar planned later to push forward the European boundaries of Rome, advancing as far as the Danube in the east and into Germany in the west. It will be remembered that the conqueror of Gaul had shown his unwonted interest in far-distant Germanic and Celtic peoples by twice crossing the Rhine and the Channel during his Gallic campaign.

If we turn from intentions and plans of conquest to the acts of reorganization which a few months' respite from war permitted Cæsar to carry out, we find that all these regulations were formulated in the spirit of a world-ruler rather than that of a Roman patrician. The methods of colonization which he used during his dictatorship differed widely from those which he adopted as consul in settling Pompey's soldiers. Then he had appropriated public lands in Italy after the time-honored fashion; now he chose promising sites throughout the length and breadth of the empire.²⁴ From far-off Pontus to the Atlantic Ocean his colonies extended. Seville and Tarragona in Spain began life at this time, and the farthestmost Greek colonies of Sinope and Heraclea were repopulated. Carthage he rebuilt; Corinth in Greece and Urso in Spain he founded as homes for freedmen of the city. The famous tenth legion was given allotments in Narbonne, the sixth at Arles. Eighty thousand Romans, proletariat from the city as well as Cæsar's sol-

diers, were placed in well-chosen colonies throughout the empire.

The same inference must be drawn from Cæsar's edicts abolishing the Graccho-Pompeian tax system in the East.²⁵ A part of the tribute he commuted, the rest he fixed at a definite amount, giving the cities and districts the privilege of collecting this sum without the intervention of extortionate middlemen. In short, Cæsar determined that the province should no longer be a field of exploitation for favored citizens, but an integral part of his empire: the rights of provincials must be respected, and they themselves must be given every opportunity of gaining even the most favored position in the state whenever they should prove worthy of it.

The meaning of all this can only be that Cæsar was shaping a world-wide territorial state with an absolute monarch at its head, whose edicts should be unquestioned law, whose instrument of rule should be the army, and whose subjects — of whatever race or color — should eventually find fair and equal treatment so long as they were obedient.

Thus the logical conclusion of Rome's long period of expansion was reached in the projected plans of Cæsar. That expansion had sprung from the natural activities of a sound and law-abiding people who had endeavored to extend the domain of law and order as they understood law and order. Their efforts had led to the inclusion within the state of peoples that could not be assimilated in a homogeneous federation, peoples that must, therefore, be held by force of arms. The necessary military force which depended for its efficiency upon single leadership created the military monarchy, and the monarch, choosing the path of least resistance, tried to legalize his absolutism on the basis of "divine rights," and set out to justify his position by world-conquest. Only the tragedy of the Ides of March postponed the realization of the natural consequences. After Cæsar's death the state reverted for a while to play with the meaningless forms of a republican constitution. But a true Republic was henceforth impossible, and Cæsar's form of empire was bound to come at last.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVII

1. Apparently Cato did not accuse Cæsar of disregarding the *jus gentile* before Cæsar's treachery to the Usipetes in the fourth campaign. Even then it is not probable that Cato found many friends to support his protest.

2. Eng. ed. V, p. 5. However, few would follow the great historian when he adds: "It was a brilliant idea, a grand hope, which led Cæsar over the Alps, the idea and the confident expectation that he should gain there for his fellow burgesses a new boundless home, and regenerate the state a second time by placing it on a broader basis." Such a reformer as little portrays the Cæsar of 59 as the stupid fumbler posited by Ferrero.

3. Er kam um Gallien zu erobern und er eroberte Gallien um das römische Reich zu besitzen, Drumann-Groebe, III, 210. The sane estimate of Heitland, *The Roman Republic*, vol. III, is a good antidote against the exaggerated characterizations of Drumann, Mommsen, and Ferrero.

4. Sall. *Cat.* 54, 4, in a comparison of the characters of Cæsar and Cato: *magna imperia, exercitus, bellum novum exoptabat ubi virtus enitescere posset*. The whole passage deserves study. Cicero, in *de prov. cons.* 32 ff., gives a more favorable view of Cæsar's designs, but he is there justifying his own recantation. The various estimates of Cassius Dio, Plutarch, and Appian come originally from prejudiced sources and are colored in addition by rhetorical purposes and vitiated by a lack of insight into Roman conditions. They can hardly be taken into account. Suetonius' own judgment of character is seldom worth repeating.

5. Cassius Dio (XXXVI, 43) is here generally following Livy: see Schwartz in Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v. Cassius*. However, we cannot be sure that he is giving Livy's view.

6. Cic. *leg. agr.* I, 6; I, 22; II, 23; II, 65, refer unmistakably to Cæsar and Crassus.

7. Plut. *Cæs.* 14; *Pomp.* 47; Cassius Dio, XXXVIII, 4.

8. Ferrero suggests that Metellus Celer, who was proconsul of Cisalpine Gaul, probably died early in the year and that Cæsar accordingly had the plebiscite passed at once giving him that province for five years. Cæsar doubtless felt that any danger threatening Italy from a migration of Gauls would justify his marching northward, even if he did not as yet have command of Narbonese Gaul. The two provinces were usually governed by the same man. The senate presently gave him the Narbonese province also, since it was not assigned for the year 58 and since Cæsar would doubtless ask the people for it as soon as the place became vacant (Suet. *Jul.* 22). It is significant that Cæsar included Illyricum in his demands, which, although not a province, might

serve as a field for expansion. Some fears must have been entertained regarding the peace of that region, for the three Cisalpine legions were stationed at Aquileia (*B. G.* I, 10). Note also that at the end of the second year of office, when practically the whole of Gaul had formally submitted to Cæsar, he made a tour through Illyricum (II, 35). Was he looking for new worlds to conquer in case Gaul should cause no further trouble?

9. T. Rice Holmes, *Conquest of Gaul*, 2d ed.; Sihler, *The Annals of Cæsar*; Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, III.

10. Cic. *ad Att.* I, 19 (March 15, 60 B.C.). Haedui fratres nostri pugnam nuper malam pugnarunt et (Helvetii) sine dubio sunt in armis excursionesque in provinciam faciunt. Senatus decrevit ut . . . dilectus haberetur, vacationes ne valerent, legati cum auctoritate mitterentur qui adirent Galliae civitates darentque operam ne eae se cum Helvetiis conjungerent. What was feared was a new invasion like that of the Cimbri and Teutoni. See also *ad Att.* I, 20, and Cæs. *Bell. Gall.* I, 4.

11. Cæs. *B. G.* I, 35, in consolato suo rex atque amicus a senatu appellatus esset, and I, 43, 4-6.

12. The Gallic legion, the Alauda, seems to have been the first legion consisting of provincials to receive the same standing as any citizen legion.

13. *B. G.* I, 33, 40; II, 4, 29; VII, 77.

14. Senatus censuisset uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtineret . . . Aeduos ceterosque amicos p. R. defenderet; *B. G.* I, 35.

15. Only the far northwest and some southern tribes were still independent. He apparently hoped that the latter would soon submit when they saw themselves completely closed in. Ferrero even holds that Cæsar organized Gaul into a new province at the end of the second year, but there is no definite proof of this.

16. Cæsar did not advance against Ariovistus because of the request of the Gauls. He does not tell us that the Gauls who requested his interference were official representatives of their various states. They came as individuals and probably at his invitation; *B. G.* I, 30-32. The first official invitation came from the Ædui after Cæsar had decided to act; I, 37. Cæsar, however, is careful to mention that he had the right to advance upon the basis of a *senatus consultum* (I, 35). Cæsar also had a right to station his legions among the Sequani for the winter, since the lands which Ariovistus had seized there fell by right of war to Rome. Jullian, *Histoire de la Gaule*, III, 243, seems to overlook this point when he says: Ce fut . . . le plus grand scandale de sa politique gauloise.

17. Cæsar felt called upon to give some kind of excuse to men like Cato. Of course, his pretext that the enemy's cavalry was treacherous is wholly inadequate. He takes so little trouble to conceal the real

fact as to admit that the chieftains came to him at his own request (IV, 11, 5). Apparently his conscience did not trouble him much. He doubtless excused the act to himself on the ground of necessity. He was in the extreme end of Gaul with an enemy outnumbering his army three to one, and surrounded by disaffected tribes. Cato would have played fair, but Cæsar was not Cato.

18. Cæsar shifted his policy during the war for the sake of gaining the good will of the Gallic populace. At first he dealt through the nobles, who generally represented the pro-Roman factions here as elsewhere. Later, he showed himself eager to make friends with the chieftains and kings, who represented the populace and the nationalistic party. He wished, of course, to gain the support of the controlling element.

19. Juba, the king of Numidia, was removed from office for aiding Pompey, and his kingdom was formally annexed to Rome, but Numidia had long been wholly a dependency of Rome.

In view of the fact that Cæsar had twice before his consulship attempted to annex Egypt, it is strange that he did not annex it in 47, when it lay in his power. Its governmental revenues were very large, since the whole kingdom was crown-land. Had Cleopatra been less seductive, Cæsar doubtless would have remained a consistent imperialist in 47.

20. Nicolaus of Damascus, 20, and Suetonius, *Julius*, 79. Both are well-informed writers and draw upon contemporaneous sources. See also Horace, *Ode*, III, 3.

21. A fact first brought out by Eduard Meyer, see *Kleine Schriften*, p. 283. He too first attributed the same policy to Cæsar; *ibid.*, p. 331, n. 2; and p. 468. Ferguson, *Legalized Absolutism*, etc., in *Am. Hist. Review*, XVIII, p. 29, has drawn some interesting deductions regarding the effects of this theory upon Roman government. Is Cic. *ad Att.* XV, 4 (*numquam revertisset*) a reference to Cæsar's intention to remain in the East? The context seems to imply as much.

22. Horace, *Ode*, III, 3, if referring to contemporary events, must be read as praising Augustus for overturning Antony's Oriental power.

23. See Drumann-Groebe, III, p. 611, for the numerous references.

24. See Kornemann in Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v. coloniae*, and Reid, *Municipalities of the Roman Empire*.

25. Appian *B. C.* V, 4; Plut. *Cæs.* 48; Cic. *ad Fam.* XV, 15, 2; Ditt. *Syll.*² 347 (a decree of thanks from Ephesus); Josephus, *Antiq.* XIV, 10, 5; Cassius Dio, XLII, 6, 3; Chapot, *La province romaine d'Asie*, p. 329.

CHAPTER XVIII

CONCLUSION

AUGUSTUS, moved by Cæsar's apparent failure to gain recognition of his regal position, and also by dread of the enormous burdens of sole responsibility, refused to accept absolute power. Assuming the position of foremost citizen and of commander of the armies of the frontier, he reinstated the old governmental machinery of the republic over Italy and the pacified provinces, and thus created what Mommsen has well called a dyarchy. This was, to be sure, not a restoration of the ancestral constitution, as Augustus chose to assume, but it made possible and, in fact, encouraged the pursuit of a foreign policy which resembled that of the conservative senate rather than that of Cæsar. The emperor indeed consulted the senate freely regarding foreign affairs and often adopted the practices of the old aristocracy¹ if only for the sake of gaining the senate's adherence and good will. Senatorial influence, as in days past, told strongly in favor of peace, especially since the aristocracy could no longer hope for a share in the military glories following a progressive program.

Opposed to this conservatism there seems to have existed a more or less strong demand on the part of the populace for spectacular deeds and aggressive wars, — if we may believe Horace² and his poet friends. We need not go so far as to suppose that in the ode *Cælo tonantem* Horace acted as the spokesman of the jingoes in goading the reluctant emperor into a militaristic policy,³ nor, on the other hand, that in *Justum et tenacem* he attempted to explain to the populace why their chief had forsaken Cæsar's program⁴ in favor of the senate's. The former course Horace would hardly have had the presumption to follow; the latter he could scarcely have undertaken while so far removed from

the secret councils of the state. However, his glowing prophecies of imminent conquests in Britain and Persia, of promised triumphs over the Medes, Indians, and Chinese, surely mirror a popular expectation of his day that Augustus, like Cæsar and Alexander, would naturally wish to gain military glory.⁵ These expectations did not necessarily emanate from any deep-seated desires. Obviously, the people of the city liked successful foreign wars in a general way. As a rule, they were not levied for service unless they wished, while they always shared in the games and donations after a victory. Yet it would be attributing too much brutality even to the Roman mob to suppose that considerations of this nature could keep it in a state of chauvinism. Perhaps the phrases caught up and passed on by Horace were, in the main, the thoughtless expressions of a hero-worshipping people who had fallen into the habit since Cæsar's day of expecting success in arms. Poets, like the rabble, found military victories easy to estimate and praise. In his public utterances ⁶ Augustus accepted the popular point of view and freely enlarged upon the list of his victories. He was always careful, however, to insist that he had never been the aggressor — *nulli genti bello per iniuriam inlato*.

We cannot now tell whether this general militarism of the populace actually affected the emperor's course in deeds as well as in words. We may well doubt it, for in the very days when the call seemed loudest that he should wipe out the disgrace of Carrhæ and follow up Cæsar's work in Britain, he set himself the far less spectacular tasks of organizing Gaul and subduing the last resistance of Spain. He knew by experience that he was neither a magnetic leader of men nor a brilliant strategist. He realized that wars of conquest which would have cost the incomparable Cæsar few men and little time would, under his generalship, require resources quite beyond his command. So he disregarded Britain entirely and postponed the Parthian affair to await the effects of secret diplomacy.

He even had the courage to "haul down the flag" in Nu-

midia in order to save the expense of occupation. This kingdom Cæsar had annexed to the province of Africa because its king had supported Pompey, but after Actium, Augustus restored the deposed king's son, the learned Juba. A few years later, however, Augustus changed his mind, transferred Juba to Mauretania, which had recently lost its king, and placed Numidia under a Roman governor again.⁷ Doubtless the cession to Juba had displeased the people and called forth criticism, for the Romans from time immemorial considered territory once subjected to the domain of the *Senatus populusque Romanus* inalienable. Nevertheless, the incident is significant of Augustus' indifference to any program of aggrandizement.

The boundaries of the empire, however, were pushed forward in three directions during Augustus' reign. Egypt was annexed, and an effort was made to establish the Danube as the frontier line on the northeast, and the Elbe in the northwest. The annexation of Egypt was not only desirable, but had come to be an absolute necessity, since Antony had proved how easily it could be made the base of supplies for any ambitious Roman who chose to raise up an independent monarchy in the East. Accordingly, when Antony and Cleopatra had been defeated at Actium the whole state entertained the conviction that annexation was an immediate political necessity. Thus the last of Rome's possible rivals fell.

Egypt was so peculiarly conditioned that it could not readily be converted into an ordinary province. Its whole territory, unlike that of any other state, constituted a royal domain,⁸ from which its kings collected, not taxes, but actual rents. This circumstance was due, of course, to the dependency of the populace upon a consistent plan of utilizing the Nile, and as the government alone could maintain the requisite system of canals and dams, a kind of feudal system had arisen with the king as national landlord. Obviously such a system could not be changed in a day. A single responsible head must be the successor of the Egyptian king, and that place Augustus naturally assumed. Hence-

forth all Egyptian rents and other revenues flowed directly into the imperial treasury, and Augustus exercised his right as overlord to forbid the entrance of any senator into Egypt without special permission, so serious did he consider the political dangers that might arise from an unfriendly influence there. The effects of this occupation were far-reaching. The system of serfdom existing in Egypt could not readily be abandoned, and it was not modified to any great extent. Its adoption furnished a precedent for later emperors, who used it at least in the management of other imperial estates. Egypt, then, furnishes the chief, though not the only, link between the feudal system of the ancient Orient and that of medieval Europe.

The advance of Roman arms as far as the Danube was also a political necessity. An intermittent border warfare had been kept up on the frontier of Illyricum for two centuries, and Cæsar had planned to bring it to an end by pacifying the whole Balkan peninsula. Even before Actium, Augustus had invaded Dalmatia in person, apparently for the sake of clearing the roads to Greece before opening the struggle with Antony. Later he met the barbaric raids by a series of attacks which finally brought the *pax Romana* to the banks of the Danube. In this territory Augustus formed the new provinces of Pannonia and Moesia,⁹ and welded together the several Thracian tribes there into a client state which he held responsible for the peace of what was until recently the main part of European Turkey. Similarly, the Alpine tribes of the modern Engadine and Tyrol were met by Drusus in a dashing raid over the Brenner Pass, and attacked in the rear by Tiberius, who marched through upper Switzerland from the Rhone. The new provinces¹⁰ of Noricum and Rætia were added to the empire as a result. The "Romansch," still spoken by the people near St. Moritz, and the "Ladin," heard to-day in the country of the Dolomites, hark back to the language introduced by these conquerors.

The acquisition of Egypt and the Danube frontier followed wars which neither Augustus nor the senate considered wars

of aggression and which, in fact, might be justified on the ground that the frontier could not otherwise have had peace. The provocation for war on the Rhine frontier was equally strong, but here Augustus drove much farther than was necessary, actually adopting Cæsar's policy of conquest for a brief period. The Transrenane Germans had made frequent efforts to cross into Gaul, and in the year 16 B.C. they thoroughly routed the Roman army of occupation. When, therefore, they returned to the attack four years later, Augustus thought it time to reciprocate.¹¹ The reports that have survived of the remarkable campaigns conducted by his step-son Drusus are so meager that we cannot now say whether Augustus gave orders for the complete subjugation of the whole of Germany as far as the Elbe, or whether it was the early success of his general that encouraged the emperor to enlarge his plans and go farther than was at first contemplated. The fact that Drusus began with the elaborate task of building a fleet and cutting a canal for it from the Rhine to the Zuyder Zee would indicate that serious measures were planned from the first. It implies that troops were to be sent by ship to the mouths of the rivers Ems, Weser, and perhaps the Elbe, thence advancing up the rivers to coöperate with the main army which was to strike directly inland. This supposition is borne out by the fact that during his second year's campaign (11 B.C.) Drusus safeguarded his conquests by a series of strong forts which he connected by a military road with the Rhine headquarters. In the fourth campaign Drusus pushed as far as the Elbe, but he succumbed to a fatal accident that same year, and after his death Augustus showed no inclination to carry on an aggressive war, though he permitted Tiberius to hold as much of the country as had been well pacified.¹² However, some ten years later (about 4 A.D.), when Tiberius had been definitely designated as Augustus' successor, he was sent to Germany to complete the work of Drusus. In his second campaign he secured the apparent submission of all the country up to the Elbe, and in the next year set out to subject the last remaining¹³ German tribe

of importance, the Marcomanni, living in the country now called Bohemia. However, a widespread revolt south of the Danube called him back, and, before this was fully suppressed, the German tribes united and destroyed the Roman army of occupation in the Teutoburg forest. Augustus then confessed his error in having yielded to militaristic ambitions, and for the future adopted the Rhine as the frontier line. There the boundary remained throughout the empire except for some minor changes along the upper course of the river.

Of far greater importance to the life of the empire than the occasional extensions of its limits was the orderly government now given it.¹⁴ The provinces especially profited by the responsible rule inaugurated¹⁵ by Augustus. With the *pax Romana* ended not only the ravages of civil war, and the irresponsible exactions of partisan leaders, but also the extortions of taxgatherers and of conniving governors, and the petty pilfering of the prætor's staff. Henceforth the governors of Augustus' provinces had to render strict account of their stewardship to a watchful and jealous master, who had the welfare both of the provincials and of the exchequer constantly in mind. He gave stated and liberal salaries to his procurators and præfects so that he could abolish the mischievous fee system, and rewarded honest and able agents by long terms of office and promotion in the civil service. He also continued Cæsar's policy of fixing the amount of the provincial tribute so that the operations of the publicans would be limited to the collection of only the poll and port dues. Needless to say, the senate hardly dared disregard the example set by the emperor. It gradually adopted his reforms in the provinces under its supervision, and if at any time it was inclined to connive at abuses, the prince, as master of morals, was ready to call attention to them. This wise reform of the civil service and the peaceful organization of the outer line of provinces established an imperial system which could not be wholly wrecked, even by the maddest and most tyrannous of his successors. Even rulers like Caligula and Nero usually realized the personal advantage of having conscientious provincial governors who

labored for peace and an honest collection of revenues. It is not a mere accident that men like Vespasian, Corbulo, Virginius Rufus, Nerva, Agricola, Tacitus, and Pliny were advanced in the civil service by the very worst emperors.

True to his deep conviction that Rome could not bear a heavier burden of occupation than she now had, Augustus urged in his last message to the senate that no further efforts at expansion be made.¹⁶ His successor, Tiberius, who knew the state of the frontier even better than Augustus, perceived the wisdom of the advice, and, brilliant soldier though he was, heartily subscribed to the pacific course. Accordingly, when the enthusiastic and ambitious Germanicus burned to repeat the career of his father Drusus in Germany, Tiberius permitted him to advance only far enough to wipe out the Teutoburg disgrace. Then he called the young general back and sent him to a peaceful province. The Emperor Claudius, who, in lieu of policies of his own, studied how to carry out the suggestions of the great Julius, borrowed from him the idea of subjugating Britain. His campaign lasted only eighteen days, however, and he accomplished nothing except to reintroduce the legions into the island. Under succeeding emperors the conquest was advanced until the larger part of Britain became a province.

Vespasian, who came into power after the civil wars which followed the tyranny of Nero, was one of the best generals of the empire, but he was also a wise administrator, and realized that his first duty was to reestablish a sane civil government. For this he needed revenue, and the one advance of boundaries that he permitted bears the characteristic stamp of his indomitable taxgathering. In southern Baden, between the falls of the Rhine and the River Neckar, there lay a rich but thinly settled district which he incorporated in the empire. A large part of this he apparently settled with farmers, who were required to pay a rent to the state. Then he built roads through it to the frontier towns at Strassburg and Windisch.¹⁷ His son, Domitian, followed Vespasian's policy so far as to add to the district a portion of the valley of the Main and the ore-bearing Taunus ridge

beyond, protecting these new possessions with a line of forts. Thus originated the idea of connecting the Rhine with the Danube by means of the frontier line of barricades, a line which has been so carefully traced by recent excavators. In another venture, a campaign against the Dacians beyond the Danube, Domitian was less successful. In fact, he was compelled to give up the contest and promise the barbarian king an annual "present" as the price of peace. After the emperor's death, men made free to call it a tribute.

This disgrace to Roman arms was removed, however, by Trajan, who punished the Dacians severely. He drove out or destroyed a large number of them, resettling their land with veterans and with colonists drawn from the Orient.¹⁸ Trajan, of course, broke completely with the cautious advice of Augustus by this act, for the new province projected into open and indefensible country, but in the East he went even farther: there his successes over the invading Parthians seem to have awakened in him the ambition to outdo Alexander. He shaped Arabia into a province in 106; a few years later, he drove the Parthians from Armenia, which they had taken, and annexed this also as a province, thus reducing Parthia to the position of a client kingdom. Advancing still farther, he created a province even in the far-distant Mesopotamian valley. His conquests reached to the Persian Gulf, and, if we may believe his biographers, he intended to march upon India.

But Trajan was the last of a long line of conquerors. Hadrian,¹⁹ his successor, though a man of no mean military talent, measured the needs of the empire more wisely, and abandoned, in the face of severe criticism, all the territory that had been annexed beyond the Euphrates. Even Armenia he gave back to a client prince. He had ideas of his own for the empire, which he translated into deeds by raising the famous wall of northern England and the barricades with which he connected the line of forts in southern Germany, extending from the Rhine beyond Coblenz to the Danube near Regensburg. His method of fortifying and walling the weak spots of the frontier was henceforth em-

bodied in the regular policy of the empire. Thus the long history of Roman expansion, which had, from the beginning, rested upon defensive rather than aggressive tactics, ended in a policy of seclusion and self-defense.

The end was not wholly out of character. At the dawn of history the Latin tribe appeared — unambitious, peaceful, home-staying men, characterized above all by a singular respect for orderly procedure. The early expansion of Rome within the tribe resulted chiefly from the gradual absorption of villages whose inhabitants sought the fortified city for safety, and perhaps, too, for a more congenial life. But such expansion brought the rising power into contact with many tribes and cities under conditions which occasionally involved disputes and armed contests. A dogged persistence, a demand for thoroughness, a willingness to submit to galling discipline, a refusal to bear the disgrace of defeat — Roman education emphasized *gloria* as the supreme prize — these qualities developed a military machine which secured a large proportion of victories for Rome whenever intertribal disputes arose. After the victories were won, the efficiency of Rome's political organization, her reputation for fair dealing, and her liberal treatment of conquered foes and allies gained for her a widespread respect that invited accretions to her federation and proportionally weakened the cohesive force of her enemies.

With the emergence of popular sovereignty in the early third century, a mild form of imperialism came into evidence: popular leaders began to dwell upon the advantages of empire and the glories of great power, inducing the populace, against the advice of the more sober senate, to accept the entangling alliances offered by Thurii and Messana. The new impulse, however, died out in the sufferings of the ensuing wars — but not until it had secured Rome a foreign empire in Sicily which she was obliged to rule as a thing extraneous to the federation, and which, before long, entailed the harrying war of vengeance directed by Hannibal. That war, fought out with the characteristic obstinacy that re-

fused to admit defeat, brought more empire beyond the sea, and raised Rome to the position of a strong world-power whose interests in every question of Mediterranean politics were manifest.

The liberal-minded men of the state accepted the new burdens, but accepted them in the generous spirit of a new diplomacy, which met with little favor among the more practical-minded men of Rome. The influence which Rome's victories had established over the East under the Scipionic régime invited interference for the sake of material gains under the more prosaic senate of Cato's day: for it was patent to all that Rome could now rule the Mediterranean world to her own advantage, if she chose. Choosing to rule, the senate removed Carthage and Corinth, the last barriers in the way of complete supremacy; and now, rid of the healthy criticism of rivals, no longer egged on by competition, the monopolistic state succumbed to a stagnating satisfaction with itself and its half-complete ideals of government. It gradually acquiesced in a policy of holding its own and drawing in the parasitic profits from its possessions. The classes within the state aligned themselves on new programs of division of spoils and profit-bringing power. Under Marius the discovery was made that that power lay in the army, upon which the life of the empire depended, and, accordingly, an era of civil wars ensued, in which the party leaders fought for long and extensive commands. Sulla employed his victory to gain ascendancy and the consequent benefits of honor and office for the aristocratic party. Pompey threw the advantages of empire to the commercial classes which had supported him. Cæsar used his control over the democratic vote to win the command of the army for himself, and, eventually, by its aid, he established an absolute monarchy which was intended to embrace a world empire under a Julian dynasty. Despite the sacred rules that forbade aggression, despite the republican constitution that compelled the ruling populace to assume the burdens and sufferings entailed by their decisions to expand, despite the obstruction of the aristocracy, whose self-inter-

ests manifestly urged a policy of domesticity, the free Roman people stumbled on falteringly and unwittingly into ever increasing dominion, until finally the overgrown empire imposed a burden of rule upon the conquerors that leveled the whole state to a condition of servitude.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVIII

1. In his *Res Gestae*, c. 27, Augustus says of Armenia: Cum possem facere provinciam, malui maiorum nostrorum exemplo regnum id Tigrani . . . tradere.
2. Hor. *Carm.* I, 2, end; 12, end; III, 5 et al.; Propertius in his fourth book, and Ovid everywhere.
3. Ferrero, Vol. IV, p. 149.
4. See E. Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, p. 472.
5. One must remember that even Cicero was ready to admit that the chief recommendation to fame was derived from military deeds; *de Off.* II, 45; *ad Fam.* XV, 4.
6. See *Res Gestae*, 26-8.
7. Cassius Dio, LIII, 26, 5; Tac. *Ann.* IV, 5.
8. Rostowzew, *Gesch. Röm. Kolonates*, p. 85 ff.
9. See Stout, *Prov. Governors of Moesia*.
10. See Peaks, *Prov. Governors of Raetia and Noricum*.
11. Velleius Paterculus, II, 97, so explains the war, and I see no reason for doubting him.
12. Vell. Pat., who is somewhat inclined to overstate the merits of Tiberius, says of him (II, 97) *in formam paene stipendiariae redigeret provinciae*.
13. See Vell. Pat. II, 109, who also reveals the fact that the Marcomanni were to be attacked, not because of any mischief done, but simply because they were growing into a strong state.
14. See the just estimates of Augustus' work in Reid, *Municipalities of the Roman Empire*; see Hirschfeld, *Die kaiserl. Verwaltungsbeamten*², on the imperial civil service.
15. The provinces freely acknowledged a preference for the monarchy; Tac. *Ann.* I, 2.
16. Tac. *Ann.* I, 11, addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii; cf. I, 9, where Tacitus holds that Augustus had only sought for natural boundaries in his wars.
17. Pelham, *The Roman Frontier in Germany* (p. 179 of his *Essays*), and the monumental publication of Sarweg and Hettner, *Der obergermanische und rhät. Limes des Römerreichs*.
18. Peterson, *Trajan's dakische Kriege*.
19. Schulz, *Leben des Kaisers Hadrian*, and Kornemann, *Hadrian*.

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